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Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations and Maintenance Guideline Inputs and Technical Evaluation Report: Maintenance - Volume 3

Final Report

Prepared for
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation
AST-200 Licensing and Safety Division
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Washington, DC 20591

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Reusable Launch Vehicle Operations and Maintenance Guideline Inputs and
Technical Evaluation Report:
Maintenance - Volume 3

Final Report

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents	i
List of Figures	ii
List of Tables	ii
Executive Summary	iii
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Purpose.....	1
1.2 Background.....	1
1.3 Scope.....	3
1.4 Relationship to RLV Licensing.....	4
1.5 Subsystem and Functional Context.....	5
2.0 Maintenance Decomposition	8
3.0 General Maintenance Guideline Recommendations	10
4.0 Perform General Maintenance	18
4.1 General Discussion.....	20
4.2 Guideline Input Considerations.....	25
4.3 Guideline Recommendations.....	27
5.0 Perform Unscheduled Maintenance	47
5.1 General Discussion.....	47
5.2 Guideline Input Considerations.....	48
5.3 Guideline Recommendations.....	49
6.0 Perform Scheduled Maintenance	53
6.1 General Discussion.....	53
6.2 Guideline Input Considerations.....	55
6.3 Guideline Recommendations.....	57
Appendix A: Acronyms/Terminology	63
Appendix B: RLV Guideline Input Suggestion Form	73
Appendix C: Traceability of Maintenance Function Decomposition	75
Endnotes	79

List of Figures

Figure 1 RLV Context Diagram	5
Figure 2 RLV O&M Context	6
Figure 3 Guidance Document Process	7
Figure 4 Maintenance Functional Decomposition.....	8
Figure 5 Current Maintenance Functional Decomposition	75
Figure 6 Previous Maintenance Functional Decomposition	76

List of Tables

Table 1 Perform General Maintenance Definitions	18
Table 2 Perform Unscheduled Maintenance Definitions	47
Table 3 Perform Scheduled Maintenance Definitions	53
Table 4 Maintain System Sub-Function Traceability	77

Executive Summary

Development of commercial Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) continues to be of great interest to many private companies. The appeal rests in an RLV's ability to support multiple mission types (e.g., cargo and "tourism") and amortize development costs over the life of the operational vehicle. Commercial RLV companies plan to use both existing and new technologies in the design/development of a launch system. RLV Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of new launch systems have the potential to affect public safety; therefore, the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) is in the process of developing preliminary guidelines for RLV O&M activities. These guidelines may be used to evaluate an RLV developer/operator's license application.

This Guideline Input and Technical Evaluation Report is intended to capture an initial set of Guideline Inputs (GIs) and Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) specific to the various functions associated with RLV maintenance, for any RLV concept, large or small, orbital or suborbital. This volume is the third of five such volumes; the first volume addressed RLV Subsystems; the second, RLV Operations; and the remaining 2 volumes address RLV O&M Training and Approval functions.

A total of three functions within the maintenance domain have been identified for development of maintenance guideline inputs. Each of these functions relate to a unique set of sub-functions for the maintenance of the RLV. The focus and intent of this task, Delivery Task (0002), has been to capture those tasks with potential public safety risks that should be considered relative to RLV maintenance. In order to ensure these guidelines have been considered, RTI proposes that a series of manuals be required as part of an RLV developer's final license application: Operations, Maintenance, Training, and Approval. These manuals would speak to the current requirements contained in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for RLV Mission License Rule (14 CFR Part 431) and would also allow an RLV developer/operator to specify how they intend to address FAA/AST O&M Guidelines. In this way, the RLV developer/operator has the ability to stipulate which of these guidelines are relevant to their vehicle design and ensures that public safety considerations associated with RLV maintenance tasks, such as those in this volume, have been fully addressed.

In summary, the Guideline Inputs in this volume, and in the other four Guideline Input volumes, are intended to contribute to a common set of criteria by which the FAA and the RLV industry can assess public safety aspects of RLV O&M processes. As the industry matures, it is expected that additional guidelines will be developed; consequently, these Guideline Input volumes are considered to be living documents that will evolve as the RLV industry evolves.

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1.0 Introduction

Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) will require guidelines and regulatory language to be developed for new approaches in both Operations and Maintenance (O&M). These approaches may have a direct effect on public safety where RLVs are being operated and maintained. This Guideline Input and Technical Evaluation Report is intended to capture an initial set of Guideline Inputs (GIs) and Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) ordered around the various functions associated with RLV maintenance, for any RLV concept, large or small, orbital or suborbital. This volume is the third of five such volumes: the first volume addresses RLV Subsystems; the second, RLV Operations; and the remaining 2 volumes address RLV Training and Approval Functions. The inputs identified in this volume, and in the other four Guideline Input volumes, contribute to a common set of criteria by which the FAA and the RLV industry can assess public safety aspects of RLV O&M processes. As the RLV industry matures, it is expected that additional guidelines will be developed, making these living documents that will evolve as the RLV industry evolves.

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide basic Guideline Inputs/Considerations for RLV maintenance, as well as a top-level introduction of the pertinent RLV maintenance functions. The intent is for these Guideline Inputs/Considerations to be general enough to be applicable for any RLV concept, large or small, orbital or suborbital. In this context, “pertinent” maintenance is considered any activity associated with an RLV’s general/common maintenance tasks, unscheduled maintenance, and scheduled maintenance that has a potential to impact public safety. The functions identified here encompass activities associated with a variety of Concept of Operations (CONOPS) being proposed by the industry.

1.2 Background

These Guideline Inputs are the result of a focused effort by Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST) to facilitate a common understanding between both regulator and industry on what is expected from RLV operators and maintainers in order to ensure public safety. The creation of these Guideline Inputs was prompted by the response to an FAA/AST presentation of an RLV O&M White Paper to the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) in October of 1999¹.

Industry feedback to that paper, along with FAA-directed research activities, led to the initiation of an information-only Rulemaking Project Record (RPR) intended to establish formal rules for RLV O&M. These Guideline Inputs represent an interim step toward a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for RLV O&M and are intended to serve as a means by which those items requiring formalization as a rule can be identified and validated both by the FAA and by industry. However, it should be recognized that an NPRM would only be developed after the RLV industry is sufficiently mature.

RTI used the Systems Functions and Procedural Items identified during previous FAA tasking² as a starting point. It was determined that a general model was needed to place the Systems Functions and Procedural Items in context. These have been further developed in a subsequent tasking and now in this Order. A context diagram, Figure 1 in Section 1.5, was developed to provide this contextual framework, as well as provide a means of marrying the O&M top-down analysis, being completed by RTI, with the bottom-up analysis, being accomplished internally within the FAA.

1.2.1 Statement of Understanding

A Statement of Understanding (SOU) between the FAA and the RTI Team has been developed to govern each of the RLV O&M tasks. The following text presents the SOU developed for this effort:

“The RTI Team will continue to support FAA/AST-100 in the development of RLV O&M guidelines and technical evaluation criteria.

This task will build on the work accomplished in the RLV O&M Top-Down Analyses performed under DO2 and DO3 and complement the RLV O&M Guidelines developed under DO4 of the reference contract. In particular, the RTI Team will develop material to aid FAA/AST-100 identify the O&M technical evaluation criteria and performance standards for safety-critical RLV maintenance, training, and approval functions. In performing the specified work, particular attention will be made to any unique features, including proven and unproven RLV O&M activities, and their correlation to any historic lessons-learned in the Space Shuttle, airline and RLV research community.

Under Order 0002, RTI will deliver the final guideline input volumes: Maintenance - Volume 3, Training – Volume 4, and Approval - Volume 5.

The following summarizes specific topics that will be addressed:

1. Guideline inputs and rationale:
The major RLV O&M subsystem and function safety items, as they pertain to the subject volumes, will be developed into guideline inputs along with the supporting rationale. These will be presented in the format approved by FAA/AST under DO4.
2. Further refinement of the Subsystem and Functional Decomposition:
A number of modifications to the current Functional Decomposition diagrams have been identified including the need to add Functions for Contingency Operations, Vehicle Configuration Management, and Simulation Requirements. The Functional Decomposition diagrams will be modified to reflect the functional refinements, as required.
3. Continued data collection from the aviation and space domains:
Continue to extract information from traditional aviation, the Space Shuttle, and other RLV programs in support of the guideline and technical evaluation criteria development.”

