**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
National Policy

**ORDER 8000.369C**

Effective Date:
06/24/20

**SUBJ:** Safety Management System

**1.** This order establishes the Safety Management System (SMS) policy and requirements for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The requirements contained within this document are intended to help FAA organizations incorporate SMS and/or International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State Safety Program (SSP) requirements into their organizations. FAA organization SMSs work together to form the overall FAA SMS. Specifically, this order:

**a.** Furthers safety management by evolving to a more process-oriented system safety approach with an emphasis on Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance processes.

**b.** Sets forth basic management principles to guide the FAA in safety management and safety oversight activities.

**c.** Requires adopting a common approach to implementing and maturing an integrated SMS, including fostering a positive safety culture and other attributes as applicable.

**d.** Defines the roles and responsibilities of the FAA organizations, FAA SMS Executive Council, and FAA SMS Committee regarding safety management.

**2.** This order applies to the following Lines of Business (LOBs) and Staff Offices: Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Aviation Safety (AVS), Airports (ARP), Commercial Space Transportation (AST), Next Generation Air Transportation System (ANG), and Security and Hazardous Materials Safety (ASH). This order is written to allow for application to other FAA organizations as deemed appropriate by the Administrator.

Steve Dickson
Administrator

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# Chapter 1. General Information

**1. Purpose of This Order.** This order:

**a.** Establishes the Safety Management System (SMS) policy and requirements for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The requirements contained within this document are intended to help FAA organizations incorporate SMS and/or International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State Safety Program (SSP) requirements into their organizations. The SMSs in FAA organizations work together to form the overall FAA SMS.

**b.** Explains the SMS principles and requirements.

**c.** Standardizes terminology for safety management, where appropriate.

**d.** Defines the roles and responsibilities of the FAA organizations, FAA SMS Executive Council, and FAA SMS Committee regarding safety management.

**e.** Requires FAA organizations to establish guidance defining SMS implementation activities for their own organizations and for their industry segment.

**f.** Establishes the commitment for continuous improvement of SMS.

**2. Audience.** This order applies to the following Lines of Business (LOBs) and Staff Offices: Air Traffic Organization (ATO), Aviation Safety (AVS), Airports (ARP), Commercial Space Transportation (AST), Next Generation Air Transportation System (ANG), and Security and Hazardous Materials Safety (ASH). In the document where the term "applicable FAA organizations" is used, it refers to the organizations listed above. This order is written to allow for application to other FAA organizations as later deemed appropriate.[1]

**3. Where You Can Find This Order.** You can find this order on the MyFAA employee website: https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices.

**4. Cancellation.** This order replaces FAA Order 8000.369B, *Safety Management System*, dated March 18, 2016.

**5. Explanation of Changes.** This revision does the following:

**a.** Removes the references to the Risk-Based Decision Making Strategic Initiative now that it has been completed and the outputs have been incorporated into the FAA SMS.

**b.** Changes the references to Significant Safety Issues to safety issues in order to align with the continuous identification and management of safety issues rather than an annual process.

[1] This order does not apply to external product/service providers. However, Chapter 2, Section 3 and Chapter 3, Section 4.b address the connection between the FAA's SMS and its oversight of the SMSs of external product/service providers.

**c.** Updates references to policies and documents that have been updated since the last publication of this order.

**d.** Updates content to describe roles and responsibilities regarding governance and execution of SMS based on the evolution of SMS in the FAA.

**e.** Changes language to reflect the continuous improvement of the SMS rather than its implementation.

# Chapter 2. Background

## 1. Rationale for SMS.

**a.** To support its mission to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world, the FAA continues to evolve its SMS to systematically integrate the management of safety risk into business planning, operations, and decision making. SMS activities leverage existing effective safety management practices in the FAA.

**b.** The SMS enables the FAA to enhance safety by allocating resources efficiently and effectively based on data-supported analysis and assessment, while responding to:

(1) Changing industry business models and growth;

(2) The aerospace system's increasing complexity; and

(3) The current and future challenging budget environment.

