Paragraph
Number

Title

4-3-1

LETTERS OF AGREEMENT

CHAPTER 11
SECTION 9

NATIONAL PROGRAMS
SAFETY LOGIC SYSTEMS SUPERVISOR/CIC PROCEDURES

11-9-1

SYSTEM OPERATION

11-9-2

ENSURE STATUS

11-9-3

MONITOR ALERTS AND ENSURE CORRECTIVE ACTION

11-9-4

RAIN CONFIGURATION

11-9-5

LIMITED CONFIGURATION

17-5-11

PROCESSING RESTRICTIONS FOR FACILITIES WITH NTML

17-11-1

GENERAL

17-11-2

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

17-12-2

RESPONSIBILITIES

17-15-6

PROCEDURES

17-18-2

POLICY

17-18-6

PROCEDURES

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4-3-1. LETTERS OF AGREEMENT

4-3-1. LETTERS OF AGREEMENT

Title through g2

No Change

3. Exchanging braking action reports with the airport management. As a minimum, procedures shall provide for the prompt exchange of reports which indicate runway braking conditions have deteriorated to "poor" or "nil" or have improved to "good".

3. Exchange braking action reports with the airport management. As a minimum, procedures shall provide for the prompt exchange of reports which indicate runway braking conditions have deteriorated to "fair," "poor," or "nil" or have improved to "good."

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Chapter 11. National Programs

Chapter 11. National Programs

Section 9. Safety Logic Systems Supervisor/CIC Procedures

Section 9. Safety Logic Systems Front-Line Manager/CIC Procedures

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11-9-1. SYSTEM OPERATION

11-9-1. SYSTEM OPERATION

a. Safety Logic Systems are software enhancements to the ASDE-3, ASDE-X, and ASDE-3X that predict the path of aircraft landing and/or departing, and/or vehicular movements on runways. Visual and aural alerts are activated when the safety logic projects a potential collision.

a. Safety Logic Systems are software enhancements to the ASDE-3 and ASDE-X that predict the path of aircraft landing and/or departing, and/or vehicular movements on runways. Visual and aural alerts are activated when the safety logic projects a potential collision.

1. AMASS is a safety logic system enhancement to the ASDE-3 SMR.

1. AMASS is a safety logic system enhancement to the ASDE-3.

2. The ASDE-X Safety Logic System is an integral part of the software program.

2. ASDE-X Safety Logic is a system enhancement to ASDE-X.

3. ASDE-3X uses the ASDE-X Safety Logic System.

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b. The Safety Logic System shall be operated in a full core alert runway configuration.

b. The Safety Logic System shall be operated in a full core alert runway configuration. (In ASDE X, when rain configuration is selected, it includes full core alerting capabilities.)

c. When ASDE-3 and/or AMASS is in maintenance mode, AMASS data shall be considered invalid and the system shall be taken offline. The supervisor/CIC shall validate, upon resumption of normal AMASS operations, that runway configurations and other user settings are adequate for operational use.

c. When ASDE-3 and/or AMASS is in maintenance mode, AMASS data shall be considered invalid and the system shall be taken offline. The front-line manager/CIC shall validate, upon resumption of normal AMASS operations, that runway configurations and other user settings are adequate for operational use.

NOTE-
Action to change AMASS online/offline status is a Technical Operations function. ASDE-X and ASDE-3X safety logic will automatically be disabled when the system is in maintenance mode.

NOTE-
Action to change AMASS online/offline status is a Technical Operations function. ASDE-X safety logic will automatically be disabled when the system is in maintenance mode.

d. When a runway becomes unavailable for aircraft operations for an extended period of time, the runway should be entered as, "Closed" in the Safety Logic System. Facility procedures should be developed to address using the Safety Logic System in this capacity.