1.3 Scope

The following Guideline Inputs are intended for use by the RLV Industry and the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation in the preparation and evaluation of RLV license applications and O&M plans. The scope of these Guideline Inputs is bounded by the jurisdictional authority provided to the FAA by Congress 112 STAT. 2848 (Public Law 105-303-Oct. 28, 1998). Additionally, these Guideline Inputs do not affect or amend the content of the licensing rules, but rather are designed to help the FAA and RLV Industry jointly ensure the rules are both followed and applied in a consistent manner.

1.3.1 Guideline Input Philosophy

These Guideline Inputs have been developed to serve as a repository for best/recommended practices. It is expected that a portion of these practices will ultimately be formalized in a federal regulation that will govern the RLV Industry. Some inputs may be revisited as newer technologies are developed and better procedures emerge as the industry matures.

A wide variety of sources were reviewed and analyzed to develop the content of these Guideline Inputs. Primary consideration was given to lessons-learned drawn from the aviation and space community. In some cases, these lessons are explicit and are clearly technology-independent public safety issues and thus could be written as a requirement. In these cases, Guideline Inputs (GIs) have been developed and the term "shall" is used. These GIs are numbered sequentially with a Maintenance Function prefix (e.g., the first Perform Maintenance Guideline Input is numbered Perf Gen Maint GI-1.) It is reasonable to assume that these items will be included in any subsequent rule development governing RLV O&M.

In many cases, however, the lesson or issue being evaluated is less clearly defined and sufficient experience or research is not available to validate the lesson or issue. Others are technology dependent and only apply to a narrow set of RLV concepts. For these cases, Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) have been developed and the term "should" is used. These GICs are numbered sequentially with a Maintenance Function prefix (e.g., the first Perform Maintenance Guideline Input Consideration is numbered Perf Gen Maint GIC -1.) While these GICs are candidates for inclusion in any subsequent rulemaking, it is reasonable to assume that further work may be necessary.

Please note that there are many additional safety issues that an RLV Operator should consider for the safety of maintainers and technicians; FAA/AST is only currently charged with public safety concerns. Further, no delineation of when and how rules would be applied is made in these considerations. Some guidelines may be considered during the licensing stage while others may be considered as repeated launches are executed for the same RLV under a specific launch license.

Within the following sections, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) appears in many of the Inter/Intra Agency Considerations subsections. Although OSHA is concerned with worker safety and not the general public, the authors of this document believe that jurisdictional issues should be addressed for cases where a worker safety situation may escalate into a public safety concern.

1.3.2 Suggestion Form

It should be noted that these Guideline Inputs are expected to evolve as the industry matures and additional data becomes available, either from research or through actual flight activity. The reader is encouraged to share their experiences and knowledge through use of the Suggestion Form in Appendix B: RLV Guideline Input Suggestion Form. It is the FAA's intent to periodically review these Guideline Inputs to ensure they are current, particularly with respect to issues that are technology dependent.

1.4 Relationship to RLV Licensing

The impetus for this effort was to provide a common set of criteria related to O&M that could be used by FAA/AST to evaluate RLV developer/operator license applications. The Guideline Inputs and the related Guideline Input Considerations contained in this volume are focused on RLV maintenance with particular emphasis placed on issues unique to the function being addressed and failure to follow these guidelines could pose a risk to the public. RLV developer/operators are expected to explain how each Guideline is satisfied for their particular vehicle design or CONOPS.

In a previous tasking, the RTI team proposed a formal set of readiness reviews, one for operations and one for maintenance. In addition, the concept of Instructions for Continued Flight-worthiness (ICF) and an Operations or Flight Manual was introduced. The reviews were intended to be focused activities within the context of the overall mission readiness review required by the RLV licensing rule. The Operations Manual was designed to lend form to the mission operational requirements. The ICF filled a gap in the current licensing description by addressing those considerations for the turnaround of an RLV and preparation for subsequent flights. The FAA has adopted the term Maintenance Program Plan (MPP) in place of ICF. Additionally, RTI proposes that the FAA also incorporate the requirement for the RLV Operator to develop and utilize an approved Maintenance Manual. The Maintenance Program Plan is considered by RTI to be similar in scope and breadth to the CONOPS document.

RTI believes that to further clarify the licensing rule and to better align with the proposed guideline structure, two additional data items should be provided to AST by the RLV developer/operator for review. These two items are a Training Manual and an Approval Manual. Note that this data can be packaged as part of the Operations Manual, Maintenance Manual, in a combined document, or individual documents, if the license applicant so chooses, provided that the data

is clearly identified. The four documents, taken together, will allow individual RLV developer/operators to address FAA/AST Guidelines. At the same time, the use of a common set of manuals will help FAA/AST evaluate the appropriateness and completeness of the provided data in a uniform manner.

1.5 Subsystem and Functional Context

Functional Guideline Inputs have been developed for those activities associated with operations and maintenance, as well as the related areas of training and approval. Figure 1 illustrates how these four areas relate to one another and where they fit in the broader scope of RLV licensing, approvals, and RLV development. It should be noted this effort considers only the items to the right of the vertical line in Figure 1. This relationship is highlighted in Figure 2.




Figure 1 RLV Context Diagram

The results of the CFR reviews, as well as the data collected during previous efforts, were used as a starting point for deriving these functions. RTI then collected and analyzed several references to further characterize maintenance. Previous work presented the first functional decomposition of RLV Maintenance Functions. These maintenance functions and sub-functions have been further analyzed and refined here in this effort for maintenance. While many functions remain the same, there are several new sub-functions and function reorganizations. See Appendix C: Traceability of Maintenance Function Decomposition for function and sub-function traceability from the previous Maintenance Decomposition to the current Maintenance Decomposition as reflected in Figure 4.

3.0 General Maintenance Guideline Recommendations

The following Guideline Inputs (GIs) were developed to reflect those tasks or procedures that are general in nature and apply to RLV Maintenance.

General Maint GI - 1. RLV Operator Maintenance Program Plan
Guideline Input RLV Operators shall develop a Maintenance Program Plan for each vehicle type.
Rationale To account for the differences in RLV designs, each RLV Operator must provide a Maintenance Program Plan that describes the operator's intent and/or assumptions relative to RLV maintenance. This plan will include general strategies associated with both unscheduled and scheduled maintenance for the RLV vehicle type, and its associated Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and facilities. The Maintenance Program Plan is complementary to the RLV Operator's Concept of Operations Document. Although the Maintenance Program Plan will be implemented through a procedural Maintenance Manual, the Maintenance Program Plan's value to the FAA lies in the additional clarity of purpose it will provide. Specifically, it will highlight to the FAA general assumptions/intent that may affect public safety; and it will provide the FAA with necessary insight into the following items of interest: <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How the RLV maintenance program will ensure general public safety and limit/mitigate environmental hazard potentials.2. What the differences will be between In-Line, Off-Line, and Depot Level Maintenance activities for different configurations of the RLV type.3. How the RLV maintenance activities will be conducted at the launch and landing sites.4. What inter/intra agency (both local and federal) coordination that may be required.5. The logistical support that will be necessary for maintenance of the RLV and its associated GSE/ facilities.6. Configuration management program for hardware, software and documentation.7. Human Error Management Programs³, that addresses the following:<ol style="list-style-type: none">a) Who will oversee/administer the program?b) How will errors be investigated?c) How will investigation results be validated?d) How will error data be tracked and analyzed?e) How will prevention/intervention strategies be implemented to prevent errors from occurring/recurring?f) How will results of the program be measured?

General Maint GI - 2. Maintenance Manual

Guideline Input

RLV Operators shall develop an FAA-approved vehicle-specific Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

Since many RLV concepts include ground-breaking/novel technologies, there is minimal commonality between current industry maintenance procedures and those required for specific RLV maintenance procedures. This lack of commonality hinders the development of common technology-specific maintenance approval/certification guidelines; therefore, each RLV Operator will need to develop a vehicle-specific Maintenance Manual and provide it to FAA/AST for approval.

This manual will provide the maintenance specifications and procedures associated with the specific RLV type for all configurations outlined in the Maintenance Program Plan. Additionally, the Maintenance Manual will contain the nominal and off-nominal maintenance procedures for the FAA-approved RLV design.

Minimally, the following items for conducting general, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance should be included in the Maintenance Manual:

1. List of safety critical RLV and GSE/Facilities sub-systems and their maintenance requirements and procedures
2. Schedule for interval-driven maintenance (i.e. Scheduled Maintenance)
3. Subsystem/system maintenance procedures
4. Hazardous material types and handling procedures
5. Engine/motor refurbishment and reconditioning procedures
6. Checklists for normal and contingency maintenance procedures
7. Reporting process to include lessons-learned
8. Personnel Requirements
9. Tools/Test Equipment identification, description, and calibration requirements.