## 2. International Standards.

**a.** Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management, contains safety management standards. These standards include requirements for SSP, applicable to Member States as regulators, and SMS, applicable to product/service provider organizations. As a member of ICAO, the United States (U.S.) has committed to comply with ICAO safety management standards.

**b.** Typically, an SSP is implemented by the regulator, and an SMS is implemented by an aviation product/service provider. Since the FAA performs both regulator and Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP) functions, the agency chose to implement an SSP with an integrated management system. The U.S. SSP document describes how the U.S. meets the SSP requirements outlined in ICAO Annex 19 and also describes additional activities that will help improve the U.S. SSP and respond to future safety challenges.[2] The FAA is meeting many of the SSP requirements through the essential integrated management component, the FAA SMS. Having an SSP and an integrated SMS enables interoperability among safety management functions across FAA organizations, and applies the same standards to our own responsibilities as we apply to those we regulate.

## 3. Oversight of Product/Service Providers.

**a.** This document refers to aviation product/service providers over which FAA has regulatory authority and safety oversight responsibility. Entities that provide products and services include airports, manufacturers, operators, maintenance organizations, training organizations, air traffic service providers, and others. Entities may be organizations or individuals. Aviation product/service providers are responsible for the safety of their products and services; they must be in compliance with safety regulations and standards established by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the FAA. The DOT and the FAA are responsible for establishing the safety regulations and standards that provide requirements for aviation product/service providers' systems. These regulations and standards are

[2] For additional information regarding the U.S. State Safety Program, refer to the current version of *AVP300-15-U.S. State Safety Program.*

founded upon safety data and analysis. The FAA's responsibilities include:

(1) Defining the requirements for those systems;

(2) Applying risk-based safety oversight;

(3) Verifying that the safety systems of the aviation product/service provider meet applicable requirements and that their processes, products, and services continue to do so during the operational phases of their lifecycle; and

(4) Evaluating the effectiveness of the regulations and standards.

**b.** With SMS, the FAA is better able to allocate resources and conduct safety oversight using safety management principles. The FAA establishes safety management requirements for, and promotes SMS implementation in, product/service provider organizations, as appropriate. The FAA verifies compliance with regulations using a variety of means such as audits, evaluations, and inspections. The FAA also confirms implementation and effectiveness of the aviation product/service provider's systems. In this way, FAA personnel are used more efficiently, and there is a higher level of confidence that an aviation product/service provider will meet safety standards.[3]

**c.** With SMS, the FAA will still assure product/service provider compliance with regulations. Therefore, direct observation and surveillance are still required in the FAA oversight activities. However, they are used differently than in the past. Rather than solely assessing compliance with the regulations, the FAA will assess the effectiveness of service providers' safety management capabilities and performance.

**d.** With SMS, the FAA will ensure that regulations are in place to control safety risk. The FAA will use available data to monitor the level of safety risk that exists in the areas of FAA's regulatory authority and ensure that safety risk is controlled. Additional/modified regulations may be developed based upon risk assessments conducted by product/service providers and/or the FAA, as needed.

**e.** Regulations serve as safety risk controls. FAA organizations with product/service provider oversight responsibility must apply the concepts of Safety Risk Management (SRM) to decisions that may lead to the initiation of regulatory changes through rulemaking. Doing so ensures that regulations address hazards in the aerospace system and provide boundaries on acceptability of design and performance of products and services. Regulations and subsequent oversight activities are part of a systematic strategy of risk control.

**f.** The FAA uses SRM throughout the aerospace system to manage safety risk with regulations, standards, and policy. The FAA typically conducts SRM in an oversight capacity to address safety issues that affect multiple product/service providers. FAA organizations with oversight responsibility must ensure that product/service providers have processes and methods in place to control safety risk.

