U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Air Traffic Organization Policy

ORDER
JO 7210.3X
Effective Date:
February 9, 2012
 
     
Subject:  Facility Operation and Administration
       Includes:  Errata effective 2/9/12, Change 1 effective 7/26/12, Change 2 effective 3/7/13, and Change 3 effective 8/22/13
 
 

Table of Contents

Paragraph
Number
Title
2-1-7 AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE (ATS) CONTINUITY
2-1-17 PROHIBITED/RESTRICTED AREAS
2-1-27 REPORTING UNAUTHORIZED ILLUMINATION OF AIRCRAFT
2-1-30 OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPERATIONS
2-1-31 SPECIAL INTEREST SITES
2-3-1 GENERAL
4-3-2 APPROPRIATE SUBJECTS
4-3-5 APPROVAL
5-3-7 OPEN SKIES TREATY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY FLIGHTS (F AND D)
6-1-7 DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ADVISOR (TMA) INFORMATION
6-3-1 HANDLING OF SIGMETs, CWAs, AND PIREPs
6-9-1 GENERAL
6-9-5 NON-RVSM REQUIREMENTS
8-1-2 ALTRV FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING
10-1-8 PROCEDURES FOR OPENING AND CLOSING RUNWAYS
10-3-8 LINE UP AND WAIT (LUAW) OPERATIONS
10-5-4 ASR PERFORMANCE CHECKS
12-1-5 CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS
17-2-4 FIELD FACILITIES
17-9-13 VFR FLIGHTS
17-17-5 CDR DATA FORMAT
17-21-4 EXCEPTED FLIGHTS
17-24-1 PURPOSE
17-24-2 DEFINITIONS
17-24-3 RESPONSIBILITIES
19-9-1 POLICY
19-9-2 PURPOSE
   

1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 
2񩨃. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE (ATS) CONTINUITY
4-3-5. APPROVAL

2. BACKGROUND: This change is in response to recommendations made during the AOV Operational Contingency Plan Audit, dated April 8, 2011. The purpose is to synchronize air traffic policies related to the air traffic contingency plan as contained in FAA Orders JO 7210.3 and 1900.47.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

2-1-7. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE (ATS) CONTINUITY

 

2񩨃. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE DURING PLANNED AND UNPLANNED OUTAGES

When a control tower must be shut down for any reason, if at all possible, make a new ATIS broadcast indicating that the tower is closed.

 

Facilities must develop and maintain guidelines to provide continuity of required services during planned (for example, radar out for maintenance, frequency out for repair) or unplanned outages (for example, power failures, natural disasters).

Add

 

a. For planned outages, facilities must maintain a checklist that provides guidance on approving shutdowns. This checklist should be maintained at an operational manager's position (for example, OMIC desk, FLM desk). Facilities should consider the following for inclusion on the checklist:

Add

 

1. Traffic volume and complexity.

Add

 

2. Weather.

Add

 

3. Alternate means of providing air traffic services.

Add

 

4. Procedures to notify affected facilities when planned outage begins and ends.

Add

 

5. Other information related to the planned outage, as appropriate.

a. Facilities must develop and maintain current operational plans and procedures to provide continuity of required services during emergency conditions; e.g., power failures, fire, flood, storm damage and similar acts璷f璆od, civil disturbances, personnel absenteeism due to epidemics, transportation stoppages, etc. The plans must include provisions for the continuity of services during breakdown or maintenance shutdown of critical system components. Emergency plans should consider or provide for:

 

b. Facilities must develop and maintain operational plans for unplanned outages that provide continuity of services to the extent dictated by the outage (for example, power failures, fire, flood, storm damage, breakdown of critical system components, facility wide outages). The plans must be in accordance with JO 1900.47.

1. The safest and fastest transition of air traffic service responsibility to an operating facility.

 

Delete

2. Alternate means of providing radar service; e.g., terminal controllers using an ARTCC radar system in the center during a terminal radar outage.

 

Delete

3. LOA between contiguous centers, terminals, and flight service stations providing a specific area to be controlled and duties to be performed should a facility be rendered inoperative or partially handicapped due to a critical system component breakdown or shutdown.

 

Delete

4. LOA between facilities concerning emergency plans and military services.

 

Delete

5. Alternate means for notifying the appropriate facilities when the plan is to be implemented.

 

Delete

6. A priority list for the restoration of the telephone circuits at all ARTCCs and certain large terminal facilities designated by the service area offices. Provide the telephone office serving these facilities with a duplicate of this priority restoration list. Advise the telephone company that the list is applicable only when widespread outages of FAA circuits occur and when restoration would not be in competition with other users. The OMIC or designee must advise the telephone company that priority of restoral is subject to change due to changing or unusual circumstances.