General Maint GI - 3. Maintenance Hazard Analysis and Mitigation Planning

Guideline Input

An RLV Operator shall perform a hazard analysis and develop appropriate mitigation procedures for those maintenance activities that may cause an unacceptable risk to the public.

Rationale

RLV maintenance activities must be assessed to determine specific processes/procedures that require hazard analysis/mitigation. The following is a candidate list for hazard analysis:

1. Chemical or physical (pressure) reactions between hardware elements
2. Collisions during handling
3. Exposure to environmental elements such as lightning and/or thermal conditions that may cause explosive hazards
4. Environmental hazards such as hazardous fluid spills
5. Gas plumes

Hazard analyses ascertain the potential repercussions for a plausible mishap/malfunction. Once the hazard/repercussion is understood, a mitigation action must be developed.

The mitigation action may be the development/modification of maintenance procedures that, by default, completely neutralize the hazard (e.g., limiting access to hazardous areas). Alternatively, a mitigation action/procedure may only reduce the potential for injuries or death due to mishaps/malfunctions to an "acceptable" level.

It is the responsibility of the Launch Operator to identify the hazards that could effect public safety and perform the necessary analysis that ensures proper mitigation of risk.

General Maint GI - 4. Maintenance Emergency Response Procedures

Guideline Input

A launch operator shall develop emergency response procedures for potential maintenance hazard sources.

Rationale

The ultimate purpose of the Maintenance Emergency Response part of the Emergency Response Plan (called out under the Operations Guidelines) is to ensure public safety in the event of a mishap during RLV, GSE, or Facility maintenance. Emergency response procedures (ERPs) are necessary to identify potential emergencies and the means to control, contain, and remove a hazard. ERPs will address handling requirements for hazardous materials, required personnel protection clothing/apparatus, and evacuation procedures for affected areas.

Maintenance activities must be assessed to determine appropriate emergency response procedures. The ERPs must specifically define the process for providing assistance to any injured people and describe the methods used to control any hazards associated with a mishap.

The overall Emergency Response Plan will describe the types of emergency support required, equipment to be used, emergency response personnel (their duties and qualifications), and any related agreements with any launch site operator and state, county, or local government agencies.

The following are a candidate set of functions that must be addressed in the ERP:

1. Firefighting
2. Explosive ordnance disposal
3. Chemical spill response
4. Medical support
5. Inadvertent release of radiological, corrosive, toxic, flammable, or cryogenic materials in hazardous quantities
6. Inadvertent activation of hazardous ordnance devices
7. Inadvertent ignition of flammable material
8. Inadvertent electrical shock/burns
9. Inadvertent deployment of appendages used in preparing the vehicle

General Maint GI - 5. Maintenance Statement of Compliance

Guideline Input

A Maintenance Statement of Compliance shall be submitted by the launch Operator to certify that each RLV will be maintained in accordance with the FAA-approved Maintenance Program Plan and Maintenance Manual for that specific vehicle design and configuration.

Rationale

Since RLV designs are markedly different, new, and novel; there is minimal commonality that can lead to technology specific approval guidelines. The referenced Maintenance Program Plan and Manual will contain the FAA-approved maintenance procedures and vehicle-unique limitations. The RLV Operator must maintain the vehicle in compliance with the Maintenance Program Plan and Manual to ensure maintenance is performed in a way that mitigates risk to the public.

General Maint GI - 6. Hazardous Substance Discharge

Guideline Input

If a discharge of a hazardous substance occurs during maintenance, a Hazardous Material Report (HMR) shall be filed with the EPA.

Rationale

In addition to the reporting requirements of the HMR found in Sections 171.15 and 171.16 of Title 49, a discharge of a hazardous substance is subject to EPA reporting requirements at 40 CFR 302.6 and may be subject to the reporting requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard at 33 CFR 153.203.⁴

4.0 Perform General Maintenance

The following sub-functions were developed to reflect those tasks or procedures that are general in nature and apply to the Perform General Maintenance activities. Table 1 highlights the general definitions for general maintenance sub-functions.

Table 1 Perform General Maintenance Definitions

Manage Logistics	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Logistics]</i>		
	The Logistics Sub-function is the set of tasks, procedures, and activities to ensure the Maintenance Function is properly supplied, manned, and scheduled.		
	Manage Parts	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Parts]</i>	
		The Manage Parts Sub-function is the set of activities necessary to order, stock, and maintain proper quality and quantities of RLV/GSE/Facilities parts; including the required special part ordering and quality checks.	
	Approval Functional Decomposition	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Parts? Approval Functional Decomposition]</i>	
		The Approval Functional Decomposition outlines functions for performing approval activities associated with equipment, procedures, and personnel. See Volume 5, Approval, of this document.	
	Schedule Maintenance	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Schedule Maintenance]</i>	
		The Schedule Maintenance Sub-function is the set of tasks and procedures to insert RLV/GSE/Facilities General, Unscheduled, Turnaround, Interval-driven, and Condition-Based Maintenance activities into the RLV Operator's overall activities schedule.	
	Manage Personnel	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Personnel]</i>	
		The Manage Personnel Sub-function is the set of tasks and procedures to ensure RLV/GSE/Facilities maintenance personnel are appropriately identified and tasked. This includes allowance for proper crew rest and ensuring that the personnel being scheduled are adequately trained and approved for the maintenance activities to be performed.	
Schedule Personnel		<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Personnel? Schedule Personnel]</i>	
	The Schedule Personnel Sub-function is the set of tasks and procedures to ensure RLV/GSE/Facilities maintenance personnel schedules reflect the personnel requirements associated with the maintenance task being scheduled: the personnel possess the appropriate skill levels and have been allotted the required crew rest.		

		Training Functional Decomposition	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Personnel? Training Functional Decomposition]</i> The Training Functional Decomposition outlines functions for performing training of maintenance personnel. See Volume 4, Training, of this document.
		Approval Functional Decomposition	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Logistics? Manage Personnel? Approval Functional Decomposition]</i> The Approval Functional Decomposition outlines functions for performing approval activities associated with equipment, procedures, and personnel involved in maintenance activities. See Volume 5, Approval, of this document.
Inspect			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Inspect]</i> The Inspect Sub-function is the set of activities to check, test, or compare a system, sub-system, component, or part against established standards of operation, wear criteria (such as worn parts), and approved design.
Adjust			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Adjust]</i> The Adjust Sub-function is the set of activities to return the sub-system or element to the original operational condition without replacement or repairing parts, components, or sub-systems.
Replace			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Replace]</i> The Replace Sub-function is the set of activities to remove and replace a part, component, or sub-system with the same, or an approved equivalent, item to return the RLV to the original specifications.
Test			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Test]</i> The Test Sub-function is the set of tasks/procedures used to evaluate the state of parts, components, or sub-systems to see whether these items meet approved operation criteria.
Return to Service			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Return to Service]</i> The Return to Service Sub-function is the critical set of activities associated with the turnover from maintenance to operations. (e.g. when the RLV is declared flightworthy by maintenance or the GSE is declared "operational").
Report			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Report]</i> The Report Sub-function is the set of procedures to establish a formal record or summary of the performed maintenance activity.
Protect Personnel			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Protect Personnel]</i> The Protect Personnel Sub-function includes those procedures and tasks necessary to ensure the safety of maintenance personnel. Potential risks include physical, chemical, and nuclear hazards.
Protect Vehicle/Elements			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Protect Vehicle/Elements]</i> The Protect Vehicle/Elements Sub-function includes the procedures and tasks necessary to ensure RLV/GSE/Facilities are protected from unauthorized access, tampering, or damage (e.g., terrorist attacks).
Transport			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Transport]</i> The Transport Sub-function includes the procedures and tasks for the movement of the RLV itself and any associated equipment, materials, cargo, or maintenance personnel to/from the maintenance activity areas.
Manage Hazardous Material			<i>[Maintenance ? Perform General Maintenance ? Manage Hazardous Material]</i> The Manage Hazardous Material Sub-function includes the procedures and tasks necessary for the safe storage, use, and loading/unloading of all hazardous material, other than propellants.

4.1 General Discussion

The tasks, procedures, and sub-functions associated with the Perform General Maintenance sub-function are further explained in this section.

