Foreword

This document reports the results of a study to assess the causes and contributing factors in accidents and incidents where a single benign propulsion system malfunction occurred and the pilot(s) did not appropriately handle the situation. This study was undertaken in response to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) letter of 6 March 1996 requesting the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) to use data from a previous AIA activity and a recent accident as a basis for initiating development of guidelines for an engine failure indications system. The AIA responded to the FAA on 19 June 1996 with a letter proposing to undertake the requested activity. The AIA proposed that the initial focus of activity would be on assembling all of the relevant facts and data associated with historical accidents and incidents, experience with various mitigation approaches, fixed-base and motion based simulator capabilities and programs, and other relevant information appropriate to a thorough study of engine failures coupled with inappropriate crew response(s). Once the data collection process had been accomplished, a follow-on phase would analyze and synthesize these data in order to prepare recommended corrective actions. AIA wrote that AIA believed that all parties would be best served by not prematurely focusing on “a solution”. Upon completion of this work a decision gate would be taken before deciding how to proceed into additional phases that could suggest multiple paths and increased use of resources.

AIA requested The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) jointly sponsor and Co-chair the project on “Propulsion System Malfunction Plus Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR)”. Representatives from all affected organizations were invited to participate mindful that the project would ultimately progress into the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee and Harmonization Processes. The organizations represented included regulatory authorities, accident investigation authorities, pilot associations, airline associations, training companies, and simulator, airplane and engine manufacturers.

This report summarizes the facts and data collected, analytical results, conclusions and recommendations for potential corrective action. The report is being transmitted by AIA and AECMA to the Regulatory Authorities for consideration and appropriate action. It has been acknowledged that a similar situation exists in the rotorcraft industry; however, it was agreed in the beginning of this workshop that only Turboprop and Turbofan airplanes would be considered (14 CFR Part 23 & 25). It is recommended that a similar exercise take place for the rotorcraft industry outside of this workshop with the aid of appropriate industry experience.

This report is separated into two volumes. Volume 1 contains the report results and appendices 1 through 3. Volume 2 contains the remaining appendices 4 through 15.
Contributing Organizations and Individuals

Aero International (Regional)
Claude Bechet

Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
J. Andrew Bedson

Aerospatiale
Howard Aylesworth

Air Accidents Investigations Branch (AAIB)
Johann Hervault

AIR BC
Patrick Zaccaria

Air Canada
K. Smart

Air Canada Pilots Association (ACPA)
Hans Lammers

Air Transport Association (ATA-STIG – Northwest Airlines)
Garrett Smith

Airbus Industrie
Kurt Ruhwald

Airline Pilots Association (ALPA)
John Hart

Allied Signal Engines
Capt. David Edward

Allison Engine Company
Capt. Thomas Jerrard

Association of European Airlines
Duane Sebens

Atlantic Coast Airlines
Gary Vechik

Atlantic Southeast Airlines (Regional Airline Association)
Yves Benoist

Bombardier Aerospace
Capt. Jim Duncan

British Aerospace (BAe)
Jean-Michel Govaere

CAE Electronics
Anne Jany

Canadian Airline Pilots Association
Georges Rebender

iii
Contributing Organizations and Individuals

Canadian Airlines International  
Peter Howe  
Capt. Jack Tucker  
Doug Hazelwood  
Donald Mallonee  
Peter Tait  
Helen Muir  
Marco Pizer  
Roy Humphreyson  
Ian Wigmore  
Kathy Abbott  
Donald Armstrong  
Anne Azevedo  
Tom Boudreau  
Martin Buckman  
Tom Clinton  
Ed Cook  
Michael Dostert  
William Emmerling  
Steven Kolb  
Hals Larsen  
Dy Le  
George Lyddane  
Lee Nguyen  
Lanny Pinkstaff  
Robert Pursel  
Thomas Toula  
James Treacy  

Cessna Aircraft Company  

CHIRP  
Cranfield University  

Emby-Riddle Aeronautical University  

European Regional Airlines Association (ERA)  

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  

Federal Express Corporation  
Wim Overmars  

Fokker Services B.V.  

General Aviation Manufacturer’s Association  

General Electric Aircraft Engines  

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation  

Hartzell Propeller Inc.  

Independent Consultant  

International Air Transport Association (IATA)  

International Federation of Air Line Pilots Assoc. (IFALPA)  

Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA/CAA)  

KLM  

KLM - IFALPA  

Lockheed Martin Aero and Naval Systems  

NASA Langley Research Center  

iv
Contributing Organizations and Individuals

NASA Lewis Research Center
Sanjay Garg
Carol Russo
Donald Simon
Kenneth Egge
Jerome Frechette
Douglas Weigmann
Mark Feeney
Dick Parker
Al Weaver
Eric Griffin
Conrad Jackson
Capt. Bruce Anderson
David Lotterer
John Chambers
Michael Cooper
David Gibbons
Pierre Mouton
Alison Starr
Gerard Clergeot
Yves Halin
David Carbaugh
James Johnson
Pam Rosnik
G. Philip Sallee
William Shontz
Jerry Swain
Dennis Tilzey
Van Winters
Steven Lund
Alan Macias
Paul Oldale
Michael Brookes
Mark Dransfield
Andrew Chan
Len Cormier
Michel Gaudreau
Larry Green
Merlin Preuss
Nick Stoss
Peter Richards
Ken Burke
Major Jeff Thomas
Lawrence Katz
Robert Wildzunas
Steve Ferro
Chuck Ferrari
Capt. Bill Yantiss

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Pratt & Whitney Canada
Pratt and Whitney

Raytheon Aircraft/Beech/Hawker

Reflectone Inc.
Regional Airline Association
Rolls Royce plc

Securite’ de Vols – Aviation Safety
Smiths Industries Aerospace
SNECMA-Villaroche

The Boeing Company

The Boeing Company – Douglas Products Division

Tompson Training and Simulation

Transport Canada

Transport Canada

Transportation Safety Board of Canada
UK Flight Safety Committee
U.S. Air Force

U.S. Army

United Airlines
# VOLUME 1 – TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing Organizations and Individuals</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume 1 – Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 Definitions and Acronyms</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0 Data Collection, Analysis Process and Results</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0 Propulsion System Instrumentation and Failure Warning Systems</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0 Simulator Capabilities and Realism with respect to Propulsion System Malfunction</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.0 Flight Crew Training</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.0 Human Factors</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.0 Regulatory Requirements</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0 Conclusions</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.0 Recommendations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices List</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1 NTSB Final Recommendations for Jetstream 31 Accident, 13 Dec 94</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2 Letter from FAA to AIA</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3 Letter from AIA to FAA</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The task report presented herewith was undertaken by AIA/AECMA at the request of the FAA in response to an NTSB recommendation arising from the 13 December 1994 turboprop accident at Raleigh-Durham, which resulted in fatal injuries to 15 passengers and 2 crew. The NTSB findings in this event strongly suggested that a warning light intended to indicate the activation of a recovery function was falsely interpreted as engine failure and led to inappropriate crew action. The FAA recognized that there were additional data suggesting that this accident was one of a number of similar accidents, and that a study would be appropriate to look into all commercial transport accident histories where an inappropriate crew action may have been taken in response to what should have been a benign propulsion system malfunction.

The rate of occurrence per airplane departure for PSM+ICR accidents has remained essentially constant for many years. These accidents are still occurring despite the significant improvement in propulsion system reliability over the past 20 years, suggesting an increase in rate of inappropriate crew response to propulsion system malfunction.

At this point in time, the number of worldwide accidents for this propulsion system malfunction with inappropriate crew response “cause” is about 3 per year in revenue service, with an additional 2 per year associated with flight crew training of simulated engine-out conditions.

A Project Group was formed, encompassing experts from authorities, accident investigation agencies, airframe, engine, and simulator manufacturers, and airline, pilot, and training organizations. The group also included human factors experts from various organizations. The Project Group gathered extensive data from all available sources where propulsion system malfunction coupled with inappropriate crew response led to an airplane accident/incident. These data were analyzed, and conclusions and recommendations were developed based upon them.

The major conclusions from this project are:

a. Although the vast majority of propulsion system malfunctions are recognized and handled appropriately, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that many pilots have difficulty identifying certain propulsion system malfunctions and reacting appropriately.

b. Particularly in the turboprop arena, pilots are failing to properly control the airplane after a propulsion system malfunction which should have been within their capabilities to handle.

c. While a review of instrumentation and warning systems was conducted, there is no clear evidence to link standards of engine failure/malfunction indications with the probability of inappropriate crew response. In addition, there are no human factors methodologies or human factors studies which provide clear evidence of the effects of a propulsion system failure indication on the probability of crew error. However, continued research and human factors activity in this area is strongly recommended, along with a review of the propulsion system instrumentation requirements.
d. The group was unable to find any adequate training materials (books, videos, etc.) on the subject of modern propulsion system malfunction recognition.

e. There are no existing regulatory requirements to train pilots on propulsion system malfunction recognition (stall/surge, severe engine failure, etc.)

f. The training requirements related to “Recognition and correction of in-flight malfunctions” are found in Appendix C of 14 CFR Part 63 for **Flight Engineers**. The disposition of the flight engineer’s recognition training requirements to pilots of airplanes where no “Flight Engineer” position exists is not apparent. However, the expectation does exist that the pilots will perform the duties of the flight engineer.

g. The simulator propulsion system malfunction models in many cases are inaccurate and/or do not have key cues of vibration and/or noise. There is also no robust process that ensures the quality and realism of simulator propulsion system malfunction models or that the malfunctions which are used in the training process are those most frequently encountered in service or those most commonly leading to inappropriate crew response. This shortfall leads, in some cases, to negative training.

h. While current training programs concentrate appropriately on pilot handling of engine failure (single engine loss of thrust and resulting thrust asymmetry) at the most critical point in flight, they do not address the malfunction characteristics (auditory and vibratory cues) most likely to result in inappropriate response.

i. The changing pilot population, coupled with reduced exposure to in-service events from increased propulsion system reliability, is resulting in large numbers of flight crews who have little or no prior experience with actual propulsion system failures.

j. Data suggest that various opportunities exist for negative transfer of trained pilot behavior and experience when transitioning between different airplane types.

The major recommendations from this study are as follows:

a. The requirements of 14 CFR Parts 61 and 121 / JAR-OPS / JAR-FCL need to be enhanced for pilot training in powerplant failure recognition, the effect of powerplant failure on airplane performance and controllability, and the subsequent control of the airplane.

b. The regulatory authorities should establish and implement a rigorous “process” to ensure that the following occurs during the development of a pilot training program:
   - Identification of powerplant failure conditions that need to be trained;
   - Preparation of training aids (Tools & Methods);
   - Establishment of the appropriate means to conduct the training;
   - Assurance that each pilot receives the appropriate training for both malfunction recognition and proper response to it; and
   - Validation of training effectiveness, along with a feedback loop to improve / update training.
c. The mandatory pilot training program associated with simulated $V_1$ engine failures in an airplane has caused a number of hull loss/fatal accidents. The value of performing this training in the airplane should be reviewed. It is the Project Group’s belief that this specific training could be better effected in simulators. Where suitable simulators are not available, the airplane handling task could then be adequately and much more safely trained at altitude where recovery can be safely accomplished.

d. The use of flight idle on turboprop airplanes for simulated engine failures or in the event of a malfunction should be reviewed by industry because of the potential association with loss of control events if the engine is not shut down.

e. The aviation industry should undertake as a matter of high priority the development of basic generic text and video training material on turboprop and turbofan propulsion system malfunctions, recognition, procedures, and airplane effects.

f. The regulatory authorities should establish a means to ensure that the simulators used to support pilot training are equipped with the appropriate realistic propulsion system malfunctions for the purpose of “recognition and appropriate response training”. To this end, the industry should develop specifications and standards for the simulation of propulsion system malfunctions.

g. A review of propulsion system instrumentation requirements should be completed to determine if improved engine displays or methods can be found to present engine information in a manner which would better help the pilot recognize propulsion system malfunctions.

h. It is recommended that the aviation industry sponsor activity to develop appropriate human factors methodologies to study both annunciation and training effectiveness for turboprop and turbofan propulsion system failures.

i. Circumstances of negative transfer from previous training or operations should be identified and their lessons learned should be communicated as widely as possible within the industry.