 

Delete

b. Contingency plans must be:

 

Delete

1. Posted in the facility operations quarters.

 

Delete

2. Reviewed annually and updated as required.

 

Delete

3. Included in facility training programs.

 

Delete

c. A copy of current ARTCCs operational plans and revisions must be forwarded to System Operations Security, Military Operations Security and the ATCSCC.

 

Delete

OLD

 

NEW

4񪏙. APPROVAL

 

4񪏙. APPROVAL

title thru d   e. Ensure that current, new, or revised LOA, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and FAA Facility Orders (FO) are posted in the Facility Directives Repository (FDR) before the effective date of the document.

Add

 

EXCEPTION. LOAs containing contingency plan information must not be posted to the FDR. LOAs with such information must be posted to the National OCP database.


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 2񩧽7. PROHIBITED/RESTRICTED AREAS

2. BACKGROUND: Guidance for the use of Stationary Altitude Reservations (ALTRV) is being updated and clarified in the 7610.4. Associated with this change, separation criteria identical to SUAs criteria is being added to the 7110.65. This change will provide guidance to facilities on how the separation criteria for Stationary ALTRVs may changed based on the activity in the area.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

2񩧽7. PROHIBITED/RESTRICTED AREAS

 

2񩧽7. PROHIBITED/RESTRICTED AREAS AND STATIONARY ALTRVs

FAAO JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, prescribes separation requirements from special use and ATC assigned airspace. In recognition of the fact that several prohibited/restricted areas are established for security reasons or to contain hazardous activities not directly involving aircraft operations, provision is made for exempting these areas from vertical and radar separation minima if the areas have been identified by facility management. The intent in prescribing separation requirements from special use and ATC assigned airspace is to establish a buffer between nonparticipating aircraft and aircraft operations inside special use or ATC assigned airspace. As such, the buffer serves as an extra safety margin in consideration of possible operational, procedural, or equipment variances. Application of the separation prescribed in FAAO JO 7110.65 is not considered necessary whenever the prohibited/restricted airspace does not contain aircraft operations because these areas typically provide an internal buffer based upon the exact type of activity taking place. In making a determination to exempt specific areas, air traffic facility managers must be guided by the following:

 

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, prescribes separation requirements from special use, ATCassigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs. In recognition of the fact that prohibited/restricted areas and stationary ALTRVs may be established for security reasons or to contain hazardous activities not directly involving aircraft operations, provision is made for exempting these areas from vertical and radar separation minima if the areas have been identified by facility management. The intent in prescribing separation requirements from special use, ATCassigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs is to establish a buffer between nonparticipating aircraft and aircraft operations inside special use, ATC assigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs. As such, the buffer serves as an extra safety margin in consideration of possible operational, procedural, or equipment variances. Application of the separation prescribed in FAA Order JO 7110.65 is not considered necessary whenever the prohibited/restricted airspace and stationary ALTRV does not contain aircraft operations because these areas typically provide an internal buffer based upon the exact type of activity taking place. In making a determination to exempt specific areas, air traffic facility managers must be guided by the following:

a. Determine the exact nature of prohibited/restricted area utilization through direct liaison with the using agency.

 

a. Determine the exact nature of prohibited/restricted area and stationary ALTRV utilization through direct liaison with the using agency.


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 2񩧾7. Reporting Unauthorized Laser Illumination of Aircraft

2. BACKGROUND: The reporting of laser illumination incidents enables the FAA, in coordination with local law enforcement, the FBI, and other governmental agencies, such as Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to take action to safeguard flights against unauthorized illuminations and expeditiously locate the source of unauthorized laser transmissions.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

2񩧾7. Reporting Unauthorized Laser Illumination of Aircraft

 

2񩧾7. Reporting Unauthorized Laser Illumination of Aircraft

title thru h

 

No Change

NOTE
Facilities without direct access to the DEN must forward the information through the overlying TRACON or ARTCC facility.

 

NOTE-
Facilities without direct access to the DEN should forward the information through the Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC) to the DEN.


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 
2񩧿0. Opposite Direction Operations
4񪏖. Appropriate Subjects

2. BACKGROUND: Numerous ATSAP reports have been received that identify opposite direction operations as a causal or contributory factor to an event. Additionally, several losses of separation due to opposite direction operations have occurred throughout the NAS. In response to these events, a national workgroup was convened to assess the risks and mitigate the hazards associated with opposite direction operations.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

Add

 

2-1-30. Opposite Direction Operations

Add

 

a. The provisions of this paragraph are applicable to areas where radar service is provided. Nonradar procedures are contained in FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Chapter 6.

Add

 

b. At locations that conduct opposite direction operations for aircraft receiving IFR separation services, facility directives must define minimum cutoff points identified by distances or fixes for same runway operations between:

Add

 

1. An arrival and a departure.

Add

 

2. An arrival and an arrival.

Add

 

c. The cutoff points established under subparagraph b. must ensure that required longitudinal or lateral separation exists before any other type of separation is applied:

Add

 

1. When a departing aircraft becomes airborne and has been issued a turn to avoid conflict; or

Add

 

2. When the first aircraft has crossed the runway threshold for opposite direction arrivals.

Add

 

NOTE
If terrain and obstructions allow, the initial heading should meet the provisions of FAA Order JO 7110.65, Paragraph 5񪶳, Passing or Diverging.