The following procedures and sub-functions are required to perform all types of maintenance:

1. Correlate parts, maintenance item, and personnel availability (Manage Logistics)
2. Inspecting the system or component (Inspect)
3. Performing maintenance adjustment work (Adjust)
4. Performing maintenance replacement work (Replace)
5. Testing the RLV/GSE/Facilities on which maintenance actions have occurred (Test)
6. Returning the item (vehicle, GSE or facility) to service (Return to Service)
7. Reporting maintenance activities, specific problems, and corrective actions (Report)
8. Preventing personnel hazards (Protect Personnel)
9. Preventing vehicle damage (Protect Vehicle/Elements)
10. Movement of the vehicle/elements and support equipment (Transport)
11. Preventing hazardous material mishaps (Manage Hazardous Material)

Logistics

Logistics includes the necessary tasks to ensure the availability of parts required to perform maintenance on the RLV and its associated GSE/Facilities; that maintenance tasks are appropriately scheduled in the RLV Operator's overall activities schedule; and that personnel scheduling meets the safety requirements of crew rest while still meeting mission and business requirements. Additionally, only personnel that have been trained on the specific RLV type, GSE, and/or Facilities will be utilized. Training and approval of these personnel are considered in the Training and Approval Volumes of this document; however, correlating the skill set of personnel to specific maintenance activities is part of the Logistics Sub-function.

RLV maintenance is assumed to closely parallel aircraft maintenance models due to the similarity in business models, anticipated frequency of flights, need for reduced turnaround time, and technologies involved. Specific practices for parts management will likely be similar to those found in the commercial and military aviation community. Additionally, the Space Shuttle may provide lessons learned for parts management for a large RLV and RLV program. For example,

“The Space Shuttle has more than 4,000 replaceable parts, many provided by original manufacturers who are no longer in business. The NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD), located near Kennedy

Space Center (KSC), meets this challenge by manufacturing, overhauling, repairing and procuring all Shuttle Orbiter Line Replacement Units.”⁶

The scheduling of the maintenance activities themselves must be part of the overall RLV Operator’s daily program schedule to ensure timely corrective action in the event of a mishap or potentially hazardous situation and to ensure required preventive maintenance activities are performed.

The Manage Personnel Sub-function is the set of tasks and procedures that verify minimum maintenance-crew rest requirements are met and that the personnel assigned possess the appropriate skills. It is well known that both the aviation and space communities regulate the minimum crew rest required for pilots and on-board crewmembers. There is also a need to ensure that RLV Aerospace Maintenance Technicians (RAMTs) have adequate rest prior to performing safety critical tasks. Additionally, the skill level of the personnel must match the maintenance task. Both of these items will affect the specific maintenance personnel that will be assigned.

Inspect

Inspections will occur for RLV systems before the RLV is flown (pre-flight inspections), after the flight (post-flight inspections), and during/after hands-on maintenance activities. The pre-flight inspections consist of a set of checks/examinations designed to verify flight readiness of the vehicle, including closeout of problems identified in previous inspections and/or problem reports, and verification that all safety-critical equipment and systems are operational.

Post-flight inspections consist of a set of checks/tests designed to identify any unexpected problems or maintenance/repair items due to incidents during flight or due to exposure to conditions such as space environment, vibrations, high speed, etc. Post-flight inspection activities include checking, testing, or comparing a system, sub-system, component or part against established standards of operation, wear criteria (such as worn parts), and deviations from design.

In addition to inspecting the vehicle itself, maintenance technicians will inspect GSE and facilities as prescribed by the Maintenance Manual. For example, fluid lines in fuel carts and facility safety systems need to be inspected to ensure safe operations.

Adjust

Adjustments to the RLV’s parts, components, or sub-systems, and GSE/facilities, may be necessary in any type of maintenance activity, scheduled or unscheduled. Adjustments will return the item to its original operational condition without any replacement or repairing, or may be subsequent to a replacement/repair task.

Replace

Replacement of a part, component, or sub-system may occur during any type of maintenance activity, scheduled or unscheduled. Although a replacement may deviate slightly from the original item, it must meet all specifications and tolerances of the original or the replacement must go through an approval process before being used as a maintenance item.

Test

The Test Sub-function is the set of tasks/procedures used to evaluate the state of parts, components, or sub-systems to ensure that these items meet approved operational criteria. The parts, components, or sub-systems being tested must demonstrate full operational capability within the margins specified in the Operations Manual and the Maintenance Manual in order to ensure proper operation of safety critical items.

Return to Service

The Return to Service Sub-function is the set of critical activities associated with the turnover from maintenance to operations crew. These activities will determine if the vehicle is “flightworthy” and the appropriate documentation of the vehicle’s status will be generated. This sub-function is considered the point at which the RLV is “handed over” to the Operations Functions.

Additionally, this sub-function includes activities that will be performed to validate that the GSE and/or Facilities being maintained are available for operational use.

Report

The aviation domain provides a potential model for problem reporting called the Service Difficulty Program.

“The objective of the Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) Program is to achieve prompt and appropriate correction of conditions adversely affecting continued airworthiness of aeronautical products fleet wide. The SDR program is an exchange of information and a method of communication between the FAA and the aviation community concerning in-service problems. A report is filed whenever a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance fails to function in a normal or usual manner. In addition, if a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance has a flaw or imperfection which impairs, or which may impair its future function, it is considered defective and should be reported under the program. These reports are known by a variety of names: Service Difficulty Reports (SDR), Malfunction and Defect Reports (M and D) and Maintenance Difficulty Reports (MDR). The consolidation, collation, and analysis of the data and the rapid dissemination of trends, problems and alert information to the appropriate segments

of the aviation community and FAA effectively and economically provides a method to ensure future aviation safety. The FAA analyzes SDR data for safety implications and reviews the data to identify possible trends that may not be apparent regionally or to individual operators. As a result of this review, the FAA may disseminate safety information to a particular section of the aviation community. The FAA also may adopt new regulations or issue airworthiness directives (AD's) to address a specific problem.”⁷

The advantage of this program is that the FAA has immediate access to problem data for trending and regulatory analyses. The disadvantage of this approach, from an RLV Operator perspective, would be the potential increased overhead associated with problem reporting during maintenance management function.

Some lessons-learned from the Shuttle's Problem Reporting And Corrective Action (PRACA) system include the necessity for trend analysis on problem reports/failures/mishaps and “near misses”. Additionally PRACA has highlighted the need for an integrated view of logistics activities, (e.g. parts management correlated with maintenance activities and problem reporting).

Protect Personnel

Ensuring the safety of maintenance personnel during maintenance of the RLV starts with the identification of hazardous/potentially-hazardous activities, followed by the appropriate procedure development and use of protective equipment. Personnel protection includes the maintenance personnel protection equipment (e.g., goggles, ear protectors, Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) suits), and the execution of procedures designed to mitigate risk during maintenance.

Protect Vehicle/Elements

The need to ensure the security of the RLV and its flight elements is two-fold. First, there is the general need for the RLV Operator to protect its assets. This clearly is not a public safety issue. Secondly, space transportation security in general is a high priority in the Homeland Security office. Through intelligence data, the launch industry (in particular the Space Shuttle) was identified as an Al Qaeda target.⁸ This information, and the events of attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, emphasize our nation's airports and launch sites as high-profile targets.

A five-page Homeland Security Department internal advisory memo recommended that aviation security officials increase security beyond existing security directives. The Transportation Security Administration issued emergency amendments to the directives. Existing directives focused on the passenger side of the airport where pre-gate security screening is done. Specifically, the memo advised officials to tighten ramp security, where the catering, cleaning, fueling, and maintenance of aircraft take place. As one of several additional protective

measures the memo recommends, "Secure unattended aircraft to prevent unauthorized use".⁹

In addition to the concern for "unauthorized use" of an RLV, the "explosive potential" of an RLV may be of even greater concern to public safety. Thus, it is necessary to ensure only authorized personnel are near the vehicle while it is in a maintenance status.

Transport

Transport involves the movement of the integrated RLV, individual flight elements, cargo, propellants, and all other materials. Transportation is multi-modal (i.e. land, sea, or air). The Department Of Transportation (DOT) regulates and inspects the movement of hazardous materials along any of these transportation routes. For example, the DOT Federal Railroad Administration (DOT/FRA) inspects the following: piping, valves, and fittings; enclosures/protective housings; pressure relief devices; and safety systems for any hazardous material shipments. DOT also regulates proximity and isolation measures between chemicals that may react to produce hazardous materials if they are transported together.

Manage Hazardous Material

Hazardous material is generally defined as a substance or material in a quantity or form that may pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property. 14 CFR Part 401.5 defines hazardous materials as those identified in 49 CFR 172.101.

In addition to the general handling of hazardous materials, this sub-function includes the removal, remediation, and disposal of hazardous materials, soils, debris, waste, etc., using personnel and equipment in such a way that will minimize endangerment to health, life, or property.