Supporting details for the above major conclusions and recommendations are included in sections 10 and 11 along with others drawn from the facts and data reviewed in this project.
2.0  INTRODUCTION

On 13 December 1994 a Jetstream 31 turboprop crashed at Raleigh Durham, resulting in fatal injuries to 15 passengers and two crew. Three passengers survived the crash. The accident was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded that the pilot had mistakenly assumed that an engine had failed and subsequently failed to respond appropriately. The NTSB considered recommending that the regulations for future transport and commuter airplanes be modified to require “clear and unambiguous indication of engine failure”, however this recommendation was not included in the final report. The final NTSB recommendations (A-95-98) are provided as Volume 1, Appendix 1. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), partly in reaction to the NTSB investigation, requested that the Aviation Industries Association (AIA) undertake a project to identify the issues related to the accident and define any corrective actions required, see Volume 1, Appendix 2. In response to the FAA, the AIA noted that a substantial number of serious incidents and accidents had occurred with similar links in the causal chain (based on the historical record of propulsion system related accidents presented in the AIA PC-342 committee report of May 1993). At this point in time, the number of worldwide accidents for this propulsion system malfunction with inappropriate crew response “cause” is about 3 per year in revenue flights, with an additional 2 per year associated with flight crew training of simulated engine-out conditions.

The FAA request to AIA included undertaking a project to:

a. Review relevant events and determine what factors influence crew errors following an engine failure.

b. Define safety-significant engine malfunctions.

c. Develop the guidelines for an engine failure indication system.

d. Define the process and guidelines for an engine failure simulation.

e. Define guidelines for engine failure recognition training.

f. Identify the process for validating the effectiveness of these guidelines.

The FAA encouraged the AIA to invite broad participation with the expectation that the project would eventually move into an Aviation Regulatory Advisory Committee (ARAC) activity and progress into an FAA/JAA/TC Harmonization Project, if required.

The AIA responded that it would undertake the requested project and would examine the need for corrective action; see Volume 1, Appendix 3. The initial focus of the project activity would be to assemble all:

- relevant facts and data including associated historical accidents and incidents;
- experience with various mitigation approaches;
- fixed- and motion-based simulator capabilities and programs;
• recommend potential improvement opportunities, and
• other relevant information appropriate to a thorough study of the issue.

The AIA response further stated that the AIA believed all parties would best be served by not prematurely focusing on "a solution." An AIA-Transport Committee (AIA-TC) “Project” was established and a chairperson selected to initiate the project. The Project chairperson chose the workshop approach for the meetings of the Project Group as the most appropriate format for sharing relevant data, information, and views. Additionally, the AIA-TC chairperson requested that The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) co-sponsor and co-chair the activity, and assist with the collection and analysis of turboprop transport airplane event data. AECMA agreed to co-chair the Project, and to help the data collection and analysis tasks related to turboprop transport airplanes.

The conduct of this Project required contributions from various parties with expertise in propulsion, flight crew training, airplane operations, flight deck design, simulator design, and human factors. The effort involved assembling and analyzing the available data (incidents and accidents from commercial airplane operations), and understanding the contributing factors to the events of interest, as well as the relevant technologies. The military services (U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army) participated and shared relevant information and experience, including potential solutions and research on mitigating technologies. Additional information to promote a comprehensive viewpoint included operational and training flight crew experience with turboprop/turbojet/turbofan airplane propulsion system failures, the variation in propulsion system failure indicating systems currently installed, and the appropriateness of current training and simulation capabilities. Aviation human factors experts were provided by Boeing, Airbus, British Aerospace, NTSB, NASA, and the U.S. Army. Regulatory and accident investigation specialists participated. The simulator manufacturers and flight crew training specialists also made valuable contributions to the group’s understanding of simulation and training issues.

The Project Group created a number of Task Groups addressing specific areas of interest. The Task Groups covered the following:

• Turbofan data acquisition and analysis
• Turboprop data acquisition and analysis
• Simulation
• Cockpit Instrumentation
• Human Factors
• Procedures and Training
• Regulations and Advisory Materials

There are several places in the FAR’s and JAR’s related to transport category airplanes that address loss of thrust from powerplants such as FAR/JAR 25.107, 25.109, 25.145, etc. In summary, current regulations require airplanes to be designed to have the capability of continued safe flight after the failure of the most critical engine at the most critical point in the flight. The achievement of this outcome is obviously contingent on the flight crew’s recognition that the propulsion system has malfunctioned in order to take the appropriate action.
During the last twenty years, there has been significant improvement in propulsion system reliability as shown in Figure 2.1. Despite the significant reduction in propulsion system malfunctions, the overall PSM+ICR accident/incident rate has remained essentially constant, suggesting that the likelihood of inappropriate crew response to the propulsion system malfunction has increased. Uncontained engine failures had previously been the dominant contributor to propulsion related turbofan and turboprop airplane accidents, but with the steady effort of the industry, uncontainments have been reduced. PSM+ICR is now the dominant contributor (25% of hull loss and fatal accidents over the past 5 years) to propulsion related turbofan and turboprop airplane accidents.

![Figure 2.1](image)

**Figure 2.1** Summary of total Inflight Shutdown (IFSD) rates for turbojets and turbofan engines since 1958 shows a clear trend toward lower IFSD rates

The Project Group analyzed accident/incident information for both turboprop and turbofan airplanes to try to establish why the improvement in propulsion system reliability has not been reflected in the accident/incident statistics. The work included examination of existing propulsion system instrumentation, pilot training programs, and simulator standards, as well as an assessment of possible changes to regulatory requirements related to these fields.

Events considered as part of this study are those which were initiated by a propulsion system malfunction on a single engine combined with an inappropriate crew response to that malfunction which then resulted in an accident or serious incident. In the process of data collection, a significant number of training accidents where crews responded inappropriately to simulated propulsion system malfunctions (e.g., V\(_1\) engine failure) have been identified. The Project Group management decided it would be appropriate to offer some views in relation to these training type of accidents.
It is clear from examination of the data that some areas of difficulty encountered by flight crews are different in the turboprop and turbofan worlds. The Project Group recognizes that transition of crews between the airplane types will continue to occur; therefore, common solutions must be found wherever possible, while highlighting any differences.

The Project Group acknowledges the contributions from all the major airframe and engine manufacturers, simulator manufacturers, regulatory authorities, training organizations, pilot groups, accident investigation authorities, and participating operators, as shown in the acknowledgment section.
3.0 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

AECMA The European Association of Aerospace Industries
AEA Association of European Airlines
AIA Aerospace Industries Association
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DC&ATG Data Collection & Analysis Task Group
DGAC-F Direction Generale de l’Aviation Civile (France)
EPDB Engine parameter display behavior
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
HFEC Human Factors Error Classification
ICR Inappropriate Crew Response
JAA Joint Aviation Authorities
JAR Joint Aviation Regulations
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
PSM Propulsion system malfunction
TC Transport Canada

PHASE of FLIGHTS:

Taxi On ground operation of the airplane prior to initiating takeoff run and following the landing roll out from the active runway.

Rejected Takeoff A takeoff that is discontinued after takeoff thrust is set and the takeoff roll has begun.

Takeoff The operational phase from application of takeoff power at the start of roll until the airplane is 1,500 feet above the takeoff surface, or at which the transition from takeoff to the enroute speed (first power reduction) is completed.

Initial Climb The operational phase from 1,500 feet above ground level or at which the transition from takeoff to enroute speed (first power reduction) is completed lift off to flaps up retraction altitude.

Climb The operational phase from the end of initial climb until cruising altitude is achieved.

Cruise The operational phase from the transition from climb to assigned cruise flight altitude until the transition from cruise to descent.

Descent The operational phase from the end of cruise until the beginning of approach at the initial navigation fix for the approach phase.
Approach  The operational phase from the end of descent at the navigation fix
to wheels touchdown. The phase from the end of descent to the    outer
marker, or 5 miles to the airport, is often referred to as Initial Approach; Final
Approach is then the phase from the end of Initial Approach or outer
marker to flare for touch down of the wheels.

Landing  The operational phase from flare and touchdown of the wheels until
the end of roll out and turn off of the active runway.

Go-around  An aborted approach/landing situation where the airplane is
commanded to a takeoff/climb pitch attitude and requires the
application of power to provide necessary airplane performance to abort
the landing.

Compressor stall/surge – The terms “surge” and “stall” are used interchangeably within this
report to describe the breakdown of engine airflow within the engine. Compressor stall/surge
occurs when the stability limit of a compressor is violated. A single surge event may occur, or
several may occur which are typically spaced less than one second apart. A high-power surge is
accompanied by an audible report from the engine, which may be accompanied by tangible
structure-borne vibration and/or flames from the inlet and/or exhaust. Within the engine, airflow
reverses, leading to vibratory thrust pulsation and loud acoustic noises, along with “flames” out
the inlet and/or exhaust. The symptoms associated with compressor surge are dependent on the
level of thrust or power at which the engine is being operated. At high power levels, the thrust
oscillations will be large and the noise will be extremely loud akin to a cannon or a shotgun blast
at 10 feet. At low power, the thrust oscillation may not be noticed and the sound will be muted;
the only cues may be the effect on engine displays. Compressor stall/surge may or may not be
the result of a mechanical malfunction and may or may not be recoverable.

Symptom – Symptom is defined in this report as a cue perceived by the pilot. Symptoms may
be auditory, visual, tactile or olfactory; i.e. loud noise, the smell of smoke, a yawing motion or
onset of vibration. A symptom is what the pilot perceives as sensory input, which may suggest,
based on training, that something is different or wrong.

Error Classification – The following error type classification definitions were identified and
used in the assessment of the PSM+ICR events:

Skill-based behavior is when the pilot executes a very familiar task without consciously
thinking about how it is executed, almost automatic.

Two types of skill-based errors can be identified:

- slips: doing the right thing incorrectly - i.e., if the outcome of the action is different
  from intended.
- lapses; intending to do something, but, because of distraction or memory failure, not
  completing the action.
**Rule-based behavior** is when the pilot performs a sequence of familiar sub-routines that is consciously controlled by a rule or procedure stored in long-term memory or a checklist. The rules can be in the form of \( \text{if (state) then (diagnosis)} \) or \( \text{if (state) then (remedial action)} \). Rules can be gained through experience or communicated from other persons’ know-how as an instruction.