**g.** The FAA is never responsible for performing SRM or primary Safety Assurance on behalf of an individual aviation product/service provider that it oversees. Aviation product/service providers are

[3] This section is specific to the FAA's role in oversight. Therefore, in this case, the term personnel includes FAA employees and designees, or others who might act on behalf of the FAA Administrator in an oversight role.

responsible for managing safety for their operations, including conducting SRM and Safety Assurance for their operations. Aviation product/service providers can directly control risk related to the hazards in their operations because they control resources and activities of people directly exposed to hazards.

**4. Safety and Quality.** There are organizations in the FAA that have implemented Quality Management Systems (QMS) that meet the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001 Standard. Organizations with a QMS can leverage QMS processes to help meet SMS requirements in this order. Organizations that do not have a formal QMS can still use quality management principles to develop processes to meet the SMS requirements. Safety management and quality management are complementary and when both are in place, they must work together to achieve the overall safety objectives of the organization. A primary objective of the FAA is to ensure that it has processes and procedures in place so that safety performance is maintained at an acceptable level (i.e., safety management) and specified product/operational results are achieved (i.e., quality management). SMS requires that the design and implementation of organizational processes and procedures identify safety hazards and control and/or mitigate safety risk in aviation operations. QMS provides a structured approach for assuring that these processes and procedures function as intended, correct non-conformances when they do not, and continually improve their effectiveness. While SMS provides the mechanisms for the FAA to carry out its regulatory, certification, and continued operational safety management functions within a framework of risk-based decision making, a QMS can ensure that this framework is operating in a structured, repeatable fashion and is able to meet its intended objectives. When those objectives are not met, QMS provides the means to take action to ensure the intended results are achieved.

## Chapter 3. SMS Components

**1. Overview.** SMS is the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk. The four main components of an SMS are: (1) Safety Policy, (2) Safety Risk Management, (3) Safety Assurance, and (4) Safety Promotion. They provide a means of defining SMS within the FAA and a systematic approach to describing and achieving the desired safety performance. The applicable FAA organizations must meet the requirements in this chapter. The components are described further below.

**2. Safety Policy.** Safety Policy is the organization's documented commitment to safety, which defines safety objectives and the accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees in regard to safety management. The safety policy of the applicable FAA organizations must be documented; communicated to all employees and responsible parties; consistent with FAA and U.S. SSP goals and objectives; and reviewed periodically to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate to the organization. The applicable FAA organizations must establish and implement safety policy that:

**a.** Describes what the organization is trying to achieve through its SMS.

**b.** Outlines the requirements, methods, and processes the organization will use to achieve the desired safety outcomes.

**c.** Establishes senior management's commitment and expectation that the organization will continually improve safety. The safety policy further establishes and defines senior management's expectation of high safety performance.

**d.** Reflects management's commitment to:

(1) Implement procedures and processes for establishing and meeting measurable and attainable safety objectives;

(2) Provide resources to implement and operate the SMS and manage safety risk; and

(3) Support promotion of a positive safety culture, as found in Section 5.b of this chapter.

**e.** Establishes roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities regarding the organization's safety performance. For organizations with oversight responsibilities, the policy establishes basic guidelines for compliance and enforcement personnel.

**f.** Promotes the use of reporting systems described in Section 4 of this chapter.

**g.** Outlines an emergency response plan that provides for the safe transition between normal and emergency operations where applicable.

**3. Safety Risk Management (SRM).** All applicable FAA organizations must establish and maintain an SRM function that provides for initial and continuing identification of hazards and the analysis and assessment of safety risk. The applicable FAA organizations' SRM functions ensure that appropriate safety risk controls are developed and employed operationally. Validation of system performance and

effectiveness of implemented risk controls and risk management strategies occurs under the Safety Assurance component, discussed in the following section. An organization's SRM function must meet the intent of the policy set forth in the latest version of FAA Order 8040.4, *Safety Risk Management Policy*, and accomplish the following:

**a. System analysis.** Establish an understanding of system design and performance factors, human interface, environment, processes, and activities to the level necessary to identify hazards.