For working conditions and protective gear, OSHA guidelines are applicable for all handlers of hazardous material; EPA rules will address environmental issues; and HAZMAT rules govern transport of these materials. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) diamond is commonly used to communicate general hazard contents. These NFPA diamonds are commonly located inside the main entrance of buildings to inform occupants; on the outside of the main entrance door to inform emergency response workers; at the perimeter fence entrance to inform the general public, and on hazardous products themselves.

4.2 Guideline Input Considerations

The following Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) have been identified for the Perform General Maintenance Function:

- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 1. Appropriate handling procedures should be employed (e.g. electrostatic discharge precautions for sensitive electronics work).
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 2. When parts for coolant circulation are replaced, ensure that the fabrication of the parts is adequate to ensure a leak-proof joint.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 3. Test stand equipment connection and operation should be performed in such a way as to not cause damage or unsafe conditions to the propulsion system or any other vehicle system.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 4. Precision instrumentation should be maintained with the use of calibrated instrumentation and tools during maintenance.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 5. Any software or hardware tools used to maintain avionics, and which have the opportunity to introduce errors, should be evaluated for correct operation and calibrated where needed.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 6. Flightworthiness verification should include:
 - a. Proper functioning of movable or “intelligent” structures affecting flight control
 - b. Integral TPS component integrity
 - c. Plume impingement area inspection
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 7. Maintenance procedures should facilitate the collection of data on subsystem/component/part performance from one flight to the next.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 8. An RLV Operator’s response to emergency conditions should mitigate compromise of public/personnel safety.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 9. Defective part/subsystem maintenance should minimize explosive potential.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 10. Any potential chemical or physical (pressure) reactions between the RLV/ components/payload/other materials and transport equipment should be assessed for potential public safety implications.
- Perf Gen Maint GIC - 11. There should be in place a procedure/system to ensure tool accountability after maintenance.

4.2.1 Inter/Intra Agency Considerations

The following Perform General Maintenance Function inter/intra agency considerations were identified:

1. The procedures for handling hazardous materials during the Perform General Maintenance function should be performed similar to those accomplished during Conduct Ground Operations. Handling and transportation of hazardous materials are governed by DOT Hazardous Material regulations. Similar standards such as those from OSHA and DOT should be employed. A key consideration would be to determine if propellant residuals could be re-used or recycled to minimize propellant-waste generation.
2. Venting and disposal of hazardous materials should follow the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for disposal of hazardous materials.
3. The North American Emergency Response Guidebook provides guidance on handling hazardous materials. It cross-references shipping names, UN numbers (United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals) and DOT labels with emergency response procedures. It is available from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration. Also, the Department of Transportation publishes a Hazardous Materials Table in Section 101 of Part 172, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These references should be reviewed and employed where applicable.
4. DOT coordination should occur with appropriate rail, air, and roadway transportation offices for safe practices and regulations associated with the transportation of hazardous materials on public routes.
5. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) coordination should occur for all frequency assignments used in RLV operations, particularly those employed in emergencies.
6. The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (ESB) should be consulted to provide a source of lessons learned to FAA/AST for conducting RLV safety evaluations, storage of propellants, and chemical agents.¹⁰
7. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) coordination should be required to ensure that adequate fire safety and mitigation procedures are in place for launch/takeoff preparations.

Perf Gen Maint GI - 19. Operational Safety of Landing and Recovery

Guideline Input

If landing gear is used, maintenance procedures shall comply with the Maintenance Manual's specifications for limiting factors during specific test techniques.

Rationale

Non-destructive testing and inspections of critical use components must be employed. For example, detection of debris embedded in tires may require x rays. Cracks in landing gear materials, in many cases, are not perceptible with the human eye and can only be detected by rigorous inspection techniques such as Eddy Current inspection. (Note: this nondestructive testing technique is only applicable to certain materials based on their conductivity and permeability.)

Perf Gen Maint GI - 20. Corrosion Control Requirements

Guideline Input

Maintenance of any metal-based facilities shall include corrosion control measures.

Rationale

Corrosion on these facilities will not only impact the structural integrity of the facility, it may also cause an explosion due to the interaction of the metal/rust with the propellants on-board the RLV.

5.0 Perform Unscheduled Maintenance

The following sub-functions were developed to reflect those tasks or procedures that are applicable to RLV Unscheduled Maintenance activities. Table 2 highlights the general definitions for unscheduled maintenance sub-functions.

Table 2 Perform Unscheduled Maintenance Definitions

Diagnose	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Unscheduled Maintenance?Diagnose]</i> The Diagnose sub-function is the set of activities that are used to analyze the cause or nature of a faulty or anomalous condition. This may include the time and resources required to perform the action.
Repair	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Unscheduled Maintenance?Repair]</i> The Repair sub-function is the set of activities to restore the RLV to continued flightworthiness-operating state by fixing a system, subsystem, component, or part.

5.1 General Discussion

The Perform Unscheduled Maintenance consists of the tasks, procedures, and sub-functions to correct discrepancies, or problems, that were identified during normal operation, scheduled maintenance, other unscheduled maintenance, or trend data analyses. The tasks and procedures performed during unscheduled maintenance that are common to all types of maintenance are addressed in Section 4.0 of this document. Only those sub-functions considered unique to Perform Unscheduled Maintenance are presented in this section.

Sources of unscheduled maintenance are varied and may include problems in system/component design, system/component failure or damage. In this sub-function, a system can be either hardware or software associated with the RLV, GSE or facilities.

Diagnose

After the identification of a problem through inspection or, potentially, an automated systems report (e.g. the vehicle health and monitoring subsystem), the problem must then be diagnosed to determine its root cause. There are various techniques and technologies that are employed in the aviation community for the Diagnose Sub-function. For instance, in diagnosing jet engine problems, an old technology called ferrography is used to run the aircraft's lubricating fluid through a magnetic device to separate out metal shavings and other ferrous engine debris.

Many new techniques and technologies will be developed to meet the challenges of diagnosing RLV problems. For instance, one study²¹ concluded that:

“New approaches are needed for subsurface inspection; the temperature history (maximum temperature reached during reentry) is the best warning indicator of potential future damage; and improved inspection technology is needed for reinforced carbon-carbon components (e.g. nose cone and wing leading edges) that are likely to be used on all future vehicles”

Repair

Webster's dictionary defines repair as "to fix, or to restore". Therefore, the repair of a sub-system, component, or part is always considered unscheduled. Repair maintenance activities must return the subsystem, component, or part to the original design specifications and tolerances.

Note: although "alteration" may be considered a repair, it is not treated as a "maintenance task" here because of the design impact and would be treated in the design approval process highlighted in Figure 1 of this document.

5.2 Guideline Input Considerations

The following Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) have been identified for the Conduct Unscheduled Maintenance Function:

- Perf Un-Sched Maint GIC - 1. Diagnose should utilize calibrated equipment to ensure complete and accurate analysis.
- Perf Un-Sched Maint GIC - 2. The on-board vehicle health monitor/management system should be utilized when diagnosing RLV repairs.
- Perf Un-Sched Maint GIC - 3. A logbook for repair and alteration activities should be maintained. This log should contain specific data on parts used for the repair activity.

5.2.1 Inter/Intra Agency Considerations

The following Conduct Unscheduled Maintenance Function inter/intra agency considerations were identified:

1. DOT coordination should occur with appropriate rail, air, and roadway transportation offices for safe practices and regulations associated with the transportation of hazardous materials on public routes.
2. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) coordination should occur for all frequency assignments used in RLV operations, particularly those employed in emergencies.
3. The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (ESB) should be consulted to provide a source of lessons learned for FAA/AST for conducting RLV safety evaluations, storage of propellants, and chemical agents.²²
4. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) coordination should be required for procedure development to ensure that fire safety and mitigation procedures are in place for launch/takeoff preparations.

5.3 Guideline Recommendations

Un-Sched Maint GI - 1. Safing the Vehicle During Diagnosis

Guideline Input

During the Diagnose Sub-function, the RLV Aerospace Maintenance Technician shall continuously evaluate the safety of the RLV/GSE/Facilities configuration based on the problem analysis, and implement additional safing actions as appropriate.

Rationale

Due to the uncertainties associated with the cause for unscheduled maintenance, the problem could cause an unanticipated/unsafe configuration state.

Un-Sched Maint GI - 2. Material Compliance

Guideline Input

The RLV Aerospace Maintenance Technician shall only use materials that have been approved for the RLV/GSE/Facilities under repair.

Rationale

In a repair situation, there may be a need to fabricate an item to accomplish the repair. A deviation from the approved material for that "part" may compromise the integrity of the maintenance item and thereby affect public safety.