Add

 

REFERENCE-
FAAO 7110.65, Para 1񩻪, Course Definition
FAAO7110.65, Para 3񫱲, Touch and Go or Stop and Go or Low Approach
FAAO 7110.65, Para 3񫱴, Simultaneous Opposite Direction Operations
FAAO 7110.65, Para 4񫱱1, Practice Approaches
FAAO 7110.65, Para 5񪶭, Application
FAAO 7110.65, Para 5񪶰, Minima
FAAO 7110.65, Para 5񪶳, Passing or Diverging
FAAO 7110.65, Para 5񫊛, Vectors Below Minimum Altitude
FAAO 7110.65, Para 7񩻩, Visual Separation

Add

 

d. At a minimum, the following must be considered when developing cutoff points:

Add

 

1. Aircraft performance.

Add

 

2. Type of approach.

Add

 

3. Operational position configuration.

Add

 

4. Runway configuration.

Add

 

5. Weather conditions.

Add

 

6. Existing facility waivers.

Add

 

e. Facility directives must:

Add

 

1. Require traffic advisories to both the arriving and departing aircraft.

Add

 

EXAMPLE
Opposite direction traffic (distance) mile final, (type aircraft).

Opposite direction traffic departing runway (number), (type aircraft).

Add

 

2.Restrict opposite direction same runway operations with opposing traffic inside the applicable cutoff point unless an emergency situation exists.

Add

 

3.Ensure that opposite direction operations conducted from parallel runways provide for a turn away from the opposing traffic when inside of the cutoff point to the other runway.

Add

 

4.Specify that towers not delegated separation responsibility are responsible to apply the cutoff points between arriving and departing aircraft.

Add

 

f.Facility directives must contain the following minimum coordination requirements:

Add

 

1. Define the position that is responsible for initiating coordination.

Add

 

2. All coordination must be on a recorded line, state 搊pposite direction, and include call sign, type, and arrival or departure runway.

Add

 

3.The tower must verbally request opposite direction departures with the TRACON/ARTCC.

Add

 

4.The TRACON/ARTCC must verbally request opposite direction arrivals with the tower.

Add

 

NOTE
Facilities that use opposite direction operations as a standard operation due to terrain constraints or noise abatement may be exempted from the provisions of subparagraph f. by the approval process in subparagraph g.

Add

 

g. Terminal standard operating procedures orders and all letters of agreement addressing opposite direction operations must be approved by the Service Area Director of Terminal Operations.

OLD   NEW
4-3-2. Appropriate Subjects   4-3-2. Appropriate Subjects
title thru h2   No change
Add   3. Opposite direction operations procedures.
Add   REFERENCE-
FAAO 7210.3, Para 2񩧿0, Opposite Direction Operations

1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 2񩧿1. SPECIAL INTEREST SITES

2. BACKGROUND: This change removes the supervisory/CIC facility requirements from FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 9񩻱, and moves them to FAA Order JO 7210.3.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

Add

 

2񩧿1. SPECIAL INTEREST SITES

Add

 

a. Supervisory/CIC personnel receiving any reports or information regarding unusual aircraft activities in the vicinity of special interest sites such as nuclear power plants, power plants, dams, refineries, etc., must immediately notify local law enforcement authorities of these reports/information and notify the overlying air traffic facility of any of these reports and the action taken. Supervisory/CIC personnel may receive reports/information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or other sources.

Add

 

b. Air traffic facilities must promptly advise the Domestic Events Network (DEN) of any actions taken in accordance with this paragraph.

Add   c.Individual facilities must determine which special interest sites, if any, should be displayed on maps, charts, and video displays.

1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 2񪏕. GENERAL

2. BACKGROUND: This change reinforces the requirement that facilities have a responsibility to track and monitor those employees who are required to maintain currency.  The change is intended to ensure consistent compliance in all facilities.  This change reinforces the current requirement specified in FAA Order 7210.3, Paragraph 2-3-1, General, which states that employees who are required to maintain currency have a personal responsibility to adhere to the requirements specified in FAA Order JO 7210.3 regarding currency requirements.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

2񪏕. GENERAL

 

2񪏕. GENERAL

It must be the responsibility of the employees identified in para 2񪏖, Application, to adhere to the requirements of this section.

 

a. It must be the responsibility of the employees identified in Paragraph 2񪏖, Application, to adhere to the requirements of this section.

Add

 

b. Facility managers must develop procedures for tracking and reporting currency for those employees identified in subparagraph 2񪏖b.