No Change

e. Construction projects in the vicinity of runways may cause nuisance or false alerts. The NASE may be able to provide an adaptation to filter the affected areas from Safety Logic System coverage. Facilities shall contact the NASE via email at 9-AMC-AOS-AMASS@faa.gov, 30 to 45 days before the construction is scheduled to begin to assist in determining whether an adaptation is necessary.

e. Construction projects in the vicinity of runways may cause nuisance or false alerts. The National Airway Systems Engineering (NASE) group may be able to provide an adaptation to filter the affected areas from Safety Logic System coverage. Facilities shall contact NASE via email at either 9-AMC-ATOW-ASDE-X@faa.gov or 9-AMC-AOS-AMASS@faa.gov, 30 to 45 days before the construction is scheduled to begin to assist in determining whether an adaptation is necessary.

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f. ASDE-X false targets may be temporarily track dropped after positive verification has been accomplished via pilot/vehicle operator position report or controller visual observation. When a false target is temporarily dropped, it shall be noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation.

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REFERENCE-
FAAO JO 7110.65, Para 3-6-2, Identification.

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g. The Air Traffic Manager may authorize a real target to be inhibited from safety logic processing when the target will likely generate a nuisance alert.

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11-9-2. ENSURE STATUS

11-9-2. ENSURE STATUS

a. The supervisor/CIC is responsible for ensuring that the Safety Logic System is set for the correct runway configuration.

a. The front-line manager/CIC is responsible for ensuring that the Safety Logic System is set for the correct runway configuration.

b. The supervisor/CIC shall ensure that the operational status of the Safety Logic System is known to all operational personnel.

b. The front-line manager/CIC shall ensure that the operational status of the Safety Logic System is known to all operational personnel.

c. When a status change is made to the Safety Logic System (i.e., online or offline, or limited configuration), all personnel assigned an operational position shall be notified verbally.

c. When a status change is made to the Safety Logic System all personnel assigned an operational position shall be notified verbally.

d. When the Safety Logic System is offline, it shall be noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation. Such status shall be shown in the facility Status Information Area (SIA). The supervisor/CIC shall ensure that all outages are carried over on applicable logs.

d. When any status change is made to the Safety Logic System it shall be noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation. Such status shall be shown in the facility Status Information Area (SIA). The front-line manager/CIC shall ensure that all outages are carried over on applicable logs.

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11-9-3. MONITOR ALERTS AND ENSURE CORRECTIVE ACTION

11-9-3. MONITOR ALERTS AND ENSURE CORRECTIVE ACTION

a. The Supervisor/CIC shall ensure that the Safety Logic System is monitored and all alerts are complied with.

a. The front-line manager/CIC shall ensure that the Safety Logic System is monitored and all alerts are complied with.

b. All Safety Logic System alerts generated shall be documented on FAA Form 7230-4. If unable to determine the origin of an alert, treat the alert as false.

b. All Safety Logic System alerts generated shall be documented on FAA Form 7230-4. If unable to determine the origin of an alert, treat the alert as false and notify Technical Operations so that corrective action can be taken.

NOTE-
The purpose of logging Safety Logic System alerts is to track the reliability and performance of the system. Therefore, the Quality Assurance Review (QAR) process shall not be used for false or nuisance alerts.

c. The purpose of logging Safety Logic System alerts is to track the reliability and performance of the system. Therefore, the Quality Assurance Review (QAR) process shall not be used for false or nuisance alerts.

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11-9-4. RAIN CONFIGURATION

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a. Due to the required sensitivity of surface movement radars, numerous false targets may be generated by moderate to extreme precipitation. During these periods the ASDE-X and AMASS Safety Logic Systems should be operated in rain configuration. Should precipitation of this magnitude occur or be imminent, rain configuration may be applied to avoid the likelihood of false alerts.

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b. When the event that led to placing the system into rain configuration is no longer a factor, the Safety Logic System must be reset to a normal configuration.

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NOTE-
When AMASS is in rain configuration all safety logic alerts with the exception of arrivals to a closed runway are inhibited and AMASS is not in full core alert status.