For example, use of inappropriate materials could affect the fatigue properties of the item. And, according to National Transportation Safety Board data, 291 accidents have been associated with fatigue cracking.²³

Un-Sched Maint GI - 3. Analysis Post- Repair

Guideline Input

As part of a repair closeout activity, the RLV Operator shall perform, and provide to the FAA, an analysis of the cause and impact of the problem/repair.

Rationale

This analysis will include assessing the impact of the problem/repair on the operating characteristics and limitations of the RLV, GSE, or Facility.

The RLV industry and the FAA will use this analysis to assess the effect that the problem/repair may have on continued use and/or flightworthiness of specific components/parts, and to ensure prompt and appropriate corrective action for conditions adversely affecting continued flightworthiness of widely-used RLV industry products (e.g. pressure vessel materials).

Un-Sched Maint GI - 4. Post Repair Return to Service Assessment

Guideline Input

The RLV Operator shall analyze the potential impact of a repair maintenance activity to operating characteristics and limitations of the RLV/GSE/Facilities, and incorporate the results of this analysis into the Return to Service criteria.

Rationale

Because of the unanticipated nature of repairs, a repair may directly, or indirectly, affect the operation of other subsystems, components or parts. Therefore, in preparation for the Return to Service maintenance activity, the RLV Operator must assess the potential impact of the repair to other subsystems in order to develop the Return to Service criteria.

This will be critical in verifying general flightworthiness of the vehicle.

6.0 Perform Scheduled Maintenance

The following sub-functions were developed to reflect those tasks or procedures that are applicable to RLV Scheduled Maintenance activities. Table 3 highlights the general definitions for scheduled maintenance functions.

Table 3 Perform Scheduled Maintenance Definitions

Perform Turnaround Maintenance	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Scheduled Maintenance ? Perform Turnaround Maintenance]</i>
	The Perform Turnaround Maintenance sub-function is the set of maintenance sub-functions that are performed between flights in order to return the RLV to flightworthiness status.
	Recondition <i>[Maintenance ? Perform Scheduled Maintenance ? Perform Turnaround Maintenance ? Recondition]</i> The Recondition sub-function consists of the set of tasks that are performed to return the RLV to its original operating condition, to include software and hardware items.
Replenish	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Scheduled Maintenance ? Perform Turnaround Maintenance ? Replenish]</i>
	The Replenish sub-function is the set of tasks and procedures to restock, reload, and/or refill expendable items on-board the RLV.
Perform Interval-driven Maintenance	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Scheduled Maintenance ? Perform Interval-driven Maintenance]</i> The Perform Interval-driven Maintenance sub-function consists of the performance of all necessary sub-functions, tasks, and procedures for maintenance of the RLV/GSE/Facilities that is performed with a particular frequency.
Perform Condition-Based Maintenance	<i>[Maintenance ? Perform Scheduled Maintenance ? Perform Condition-Based Maintenance]</i> The Perform Condition-Based Maintenance sub-function consists of all necessary sub-functions, tasks, and procedures for RLV Maintenance that is scheduled based on the condition of a part, component, or subsystem.

6.1 General Discussion

Scheduled maintenance tasks may be based on calendar time, number of flight hours, or parametric values associated with the condition of a subsystem/component/part or cycle time. Cycle time dependent maintenance tasks (e.g. propellant subsystem inspection) are performed during turnaround maintenance. Interval-driven maintenance is solely time-based. Some examples would be: inspection and checkout of those systems/subsystems that are affected whether the vehicle is flying or not (e.g. corrosion control inspection); or a replacement based on the number of flight hours logged for a given subsystem, component or part. Condition-based maintenance is a relatively new maintenance model that has become more and more attractive as advancements in the integrated vehicle health monitoring field have occurred.

Although the goal of Scheduled Maintenance is to prevent deficiencies, if an unexpected anomaly is discovered during a scheduled maintenance task, then associated corrective actions will be considered unscheduled maintenance and communicated/tracked according to Unscheduled Maintenance Guidelines. Generally, reliability-centered scheduled maintenance is recommended; however, it requires a relatively deep understanding of the selected subsystem's

failure modes and the consequences of that failure to determine the “schedule”. Failure modes are equipment/component-specific failures that result in functional failure of a subsystem. Whatever method is used to develop the initial schedule outlined in the Maintenance Manual will need to be revised based on trend analyses performed following the RLV/GSE/Facility deployment.

Perform Turnaround Maintenance

There will be a set of standard maintenance tasks performed during Turnaround Maintenance that are based solely on cycle time (e.g. propulsion subsystem tasks).

The first task performed during the Turnaround Maintenance sub-function should be a post-flight inspection. This inspection will be performed right after the recover operation, and will include a set of checks/tests designed to identify any unexpected problems or maintenance/repair items.

Specifically, the goal is to check, test or compare a system, sub-system, component or part against established standards of operation, wear criteria (such as worn parts), deviations from design, and damage due to incidents during flight or due to exposure to conditions such as space environment, vibrations, high speed, etc. Any anomalies and associated corrective actions discovered during Turnaround Maintenance will be considered unscheduled maintenance and communicated/tracked according to Unscheduled Maintenance Guidelines.

Perform Interval-driven Maintenance

Interval-driven Maintenance may be based either on calendar time, number of hours used, or cycle time. For example, traditional aviation often uses flight hours for scheduling powerplant overhaul activities and landing gear are evaluated based on numbers of takeoff/landing (i.e. cycle time). Of note: in a Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) program the interval-driven maintenance scheme will be based on the reliability for the various components of the system or subsystem.

Interval-driven tasks may not be initiated until the initial task/inspection date occurs. Once initiated, interval-driven tasks will have a Repeat Interval (RI) associated with them. Again, this interval will be based on calendar time, flight hours, or cycle time²⁴.

Perform Condition-Based Maintenance

Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) is defined as “Maintenance actions based on actual condition (objective evidence of need) obtained from in-situ, non-invasive tests, operating and condition measurement.”²⁵

If so equipped, an RLV’s Integrated Vehicle Health Management/Monitor (IVHM) Subsystem will provide information on the part, component, or subsystem’s

condition. The IVHM will enable the condition to be assessed, analyzed, and diagnosed for insertion into the operations and maintenance schedules.

CBM is unique from the other maintenance types as follows:

1. "Operations have now been engaged and integrated into the maintenance equation by becoming responsible for recognizing and correcting the existence of an abnormal condition or stressor level.
2. Finding the root cause stressors (parameters outside the design envelope) responsible for the off-design condition is now the prime directive.
3. The maintenance task can be preplanned and streamlined to eliminate the brushfire urgency and huge parts inventories, and minimize the maintenance impact on production."²⁶

Availability prediction and analysis is included in determining the Condition-Based Maintenance task schedule. Availability can be estimated for components, items, or units but overall spacecraft system or ground system availability estimation is based on the combinations and connectivity of the units within the system.

There are three types of availability measures. One is the inherent availability, and it is a function of the as-designed reliability and maintainability characteristics. Second is the achieved availability and it is a function of the total time spent in an operational state versus the total corrective maintenance time and the total preventive maintenance time. The third basic measure of availability is operational availability and it considers all repair and ancillary support time: corrective and preventive maintenance time, administrative delay time, and logistic support time. Operational availability is the most all-inclusive and should be used when determining the schedule for a subsystem.²⁷

6.2 Guideline Input Considerations

The following Guideline Input Considerations (GICs) have been identified for the Conduct Scheduled Maintenance Function:

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Perf Sched Maint GIC - 1. | Appropriate handling procedures should be employed (e.g. electrostatic discharge precautions for working on sensitive electronics). |
| Perf Sched Maint GIC - 2. | Maintenance cycles should be adjusted based on inspection data (i.e. more frequent maintenance for an increased incidence of problems found). |
| Perf Sched Maint GIC - 3. | The interval, as measured by the maintainer, may be different from the interval meant by |

maintenance procedures. It should be clearly stated whether the actual flight hours are counted or whether calendar time is counted for this interval.

- Perf Sched Maint GIC - 4. Maintenance activities should manage general OSHA requirements relative to occupational safety that may not cover safe practices for new materials, chemicals, and technology (safe maintenance practices) that affect public safety.

6.2.1 Inter/Intra Agency Considerations

The following Conduct Scheduled Maintenance Function inter/intra agency considerations were identified:

1. DOT coordination should occur with appropriate rail, air, and roadway transportation offices for safe practices and regulations associated with the transportation of hazardous materials on public routes.
2. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) coordination should occur for all frequency assignments used in RLV maintenance procedures, particularly those employed in emergencies.
3. The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (ESB) should be consulted to provide a source of lessons learned for FAA/AST for conducting RLV safety evaluations, storage of propellants, and chemical agents.²⁸
4. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) coordination should be required for procedure development to ensure that fire safety and mitigation procedures are in place for maintenance.