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 5񪏛. OPEN SKIES TREATY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY FLIGHTS (F and D)

2. BACKGROUND: An earlier DCP was initiated to clarify a misunderstanding that SUA must be always be vacated for Open Skies F and D aircraft. However, that DCP raised questions and drew comments regarding its wording. The intent is to clarify that Open Skies F and D aircraft can transit active SUA, but only in accordance with a Letter of Agreement (LOA) coordinated between the using agency and controlling agency that ensures Open Skies F and D aircraft transiting Active SUA are in compliance with FAA JO 7110.65 paragraph 9񪏘, Transiting Active SUA/ATCAA. The LOA does not necessarily need to be specific to Open Skies, but a concern has been that para 9񪏘 could overshadow the rules of FAA JO 7110.65 para 9񩻪2.c. and be misinterpreted to allow Open Skies F and D flights to transit active SUA not associated with an ATC facility. When Open Skies F and D aircraft transit SUA, there must be an ATC facility that will provide standard separation services at all times. Otherwise, the SUA must be vacated. In some instances, coordination between the using agency and controlling agency can designate airspace (i.e., block altitudes, stratification, or partitioning of airspace) that provides additional separation for Open Skies F and D aircraft from activities in SUA.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

5񪏛. OPEN SKIES TREATY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY FLIGHTS (F and D)

 

5񪏛. OPEN SKIES TREATY AIRCRAFT PRIORITY FLIGHTS (F and D)

title thru c

 

No Change

d. Upon initial notification of a priority OPEN SKIES flight, the affected ARTCCs/CERAPs/ HCF must inform all SUA璾sing/scheduling agencies along the route of flight and any other facility/agency it deems necessary within their area of responsibility of the flight path and possible deviation path of the aircraft.   d. Upon initial notfication of a priority OPEN SKIES flight, the affected ARTCCs/CERAPs/HCF must inform all SUA璾sing/scheduling agencies along the route of flight and any other facility/agency it deems necessary within their area of responsibility of the flight path and possible deviation path of the aircraft. A letter of agreement is required between the using agency and the controlling agency for Open Skies (F and D) aircraft to transit active SUA. When Open Skies (F and D) aircraft transit SUA, an ATC facility must provide standard separation services at all times.
NOTE
OPEN SKIES flights will not deviate from approved route of flight without ATC clearance.
  NOTE
OPEN SKIES flights will not deviate from approved route of flight without ATC clearance.

Add

 

REFERENCE-
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 9񩻪2.c.1(a)(1), Open Skies Treaty Aircraft


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 
 6-1-7. DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ADVISOR (TMA) INFORMATION
17-24-1. PURPOSE
17-24-2. DEFINITIONS
17-24-3. RESPONSIBILITIES

2. BACKGROUND: One of the first steps in the Joint Planning and Development Office's (JPDO) plans for the Next璆eneration Air Transportation System (NextGen) and the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) Flight Plan objectives is to develop and deploy a versatile, nationwide, time璪ased metering capability. JPDO and OEP plans document an end璽o璭nd time based flow management system that provides a more efficient alternative to today's miles璱n璽rail restrictions and ground stops. Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) is a comprehensive, automated method of planning efficient arrival trajectories from cruise altitude to the runway threshold. TMA increases situational awareness through its graphical displays, timelines, and load graphs. TMA trajectories are optimized for each aircraft to permit an accurate estimated time of arrival at an airport and provide scheduled times of arrival (meter times) that optimize the flow of traffic into a terminal area. Now that Phase 1 of the TMA development is complete, planning for the next generation of Time瑽ased Flow Management (TBFM) has begun. Phase 2 will include additional TMA airports, improve the functionality of TMA in support of Adjacent Center Metering (ACM), TRACON Metering, Enhanced Departure Capability (EDC), and point璱n璼pace metering.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

Add

 

6-1-7. DISPLAY OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT ADVISOR (TMA) INFORMATION

Add

 

Configure TMA delay information for single-center metering (SCM) or adjacent-center metering (ACM) to display TMA schedule information on the main display monitor (MDM).

 

 

 

OLD

 

NEW

Add   Section 24. Traffic Management Advisor (TMA)
Add   17241. PURPOSE
Add   This section establishes procedures and responsibilities for the use of Traffic Management Advisor (TMA).
     