**Rule-based errors** are typically associated with the misclassification of situations leading to the application of the wrong rule or the incorrect recall of procedures.

Two types of rule-based errors can be identified:
- errors of omission; not doing something you should do.
- errors of commission; doing the wrong thing - also called mistakes.

**Knowledge-based behavior** comes into play when a pilot is faced with novel, unfamiliar situations, for which no procedures are available. The problem solving required in these unfamiliar situations is goal-driven. Goals are formulated based on an analysis of the environment and the overall aims of the person.

**Knowledge-based errors** arise from any or all of the following; selecting the wrong goal, incomplete or inaccurate knowledge (of the systems and the environment), and human limitations in terms of information processing and memory required for complex problem solving.

The same two types of knowledge-based errors can also apply to knowledge-based errors:
- errors of omission; not doing something you should do.
- errors of commission; doing the wrong thing - also called mistakes.

Reason (1990)\(^1\) describes that, with increasing expertise, the primary focus of control moves from the knowledge based to the skill based level; but all three levels can co-exist at any one time. For example;

- diagnosis may be knowledge based (unfamiliar situation),
- once a diagnosis is made, a procedure is selected using rule-based behavior; and the procedure is performed in an automatic, highly-practiced manner (skill-based behavior).

**Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response (PSM+ICR)** - An event where the pilot(s) did not appropriately handle a single benign engine or propulsion system malfunction. Inappropriate response includes incorrect response, lack of response, or unexpected or unanticipated response.

**Negative Training** - Training effects which result in behavior that is not appropriate in real operational flight situations (e.g. display cues in engine failure training using engine fuel cuts are different from the cues experienced during real engine failure in flight).

---

\(^1\) Reason, J. (1990), Human Error, Cambridge University Press.
**Negative Transfer** (of training on different airplane) - Negative transfer is when previous training or experience on another airplane type is inappropriate, or even counter productive, in the current airplane type. Negative transfer is most likely to occur during stressful, high workload situations when pilots revert to ‘old habits’. 
4.0 DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS PROCESS AND RESULTS

The objective of the data collection and analysis task groups was to examine the historical record of airplane accidents and incidents related to propulsion system malfunction plus inappropriate flight crew response (PSM+ICR) to identify potential improvement opportunities. Experts from the airframe and engine manufacturers, flight crew training, and regulatory agencies conducted the analysis.

Collection of relevant data for this activity focused on western-built commercial transport airplanes. Each airframe and engine manufacturer provided the best available factual information for the events involving its respective products. It should be noted that the depth of information available for accidents/incidents varies widely, and that a great deal of difficulty was encountered getting substantive data on the smaller turboprop airplane types. It is hoped that, in the future, more emphasis will be placed on recording factual findings of such events because of their importance to activities of the type undertaken here.

The data analysis teams focused on identifying the “key factors” involved in the sequence of events, including flight deck symptoms, cues, contextual variables, and classification of error types. Key factors are those specific “links” in the chain or attributes of an event sequence for each accident or incident that had a significant impact on the outcome. In addition, an assessment to identify opportunities to further minimize the probability of inappropriate crew response to propulsion system malfunctions was conducted. PSM+ICR accident and incident rates with respect to time were developed to identify any trends. Accident and incident rates by worldwide regions were assessed to determine any regional differences.

The data analysis process concentrated on a small number of “data-rich” events. Care was taken to test that the conclusions drawn from these events remained appropriate for those other events where data were sparse.

The process for identifying improvement opportunities was carried out in the following manner:

- Each event was judged independently and improvement opportunities identified.
- The opportunities identified from the data-rich events were assessed in relation to those with sparse results to ensure
  a) All potential solutions had been identified; and
  b) Identified solutions remained appropriate in all cases.

The analysis process was not intended to focus on the root cause of the initial propulsion system malfunction, but rather on the malfunction symptom(s) experienced by the flight crew and their response to that malfunction symptom(s).
4.1 Turbofan Data Analysis

This section contains the results of the data and analysis for turbofan accident/incident events from 1959 through 1996 for western built commercial transport airplanes that are heavier than 60,000 pounds maximum gross weight. There were a total of 79 events analyzed, 34 of which were accidents. A summary of each event is contained in Volume 2, Appendix 4.

This section also includes a qualitative judgment of improvement opportunities. A summary of the conclusions reached by the group is also included.

4.1.1 Turbofan Propulsion System Malfunction Symptoms

The propulsion system malfunctions symptoms present in turbofan accidents and incidents are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom (Accident and Incidents)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck throttle (throttle remains fixed)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire warning</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response to commanded power</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT warning light</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low oil quantity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe vibrations &amp; perceived power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected power loss due to airplane deceleration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary power loss due standing rwy water ingestion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust reverser “Unlock” light on</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust reverser did not transition to “Rev Thrust”</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust reverser to “Unlock” position, no power increase</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom (Accidents Only)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck throttle (throttle remains fixed)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire warning</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected power loss due to airplane deceleration</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT warning light</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low oil quantity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary power loss - standing runway water ingestion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust reverser did not transition to “Rev Thrust”</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.2 Turbofan Event Categories

The data analysis identified four major categories for the turbofan PSM+ICR events. These categories are: Rejected Takeoffs, Loss of Control, Shutdown/Throttled Good Engine, and Other.

- **Rejected Takeoffs**
  at/above $V_1$ following compressor stall/surge, severe vibration, or warning lights

- **Loss of Control resulting from:**
  - Undetected thrust asymmetry due to slow, quiet engine or throttle malfunction
  - Aerodynamic cues masked by auto-throttle/auto-pilot until situation develops wherein airplane recovery becomes difficult

- **Shutdown/Throttled Good Engine**
  Inappropriate crew response to an engine malfunction (surge, severe vibration) leading to shutdown or power reduction of the wrong engine either by:
  - incorrect diagnosis
  - incorrect action following correct diagnosis

- **Other**
  - Difficulty isolating which engine is malfunctioning,
  - Failure to recognize the need to take action or follow established procedures (i.e., continuously surging engines)

### 4.1.2.1 Turbofan Rejected Takeoffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMPTOM</th>
<th>No. Events</th>
<th>Fatal</th>
<th>Hull</th>
<th>Subst Dmg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rejected takeoffs at or above $V_1$ resulting in runway overrun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire warning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT warning light</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe vibration / perceived power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrust reverser “Unlock” light - no overrun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTO attempted after $V_1$,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected takeoff below $V_1$ resulting in runway overrun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected takeoff below $V_1$ with no overrun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mis-identified eng malfunction as tire failure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note (*): The accidents are classified as Fatal, Fatal-Hull Loss, Hull Loss or Substantial Damage per the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) definitions.
Engine bird strikes played a role in 8/28 (29%) of the RTO events. Another 8/28 (29%) of RTO’s involved wet or contaminated runways.

4.1.2.2 Turbofan Loss of Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMPTOM</th>
<th>No. Events</th>
<th>Fatal-H</th>
<th>Hull</th>
<th>Subst Dmg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Control - In flight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck throttle (throttle remains fixed)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loud bang, power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training flight (V₁ cut plus power loss)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss &amp; loss control returning to land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Control - On ground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric thrust during landing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated approach and landing resulting in offside landing - with single engine power loss</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No horizon or ground reference was present in 4/9 of the loss of control accidents in-flight.

4.1.2.3 Turbofan Shutdown / Throttle Good Engine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMPTOM</th>
<th>No. Events</th>
<th>Fatal-H</th>
<th>Hull</th>
<th>Subst Dmg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shutdown Good Engine</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge &amp; power loss</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuck throttle (throttle remains fixed)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loud noise (growling sound), EGT rise</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire warning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss, perceived both engines failed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise, vibration, compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vibration, smell, compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power loss, no throttle response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throttled Good Engine</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compressor stall/surge</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loud bang, power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals | 27 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
4.1.2.4 Turbofan - Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error classification</th>
<th>No. Events</th>
<th>Fatal-H</th>
<th>Hull</th>
<th>Subst Dmg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure to complete procedures engine shutdown checklist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC communication error resulting in shutdown of a good engine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to detect asymmetric thrust (stuck throttle)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive pitch attitude with single engine power loss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous surging of multiple engines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3 Turbofan Error Type Classifications

Error classifications as defined in section 3 have been used in analyzing the events. An in-depth discussion of the analytical results for error type classification is provided in section 8.0, Human Factors, which provides a description of the types of events corresponding to these errors.

The following summarizes the results of the error classification. In many of the events, multiple errors were assessed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident &amp; Incidents</th>
<th>Accidents Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Error classification</td>
<td>% Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge &amp; Rule</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge &amp; Skill</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule &amp; Skill</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.4 Turbofan - Potential Areas for Improvement

A process was undertaken in an attempt to identify improvement opportunities, based on data analysis. This process proceeded event by event, using the following techniques. The conclusions offered here should not be taken literally, but rather should be used to identify a hierarchy (relative ranking) of the opportunities for improvement. Each event was judged independently and evaluated qualitatively by the analysis team of subject-matter experts. The following definitions of areas where improvement opportunities could be found were used.

Design
Annunciation - Design and implementation of an engine or system malfunction indicating system.

System - Corrective design and implementation action on the cause(s) of propulsion system malfunction.

Simulation - Design and implementation of representative propulsion system failure symptomology (auditory, visual, & tactile cues) in simulators.

Training

Initial - Flight crew training on the identification and proper response to failure condition symptomology/annunciation/indication.

Recurrent - Exposure, training, and check ride testing on the identification and proper response to failure condition symptomology/annunciation/indication and current operating anomalies and problems.

Academic/System - Audio and visual training (AVT) and computer-based training (CBT) for recognition and training in system functions and malfunction/failure characteristics.

Simulation

Fixed Base - Capability enhancement of failure/malfunction representation for recognition and proper response training.

Full Flight - Capability enhancement of failure/malfunction representation for recognition and proper response training.

Procedures

New - Development of new procedures related to failure/malfunction condition; recommended action.

Modified - Enhancement of current procedure(s).

Communication

Manuals - Add material addressing the propulsion system malfunction into Operating Manuals as appropriate.

Awareness - Special awareness/training publications including videotape awareness information, operating bulletins, airline publications, special briefings, and/or safety symposia.

Crew Resource Management
Crew Coordination  -  Additional training, etc., with emphasis on crew coordination.

Culture

Cross-Culture Adaptation  -  Refers to those learning groups (such as pilots, mechanics, et al) who have English as a second language and a non-European language as their primary language. This refers especially to cultures which use pictographs, Cyrillic symbols and/or reverse reading direction (other than left to right and/or up to down). This culture adaptation need is most evident in English-labeled flight decks.

4.1.4.1  Summary of Results for Potential Areas for Improvement

The data analysis team considered each event in the database and determined by consensus what were the potential areas for improvement based on each event. These potentials were then tabulated and are presented as percentages in the table below.