6.3 Guideline Recommendations

Sched Maint GI - 1. Turnaround Maintenance - Structural Inspection

Guideline Input

During Turnaround Maintenance, the RLV operator shall perform a structural inspection of any structure that affects the safety critical subsystems delineated in the Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's final report²⁹ included the following recommendation: Maintenance procedures should (sic shall) be in place that allow for a complete structural inspection using non-destructive evaluation techniques.

The RLV Structure Subsystem will be subjected to stresses and fatigue from a variety of sources (e.g., vibration, extreme temperature cycles, repair stresses, material fatigue, and micrometeoroid damage). Additionally, cracks, dents, and breaks may be the result of inadvertent mishandling during maintenance of the vehicle. Such damage may or may not appear significant; however, due to the stressful environment of launch/takeoff, space travel, and reentry, minor blows may lead to major cracks.

The types of inspection to detect such cracks will vary depending on the structural material. For example, on aluminum structures a visual inspection may be sufficient; however, on composite structures non-invasive techniques must be used, such as a remote-field eddy current method. Additionally, the RLV owner will need to provide damage tolerance data so that a valid inspection plan for each principal structural element can be developed to ensure cracking (initiated by fatigue, accident, or corrosion) will never propagate to failure prior to detection. In particular, damage tolerance to integral fuselage³⁰ and sandwich composite materials³¹ is an area of on-going research. Due to the nature of these structures, damage tolerance analysis is more complex than conventional structures.

Of note: some aluminum alloys (i.e. Al-Mg-Li and Al-Mg-Sc) used for integral fuselage research have exhibited unacceptable critical properties: insufficient thermal stability and accelerated fatigue crack propagation.³²

Sched Maint GI - 2.Turnaround Maintenance - Thermal Protection Subsystem Inspections

Guideline Input

During Turnaround Maintenance, the RLV Operator shall perform an inspection of the Thermal Protection Subsystem (TPS) in accordance with the Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

During turnaround maintenance inspection of an active TPS, the following items should be verified:

1. Coolant or other materials used are still operationally viable after being exposed to extreme conditions (temperature and pressure).
2. Coolant circulation and ejection systems are fully functional.
3. Protective surfaces are free of fractures.

The TPS has to function in an extremely hostile environment. Relatively minor issues can be exaggerated in this environment to cause a mishap. Inspections need to include identifying any effects of rain erosion, space debris and micrometeorites, gaps from thermal effects, deflections of the airframe, material changes from extreme temperatures, loosened parts from vibration, melting, deformation (especially at leading edges of wings and nose cone), tears, frays and breaks in fabrics, and the integrity of bonding materials, gap fillers and adhesives.

Inspections need to take advantage of advanced non-destructive inspection technology. Temperature history during reentry from sensors in subsurface may be used to target specific areas for more detailed inspection.

Sched Maint GI - 3. Environmental Control and Life Support System Scheduled Maintenance

Guideline Input

The RLV Operator shall perform an inspection of the Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (ECLSS) during Turnaround Maintenance and following any maintenance activity that may affect the ECLSS, in accordance with the Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

The ECLSS is critical to the ability of the pilot/crew to perform as part of the Flight Safety Subsystem.

Post-flight replenishment, maintenance, repair, or testing of an environmental control and life support system should also ensure the primary and backup systems are maintained within specifications as part of the Return to Service inspection.

Sched Maint GI - 4.Propulsion System Repair and Overhaul

Guideline Input

Propulsion System repair and overhaul shall return the RLV to flightworthy condition per the Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

Current propulsion technologies often employ an extremely complex set of piping, valves, combustors/igniters, and gimbal actuators to perform engine control and combustion. The RLV developer/operator needs a clear and complete set of maintenance procedures for ensuring Propulsion Subsystem maintenance is done correctly.

Sched Maint GI - 5.Motor Refurbishment

Guideline Input

Motor refurbishment shall return the motor to flightworthy condition in accordance with the Maintenance Manual.

Rationale

Some RLV concepts will employ solid rocket motors. Motor refurbishment needs to be conducted to maintain the design specifications and to ensure reliability. While this technology is well known, motor refurbishment poses a potential safety risk to the public at the facility of refurbishment as well as a potential risk to the public during flight.

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Appendix A: Acronyms/Terminology

AAAF	Association Aéronautique et Astronautique de France	ARINC	Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
A&P	Airframe & Powerplant	ARP	Aerospace Recommended Practice
A/C	Aircraft	ASEE	American Society for Engineering Education
AC	Advisory Circular	ASICS	Application Specific Integrated Circuits
AD	Airworthiness Directive	ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ADIZ	Air Defense Information Zones	ASQ	American Society for Quality
AETB	Alumina Enhanced Thermal Barrier	AST	Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation
AFS	Aviation Flight Standards	ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
AIAA	American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics	ASTWG	Advance Spaceport Technology Working Group
ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable	AWS	Aerospace Worthiness Standards
AM	Amplitude Modulation	ATA	Air Transport Association
AMF	Astronauts Memorial Foundation	ATAC	Advanced Technology Advisory Committee
ANPRM	Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making	ATC	Air Traffic Control
ANSI	American National Standards Institute	ATM	Air Traffic Management
AOA	Abort Once Around	ATO	Abort to Orbit
AOG	Airplane on Ground	ATOS	Air Transport Oversight System
APU	Auxiliary Power Unit	ATSRAC	Aging Transport Systems Rule Making Advisory Committee
ARAC	Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee		
ARC	Ames Research Center		
ARF	Assembly and Refurbishment Facility		

AVCS	Air Vehicle Control Station	CMR	Certification Maintenance Requirements
BCSP	Board of Certified Safety Professionals	CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
BFE	Buyer Furnished Equipment	COFR	Certificate of Flight Readiness
BITE	Built In Test Equipment	COLA	Conjunction On Launch Assessment or Collision Avoidance
BPSK	Bi Phase or Binary Phase Shift Keying	COMBO	Computation of Miss Between Orbits
CAA	Civil Aviation Authorities	COMSTAC	Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee
CAM	Civil Aeronautics Manual	CONOPS	Concept Of Operations
CAR	Code of Aviation Regulations	CONUS	Continental United States
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority	CRM	Cockpit Resource Management
CASS	Continuous Analysis and Surveillance	CRV	Crew Return/Rescue Vehicle
CAST	Civil Aviation Safety Team	CVR	Cockpit Voice recorder
CBM	Condition-Based Maintenance	dB	Decibel
C-Band	Frequency range between 3.6 and 4.2 GHz	DACUM	Developing A Curriculum
CCAFS	Cape Canaveral Air Force Station	DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
CDR	Critical Design Review	DCC	Division of Community College
CEI	Contract End Item	DCN	Document Change Notice
CEO	Chief Executive Officer	DFRC	Dryden Flight Research Center
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations	DMS	Docket Management System
CIL	Critical Items List		
CINCSPACE	Commander In Chief, Space Command		

DNPS	Delaware North Park Services	FCC	Federal Communications Commission
DO	Delivery Order		
DoD	Department of Defense	FHA	Functional Hazard Assessment
DOF	Degrees of Freedom	FL	Florida
DOT	Department of Transportation	FM	Frequency Modulation
E _c	Casualty Expectation	FMEA	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement	FMEA/CIL	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
EFI	Enterprise Florida, Inc.		
ELV	Expendable Launch Vehicle	FMECA	Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility	FMS	Flight Management System
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference	FOCC	Flight Operations Control Center
EOM	End Of Mission	FOQA	Flight Operations Quality Assurance
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency	FR	Flight Recorder
ERP	Emergency Response Procedure	FRCS	Forward Reaction Control System
ESA	European Space Agency	FRR	Flight Readiness Review
ESD	Electrostatic Discharge	FSDO	Flight Standards District Office
ESMC	Eastern Space and Missile Center	FSO	Flight Safety Officer
ET	External Tank	FSS	Flight Safety Systems
ETMS	Enhanced Traffic Management System	FTA	Fault Tree Analysis
		FTD	Flight Training Devices
ETOPS	Extended Twin (engines) Operations	FTS	Flight Termination Systems
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration	FY	Fiscal Year
FAR	Federal Aviation Regulation		