11-9-4 and 11-9-5

Renumbered 11-9-5 and 11-9-6

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11-9-4. LIMITED CONFIGURATION

11-9-5. LIMITED CONFIGURATION

a. Under certain circumstances, there may be a need to operate the Safety Logic System in limited configuration. The limited configuration shall only be used for the following reasons:

a. Under certain circumstances, there may be a need to operate the Safety Logic System in limited configuration. The limited configuration shall only be used to temporarily inhibit persistent false alerts. The term "persistent false alert" refers to frequent false alerts caused by continuous or repetitive circumstances. False alerts caused by random events or circumstances of short duration are not considered "persistent false alerts." The determination of "persistent alerts" is at the discretion of each front-line manager/CIC.

1. Moderate to Heavy Precipitation. Due to the required sensitivity of surface movement radars, numerous targets may be caused by precipitation of moderate or greater intensity. Should precipitation of this magnitude occur or be imminent, limited configuration may be applied to avoid the likelihood of nuisance alerts.

b. Due to the required sensitivity of surface movement radars, numerous false targets may be caused by precipitation of moderate or greater intensity. Should precipitation of this magnitude occur or be imminent at locations where ASDE does not have rain configuration availability, limited configuration may be applied to avoid the likelihood of false alerts.

2. False Alerting. Following the determination of a false alert, limited configuration should be applied and Technical Operations notified. Once the cause of the alert has been identified by Technical Operations and/or NASE, the availability of the Safety Logic System in full core alerting will be at the discretion of the facility management, taking into account the cause of the false alert, any pending resolution to the false alert, and the recommendation of Technical Operations or NASE.

c. When it is necessary to operate the ASDE-X Safety Logic System in limited configuration due to "persistent false alerts," notify Technical Operations so that corrective action can be taken.

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d. When an AMASS false alert is received, limited configuration shall only be used until Technical Operations verifies that the system is functioning properly and that the data necessary to analyze the alert has been obtained. Analysis and resolution of the circumstances surrounding the false alert will be determined by Technical Operations at a later date.

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e. When limited configuration is applied, it shall be noted on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation, including the reason for the configuration change. Ensure that all limited configurations are carried over on applicable logs.

NOTE-
1. For AMASS, the limited configuration disables all alerts except arrivals to a closed runway.
 

2. For ASDE- X and ASDE-3X, the limited configuration disables all alerts except arrivals to and departures on a closed runway.

3 through c

NOTE-
1. For AMASS, the limited configuration disables all alerts except arrivals to a closed runway and is not considered full-core alert status.

2. For ASDE-X the limited configuration disables all alerts except arrivals to and departures on a closed runway and is not considered full-core alert status.
 

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17-5-11. PROCESSING RESTRICTIONS FOR FACILITIES WITH NTML

17-5-11. PROCESSING REQUESTS FOR REROUTES AND RESTRICTIONS FOR FACILITIES WITH NTML

Title through b

No Change

c. Restrictions/modifications associated with reroutes:

c. Requests for reroutes and associated restrictions/modifications:

1. Restrictions will be discussed during the development of the reroute.

1. Field facilities must share Flow Evaluation Areas (FEA) that may require implementation of traffic management initiatives. If requesting a reroute in conjunction with a shared FEA, notify the ATCSCC National System Strategy Team (NSST) via the NTML of the FEA and the proposed reroute. Any facility requiring a restriction in conjunction with a reroute must enter the initiative into NTML via the RSTN template with the SVR WX RERTE button enabled and transmit to the NSST.

2. Any facility requiring a restriction in conjunction with a reroute must enter the initiative into the RSTN template with the SVR WX RERTE button enabled. Modifications to previously approved restrictions with a reroute must be verbally coordinated through the ATCSCC Severe Weather Unit prior to submitting in NTML.