OLD

 

NEW

Add   17242. DEFINITIONS
Add   a. Adjacent Center Metering (ACM). An extension of SCM that provides time璪ased metering capability to neighboring facilities. There are three categories of ACM processing and control at a facility:
Add   1. Controlling facility The TMA unit that exercises control over SCM and/or ACM settings and the relevant metering operation.
Add   2, Limited Control The ability to manage specific ACM settings and activities for relevant metering operations.
Add   3. Non瑿ontrolling A facility that only has monitoring capability.
Add   b. Coupled Scheduling. An automation process that adds additional meter璸oints and allows the linking of time璪ased flow management (TBFM) systems. This results in more optimal balancing and distribution of delays over a greater distance from the airport or meter point.
Add   c. En Route Departure Capability (EDC). A functionality within TMA that assists TMCs in formulating release times to adapted meter points in space.
Add   d. Metering. A method of controlling aircraft demand by scheduling the time at which each aircraft should cross a predetermined fix.
Add   e. Rippling. The recalculation of TMA-generated, frozen scheduled times of arrival (STA) resulting from a manual action at the controlling graphical user interface (GUI). Rippling, also commonly referred to as 搑escheduling" or 搑eshuffling," can be executed independently but is normally associated with changes to TMA configurations or settings.
Add   f. Single Center Metering (SCM). An application of the TMA tool that provides TMCs with the ability to view and manage arrival flows to an ARTCC's internal airports.
Add   g. Time瑽ased Flow Management (TBFM). The technology and methods of balancing demand and capacity utilizing time.
Add   h. Traffic Flow Management (TFM). The processes and initiatives a TMC uses to balance air traffic demand with system capacity.
Add   i. Traffic Management Advisor (TMA). A comprehensive, automated method of planning efficient arrival trajectories from cruise altitude to the runway threshold.
     

OLD

 

NEW

Add   17243. RESPONSIBILITIES
Add   a. The ATCSCC must:
Add   1. Be the final decision authority for TMA璻elated operations and initiatives.
Add   2. Manage the equity of overall system delays throughout the NAS.
Add   3. Host/participate in ACM discussions and support all ACM and other time璪ased metering initiatives. Collaborate on an exit strategy when ACM is no longer required.
Add   4. Include the status of any pertinent TMA璻elated information on the planning telecons and on the Operational Information System (OIS).
Add   5. Prioritize TBFM activity based on NAS and/or facility constraints.
Add   6. Inform impacted facilities of relevant information that would influence arrival metering decisions or en route EDC operations.
Add   7. Establish and maintain multi璮acility communications when necessary for ACM operations.
Add   8. Log ACM events and other TMA activities as appropriate in the NTML.
Add   9. Serve as a repository for TBFM information and TMA reference materials.
Add   b. All TMUs with controlling TMA systems must:
Add   1. Determine appropriate TMA settings.
Add   2. Ensure TMA settings are entered, current, and coordinated.
Add   3. Monitor TMA to determine metering timeframes and coordinate start/stop times and reportable delays with the ATCSCC and affected facilities.
Add   4. Communicate meter start/stop information to operational areas, operating positions, and participating facilities, and enter into NTML as necessary.
Add   5. Enable sector meter list as coordinated.
Add   6. Monitor internal facility metering delays and initiate actions, as appropriate, when values exceed or are projected to exceed delays that can be absorbed by control sectors. Notify the FLM or affected areas/sectors of actions taken and expected outcomes.
Add   7. Monitor multi璵etering scenarios. Advise ATCSCC if time based metering (TBM) to multiple airports or fixes is impacting or projected to impact sector or facility level operations.
Add   8. Coordinate changes to the metering plan or updates to the TMA schedule with the affected facilities.
Add   9. Coordinate internally with affected areas and with any ACM supporting facilities before taking action to update the TMA schedule.
Add   10. To the extent possible, avoid making any changes in TMA that cause a global schedule change (rippling) during metering operations. Advise affected facilities and sectors before rippling.
Add   NOTE
Coordinate and disable the sector meter list when rippling is necessary. Enable the metering list when rippling is complete.
Add   11. Use TMA to determine release times for internal departures to a metered airport.
Add   12. Monitor arrival and departure flows for potential metering actions/changes.
Add   13. Monitor internal and adjacent facility metering compliance and take appropriate action.
Add   14. Coordinate and disable sector meter list when metering times are no longer in effect.
Add   c. Supporting TMUs performing ACM or coupled scheduling must:
Add   1. Determine appropriate local TMA settings.
Add   2. Ensure TMA settings are entered, current, and coordinated.
Add   3. Coordinate with controlling facility and ATCSCC, as appropriate.
Add   4. Communicate meter start/stop information to operational areas, operating positions, and participating facilities.
Add   5. Enable sector meter list as coordinated.
Add   6. Use TMA to determine release times for internal departures to a metered airport.
Add   7. Monitor arrival and departure flows for potential metering actions/changes.
Add   NOTE
Coordinate and disable the sector meter list when rippling is necessary. Enable the metering list when rippling is complete.
Add   8. Monitor internal and upstream compliance.
Add   9. Disable the sector meter list when metering has been completed.
     