G	Gravitation Acceleration at Sea Level	HTHL	Horizontal Take Off and Landing
GLONASS	Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System	HTVL	Horizontal Take Off and Vertical Landing
GNC	Guidance, Navigation, Control	HW	Hardware
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System	IASA	International Aviation Safety Assessment
GOR	Ground Operations Review	ICA	Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
GPS	Global Positioning System	ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
GRC	Glenn Research Center	ICF	Instructions for Continued Flight- worthiness
GSE	Ground Support Equipment	ICHM	Integrated Control and Health Management
GSO	Ground Safety Officer	IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
GSRP	Ground Safety Review Panel	IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
GSS	Ground Support System	IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material	ILL	Impact Limit Lines
HBAT	Handbook Bulletin for Air Transportation	ILS	Instrument Landing System
HCF	High Cycle Fatigue	IMU	Inertial Measurement Unit
HDTV	High Definition Television	ISO	International Organization for Standardization
HMI	Human-Machine Interface	ISS	International Space Station
HMF	Hypergolic Maintenance Facility	ITU	International Telecommunication Union
HMR	Hazardous Material Report		
HRST	Highly Reusable Space Transportation		

IVHM	Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring	MMEL	Master Minimum Equipment List
IV&V	Independent Validation and Verification	MEL	Minimum Equipment List
JAA	Joint Aviation Authorities	MLP	Mobile Launcher Platform
JAR ₁	Joint Airworthiness Regulations	MMH	Monomethyl Hydrazine
JAR ₂	Joint Aviation Regulations	MNPS	Minimum Navigation Performance Specifications Airspace
JAR-VLA	Joint Aviation Regulations-Very Light Airplanes	MPP	Maintenance Program Plan
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council	MRB	Maintenance Review Board
JSC	Johnson Space Center	MRM	Maintenance Resource Management
Klb	Kilo Pound	MRO	Maintenance, and Repair, Overhaul
Klbs	Kilo Pounds		
KSC	Kennedy Space Center	MSFC	Marshall Space Flight Center
Ku-Band	Frequency Range from 1.7 to 12.76 GHz	MSG	Maintenance Steering Group
LA	Los Angeles	MSI	Maintenance Significant Items
LCC	Launch Control Complex	MSL	Mean Sea Level
LH2	Liquid Hydrogen	N/A	Not Applicable
LOA	Letter of Agreement	NAI	National Aerospace Initiative
LEO	Low Earth Orbit		
LLC	Limited Liability Corporation	NAS	National Airspace System
LOX	Liquid Oxygen	NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
LRCS	Long-Range Communication System	NASP	National Aerospace Plane
LRU	Line Replaceable Units		
MAKS	Multi-Purpose Aerospace System	NAT	North Atlantic

PRR	Payload Readiness Review	RTI	Research Triangle Institute
PSI	Pounds per Square Inch	RTLS	Return To Launch Site
PSRP	Payload Safety Review Panel	RTS	Return To Service
Pt.	Part	RTV	Room Temperature Vulcanizing
PVAT	Position, Velocity, Attitude, Time	RVT	Reusable Vehicle Test
Q-D	Quantity Distance	SAE	Society of Automotive Engineers
QD	Quick Disconnects	SATMS	Space and Air Traffic Management System
QoS	Quality of Service	SCAPE	Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble
QPSK	Quadrature Phase Shift Keying	SDP	Safety Data Package
RCM	Reliability Centered Maintenance	SDR	Service Difficulty Report
RCS	Reaction Control System	SFE	Supplier Furnished Equipment
RF	Radio Frequency	SGS	Space Gateway Support
RLV	Reusable Launch Vehicle	SIAT	Shuttle Independent Assessment Team
RNAV	Area Navigation	SLF	Shuttle Landing Facility
RPM	Revenue Passenger Mile	SLI	Space Launch Initiative
RPR	Rulemaking Project Record	SME ₁	Shuttle Main Engine
RPSF	Rotation, Processing & Surge Facility	SME ₂	Subject Matter Expert
RSO	Range Safety Officer	S/N	Stock Number
RSRM	Reusable Solid Rocket Motor	SNPRM	Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rule Making
RSS	Range Safety System	SOH	State of Health
RTG	Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
		SPST	Space Propulsion Synergy Team

SRB	Solid Rocket Booster	TSOA	Technical Standard Order Authorization
SRD	Systems Requirements Document	TSPI	Time Space Position Information
SRM	Solid Rocket Motor	TSTO	Two Stage To Orbit
SRSO	Senior Range Safety Officer	TTS	Thrust Termination System
SSA	System Safety Assessment	TVC	Thrust Vector Control
SSB	Single Side Band	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
SSME	Space Shuttle Main Engine	US	United States
SSP	Space Shuttle Program	USAF	United States Air Force
SSTO	Single Stage To Orbit	USBI	United States Boosters, Inc.
SSV	Space Shuttle Vehicle	USC	United States Code
STC	Space Traffic Control	VAB	Vehicle Assembly Building
STS	Space Transportation System	VFC/MFC	Maximum Speed For Stability Characteristics
SUA	Special Use Airspace	VDF/MDF	Demonstrated Flight Diving Speed
SUP	Suspected Unapproved Parts	VFR	Visual Flight Rules
SW	Software	VHF	Very High Frequency
TAL	Transoceanic Abort Landing	VOR	VHF Omnidirectional Range (navigation system)
TBD	To Be Determined	VSP	Vision Spaceport Program
TCAS	Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System	VTHL	Vertical Take Off and Horizontal Landing
TOGA	Takeoff/Go-Around	VTVL	Vertical Take Off and Landing
TOL	Transoceanic Landing	WSMC	Western Space and Missile Center
TPS	Thermal Protection System	WWI	World War 1
TSA	Transportation Security Administration	Wx	Weather
TSO	Technical Standard Order		

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Appendix B: RLV Guideline Input Suggestion Form

RLV Guideline Input Suggestion Form

Name: _____ Company Name: _____
Address: _____
City: _____ State, Postal Code, Country: _____
Phone: _____ Date: _____
Email: _____

Document: RLV O&M Guideline Inputs – Vol. 3 – Maintenance

Sec: _____ Page: _____ Line: _____

Documentation Error (Format, punctuation, spelling)

Content Error

Enhancement or Refinement

Rationale (Describe the error or justification for enhancement):

Proposed change (Attach marked up text or proposed rewrite):

Please provide any general comments for improvements of this document:

Return completed form to:

FAA/AST-100
RLV O&M
800 Independence Ave SW RM 331
Washington DC 20591

Table 4 Maintain System Sub-Function Traceability

Indicates Same from Previous to Current					Indicates Move from Previous to Current					Indicates New Sub-Function					Indicates no Previous to Current Correlation							
Current Sub-Functions										Previous Sub-Functions												
High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change	High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change	High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change	High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change			
Perform General Maintenance				New Name																		
	Manage Logistics			New																		
		Manage Parts			New																	
				See Approval Decomposition	New																	
		Schedule Maintenance			New																	
		Manage Personnel			New																	
				Schedule Personnel	New																	
				See Training Decomposition	New																	
				See Approval Decomposition	New																	
	Inspect			Moved from Perform Unscheduled Maintenance																		
	Test			New																		
	Return to Service			Moved from Perform Unscheduled Maintenance																		
Report			Moved from Perform Unscheduled Maintenance																			
Perform Unscheduled Maintenance	Perform Unscheduled Maintenance			Same	Perform Unscheduled Maintenance				Same													
	Diagnose			Same		Diagnose			Same													
	Repair/Adjust			New - Combined 2 DO3 sub-functions: Repair and Alter		Repair			Same													
					Alter			Changed to Adjust														
Perform Scheduled Maintenance				Same	Perform Scheduled Maintenance				Same													
	Perform Turnaround Maintenance			Same	Perform Scheduled Maintenance	Perform Turnaround Maintenance			Same													
		Recondition			New			Perform Post Flight Inspections	Moved to General Maintenance													
		Replenish			New			Correct Deficiencies	Moved to General Maintenance													
								Diagnose	Moved to Unscheduled Maintenance													

Current Sub-Functions					Previous Sub-Functions				
High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change	High Level Function	Second Level Sub-Function	Tertiary Sub-Function	Fourth Level Sub-unction	Change
								Inspect	Moved to General Maintenance
								Repair	Moved to Unscheduled Maintenance
								Alter	Moved to Unscheduled Maintenance
								Return to Service	Moved to General Maintenance
								Report	Moved to General Maintenance
								Perform Pre-Flight Inspection	Moved to General Maintenance
	Perform Interval-driven Maintenance			Same		Perform Interval-driven Maintenance			Same
	Perform Condition-Based Maintenance			New		Perform Part/Subsystem Life-Cycle Replacement			Replaced

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