2. The ATCSCC NSST must monitor NTML and respond to field facility requests for reroutes and restrictions associated with shared FEAs. The NSST must evaluate reroute requests and, if applicable, conference the appropriate facilities to coordinate the reroute. Restrictions will be discussed during the development of the reroute.

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3. When applicable, the NSST must transmit the reroute and enter approved restrictions in the NTML.

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4. Modifications to previously approved reroutes and associated restrictions must be verbally coordinated through the NSST prior to submitting the modification via NTML.

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17-11-1. GENERAL

17-11-1. GENERAL

a. The AT system is most susceptible to thunder-storm activity between April and October on a national basis. Thunderstorms create a major disruption to the normal and organized movement of air traffic and significantly increase the workload in an impacted facility. To meet this challenge, System Operations has charged the ATCSCC to set aside a cadre of TMSs to deal directly and independently with severe weather problem areas. To accomplish this task, the ATCSCC established severe weather management teams.

a. The AT system is most susceptible to thunderstorm activity between April and October on a national basis. Thunderstorms create a major disruption to the normal and organized movement of air traffic and significantly increase the workload in an impacted facility. To meet this challenge, System Operations has charged the ATCSCC to set aside a cadre of National Traffic Management Officers (NTMO) to deal directly and independently with severe weather problem areas. To accomplish this task, the ATCSCC established the National System Strategy Team (NSST).

b. When the potential for severe weather exists which will cause a disruption to normal traffic movements, the ATCSCC severe weather management specialists will implement procedures designed to optimize the use of the available airspace. Strategic planning is an integral part of severe weather management and the responsibility of all involved.

b. When the potential for severe weather exists which will cause a disruption to normal traffic movements, the ATCSCC NSST will implement procedures designed to optimize the use of the available airspace. Strategic planning is an integral part of severe weather management and the responsibility of all involved.

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17-11-2. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

17-11-2. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The ATCSCC shall be the final approving authority for alternate routes and initiatives that transcend center or terminal boundaries.

The ATCSCC must be the final approving authority for alternate routes and initiatives that transcend center or terminal boundaries.

a. The ATCSCC severe weather management supervisor shall:

a. The ATCSCC NSST must:

1

No Change

2. Ensure coordination is completed to develop severe weather strategies.

2. Ensure coordination is completed to implement TM initiatives in support of severe weather management.

NOTE-
ATCSCC NTMOs shall be responsible for the implementation of TM initiatives in support of severe weather management.

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3. Conduct special weather TELCONs, when appropriate.

3. Conduct a daily NSST operations critique with affected facilities and system customers, as appropriate.

4. Conduct a daily severe weather operations critique with ATCSCC severe weather management specialists, affected facilities, and system users, as appropriate.

4. Receive and evaluate facility requests for alternate routes and initiatives to avoid severe weather.

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5. Coordinate with appropriate facilities and customers to determine the need for developing alternate routes and initiatives to avoid severe weather.

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6. Coordinate alternate routes with all affected facilities.

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7. Transmit advisories defining severe weather areas and alternate routes.

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8. Conference all affected facilities and system users to apprise them of weather conditions that will impact the NAS.

b. The ATCSCC severe weather management specialist shall:

b. Facility TMUs must coordinate directly with the ATCSCC NSST for matters pertaining to severe weather.

1 through c

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17-12-2. RESPONSIBILITIES

17-12-2. RESPONSIBILITIES

Title through a6

No Change

b. ATCSCC severe weather management specialist shall:

b. The ATCSCC NSST must:

1 and 2

No Change

3. Formulate a dynamic severe weather operational plan. Coordinate TM initiatives and alternate routes with all affected facilities.

3. Formulate a dynamic severe weather operational plan and coordinate TM initiatives and alternate routes with all affected facilities.

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(a) Capping and tunneling initiatives.

(a) through (c)

Renumbered (b) through (d)

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(e) Airspace flow programs.