1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE:  6񪏕. HANDLING OF SIGMETs, CWAs, AND PIREPs

2. BACKGROUND: The FAA is responsible for providing meteorological data to stakeholders of the NAS. This includes disseminating and distributing observations, forecasts, and warning messages that pertain to volcanic activity including volcanic ash. PIREPs for volcanic activity and volcanic ash are provided to ATC in a specified format which is delineated in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). These reports are then forwarded to the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC) and are used to issue volcanic ash SIGMETs. These changes follow new ICAO guidelines as set forth by the International Airways Volcano Watch Operations Group and are in effect as of November 2010.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

6񪏕. HANDLING OF SIGMETs, CWAs, AND PIREPs

 

6񪏕. HANDLING OF SIGMETs, CWAs, AND PIREPs

 a thru c1(f)

 

No Change

Add

 

(g) Detection of sulfur gases (SO2 or H2S), associated with volcanic activity, in the cabin.

Add

 

NOTE
The smell of sulfur gases in the cockpit may indicate volcanic activity that has not yet been detected or reported and/or possible entry into an ash璪earing cloud. SO2 is identifiable as the sharp, acrid odor of a freshly struck match. H2S has the odor of rotten eggs.

c1(g)

 

Renumber to c1(h)


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 
6񬅝. GENERAL
6񬅡. NON璕VSM REQUIREMENTS
8񩧾. ALTRV FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING
12񩨁. CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS
17񬅝3. VFR FLIGHTS
17214. EXCEPTED FLIGHTS

2. BACKGROUND: ICAO 2012 changes the way aircraft are required to file. This will require the use of the term MEDEVAC for civilian air ambulance flights in the Special Handling Section of the ICAO flight plan. To maintain consistency between ICAO and HOST flight plan filing, all civilian air ambulance flights will be required to file as a MEDEVAC instead of the previous term Lifeguard.

3. CHANGE: 

OLD

 

NEW

6񬅝. GENERAL

 

6񬅝. GENERAL

title thru b1

 

No Change

NOTE
1.
The following non璕VSM aircraft are exceptions to the exclusive RVSM airspace. However, access will be on a workload璸ermitting basis:
a. DOD aircraft.
b
.DOD certified aircraft operated by NASA (T38,F15, F18, WB57, S3, and U2 aircraft only).
c. Lifeguard aircraft.

 

NOTE
1.
The following non璕VSM aircraft are exceptions to the exclusive RVSM airspace. However, access will be on a workload璸ermitting basis:
a. DOD aircraft.
b. DODcertified aircraft operated by NASA (T38, F15, F18, WB57, S3, and U2 aircraft only).
c. MEDEVAC aircraft.

     

OLD

 

NEW

6񬅡. NON璕VSM REQUIREMENTS   6񬅡. NON璕VSM REQUIREMENTS
 title thru a   No Change
b. DOD, DOD certified aircraft operated by NASA (T38, F15, F18, WB57, S3, and U2 aircraft only), Lifeguard, aircraft operated by manufacturers for certification and development, and Foreign State exception aircraft will be accommodated in RVSM airspace on a workload permitting basis.   b. DOD, DODcertified aircraft operated by NASA (T38, F15, F18, WB57, S3, and U2 aircraft only), MEDEVAC, aircraft operated by manufacturers for certification and development, and Foreign State exception aircraft will be accommodated in RVSM airspace on a workload permitting basis.
     

OLD

 

NEW

8񩧾. ALTRV FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING   8񩧾. ALTRV FLIGHT DATA PROCESSING
title thru a4   No Change
Add   5. Flight Plan Entries for MARSA and ALTRV
Add   (a) For domestic flight plans (not leaving U.S. domestic airspace), include 揗ARSA and/or 揂LTRV in Field 11.
Add   (b) For international flight plans, include the word(s) 揗ARSA and/or 揂LTRV in Reasons for Special Handling (STS/). Do not include additional/supplemental information in STS/. Include any additional/supplemental information in Remarks (RMK/).
Add   EXAMPLES
STS/ALTRV

STS/MARSA RMK/AR20HFAKER1233 IR101E1802X1845 MARSA BAKER23
     

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12񩨁. CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS   12񩨁. CATEGORIES OF OPERATIONS
title thru a1   No Change
2. Air Taxi: Operations by aircraft other than those identified in Appendix 3 which use three-letter company designators or the prefix 揟 (TANGO) or 揕 (Lifeguard).    2. Air Taxi: Operations by aircraft other than those identified in Appendix 3 which use three-letter company designators or the prefix 揟 (TANGO) or 揕 (MEDEVAC).

 

 

 

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17񬅝3. VFR FLIGHTS

 

17񬅝3. VFR FLIGHTS

 title thru a

 

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b. Aircraft requesting to remain VFR will be at the discretion of the terminal facility with the GDP, if they can be accommodated without additional delay to IFR aircraft, except in unusual circumstances, e.g., emergency, Lifeguard.   b. Aircraft requesting to remain VFR will be at the discretion of the terminal facility with the GDP, if they can be accommodated without additional delay to IFR aircraft, except in unusual circumstances; for example, emergency, MEDEVAC.
     