Figure 4.1.4.1  Potential Improvement Opportunities

The areas with greatest potential improvement opportunities were those of “awareness” and “systems design”. Providing “awareness” information to flight crews on these types of events and the symptoms that the crew faced was judged by the team to be beneficial in all cases. Further, the team realized that reduction in the frequency of the initiating propulsion system malfunction/failures would also be effective (reduce the rate directly). However, the data team noted that such improvements (reducing the initiating propulsion system malfunction/failure rate) would be difficult to achieve, at least in the near term.
Training (initial, recurrent and academic/systems) was judged to represent good potential for improvement particularly if the training was part of basic airmanship training. Training for malfunction recognition could be integrated into current training programs with negligible cost. Enhanced text and video material could be developed at reasonably low cost. Training in malfunction recognition was seen as an integral part of flight crew procedures training to ensure appropriate response to malfunctions.

The design areas of annunciation and simulation symptomologies were also considered to have high potential to provide improvement. Both annunciation system and simulation symptomology design action should be evaluated critically using the appropriate validity assessment techniques.

It is clear there is no single solution. The data indicate that it will take a combination of enhanced awareness, training and simulation of a relatively few failure types to achieve an order of magnitude reduction in the accident rate for PSM+ICR. The enhancement of full-flight simulators with a few appropriately-designed engine malfunction simulations, in conjunction with better training, was identified as having a high potential for success.

4.1.5 Turbofan - Phase of Flight for Events

The figure 4.1.5 below depicts the percentage of turbofan events as a function of flight phase. The majority of events, over 70% occur during the takeoff and climb phase of flight.

![Phase of flight distribution summary](image-url)
4.1.6 Turbofan Accident & Incident Rates

The figure 4.1.6 below depicts the PSM+ICR annual accident rate per 10 million departures for the turbofan events. This rate was calculated using the number of hull loss and substantial damage type accidents per year divided by the total yearly commercial fleet airplane departures. The annual accident rate for PSM+ICR appears to be constant.

![Figure 4.1.6: Annual accident rate trend with time - Hull loss and substantial damage](image)

The figure below depicts the PSM+ICR annual Hull Loss-only accident rate per 10 million departures for the turbofan events. This rate was calculated using the total number of hull loss accidents per year divided by total yearly commercial fleet airplane departures. The annual accident rate for PSM+ICR appears to be basically constant.
Figure 4.1.6 Annual accident rate trend with time - Hull loss only

4.1.7 Turbofan Regional data

Differences appear to exist between the airplane accident rates in different geographical and geopolitical regions. These differences have been attributed to a number of factors such as cultural differences, resource limitations, equipment used, underlying engine reliability rates, training approaches, etc. The validation of cause and effect is not clearly demonstrated by anything other than the rate difference. Volume 2, Appendix 15 contains the charts developed to assess the statistical differences by airline regional and airplane generation aspects.

The differences in the accident rates for PSM+ICR were examined using a number of statistical significance tests. The confidence intervals suggest that some differences exist, but the statistically small number of events, the existence of multiple potential underlying causes, and the lack of detailed circumstantial information make it impossible to definitively establish the reasons for the differences.

Several factors may play important roles in the rate differences. These include the training program used and the cumulative experience levels of the flight crews. When the group considers future trends such as more pilots paying for their qualification training, improved powerplant reliability with decreased exposure to on-the-job training, lack of regulatory requirements for training beyond the $V_1$ cut, and the general decrease in cumulative flight deck experience, it is unclear that the above-average historical experience in the US and Canada community will continue into the future. There is a strong possibility that differences perceived to be due to the training and experience in less-developed regions will become the future for the developed countries due to neglect of this type of training and the retirement of crews who had the experience to recognize such failure conditions and react properly. There is no reason to
believe that any region is immune to these types of accidents; therefore, early action would seem to be indicated.

It would be preferable to be proactive than to wait for what is perceived to be an increased exposure to these types of accidents in the future years. There is nothing in the data to suggest either that the U.S. and Canada are immune from these events, or that their rates will continue to be better than the worldwide average.

### 4.1.8 Turbofan Training Accidents

A review of the historical accident record for western-built turbofan airplanes involving training accidents where either single or multiple engines were reduced to minimum thrust setting (simulated engine-out conditions) was conducted to examine relative frequency, phase of flight, and geographical location of the events. The following chart depicts the number of simulated engine-out training related accidents (Substantial Damage, Hull Loss, and Fatal) in comparison to the PSM+ICR accidents since the beginning of commercial jet transport service.

![Comparison of PSM+ICR revenue service events versus simulated engine-out crew training events](image)

**Figure 4.1.8** Comparison of PSM+ICR revenue service events versus simulated engine-out crew training events

Volume 2, Appendix 5 provides a summary of the substantial damage, hull loss and fatal type accidents for the turbofan training related events. The following tables summarize the 30 simulated engine-out training accidents history by phase of flight and the airline geographical location. Analysis results of the simulated engine-out training related events are only included in the section of the report.

**DATA PERIOD: 1959-1998**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Phase</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go-around</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>S. America</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise/Inflight</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Approach</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DATA PERIOD: 1988-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Phase</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Geographical Region</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflight</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S. America</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.9 Turbofan - Summary of Findings

- Calendar frequency of accidents is 1 per year in revenue service and 1 per year in training.

- Loud bangs (compressor stall/surges) and/or vibration-related malfunctions are influencing factors and appear to be outside most crews’ experience (training and service events). This class of symptoms is a major contributor to inappropriate crew response.

- In all cases of accidents after RTO’s above $V_1$, the airplane would have flown satisfactorily.

- Quiet malfunctions which are slow and have unobserved onset cues (masked by automatic controls) are a major contributor to inappropriate crew response.

- Many flight crew members will never experience an in-service propulsion system malfunction (power loss, high power surge, no response to commanded power) in their careers (estimate 0.7 to 0.9 events/career).

- Crews appear to have sometimes reacted inappropriately to annunciation lights (Engine Fail, EGT exceedance, Fire Warning, Thrust Reverser Unlock) during takeoff phase at or above $V_1$.

- Crews sometimes had difficulty identifying which engine was malfunctioning. Modern surge recovery systems tend to eliminate an EGT exceedance as a visible cue of engine malfunction, thus making the identification of the affected engine more difficult.

- Negative transfer due to basic ADI display philosophy differences may have been a factor in two “loss of control” accidents involving asymmetric thrust related events.

- Regional similarities across groups exist with PSM+ICR event occurrence rates. However, there is nothing in the data to suggest that any regions are immune from these events. Airplane generation rate data breakdown indicates that no significant differences exist between airplane generation types.

In addition to the main study, a more detailed study which addressed all engine malfunction-related RTO’s above $V_1$ in the GE/CFMI commercial fleet, was completed. The results of this specific analysis supported the conclusions of the main study given above, and produced certain additional detailed conclusions as given below:

- The number of RTO’s above $V_1$ per calendar year is increasing in line with the increasing number of airplane departures. The rate of inappropriate crew response to an alarming engine malfunction symptom in the high-speed portion of the takeoff roll is remaining constant per opportunity or engine malfunction.

- The probability of inappropriate crew response is not affected by the number of engines on the airplane (i.e., having more instruments to watch does not increase confusion).
• Engine compressor stall/surge, flight deck warnings, vibration and yaw are relatively likely to result in a pilot decision to reject a takeoff above \( V_1 \).
• There is considerable variation between operators in the incidence of RTO’s above \( V_1 \). Most geographical regions include operators with a significant incidence of these events.
• Crew experience alone does not appear to affect the likelihood of the event.

The very limited data available indicate that an engine stall/surge accompanied by a flight deck warning may have a higher probability of an RTO above \( V_1 \) than an engine stall/surge without a flight deck warning. The detail charts of this study are provided in Volume 2, Appendix 6.

4.1.10 Turbofan - Potential Corrective Action Opportunities

The following are suggested as potential corrective action opportunities:

A. To provide assistance to crews in identifying that an engine has malfunctioned:
   • Develop a flight crew “Awareness Package” to provide information to line-flying pilots to provide the following:
     1. Examples of appropriate and inappropriate crew responses (lessons learned)
     2. Types of engine malfunctions, characteristics and flight deck effects
     3. Frequency of malfunctions
     4. Impact of technology features on crew recognition and the need for no action (e.g., surge detection and recovery)
   • Enhance the crew training curriculum (expand engine events beyond \( V_1 \) throttle chops), malfunction simulation representation, and training for both recognition and proper response for propulsion system malfunctions.
   • Train crews for engine surge malfunction recognition and proper response.
   • Provide a means to assist crews in identifying which propulsion system is malfunctioning in-flight (may not be feasible for legacy hardware).

B. Communicate the meaning of \( V_1 \) and its related performance aspects to line-flying pilots.

4.2 Turboprop Data Analysis

Regrettably, only a few turboprop airplanes have flight data recorders; therefore the data available from turboprop accidents is disproportionately small. Although the data enabled identification of Loss of Control as the major category to PSM+ICR accidents, insufficient data were available from the accident information to allow a meaningful analysis of the reasons for the loss of control. In an effort to understand the underlying factors in the Loss of Control events, advantage was taken of the engineering and operational expertise of the manufacturers,
airline, and pilot representatives participating in the data analysis task group. The participants’ experience of actual incidents which involved potential loss of control situations both in operation and simulations was used as a basis for recommending potential improvement opportunities. Data in this report were obtained from formal accident reports and manufacturer databases. The incident experience drawn upon by the experts may be not included in these data. It has been determined that all data included in this report are in the public domain and, therefore the relevant data set is provided in full in Volume 2, Appendix 7 for the PSM+ICR turboprop events. Volume 2, Appendix 8 provides a summary of the turboprop training-related accidents.

Of the initial 114 events that were collated, only 75 met the objectives of this report. During the initial review phase, additional searches for data relating to known events were not successful. Of the final 75 events only a few had sufficient data to elaborate on the accident cause; these were classified as data-rich events. A significant number of events were rejected as failing to meet the task criteria. In some of these events, it was the Inappropriate Crew Response that preceded the Propulsion System Malfunction; i.e., the crew actions caused the engines to fail, which subsequently led to an accident. Many of these Inappropriate Crew Responses were associated with flight in icing conditions and crew actions in fuel system management. Although not part of this report, the crew actions (human factors), in these events should be investigated further, as they may give insight to human errors that lead to propulsion system malfunction. Accidents involving flight training where the engine failure was simulated have been retained in the database and have been used in this analysis.

The analysis considered the following categories:

- Distribution over time.
- Phase of flight and event category.
- Error type.
- Type of malfunction, type of flight.
- Effect of autofeather.
- Geographical location.

Detailed analysis concentrated on data-rich accidents. The analysis was reviewed with operators and manufacturers who participated in the study, and whose opinion were sought to confirm the conclusions. Issues relating to training and airplane instrument displays were also discussed with operators, often resulting in wide-ranging differences of opinion.

Human factors analysis of the data did not show any root causes for the accidents due to insufficient data. However, several human-centered factors were identified by the operators who participated in the study which would appear to center on training and operating problems.

Subdivision of airplane accidents involving non-14 CFR 121 operations, or those involving airplanes with 19 or less seats failed to show any patterns that differed from the general conclusions.
Specific airplane flight deck and instrument arrangements were reviewed. Again, the lack of data prevented quantitative analysis, and many conclusions in these areas are also subjective.

4.2.1 Distribution over time

The annual numbers of turboprop PSM+ICR events since 1985 are shown in Figure 4.2.1 below. It will be seen that there is no recognizable upward or downward trend in the annual numbers. However, it does show that these events continue to occur at a rate of $6 \pm 3$ events per year, indicating that action is required if this rate is to be reduced. The data for 1997 are only partially complete.