5

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6. Be the final approving authority for traffic flows and reroutes.

6. Be the final approving authority for traffic flows, reroutes, and MIT associated with reroutes.

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17-15-6. PROCEDURES

17-15-6. PROCEDURES

a. Facilities shall notify ATCSCC when implementing and terminating CDRs in accordance with para 17-14-2, Duties and Responsibility.

a. Facilities must notify ATCSCC when implementing and terminating CDRs.

b. The ATCSCC shall issue an advisory in accordance with para 17-13-2, Duties and Responsibilities, when facilities are implementing or terminating CDRs.

b. The ATCSCC must issue an advisory when facilities are implementing or terminating CDRs.

c. Facilities shall make real-time reports of unusable or inaccurate CDRs through the Severe Weather Specialist for follow-up by the ATCSCC POC.

c. Facilities must make real-time reports of unusable or inaccurate CDRs through the ATCSCC National System Strategy Team (NSST) for follow-up by the ATCSCC POC.

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17-18-2. POLICY

17-18-2. POLICY

Facilities and the ATCSCC shall use National Playbook routes in preference to ad hoc routes. National Playbook routes shall only be used after collaboration and coordination between the ATCSCC Severe Weather Unit and the Traffic Management Unit(s) of affected air traffic facilities.

Facilities and the ATCSCC must use National Playbook routes in preference to ad hoc routes. National Playbook routes must only be used after collaboration and coordination between the ATCSCC National System Strategy Team (NSST) and the Traffic Management Unit(s) of affected air traffic facilities.

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17-18-6. PROCEDURES

17-18-6. PROCEDURES

a. National Playbook routes are considered active when the ATCSCC Regional Airspace Manager (RAM) has completed coordination with all impacted facilities. An ATCSCC numbered advisory will be sent by the Severe Weather Unit describing the route being used.

a. National Playbook routes are considered active when the ATCSCC NSST has completed coordination with all impacted facilities. An ATCSCC numbered advisory will be sent by the NSST describing the route being used.

b. National Playbook routes may be modified tactically to achieve an operational advantage. The ATCSCC RAM will coordinate these changes verbally with all impacted facilities and insure that the published advisory contains the modification(s).

b. National Playbook routes may be modified tactically to achieve an operational advantage. The ATCSCC NSST will coordinate these changes verbally with all impacted facilities and ensure that the published advisory contains the modification(s).

c. Facilities shall monitor and provide real-time reports of the impact and continued need for the use of the National Playbook route(s) through the RAM.

c. Facilities must monitor and provide real-time reports of the impact and continued need for the use of the National Playbook route(s) through the ATCSCC NSST.

d. A National Playbook route is no longer active when the expiration time stated on the advisory has been reached without an extension coordinated or a decision to cancel the route has been reached. If the route is cancelled prior to the expiration time, the ATCSCC RAM will coordinate with all impacted facilities and publish an advisory stating that the route has been cancelled.

d. A National Playbook route is no longer active when the expiration time stated on the advisory has been reached without an extension coordinated or a decision to cancel the route has been reached. If the route is cancelled prior to the expiration time, the ATCSCC NSST will coordinate with all impacted facilities and publish an advisory stating that the route has been cancelled.

e. If there are circumstances that prevent the use of a National Playbook route, then the air traffic facility involved shall inform the ATCSCC RAM. The RAM will coordinate this information with the Planning Team (PT). It is the responsibility of the impacted facility and the ATCSCC to ensure the route is not utilized until the circumstance(s) preventing its use is corrected or the route is deleted.

e. If there are circumstances that prevent the use of a National Playbook route, then the air traffic facility involved must inform the ATCSCC NSST. The ATCSCC NSST will coordinate this information with the Planning Team (PT). It is the responsibility of the impacted facility and the ATCSCC to ensure the route is not utilized until the circumstance(s) preventing its use is corrected or the route is deleted.