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17214. EXCEPTED FLIGHTS   17214. EXCEPTED FLIGHTS
title thru b   No Change
c. Active air ambulance utilizing 揕ifeguard call sign;   c. Active air ambulance utilizing MEDEVAC call sign;

 

 

 


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 10񩨄. PROCEDURES FOR OPENING AND CLOSING RUNWAYS

2. BACKGROUND: Operations on closed runways are a growing concern in the NAS. This risk arises from several areas: breakdowns in communication, the variety of conditions which prompt closures, lack of (or consistent use of) effective visual aids or memory joggers, etc. Legally, only airport management at civil airports and military operations office are permitted to open or close a runway. There are many reasons that runways may need to be closed. Short璬uration closures may be necessary for clearance of winter contaminants from the runway; regular maintenance of airfield pavements, lighting and signage; grass cutting; and airfield inspections, among other reasons. Longer璬uration closures may be necessary for airfield construction projects and longer璬uration maintenance activities. Regardless of the duration of the closure, close coordination is needed among the ATM, other air traffic facilities, and airport management to ensure all involved maintain safe operations when closing and reopening runways.

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10񩨄. PROCEDURES FOR OPENING AND CLOSING RUNWAYS

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Each ATM:

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a. Must ensure that the authority, responsibility, and procedures to be used when opening or closing a runway are defined in an LOA with airport management/military operations office. Items which should be addressed, if relevant, are: the use of barriers/visual aids (lighted or unlighted 揦, barricades, etc.), portions of the closed runway available for ground operations such as crossings, and information for issuing NOTAMs. Other items may be included, as appropriate.

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NOTE
Only the airport management/military operations office can close or open a runway.

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b. Must develop and provide a tailored checklist to be used when opening and closing a runway. A facility directive must designate the position responsible for completing the checklist. Items which should be included, if relevant, are:

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1. Coordination.

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(a) Airport management.

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(b) Intra璮acility.

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(c) Inter璮acility.

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(d) Technical operations.

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(e) Traffic management.

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2. Memory aids.

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3. Safety Logic System.

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4. Status information area.

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5. Airfield lighting.

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6. NAVAIDs.

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7. ATIS.

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8. Entry on the daily log.

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c. May increase the number of items and/or the level of detail of the opening and closing checklist as they deem necessary.

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d. Must ensure that a facility directive includes procedures for the use of a memory aid that visually and/or aurally indicates that the runway is closed. Where a memory aid for a closed runway has been established, its use must be mandatory. Where a memory aid for a closed runway is not in place, utilize collaborative efforts to develop and implement site璼pecific memory aid(s) and procedures outlining its use.

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NOTE
When implementing these procedures, one should consider short璽erm versus long璽erm closures as well as planned versus unplanned processes.

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REFERENCE-
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 3񪏕, Landing Area Condition
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 3񪏖, Closed/Unsafe Runway Information
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 4񫞅2, Airport Conditions
FAAO JO 7210.3, Para 4񫞇, System Impact Reports
FAAO JO 7210.3, Para 17񪶭3, Electronic System Impact Reports

Paragraphs 1018 thru 10112

 

Renumber 1019 thru 10113

 

 

 


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 10񪏜. LINE UP AND WAIT (LUAW) OPERATIONS

2. BACKGROUND: The original requirements for the facilty LUAW directive required each element contained in paragraph 10񪏜 (a) through (i) to be addressed. The inclusion of elements that are not applicable in the facility directive caused confusion while in the draft stage. This change will require the facility to consider each element in their LUAW directive, but only include the elements that are applicable to the operation in the facility directive.

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10񪏜. LINE UP AND WAIT (LUAW) OPERATIONS

 

10񪏜. LINE UP AND WAIT (LUAW) OPERATIONS

a1 thru a2

 

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3. Prepare a facility directive prescribing:

 

3. Prepare a facility directive. The directive must prescribe items (a) through (d). Items (e) through (i) must be included if applicable.


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 10-5-4. ASR PERFORMANCE CHECKS

2. BACKGROUND: There are many automated tracking systems in use in the NAS. Technology has progressed faster than our ability to keep directives up to date. Many locations use digital tracking platforms that conduct continuous self璵onitoring for performance and alignment. At those locations, controller responsibility to conduct performance checks are no longer necessary.

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10񪶰. ASR PERFORMANCE CHECKS

 

10񪶰. ASR PERFORMANCE CHECKS

a. Each radar controller is responsible for determining on a day璽o璬ay basis if the quality of their radar display and video display accuracy is satisfactory for ATC purposes. Radar quality and performance is determined by comparing identified targets against data obtained during the commissioning flight check or through minimum performance criteria determined jointly by air traffic and Technical Operations personnel. Radar controllers must be familiar with commissioning flight check and minimum performance data. Air traffic managers must make this information available to the controllers. Aircraft selected for these daily checks should be small aircraft similar in size to those used in the commissioning flight checks.

 

Each radar controller is responsible for determining on a day璽o璬ay basis if the quality of their radar display and video display accuracy is satisfactory for ATC purposes.