![Figure 4.2.1](image)

**Figure 4.2.1** Chronological Distribution of Turboprop PSM+ICR Events since 1985

4.2.2 Phase of Flight

The number of propulsion system malfunction events which occurred during a particular phase of flight is shown in Fig 4.2.2. The phases of flight are defined in Section 3.0 of this report. The dominant phase of flight for all turboprop propulsion system malfunctions is Takeoff - this
accounts for half of the accidents. The next highest flight phase in the rankings was Approach, where there were 12 events (16% of the total).

![Figure 4.2.2 All events, by phase of flight](image)

All of the take-off events occurred once the airplane were airborne. There was one rejected takeoff (RTO) event recorded for turboprop airplanes. This is a significant difference from turbofan events. The reason for this difference is that most turboprop operations are not conducted from runways where the accelerate-stop distance is limiting. Even at the “spoke” airfields of the typical US “hub and spoke” operations, runways are 7000 - 8000 feet long and are more likely to be obstacle clearance limited. This forces the turboprops to reduce take-off weights, which further improves their stopping capabilities. High speed aborts on turboprops seldom result in overruns.

There were no data-rich events in the takeoff phase of flight.
4.2.3 Event Category

The accidents were categorized and the results are plotted on Figure 4.2.3 below. The dominant event category is Loss of Control, accounting for 63% of all events.

![Figure 4.2.3 All events, by category](image)

4.2.4 Flight Phase and Event Category

Figures 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 show clearly that Takeoff and Loss of Control individually dominate their respective analyses. Figure 4.2.4 shows that these two classifications strongly coincide. A correlation of the data by flight phase and event category shows that 70% of the “powerplant malfunction during takeoff” events led to loss of control, either immediately (22 events) or on the subsequent approach to re-land (4 events). Or, put another way, 55% of the “loss of control” events occurred during the takeoff phase of flight.

It is concluded that the overwhelming majority of turboprop accidents resulting from powerplant malfunctions occur during the takeoff phase of flight and are due to the loss of control of the airplane.
4.2.5 Error Type

Each accident was evaluated to determine the specific error type associated with the inappropriate crew response. However, the assessment was based on the opinions of the experts involved. The error types are those defined in Section 3.0 of this report. Figure 4.2.5 below shows the distribution of error types.

Figure 4.2.4 All events, by category and phase of flight

Figure 4.2.5 All events, by type of error
For a given (certificated) airplane type, rule-based errors are generally addressed by training. Discussion of this data with operators supported these findings and again identified problems, in human factors, training, and regulation, which are discussed later.

### 4.2.6 Type of Flight

The percentage of accidents for a given type of flight is shown at Fig 4.2.6. Revenue flights accounted for 80% of the events. As discussed previously, the data does not support a detailed breakdown between 14 CFR Part 121 and other operations.

A disproportionately large number of events (17%) occurred during training or test flights.

![Figure 4.2.6 All events, by type of flight](image)

### 4.2.7 Type of Powerplant Malfunction

The types of powerplant malfunction identified as the initiating event are shown in Figure 4.2.7. Propulsion system failures resulting in an uncommanded total power loss was the dominant category. Turboprop engines seldom experience compressor stall/surge. This is significantly different from the situation on turbofans. Discussion with engine manufacturers concluded that one reason for this difference is that most turboprop engines (and some small turbofan engines) have a centrifugal stage in the compressor and hence are more tolerant to instability.

“Shut down by crew” events are those where either a malfunction of the engine occurred (partial
power loss/torque fluctuations etc.) and the crew then shut down that engine, or where one engine malfunctioned and the other (wrong) engine was then shut down. The distinction between “shut down by crew” and “failed” is that in the “failed” events the engine suffered a total power loss prior to any crew intervention.

There were 6 of the 13 “shut down by crew” events where the pilot shut down the wrong engine - three of which were on training flights where the instructor had deliberately throttled one engine and the student then shut down the wrong engine. Accidents where the engine was not shut down, but maintained at flight idle, identified a category where there could have been a serious misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of turboprop operations. When an engine is at idle the unfeathered propeller can give negative thrust, which, particularly at low airspeed, can result in a thrust asymmetry beyond that for which the airplane was certificated. Events in this category included training and deliberate “idle” selection by the crew. Each of these categories will be discussed later.

![Figure 4.2.7](image)

**Figure 4.2.7** All events, by type of powerplant malfunction

### 4.2.8 Failure Cues

There is little data to show which sensory cues, other than system alerts and annunciators, that the crew used or failed to use in identifying the propulsion system malfunction. Also, it is unknown whether, in fact, the crews recognized that they had a powerplant malfunction, or which powerplant was malfunctioning. Unfortunately, in the turboprop accidents, few of the crew survived.
4.2.9 Effect of Autofeather

The influence of autofeather systems on the outcome of the events was examined. The “loss of control during takeoff” events were specifically addressed since this is the type of problem and flight phase for which autofeather systems are designed to aid the pilot. In 15 of the events, autofeather was fitted and armed (and is therefore assumed to have operated). In 5 of the events, an autofeather system was not fitted and of the remaining 6, the autofeather status is not known. Therefore, in at least 15 out of 26 events, the presence of autofeather failed to prevent the loss of control. This suggests that whereas autofeather is undoubtedly a benefit, control of the airplane is being lost for reasons other than excessive propeller drag.

4.2.10 Geographical location

The analysis of the data with respect to geographical location was inconclusive. The largest number of accidents took place in North America, but this is roughly in proportion to the number of turboprop airplane operating in the geographic regions. Additionally, the Western Hemisphere produced more consistent data.

4.2.11 Operations and Personnel

The following statements were derived from discussions between the turboprop task group members, based on personnel experience, and were assembled to provide some perspective on the potential differences between turboprop and turbofan powered airplane operations. In the quest to understand why pilots were losing control of the airplane, the following potential contributing factors were identified. There has been no statistical analysis performed to substantiate the following issues. Although the data enabled identification of Loss of Control as the major category to PSM+ICR accidents, insufficient data were available from the accident information to allow a meaningful analysis of the reasons for the loss of control. In an effort to understand the underlying factors in the Loss of Control events, advantage was taken of the engineering and operational expertise of the manufacturers, airline, and pilot representatives participating in the data analysis task group. The participants’ experience of actual incidents which involved potential loss of control situations both in operation and simulations were used as a basis for recommending potential improvement opportunities.

Some turboprop operations are frequently characterized as having lower-cost operations, lesser experienced crews, and airplanes which may be demanding in flight path/speed control following engine failure. The pilot associations and airline members report a decrease in the availability of experienced pilots. Training groups report that pilot candidates having less motivation or natural ability are allowed to progress through basic training. Regional airlines report a high turn-over rate of pilots in the turboprop sector, particularly by advancement to jet airplanes, that further reduces the turboprop operator's experience level, resulting in early promotion of lower-experienced first officers. Some operators reported that some captains did not trust junior first officers due to the first officers’ low experience level and training.
Thus, in most in-flight emergencies, those captains not only flew the airplane and commanded the drills to be taken, but also actively participated in the drills, which detracted from the primary task of flying.

Older turboprop airplanes had a reputation as being demanding in skill and workload. A crewmember would expect to serve an apprenticeship as a first officer to acquire skills and experience of situation and diagnostic technique. More recent airplanes utilize designs and equipment, which are more error tolerant. However, as the overall crew qualifications and skill levels can easily be eroded by the high turn over rates and expectation of early promotion, those pilots now flying older airplanes are disproportionately less experienced. There should be a review of the balance of requirements between airplane certification and crew qualification, particularly for inexperienced crews flying older airplanes. It was also reported that instructors and authorized maintenance test pilots can be appointed to those positions as staff jobs, without the necessary experience or abilities. There are no requirements for specific training that must be completed before assuming an instructor’s or authorized maintenance test pilot’s position.

The connection between the certification basis of the airplane (the assumptions made about crew capability to recognize and handle) and pilot training is unclear to the participants of the task group. This forms the basis for the recommendation for the development of a process to ensure that all parties have a clear understanding of the philosophies and assumptions on which the designs are based. Also, there should be formal training and qualification for instructors and maintenance test pilots.

4.2.12 Human Factors

The following major issues have been identified during the analysis of the turboprop data:

Examples of negative training have been identified where the symptoms and modeling of propulsion system malfunctions can be inconsistent with the real operational event. In addition, with the preponderance of on-aircraft training, the only training exposure pilots see is the throttle cut to idle at $V_1$; again, this is inconsistent with the kinds of events most likely to be seen in service operational environment.

Negative transfer has also been seen to occur since initial or ab initio training is normally carried out in aircraft without autofeather systems. Major attention is placed on the need for rapid feathering of the propeller(s) in the event of engine failure. On most modern turboprop commercial transport airplanes, which are fitted with autofeather systems, this training can lead to over-concentration on the propeller condition at the expense of the more important task of flying the airplane.

Both negative training and transfer are most likely to occur at times of high stress, fear and surprise, such as may occur in the event of a propulsion system malfunction at or near the ground.

Loss of control may be due to lack of piloting skills or it may be that preceding inappropriate actions had rendered the airplane uncontrollable regardless of skill. It is very difficult, with just
the database, to sort these two situations out. The recommended solutions (even within training) would be quite different for these two general circumstances. In the first instance, it is a matter of instilling through practice the implementation of appropriate actions without even having to think about what to do in terms of control actions. In the second instance, there is serious need for procedural practice. Physical and mental workload can be very high during an engine failure event. The physical aspects are determined by the certification requirements. However, many turboprop airplanes have higher control forces than turbofan airplanes, and thus may be physically more demanding. It is suggested that the certification requirements related to control forces be reconsidered in light of the above assessment.
5.0 PROPULSION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND FAILURE WARNING SYSTEMS

5.1 Turbofans

The indication task group was composed of members from each of the major airplane and engine manufacturers, the FAA, the NTSB, and airline flight crews. The group heard presentations from several parties detailing potential problems with existing designs, proposed new methods for presenting information to the flight crew, and discussed real-life experiences which had resulted in accidents.

A primary area of concern is during takeoff roll approaching and above $V_1$ where warning messages have influenced flight crews to abort even when the takeoff should have been continued; e.g., above $V_1$. (It is noted that there has been much discussion and confusion concerning the flight crew decisions and actions that have to be completed at or before $V_1$ when aborting a takeoff. Actions have been taken by the various manufacturers and certification authorities which are designed to address this issue.)

Crews have aborted takeoffs based on lack of indications following a loud noise or heavy vibration. In at least one case, a severe engine stall or surge was thought to be a bomb, and the captain elected to abort the takeoff after $V_1$. It is possible to indicate the source of some surges and engine noises. Several engine manufacturers have stated that their FADEC-equipped engines could detect a compressor stall/surge and send a message in a timely manner to the cockpit. Tire failures, which sound like an engine surge on some airplanes, are already annunciated throughout the length of the takeoff roll (no $V_1$ inhibit) on at least one airplane. It would also be possible to annunciate severe engine out-of-balance conditions to the flight crew. However, the data also indicate that flight crews have inappropriately aborted takeoffs at high speed based purely on cockpit indications. Some pilots have indicated that a timely, reliable and "trained to" indication of the source of a noise or vibration could provide the necessary information for the crew to decide that an airplane is airworthy, when in the past they would have been convinced otherwise.