**b. Identify hazards.** Identify and document hazards and the effects of each hazard in sufficient detail to determine the associated safety risk (within the system description).[4]

**c. Analyze safety risk.** Determine and analyze the severity and likelihood of potential effects associated with identified hazards.

**d. Assess safety risk.** Compare the safety risk of each identified hazard's effect to established safety performance targets and/or rank hazards based on risk. The objective is to determine the acceptability of the safety risk of each hazard.

**e. Control safety risk.** Design and implement safety risk control(s) for hazards in order to reduce the safety risk to a level acceptable to the decision maker, when possible.

**f. Track and monitor.** Track identified hazards and monitor implemented safety risk controls/mitigations to ensure that they achieve their intended safety performance targets. Tracking and monitoring are described in a monitoring plan and are primarily accomplished through Safety Assurance functions. The Hazard Identification, Risk Management and Tracking (HIRMT) tool supports SRM within the FAA. Refer to FAA Order 8040.4 for more information.

**4. Safety Assurance.**

**a. Safety Assurance Within FAA.** All applicable FAA organizations must establish and maintain Safety Assurance processes to ensure that safety risk controls achieve their intended safety performance targets and are used to assess operations to identify hazards.[5] The Safety Assurance validation processes are a primary function of FAA organizations which provide oversight of product/service providers. Safety Assurance includes monitoring systems of interest and assessing the need for new risk controls, modification of ineffective risk controls, or elimination of those no longer needed due to changes in the operational environment. These monitoring activities apply whether the operations are accomplished internally or outsourced (e.g., contracted activities or designees). The HIRMT tool supports Safety Assurance within the FAA. Refer to FAA Order 8040.4 for more information. The organization's Safety Assurance processes must include:

(1) Data/information acquisition. Collect, manage, and monitor operational data and knowledge of the aerospace system for which the organization is responsible. Consider and collect, if applicable, data from sources external to the FAA for use during system analysis and assessment. Collection and monitoring of data/information include the following:

[4] The security of information in safety critical systems should also be considered in hazard identification.
[5] SRM is applied when hazards are identified through Safety Assurance processes.

(a) Employee reporting system(s). Establish and maintain a safety reporting system in which employees can report safety issues or concerns. Data obtained from this system are monitored to identify emerging and existing hazards and to assess performance of risk controls in the operational systems.[6]

(b) Investigation. Collect data and investigate incidents and accidents to identify hazards or ineffective safety risk controls.[7]

(c) Monitoring, evaluations, and audits. Monitor, evaluate, or audit standards, systems, programs, and processes on a routine basis to determine the performance and effectiveness of safety risk controls both within the FAA and in aviation product/service provider organizations for which the FAA organization has oversight responsibility. Also, conduct regularly scheduled evaluations of the SMS to determine if the SMS as a whole conforms to its requirements.

(2) Data/information analysis. Data analysis is conducted on the data acquired to assess system performance, identify potential hazards, measure the effectiveness of safety risk controls, and identify instances of nonconformance.

(3) System assessment. The system assessment is based on the data analysis to identify potential new hazards or ineffective safety risk controls and determine conformance with requirements.

(4) Corrective action. Prioritize and implement corrective actions to mitigate or eliminate safety issues identified during system assessments. Prior to implementing a corrective action, evaluate any active or latent issues, to ensure that potential corrective actions are analyzed through SRM processes for residual impacts. Periodically review/monitor completed corrective actions to evaluate the effectiveness and completeness of the original corrective actions.

(5) Periodic management reviews. Conduct regular reviews of SMS effectiveness and assess the need for changes, and implement changes to the SMS to achieve continuous improvement. These reviews should be conducted on a consistent schedule that is appropriate to the organization (e.g., quarterly, semi-annually, annually).