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a. At locations using digital terminal automation systems (DTAS), such as STARS, MEARTS, and ARTS III璄, daily ASR performance checks are not required. DTAS conducts continuous self monitoring checks for performance and alignment.

REFERENCE-
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 5񩧾, Alignment Check
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Add   b. At facilities that do not use a DTAS, radar quality and performance is determined by comparing identified targets against data obtained during the commissioning flight check or through minimum performance criteria determined jointly by air traffic and Technical Operations personnel. Radar controllers must be familiar with commissioning flight check and minimum performance data. Air traffic managers must make this information available to the controllers. Aircraft selected for these daily checks should be small aircraft similar in size to those used in the commissioning flight checks.
b. The daily radar performance check, except at MEARTS and REHOST facilities, must be a part of the routine checks of equipment. (See para 4񫊝, Preparation of FAA Form 72304). The check must be accomplished once each watch. It is recognized that on some watches this check may not be accomplished because of the lack of traffic. The facility air traffic manager may request a special flight check to ensure that the requirements of para 10񪶰, ASR Performance Checks, are met.   c. The daily radar performance check must be a part of the routine checks of equipment. (See para 4񫊝, Preparation of FAA Form 72304). The check must be accomplished once each watch. It is recognized that on some watches this check may not be accomplished because of the lack of traffic.
Add   REFERENCE-
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 5񩧾, Alignment Check.
NOTE
The MEARTS and REHOST operational programs accomplish ASR performance checks automatically.
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1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 17񩻬. FIELD FACILITIES

2. BACKGROUND: In order to ensure appropriate coordination of route closures, facilities must be required to contact the ATCSCC via telephone or hotline coordination as soon as this information becomes available.

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17񩻬. FIELD FACILITIES

 

17񩻬. FIELD FACILITIES

title thru a5

 

No change

6. The ATCSCC is advised of all known component changes that could have a significant system impact (e.g., NAVAID/radar shutdowns, runway closures, TELCO outages, computer malfunctions or outages, and procedural changes affecting key terminals and/or centers).

 

6. The ATCSCC is advised by telephone or hotline coordination of all known component changes that could have a significant system impact (for example, route/airway closures, NAVAID/radar shutdowns, runway closures, TELCO outages, computer malfunctions or outages, and procedural changes affecting key terminals and/or centers).



1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 17175. CDR DATA FORMAT

2. BACKGROUND: There is an increased emphasis on the use of area navigation (RNAV) procedures in the National Airspace System. Currently, the CDR database contains CDRs that contain both conventional and RNAV璪ased CDRs. However, many facilities are not taking advantage of RNAV standard terminal arrival routes (STAR) at destinations served by these procedures.

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17175. CDR DATA FORMAT

 

17175. CDR DATA FORMAT

title thru a3

 

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b. CDRs may be developed for aircraft with basic navigational capabilities (/A) or with advanced RNAV capabilities (/E, /F, /G, /K, /L, /Q, /R).

 

b. CDRs may be developed for aircraft with basic navigational capabilities or with advanced RNAV capabilities. When developing or amending CDRs, the RNAV STAR is preferred. Facilities may include both conventional and RNAV CDRs in their CDR database.

 


1. PARAGRAPH NUMBER AND TITLE: 
19񬅝. POLICY
19񬅞. PURPOSE

2. BACKGROUND: SECNOTs are currently limited only to security violations associated with aircraft operations in the DC SFRA and TFRs. There have been very few SECNOTs issued under this criteria. However, there is a need for use of SECNOTs for other law enforcement activities involving aircraft that are considered a security threat.

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19񬅝. POLICY

 

19񬅝. POLICY

This section contains policy, responsibilities, and procedures for issuing a SECNOT. A SECNOT is only issued when the following occurs: an aircraft violates a TFR/DC SFRA, the pilot has been in contact with ATC and the aircraft identification is known, and the pilot tries to avoid a pilot deviation.   This section contains policy, responsibilities, and procedures for issuing a SECNOT. A SECNOT is only issued when the aircraft identification is known and either a security violation has occurred or an aircraft is considered a security risk.
NOTE
SECNOTs involving future designations of land璪ased ADIZ airspace will be handled in accordance with this section
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19񬅞. PURPOSE   19񬅞. PURPOSE
a. A SECNOT enables the FAA to locate aircraft that violate national security measures. These security measures include the DC SFRA and TFRs.   a. A SECNOT enables the FAA to locate aircraft that violate national security measures or are considered a security risk. National security measures include the DC SFRA and TFRs. Security risks include stolen aircraft and other law enforcement activities involving aircraft.

b. A SECNOT is a request originated by the Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC) for an extensive communications search for aircraft involved or suspected of being involved in a security violation.

 

b. A SECNOT is a request originated by the Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC) for an extensive communications search for aircraft involved or suspected of being involved in a security violation or are considered a security risk.

 

 

 


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