A further area of concern was power asymmetry resulting from a slow power loss, stuck throttle, or no response to throttle coupled with automatic controls. Flying aids, such as the auto-pilot and auto-throttle, can mask significant power asymmetry until a control limit is reached. At this point, the flight crew has to intervene, understand the malfunction, and assume control of an airplane which may be in an upset condition. Better indications and/or annunciations of power asymmetry could warn crews in advance and allow them time to identify the problem and apply the appropriate procedures.

A separate issue of cockpit indications inducing crew error relates to the design layout of those indications in at least one event. Although the existing regulation in FAR/JAR 25.1321(c)(1) is explicit, the evaluation of a particular layout is subjective. The layout factors should not be ignored, and the suitability of new displays for use by airline pilots should be further evaluated.
Consideration of the development of additional guidance material for FAR/JAR 25.1321 is recommended.

The task group discussed the issue of whether presentation of all parameters required by the FAR/JAR regulations helps or hinders in diagnosing engine malfunctions. These parameters may help in trend monitoring, but their varying relationships at different power and atmospheric conditions make them difficult for crews to use when analyzing a problem.

Improvements in cockpit indications alone may not significantly reduce crew error in handling propulsion system malfunctions. In takeoff abort situations, digital flight data recorder (DFDR) information shows that the flight crew's decision is often made and executed within 2 seconds of the event. In a number of instances, crews testified that the actual propulsion system malfunction they experienced was unlike anything they had ever heard or seen. They incorrectly concluded that the airplane was not airworthy.

A topic that merits further consideration is that of the use of automation to warn the crew when they may have taken an inappropriate action in response to a malfunction; e.g., a challenge regarding the selection of an engine to be shut down.

Volume 2, Appendix 9 contains the results of a fleet survey of engine failure indications for turbofan powered airplanes.

5.2 Turboprops

5.2.1 Instrumentation and Displays

The role of engine and flight instruments displays in accidents was considered during the analysis and Volume 2, Appendix 10 contains a fleet survey of turboprop airplane engine failure indications. However, the wide variation, differing applications, and lack of specific data relating to displays precludes a statistical analysis.

5.2.2 Engine Instruments

There were no accidents where instruments or engine displays could be clearly identified as the root cause. There were accidents where displays may have contributed to the outcome, but, even in these instances, there were extenuating circumstances of poor maintenance or flight training. It is observed that as airplane designs have evolved, the size of the turboprop engine instruments has been reduced. While, in the past, classic, direct-drive propeller airplanes had three large ATI propeller gauges, modern turboprop displays may be as small as one inch in diameter. Additionally, parameters have been grouped within a single display and occasionally use concentric pointers.
5.2.3 Propeller Instruments

On turboprop airplanes malfunctions of the propeller subsystem may be as or more critical than engine malfunctions. Although not directly supported by the accident analysis there exists a body of incident/accident data which suggests that more-comprehensive propeller condition instrumentation may be beneficial for turboprop airplanes, particularly those with free-turbine installations. It is therefore recommended that and appropriate group within the FAA/JAA harmonization process consider additional propeller instrumentation.

5.2.4 Airplane Instruments Potentially Relevant to Loss of Control

Turboprop airplane flight instruments have improved in recent years. The three small ATI attitude and compass displays have been replaced with five large ATI instruments or more, recently, EFIS. With the advent of integrated displays and redundant airplane electrical designs, turn rate instruments are no longer fitted to modern airplanes. However, many pilots undertook their basic twin engine flying training in airplanes using a ‘turn co-ordinator’ instrument, where rate of turn is depicted in a similar manner to roll attitude. Recently, some major flight training establishments have banned the use of this instrument, as it can be misunderstood as bank angle. The more traditional turn needle and slip ball are now used. Human factors investigation has shown that well-learned responses from basic training may have a significant effect in later years. Thus, the use of the ‘turn co-ordinator’ in basic training could result in incorrect concentration on roll control at the expense of controlling lateral acceleration in the event of an engine failure. Industry should investigate the suitability of turn co-ordinator instruments in training airplanes where commercial airplanes do not use these displays.

5.2.5 Lateral Acceleration

In recent years, lateral acceleration displays have decreased in size, particularly when integrated with Electro-mechanical ADIs or EFIS. However, the requirement to control slip is still a vital parameter in controlling turboprop-powered airplanes in asymmetric flight. In turbofan-powered airplanes slip is now not so important, as the control systems and engine locations have changed with time. Turboprop airplanes often use displays and formats developed for large jet transports, but the turbofan transport EFIS symbol size and format may be totally inappropriate for turboprop airplanes. Some of the turbofan airplanes have automatic rudder compensation or little requirement for the control of lateral acceleration in the event of an engine failure, particularly on rear-engined airplanes. These airplanes have smaller slip displays, which may be inadequate for turboprop airplanes. Thus, some turboprop airplanes have less than optimum instrument displays for lateral acceleration. The requirements for the clear display of lateral acceleration should be reviewed.
5.2.6 Flight Directors

Modern airplane flight instrument displays have flight-directed (FD) guidance systems. Few of these have been optimized for use following engine failure. Most control laws used in take-off modes are based on heading/roll and pitch attitude. If this type of FD is used when an engine fails the resulting airplane yaw will result in a flight-directed roll command to restore the heading or a wings-level attitude. The pilot’s natural instinct and trained response is to follow the FD; the command is conceptually similar to a turn co-ordinator instrument. The emphasis on the control of lateral acceleration by immediate use of rudder is lost, as there are no flight directed rudders. The pitch FD command during takeoff, and in some systems go-around, is to maintain constant attitude, but the original value is almost certainly inappropriate for a climb with an engine failed. The requirement is to control speed, particularly respecting the $V_{mca}$ and stall margins. Few, if any, turboprop airplanes have a takeoff/go-around FD mode with a speed command control law. **A Flight Director display should not be used during takeoff or go-around unless it has been specifically approved for engine failure operations.**

5.2.7 Low Speed Awareness

EFIS displays with low speed awareness symbols may provide enhanced cues of low speed following an engine failure. If the airplane is inappropriately configured or the propeller has not been feathered, the crew does not have a display of the increased minimum control speed ($V_{mca}$). The adjustment of the low-speed symbol to match the $V_{mca}$ for the actual airplane configuration should be considered in future designs. EFIS strip speed displays, with high values at the top, conflict with the convention of speed an attitude control, ‘pulling up’ to the high numbers results in loss of speed. Similarly, with these displays, fast slow indications cannot be used due to conflicting direction of error information. The exposure time of airplanes with these displays is still relatively low in comparison to the time-scale of the database, and there was no conclusive evidence from the data to suggest that instrument displays caused any accidents.

5.3 SUMMARY

1. For turbofan engines, an “ENGINE SURGE” indication could be beneficial. Such an indication would be useful within one second of the event during the takeoff and go-around phases of flight, and should be engine-position specific.

2. An asymmetric thrust indication displayed to the flight crew when the thrust asymmetry exceeds a pre-determined value could be beneficial.

3. An engine failure indication, e.g., "ENG #_ Fail", displayed to the flight crew when the engine rolls-back or runs down to a sub-idle condition, could be beneficial.

4. A review of propeller condition instrumentation is recommended to establish if additional instrumentation could be beneficial.
5. Manufacturers’ representatives indicated that retrospective embodiment of additional engine failure/malfunction indications, particularly on non-FADEC engines, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

6. A tire failure indication provided to the flight crew within one second of the tire failure during both the takeoff and landing phases of operation could be beneficial.

7. A review of propulsion system parameters is recommended to determine if improved engine displays or methods can be found to present engine information in a manner that would help the flight crew recognition and handle engine malfunctions.

8. Standardization among the airplane manufacturers regarding engine caution and warning messages and inhibit strategies during different flight phases (reference ARP 450D) is recommended.

9. The locations of Warnings, Indicators, and Controls should not lead to a mistaken association with a particular engine.

10. It is evident that, where practical, all of the messages associated with systems that are affected by an engine failure be made secondary to a primary "engine failure (sub-idle)" indication.

11. Consideration should be given to the use of automated systems to provide warning that a crew action may be inappropriate.
6.0 SIMULATOR CAPABILITIES AND REALISM WITH RESPECT TO PROPULSION SYSTEM FAILURES

6.1 Overview

The FAA and the ATA both conducted reviews of powerplant malfunction simulation characteristics in modern simulators during the course of this project. These reviews disclosed variability (lack of standardization) and, in some cases, the lack of realism of the sound and motion for specific simulated propulsion system malfunctions. The lack of realism had previously not been considered significant, as flight simulators were primarily intended to be used for training performance and controllability issues and were not expected to be used for propulsion system malfunction recognition training. There are no standards or specifications for the design and presentation of many propulsion system malfunctions in flight simulators. The reason for the observed variability and lack of realism is due to the prior lack of industry recognition of the need for propulsion system malfunction recognition pilot training. No criticism is intended or implied by the above preceding statement.

6.2 General

Volume 2, Appendix 11 contains the results of a simulator survey conducted worldwide. There is a significantly lower number of simulators for turboprop than for turbofans. Simulators are evaluated and classified by various regulatory standards; e.g. FAA AC 120-40B or JAR-STD. These standards address all instruments, equipment, panels, systems, and controls as installed in the simulator, including the assemblage of equipment and computer software programs necessary to represent the airplane in ground and flight operations, through the range of normal operations and a number of abnormal and/or emergency situations; a visual system that provides an out-of-the-cockpit view; a motion system; a sound system for providing appropriate sounds and noises throughout the operating range of the airplane; and a control loading system to provide the pilot with proper control feel and feedback.

Throughout the development of airplane flight simulators, there has been a concerted effort to measure all performance and handling qualities of the simulator against the same parameter as measured on the airplane. It was for this reason that the criterion adopted for the basis of this measurement has been that “…only (the aircraft) manufacturer’s flight test data (is) accepted for initial qualification” and that “…exceptions to this policy must be submitted to appropriate regulatory authorities for review and consideration” before being accepted.

A majority of the airplane flight simulators in service at this time represent turbofan-powered transport category airplanes. However, there are a growing number of smaller business jet or commuter jet simulators coming on line. An even smaller number of simulators represent turbo-propeller-powered airplanes. In fact, of the complete simulator inventory, only approximately 15% simulate turboprop airplanes. This disparity is primarily due to the relative cost of the airplane and its respective simulator. It may also be in part due to the current regulatory requirement to use airplanes to accomplish all of the required training and testing for all pilots, initially and recurrently – and a mere “authorization” to use simulation, if desired, to meet those same requirements. The cost of operating a turboprop airplane may well be essentially equal to
what it may cost to lease time in a qualified simulator for the specific airplane type, not to mention the cost of transporting pilots from their home base to the simulator’s location and the per diem necessary during their stay. However, the use of simulators for training in place of the airplane even for turboprop types is increasing. In fact, in Canada, the use of a simulator is mandated for airplanes above 19 seats, and the U.S. is in the process of mandating the use of a simulator for all Part 121 operations; i.e., 10 seats and above. Certain relief is expected for limited applications and the change will allow the use of airplanes for the completion of training, testing, and/or checking activities that cannot be supported in Level A or Level B simulators.