**b. Safety Assurance of Product/Service Providers.[8]** FAA organizations with services/offices that perform oversight of product/service providers (i.e., AVS, ARP, ASH, and AST) must allocate resources for product/service provider Safety Assurance with priority given to areas of highest risk. FAA organizations performing Safety Assurance of product/service providers' design and performance must use the following processes:

(1) Data/information acquisition. Monitor, manage, and collect operational data and knowledge of the segment of the aerospace system for which the organization is responsible. Consider

[6] FAA organizations must ensure the security of voluntarily submitted data as required by Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) 40123 and 44735.
[7] The role of accident investigation is primarily a function of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); however, FAA offices need to consider their role in this function as well.
[8] FAA organizations that perform oversight (i.e., AVS, ARP, ASH, and AST) have a dual focus regarding Safety Assurance. These organizations assure the safety of their own organizations and the safety of the product/service providers they oversee.

and collect, if applicable, data from sources external to the FAA for use during system analysis and assessment. Collection and monitoring of data/information must include the following:

(a) Stakeholder reporting system(s). FAA organizations with oversight responsibility establish and maintain a means for stakeholders to report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, incidents, etc.

(b) Auditing of product/service providers (surveillance and sampling). Conduct audits of their product/service providers' products, processes, and services, as agreed to with those organizations, to: assess conformity with safety risk controls established by the organization providing oversight and validate outputs of the product/service providers' SMSs.

(c) Investigation. Establish criteria and procedures to investigate accidents, incidents, and instances of suspected non-compliance with regulations.

(2) Data/information analysis. Analyze the data/information described in Sections 4.b.(1) (above).

(3) System assessment. Organizations with oversight responsibility conduct assessments of the effectiveness of safety risk controls within the components(s) of the aerospace system for which they have oversight responsibility.

(4) Corrective action. Periodically review/monitor corrective actions by product/service providers to evaluate the effectiveness and completeness of the original corrective actions.[9]

**5. Safety Promotion.** Applicable FAA organizations must establish and maintain a safety promotion function. Safety promotion is a combination of training and communication of safety information to support the implementation and operation of an SMS in an organization. It includes actions taken to create an organizational environment where safety objectives can be achieved in fulfillment of its mission.

**a. Personnel competencies.** Applicable FAA organizations must ensure that the workforce has the necessary competencies to perform their duties relevant to the operation and performance of the SMS.

**b. Safety culture.** Applicable FAA organizations must promote a positive safety culture throughout the organization, which is characterized by an adequate knowledge base, personnel competency, communications, training, informed decision making, and information sharing in which lessons learned and best practices are developed and shared. All levels of management must actively promote and provide leadership to foster a positive safety culture. A safety culture consists of the shared values, actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demands. In the desired safety culture, people acknowledge their accountability and act on their individual responsibility for safety. They trust, use, and rely on the organization's processes for managing safety. Individuals report/raise safety issues without fear of reprisal, supporting the

[9] For additional information regarding compliance, refer to the current FAA Order 8000.373, *Federal Aviation Administration Compliance Program*, and the current version of FAA Order 2150.3, *FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program*.

implementation of a non-punitive safety reporting system. Decision makers promote continual safety improvement through timely action, when appropriate, and provide feedback to the reporters. There is good communication in the organization, and personnel continue to learn and develop through training and coaching. The ways in which an organization works to improve its safety culture are best determined by the organization's management.

## Chapter 4. Interoperability, Governance, and Continuous Improvement

**1. Interoperability of the SMS.** SMS provides a common approach for conducting safety oversight at the FAA level.[10] The effectiveness of the system relies on communication and coordination among FAA organizations in regard to safety risk.

**a. Basic Requirements.** In order to ensure interoperability of SMS across the FAA, all applicable FAA organizations must develop and continuously refine:

(1) Common definitions and understanding of hazards and risk.

(2) Common safety risk management processes and objectives.

(3) A common system for managing safety performance, including:

(a) An approach to identifying safety issues, and

(b) An approach to establishing safety performance targets.

(4) A common tool or system to track Aerospace System Level (ASL) safety issues, including hazards and safety risk mitigations.[11]

**b. Tools and Guidance.** All applicable FAA organizations must work together to develop and continuously refine the following tools and guidance for meeting the requirements above:

(1) Safety Data Taxonomies. Common taxonomies to improve the consistency and commonality of data sources and facilitate the sharing of existing and new data sources throughout the FAA, and with stakeholders.

(2) Safety Data Access. Improved data access to support information sharing, enhance FAA decision making, and enable executives and managers to better focus organizational resources on areas of greatest safety risk.

(3) Safety Risk Management. The current version of FAA Order 8040.4, *Safety Risk Management Policy*, and its supporting guidance material to ensure consistent application of SRM processes.

**2. Governance.**

**a. FAA SMS Executive Council.**

(1) Responsibilities. This order establishes the FAA SMS Executive Council. The FAA SMS Executive Council is responsible for setting the strategic direction for safety management across the FAA. It provides executive-level guidance and conflict resolution for FAA SMS-related issues. It also

[10] FAA Order 8000.72, *FAA Integrated Oversight Philosophy*, sets forth the core set of principles for evolving FAA safety oversight systems and using safety management principles to proactively address emerging safety risks.
[11] The most recent version of FAA Order 8040.4 provides hazard tracking requirements and the criteria that define ASL safety issues.

approves SMS guidance and other products/processes developed by the FAA SMS Committee. The FAA SMS Committee keeps the Council apprised of SMS activities across the FAA. The Council resolves any issues that the FAA SMS Committee raises, which may include disagreements related to SRM. The FAA SMS Executive Council is ultimately responsible for the development and continuing maintenance of the U.S. SSP document and for monitoring and reporting on SSP implementation and the indicators relating to levels of safety in the U.S. aerospace system.

(2) Composition. The FAA SMS Executive Council is chaired by the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS-1) and is composed of senior-level management personnel, including the Assistant Administrator of ANG; the Associate Administrators of ARP, AST, and ASH; and the ATO Chief Operating Officer.

**b. FAA SMS Committee.** This order establishes the FAA SMS Committee, which works with and reports to the FAA SMS Executive Council. The Committee provides assistance to FAA organizations regarding safety management. It meets at regular intervals and at the discretion of the Committee chairperson to exchange SMS information.

(1) Responsibilities. The FAA SMS Committee provides advice and guidance to the responsible program offices to help them fulfill their authority and responsibility to evolve SMS. It serves as a forum for discussion of safety policy, SRM, Safety Assurance, and safety promotion across all member organizations. Organizations raise safety issues to the FAA SMS Committee that would be best addressed cross-organizationally. The FAA SMS Committee determines whether to track and manage a safety issue on behalf of the FAA SMS Executive Council and assigns an Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for safety risk assessment of those safety issues. The Committee resolves disagreements between FAA organizations regarding safety management, including disagreements related to SRM, and escalates disagreements to the FAA SMS Executive Council that it cannot resolve at the Committee level. The Committee provides regular status reports to the FAA SMS Executive Council. The FAA SMS Executive Council delegates management of the U.S. SSP to AVS-1 and the FAA SMS Committee.

(2) Composition. The FAA SMS Committee is composed of safety professionals from each organization incorporating SMS (ATO, AVS, ARP, AST, ANG, and ASH). AVS-1 designates an individual to chair the Committee. The chairperson is responsible for coordinating the logistics of all meetings with Committee members. The ATO provides the position of executive secretary of the Committee.

(3) Assignments. The FAA SMS Committee may form ad hoc working groups and standing teams to address specific issues related to incorporating SMS throughout the FAA. Composition of those working groups and teams will consist of member representatives as required from across the FAA. Ad hoc working groups will be disbanded upon completion of their task. Standing teams must be formed by charter, and the FAA SMS Committee has the authority to establish and sign charters. One such standing team is the Safety Collaboration Team (SCT), which was formed to conduct safety risk analyses of significant planned changes that affect National Airspace System (NAS) operations.