6.3 Overall Realism

In today’s simulators, for all airplane types, the synergistic operation of the aerodynamic programming, the visual system, the motion system (including the control loading system), and the sound system provides an excellent level of realism when compared to the operation of an airplane. The objective is that pilot behaviors that are demonstrated and reinforced in the simulator, as well as skills that are learned and polished in the simulator, are behaviors and skills that should not have to be adjusted or adapted when they are required to be used and depended upon in the airplane. Such facility provides for more complete training and more complete evaluation of pilots; and that yields a more competent, and thereby, a safer pilot.

Currently there is an active Sound Requirements Working Group that has the objective of describing both static and dynamic cases where sounds as heard in the airplane cockpit will be developed for use in the simulator. This situation is applicable only to Level D simulators, but all simulation device levels will undoubtedly benefit from having this type of objective data available.

6.4 Realism with Respect to Engine Malfunctions or Failures

Among the current regulatory requirements for pilot training, testing, and checking is one that requires that pilots be trained for and demonstrate competence in being able to handle the airplane should they experience an “engine failure” (usually a “failure” of the most critical engine or the propeller on the most critical engine) at the most critical point of flight, typically V1. When these tasks were accomplished solely in the airplane, this engine/propeller “failure” was simulated by a rapid throttle reduction to an idle thrust position.

When training, testing, and checking of pilots was moved largely from the airplane into simulators, the requirement for training and competency demonstration during “engine/propeller failures” remained unchanged. The typical malfunction represented in the simulator for training remained the rapid loss of thrust rather than more representative failures likely to be seen in operation. Where attempts were made to include more representative malfunctions, these were often programmed, modified, and “tuned” to a series of subjective descriptions related by the relatively few pilots who experienced them, rather than based on data from real events.

There is a growing quantity of information that indicates the simulations provided in pilot training, testing, and/or checking are not sufficiently realistic. Perhaps the most notable malfunction that fits this description is that of a low airspeed, high engine-RPM compressor
stall/surge on a high bypass, turbofan engine. Pilots who have experienced such occurrences describe moderate to severe airframe buffeting or vibrations, a “shotgun blast” noise that startles everyone in the airplane cockpit, and if at night, flames streaking forward of the engine inlet, accompanied by the airplane response to the rapidly varying thrust. Pilots who have flown simulators with malfunctions or failures programmed to simulate certain circumstances often report that buffeting or vibrations and the accompanying noise of a compressor stall/surge at high engine RPM is unrealistically low in most, if not all, simulators.

The group opinion is that, while the aerodynamic/visual/control feel/motion cueing of current advanced simulators is good, the motion system buffeting and sound system contributions do not well represent many propulsion system malfunctions, particularly high power compressor stall/surge of the turbofan engine. There is currently no basis for standardization of the propulsion system malfunction cues.

6.5 Probable Areas of Focus – Simulator Motion and Sound Systems

The simulator manufacturers have confirmed that it would be possible to modify both motion and sound systems of simulators to improve the realism of propulsion system malfunction representation. The engine and airframe manufacturers also confirm that data can be made available to produce more realistic malfunction simulations. Care is needed to ensure the increased levels of vibration and noise do not degrade the system capability.

As part of the Project Group’s activity, a survey was initiated to establish the extent of data available from the airframe, engine and propeller manufacturers, which could assist in ensuring more realistic malfunction simulations. This work is ongoing and not yet completed. However, Volume 2, Appendix 12 contains a proposed list of propulsion system malfunction descriptions which need to be considered for incorporation into simulators for malfunction recognition training.
7.0 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

7.1 General

In the days of reciprocating engines and the early generations of jet and turboprop airplanes, flight engineers were assigned the duties of recognizing and handling propulsion system anomalies. Specific training was given to flight engineers on these duties under the requirements of CFR Part 63 - Certification: Flight Crew Members Other than Pilots, see Volume 2, Appendix 13. To become a pilot, an individual progressed from flight engineer through co-pilot to pilot and all pilots by this practice received powerplant malfunction recognition training. In those times, the majority of pilots were likely to see several engine failures during their careers, and failures were sufficiently common to be a primary topic for discussion in the pilot fraternity. Today, it is not clear how pilots learn to recognize and cope with propulsion system malfunctions.

With the huge improvement in reliability of turbofan and turboprop engines in the last 20 years, many pilots will never experience a genuine engine failure in service. In addition, the pilot profile is changing rapidly, with a large reduction in the number of ex-military pilots in commercial service and a significantly shorter time to achieve the position of captain (approximately 3 to 6 years recently as compared to 15 to 20 years historically in the major carriers). Both the training and the flying regime in the military provides much greater exposure to propulsion system malfunctions and the need to properly diagnose and deal with them.

At present, pilot training and checking associated with propulsion system malfunction concentrates on emergency checklist items which are normally limited, on most airplanes, to engine fire, in-flight shutdown and re-light, and, probably, low oil pressure. In addition, the training and checking will cover the handling task following engine failure at or close to $V_1$. In order to maximize the handling task in the latter case, the most rapid loss of thrust, a fuel cut or engine seizure is usually most appropriately used. Pilots generally are not exposed in their training to the wide range of propulsion system malfunctions that can occur.

No evidence was found of pilot training material (books, videos, etc.) on the subject of propulsion system malfunction recognition on modern engines. Nor, apart from 14 CFR 63, Flight Engineer Training, was there any requirement to provide such training.

The range of propulsion system malfunctions that can occur, and the symptoms associated with those malfunctions, is wide. If the pilot community is, in general, only exposed to a very limited portion of that envelope, it is almost inevitable that the malfunctions that occur in service will be outside the experience of the pilots (flight crew). It was the view of the group that, during basic pilot training and type conversion, a grounding in propulsion system malfunction recognition is necessary. This should be reinforced, during recurrent training with exposure to the extremes of propulsion system malfunction: e.g., the loudest, most rapid, most subtle, etc. This, at least, should ensure that the malfunction is not outside the pilot’s experience, as is often the case today.
Powerplant malfunctions communicate to the flight crew in multiple ways. Loud noise, onset of vibration, display behavior, and smells of smoke are some of the cues, of a malfunction. Lacking training and exposure to these cues, and with the increased reliability of modern engines and propellers, there is little chance for a pilot to gain experience as a co-pilot before being called upon to provide an appropriate response as the pilot in command. The accident and incident event data examined in this project suggest that pilots have difficulty in determining the appropriate action when confronted with a situation never before experienced.

It is beyond the charter of this project to suggest how pilot training should be conducted on propulsion system malfunctions recognition. The design of modern commercial transport airplanes requires that an airplane be designed to provide the capability for continued safe flight and landing after the failure of the most critical engine at the most critical point in the flight. The realization of continued safe flight is critically dependent on the pilot recognizing and appropriately responding to powerplant malfunctions. The lack of training on the recognition aspect is seen as a significant oversight. In the future, it is suggested that designers should make note of the malfunctions that pilots are expected to recognize and handle. In addition, a process should be developed to collect this information and pass it forward to the pilot-training community to address. If designers must assume that pilots will recognize a malfunction and take appropriate action to minimize the chance of a hazardous or catastrophic effect, there should be a process that ensures all pilots receive the appropriate training.

The industry trend is for some ab initio pilots to be required to pay for their initial training. This emerging practice puts pressure on training companies to provide training at a cost that individuals can afford. Without a regulatory requirement for propulsion system malfunction recognition training to be provided or taken, only a minimal level of training will be provided. It is recommended that a qualified group of training experts review the supporting data and material enclosed, and be tasked with defining an appropriate minimum recognition-training standard. It is recommended that an attempt be made to recapture some of the training course material for flight engineers; that material should then be used as a baseline.

The lack of text books, videos, etc., on the subject presents a challenge.

Volume 2, Appendix 12 contains a proposed list of simulator malfunctions that need to be considered for propulsion system malfunction recognition training.

Crews need to train to build the confidence that they can safely continue a takeoff with an engine failure past $V_1$. The high number of runway departures following high-speed rejected takeoffs (RTO’s) beyond $V_1$ with turbofan airplanes clearly indicates that a number of factors may unduly influence captains at 250+ feet per second ground speed to make the wrong decision in not continuing the takeoff.

Although it is important to quickly identify and diagnose certain emergencies, the industry needs to effect cockpit/aircrew changes to decrease the likelihood of a too-eager crew member in shutting down the wrong engine. Many pilots today obtained their early multi-engine time and ATPs in a reciprocating twin. The standard mentality is to train to achieve lightning reflexes and decision-making in the event of an engine failure during or after takeoff. With the
acknowledgment that certain engine/propeller malfunctions require immediate action due to high-drag conditions, it is seldom required to identify, diagnose, and secure jet and turbofan powerplants in a radically short elapsed time period. Yet that is conventional thinking. Many pilots today flying jet equipment have considerable flight time on reciprocating/turboprop airplanes. The think-quick/secure-quick mentality is still there in the jet cockpit when the flight crews move up from the prop to the jet (“first learned, most retained” {Law of Primacy}). However, there are very few turbofan powerplant failure scenarios that require such immediate action. Except for four-engine airplanes, there are no “critical” engines on a jet as with a prop airplane. Emphasis during training for jet crews should be placed on deliberate, considered actions during an engine failure. Habit patterns are hard to break.

7.1.1 Summary

Accident and incident events from history have similar characteristics. These characteristics suggest that the flight crew did not recognize the propulsion system malfunction occurrence from the symptoms, cues, and/or indications. The symptoms and cues were, on occasion, misdiagnosed resulting in inappropriate action. In many of the events with inappropriate action, the symptoms and cues were totally outside of the pilot’s experience base (operational and training). The symptoms and cues, common to the majority of turbofan transport events, were very loud noise (similar to a shotgun blast at 10 feet) and/or the onset of extreme vibration. The levels of these symptoms and the airplane’s reaction to them, had not been previously encountered by the flight crew. Loud noises and vibration cues were occasionally misidentified (e.g. tire failure) as powerplant failures, and also have led to inappropriate response.

Any assumption that engine failure recognition training will occur in service is not currently valid with modern engine reliability. The onset of aural and tactile cues in powerplant failure in modern simulators is still inadequate and misleading relative to the accident and incident cases assessed. To recognize powerplant failures, the entry condition symptoms and cues need to be presented during flight crew training as realistically as possible. When these symptoms and cues cannot be presented accurately, training via some other means should be considered. Care should be exercised to avoid the chance of negative training. The need to accomplish failure recognition emerges from analysis of accidents and incidents that initiated with single powerplant failures which should have been, but were not, recognized and responded to in an appropriate manner.

Flight departments, from ab initio upward to the largest flight training departments, need to develop unique and innovative methodologies to better educate and train aircrews in the basics of powerplant operations and aerodynamics. All pilots need solid understanding of the performance factors that drive $V_x$, $V_y$, $V_2$, and other important airspeed requirements. Special attention should be devoted to pilots who are transitioning from a high-time background in another airplane, for habit patterns will be deeply ingrained. Transition and even upgrade pilots should be afforded some amount of free play time during simulator sessions to experiment with engine-out flying qualities, the special combination of indications and warning/advisory lights, and as many perturbations of engine/system anomalies as possible.