(4) Funding. Resources for support staff and working group activities are provided as determined by AVS-1. Unless otherwise stated, each member’s organization is responsible for his or

her own costs associated with Committee membership, including support for assessing and addressing cross-organizational issues.

**c. Supporting Office.** The Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention (AVP) within AVS manages the AVS SMS, FAA SMS, and U.S. SSP programs and maintains their supporting policies, processes, and tools in support of AVS-1, the FAA SMS Executive Council, and the FAA SMS Committee. AVP helps LOBs and Staff Offices remain aligned with FAA SMS policy and provides input to their processes to ensure that SMS requirements are met and woven into the way the FAA does business. AVP manages the AVS and FAA safety issue identification and management processes, and facilitates potential safety issues through both processes. AVP also provides consultative services and guidance to help organizations regarding the use of the system.

**3. Continuous Improvement of the SMS.** To fulfill senior management's commitment and expectation that the organization will continually improve safety, management will need to conduct regular reviews of SMS effectiveness and assess the need for changes to the SMS. This requires a consistent evaluation process to ensure that SMS requirements are being met across the agency and a functioning process for obtaining maximum benefit from lessons learned as they relate to the operation of the SMS. In support of continuous improvement of the SMS, all applicable FAA organizations must:

**a.** Share lessons learned, including what is working well and challenges encountered, with other FAA organizations in order to improve safety through intra-agency experiences and knowledge.

**b.** Develop and maintain a means to measure performance of the SMS, including establishing safety performance targets.

**c.** Report SMS performance information to management.

## Chapter 5. Administrative Information

**1. Distribution.** This order is distributed to all offices in Washington Headquarters, regions, and centers, with distribution to all field offices and facilities.

**2. Related Publications.** The following documents are related to the subject matter in this order:

**a.** Department of Transportation (DOT), *Safety Management Systems Guidance Document*

**b.** FAA Order 8000.373, *Federal Aviation Administration Compliance Program*

**c.** FAA Order 2150.3, *FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program*

**d.** FAA Order 8040.4, *Safety Risk Management Policy*

**e.** FAA Order VS 8000.367, *Aviation Safety (AVS) Safety Management System Requirements*

**f.** FAA Order 1100.161, *Air Traffic Safety Oversight*

**g.** FAA Order JO 1000.37, *Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System*

**h.** FAA Order 5200.11, *FAA Airports (ARP) Safety Management System*

**i.** FAA Order NG 1000.44, *NextGen Safety Management System*

**j.** *Air Traffic Organization, Safety Management System Manual*

**k.** *Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions (SRMGSA)*

**l.** *Flight Safety Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0*

**m.** *FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation Safety Management System (SMS) Manual*

**n.** Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 5, *Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag and Supplemental Operations*, (80 FR 1308, January 8, 2015)

**o.** *International Civil Aviation Organization Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 18, and 19*

**p.** *ICAO Safety Management Manual* (Document 9859)

**q.** *AVP300-15-U.S. State Safety Program*

**r.** *FAA Safety Issue Identification and Management Process*

**3. Authority to Change This Order.** The FAA Administrator has authority to issue changes and revisions to this order.

# Appendix A. Definitions

As used in this document, the following words or phrases are defined.

**1. Accident** – An unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, or damage to, or loss of, equipment or property.

**2. Aerospace System** – U.S. airspace, all manned and unmanned vehicles operating in that airspace, all U.S. aviation operators, airports, airfields, air navigation services, pilots, regulations, policies, procedures, facilities, equipment, and all aviation-related industry.

**3. Aircraft Accident** – An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. The definition of "aircraft accident" includes "unmanned aircraft accident," as defined herein.

**4. Audit** – A systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining records, statements of fact or other information and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which policies, procedures, or requirements are met.

**5. Control** – See *Safety Risk Control*.

**6. Corrective Action** – Action to eliminate or mitigate the cause or reduce the effects of a detected nonconformity or other undesirable situation.

**7. Evaluation** – Denotes the process whereby data is assembled, analyzed, and compared to expected performance to aid in making systematic decisions.

**8. Hazard** – A condition that could foreseeably cause or contribute to an aircraft accident.

**9. Incident** – An occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations.

**10. Interoperability** – The ability for each organization's SMS to be part of a larger SMS framework through interdependent processes and/or components with shared principles, information, and governance.

**11. Likelihood** – The estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative or qualitative terms, of a hazard's effect or outcome.

**12. National Airspace System** – A complex system that is composed of airspace, airports, aircraft, pilots, air navigation facilities, and air traffic control facilities; communication, navigation, and surveillance services and supporting technologies and systems; operating rules, regulations, policies, and procedures; and people who implement, sustain, or operate the system components.

**13. Product/Service Provider** – An organization engaged in the delivery of aviation products or services.

**14. Risk** – See *Safety Risk*. The terms Risk and Safety Risk are used synonymously.

**15. Safety** – The state in which the risk of harm to persons or property damage is acceptable.

**16. Safety Assurance** – Processes within the SMS that function systematically to ensure the performance and effectiveness of safety risk controls and that the organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives through the collection, analysis, and assessment of information.

**17. Safety Culture** – The shared values, actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demands.

**18. Safety Management System (SMS)** – The formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk.

**19. Safety Objective** – A brief, high-level statement of safety achievement or desired outcome to be accomplished.

**20. Safety Performance** – Realized or actual safety accomplishment relative to the organization's safety objectives.

**21. Safety Policy** – The documented commitment to safety of an FAA Line of Business (LOB) or staff office, or an aviation service/product provider, organization, or certificate holder, which defines its safety objectives and the accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees with regard to safety.

**22. Safety Promotion** – A combination of training and communication of safety information to support the implementation and operation of an SMS in an organization.

**23. Safety Risk** – The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard.

**24. Safety Risk Control** – A means to reduce or eliminate the effects of hazards.

**25. Safety Risk Management (SRM)** – A process within the SMS composed of describing the system, identifying the hazards, and analyzing, assessing, and controlling risk.

**26. Severity** – The consequence or impact of a hazard's effect or outcome in terms of degree of loss or harm.

**27. State Safety Program (SSP)** – An integrated set of regulations and activities established by a State aimed at improving safety.

**28. System** – An integrated set of constituent elements that are combined in an operational or support environment to accomplish a defined objective. These elements include people, hardware, software, firmware, information, procedures, facilities, services, and other support facets.

**29. Unmanned Aircraft Accident** – An occurrence associated with the operation of any public or civil unmanned aircraft system that takes place between the time that the system is activated with the purpose of flight and the time that the system is deactivated at the conclusion of its mission, in which:

**a.** Any person suffers death or serious injury: or

**b.** The aircraft has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 300 pounds or greater and sustains substantial damage.

## Appendix B. Acronyms

As used in this document, the following acronyms are defined.

1. **ANG** – Next Generation Air Transportation System
2. **ANSP** – Air Navigation Service Provider
3. **ARP** – Airports
4. **ASH** – Security and Hazardous Materials Safety
5. **ASL** – Aerospace System Level
6. **AST** – Commercial Space Transportation
7. **ATO** – Air Traffic Organization
8. **AVP** – Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention
9. **AVS** – Aviation Safety
10. **AVS-1** – Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
11. **CFR** – Code of Federal Regulations
12. **DOT** – Department of Transportation
13. **FAA** – Federal Aviation Administration
14. **HIRMT** – Hazard Identification, Risk Management and Tracking
15. **ICAO** – International Civil Aviation Organization
16. **LOB** – Line of Business
17. **NAS** – National Airspace System
18. **NTSB** – National Transportation Safety Board
19. **OPR** – Office of Primary Responsibility
20. **QMS** – Quality Management System
21. **SCT** – Safety Collaboration Team
22. **SMS** – Safety Management System
23. **SRM** – Safety Risk Management
24. **SRMGSA** – Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions
25. **SSP** – State Safety Program
26. **U.S.** – United States