7.2 Turboprop Training
7.2.1 Training Engine Failure Recognition

Training for engine failure or malfunction recognition is varied. It is feasible that a pilot throughout training will never have had to identify a failed engine. Engines are shut down to practice re-start drills. During these demonstrations, the pilot does not have to evaluate the condition of the gas generator or propeller system by reference to the instruments; "the fuel is off so, it must have stopped". This is indicative of a reaction to a single piece of data (one instrument or a single engine parameter), as opposed to assessing several data sources to gain information about the total propulsion system.

During in-flight engine failed training (for the purpose of practicing airplanes handling), the engine is only simulated failed. Again, the pilot gains no experience of actual engine failure recognition. The propulsion system instruments show a normal, healthy engine but at low power. The dominant datum is the instructor retarding the power lever. An additional negative aspect of simulated in-flight training is that during a go-around, only the live engine power lever is advanced. For those accidents where one engine was at idle as a precaution, the crew is not pre-disposed to using the idling engine.

Operators reported that there is little or no training given on how to identify a propulsion system failure or malfunction. Often, audio identification predominates due to the awareness of propeller pitch change, but this is only a single data source which could represent either a propulsion system failure or a minor engine control system malfunction. A cross-check of propulsion system parameters between engines is taught as a quick reference to identify which engine has a problem. However, this technique does not always give sufficient information about a particular engine or necessarily the correct answer. Industry should provide training guidelines of how to recognize and diagnose the engine problem by using all available data in order to provide the complete information state of the propulsion system.

7.2.2 Operational Training

Generally, flight or simulator training is procedure based. Many operators only train to the minimum standard; i.e., to pass the takeoff $V_1$ cut check ride and, where applicable fly a single engine go-around.

There are few specific requirements for propulsion system failure recognition or malfunction diagnosis.

Airplane flight handling policy is often decided at operator level, either by the management and training staff or local authority inspectors. Surprisingly, operators reported varying opinions on whether to control the yaw before roll or vice versa as the correct immediate action for an engine failure. The airframe manufacturer normally gives this advice, but where it is not explicit, or there is no textbook to refer to, folklore and partially understood aerodynamic theories are used to justify procedures.

Basic and recurrent training should include a consistent and in-depth explanation of asymmetric
thrust flight and the flight control techniques to be used. Industry should consider the provision of training aid material to support the identification of propulsion system failure or malfunction and to standardize training for asymmetric flight. For example, many training schools and operators teach the necessity to trim the airplane in yaw at V2 to reduce the high foot loads due to asymmetric thrust. However, they may also fail to teach or demonstrate that, as the airplane subsequently accelerates, the requirement for rudder decreases. From the new trimmed state, the rudder force and position lessen as airspeed increases; these can appear to the pilot to be in the opposite sense to that required to control the initial failure. This potential confusion, together with the stress of the situation, may adversely affect the crew’s performance. Some manufacturers recommend that, following a propulsion system failure, yaw trim should not be used or applied fully until the airplane has reached the final take off speed.

7.2.3 Stall recovery training

The recommended procedure for stall recovery training should be reviewed by industry as it is believed to be a source of negative transfer between turboprops and turbofans. Maintaining adequate speed is essential to controlling of the airplane. The small performance margins in turboprop airplanes result in low climb rates during single engine operations; thus, the crew may be reluctant to lower the pitch attitude in order to accelerate. Furthermore the basic stall warning recovery training could compound this situation. If training teaches to hold a constant attitude, apply power and achieve minimum height loss, there is little or no applicability of this technique to the problems of low-speed flight following engine failure. Classic stall recovery training concentrates on the low power and approach and landing scenarios, where power can be applied to restore speed without attitude change. Stalls with an engine failed during takeoff or go-around are not taught due to the problems of $V_{mca}$. With an engine failed, speed can only be controlled by adjusting attitude, as power is already at the maximum. This technique is in conflict with the basic stall recovery training and may therefore cause confusion during low speed flight with an engine failure.

7.2.4 Use of Flight Idle

It is concluded from review of the accidents occurring during training, where one engine was deliberately set to flight idle, that either the check pilot did not understand the flight mechanics of turboprop airplanes at flight idle power or failed to maintain the conditions simulating an engine failure. At flight idle, the unfeathered propeller will give negative thrust at low airspeed. For zero thrust a particular value of torque must be set and maintained with changing airspeed. During training or a check flight it is possible that, since the instructor has to act as both the non-flying pilot as well as the check and safety pilot, the attention to power resetting can be overlooked.

The use of flight idle in training has two further negative aspects. Firstly, retarding an engine to idle is of little value for the recognition of a true engine failure by reference to instruments. In some cases (free turbine engines), the core engine is running normally and the propeller speed or torque is artificially set to a false value. The propeller torque is adjusted, or should be set, to give zero thrust. This is similar to day-to-day conditions during a descent and thus gives the crew a feeling of normality. Secondly, once a crew has been given training with an engine at
flight idle they then could be predisposed to use the technique as a precaution for a partially diagnosed or minor powerplant malfunction. The use of flight idle for training during simulated engine failures and as a precautionary action in the event of a propulsion system malfunction should be reviewed by industry.

### 7.2.5 Negative Thrust

When given a choice between shutting an engine down or selecting idle, the crew often opts for idle. This is due to a situation where it may be better to maintain an engine at idle with the propeller feathered for electrical or hydraulic services as a precaution against a further problem rather than shutting the engine down. This debate applies for free-turbine installations only, as in the case of single shaft engines, the engine must be shutdown to feather the propeller. This issue is another potential source of negative transfer. If, with an engine at idle, with an unfeathered propeller, the crew fails to recognize the problem of negative thrust at low airspeed, or, conversely, fails to appreciate the higher effective $V_{mca}$ (which the manufacturer does not have to publish), loss of control is most probable. Although most manufacturers advise the correct propulsion system setting for zero thrust, there is no mandated training for this operation, nor for any demonstration of the increased $V_{mca}$.

Abnormal flight operations with the engine at idle (zero thrust) resulted in an accident recorded by one of the data-rich events. The airplane deviated from the flight path during the approach due to negative thrust, and, during the subsequent go-around the handling pilot lost control of the airplane. This type of behavior occurs in other events, particularly during go-arounds where the crew does not use the precautionary engine for power, and the handling pilot fails to recognize the negative thrust and then loses control. Modern airplane certification standards are such that an airplane can be flown safely with an engine shut down and that a failure of the remaining engine is very much less likely than the requirement to fly a go-around. Most manufacturers recommend that for an engine malfunction the engine should be shut down with the propeller feathered. However, where there is choice, pilots appear to have developed closely held assumptions regarding the need for additional redundancy. This issue should be reviewed by industry but training should clearly indicate the manufacturer’s recommendations, and the logic behind them.
8.0  HUMAN FACTORS

8.1  Background

8.1.1  Human Factors Role in the Workshop

Human Factors Specialists participating in the AIA Workshop on PSM+ICR had three important functions to perform:

- Provide real-time inputs on the human factors perspective to issues under discussion by the various task groups during workshop sessions.

- Develop and implement a process to validate the recommendations made by the workshop task groups using error data derived from human factors analyses of the accident/incident databases of the Data Collection & Analysis Task Groups - Turbofan & Turboprop.

- Develop human factors-based recommendations related to methods for validating the effectiveness of proposed corrective actions when implemented.

The human factors (HF) specialists involved in the workshop process and HF Task Group came from Airbus, Boeing, British Aerospace, FAA, NASA, NTSB, and the U.S. Army. The human factors specialists, knowledgeable in commercial air transport issues, are a limited resource. The Project Group wishes to express their thanks for the help provided.

8.1.2  Databases

There are three databases involved in the development and validation of the recommendations produced by the workshop. These are:

- The Data Collection & Analysis Task Group (DC&ATG) - Turbofan summary database (Volume 2, Appendix 4) and results for turbofan events described in Section 3.1 of this report.

- A human factors error classification database derived from the summary event data of the Turbofan - DC&ATG database (Volume 2, Appendix 14).

- The Data Collection & Analysis Task Group - Turboprop database (Volume 2, Appendix 7) and results for turboprop events described in Section 4.2 of this report.

The first two of these three databases served as the primary sources for recommendations and for the development of the validation process to support those recommendations. The related research to be described below served as secondary sources for the validation process.
8.1.3 Related Research

Human Factors research related to the efforts of the workshop is of two types: that dealing with
the classification of errors and inappropriate responses of aircrews in the presence of system
malfunctions, and basic applied research on flight crew/system interface design.

A review of research on flight deck design, especially as related to propulsion systems and as
conducted at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) was presented at the initial AIA/AECMA
Workshop on PSM+ICR held in Seattle, WA, in January of 1997\(^2\). This material contains
recommendations on both top-level conceptual issues as well as specific research results.
Additional relevant research references were also made available as an addendum to the
presentation. This material will be particularly useful in support of efforts to validate any
proposed design solutions that may be derived from workshop recommendations.

The work of several authors on the classification of errors in aviation accidents was also
reviewed. Research directly relevant to workshop issues as well as relevant error classification
work is discussed in more detail in Section 8.4.2.7. The relationship of the results of this related
work to the results of the Human Factors Error Classification (HFEC) model and the error
classification database generated in support of the workshop activities is discussed as well.

8.2 Database Development and Analysis

8.2.1 Turbofan Database

A description of the development of the PSM+ICR database and analysis of the data for turbofan
events is discussed in Section 4.1 of this report. A member of the Human Factors Task Group
participated in an initial detailed analysis of the events in the summary version of this database.
Conclusions and recommendations resulting from the activities of the DC&ATG-Turbofan are to
be found in the above-mentioned section. The summary data on which the results and
recommendations from the DC&ATG-Turbofan are based were used in developing the Human
Factors Error Classification (HFEC) database. The validity of the workshop recommendations
will be addressed using this latter database.

8.2.2 Turboprop Database

For various reasons, the Turboprop Database has such a paucity of context data that no
validation of the turboprop recommendations based on human factors error classification data
could be included in the workshop final report. However, a large number of human factors
issues are dealt with and recommendations made based on the data available. These are
summarized in Section 4.2 TURBOPROPS and other sections of the report related to the
analysis of turboprop accident/incident data.

---

at AIA/AECMA Workshop on Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response, Ramada Inn,
Seattle, WA., January 14-16.
8.3 Overview of Human Factors Analysis

A detailed summary of the results of and rationale for applying the Human Factors Error Classification (HFEC) model to the DC&ATG - Summary Turbofan Database can be found in Volume 2, Appendix 14. Also included in this appendix are the complete HFEC database and the error classification model used in deriving the database. Table 8.3 below provides an overview of the data summarized in Appendix 14 and permits comparison of the results with other studies of flight crew error to be discussed in Section 8.4.2.7. A total of 218 cognitive errors were identified within the 79 events of the Summary Turbofan Database. The average number of errors per event was 2.8, with a range of errors per event of 1 - 9. There were only two events in which there was only one cognitive error identified. This finding of multiple cognitive errors per events precluded an attempt to achieve a simple mapping of recommendations to event and thus dictated the approach taken in relating the Human Factors recommendations to the overall workshop recommendations.

The error classification data are organized by error category, number of events in which the error occurred, and percent of error total. Within some of the categories, a further breakdown is shown with headings that help to relate the data to other research efforts to be discussed later. The percentage values shown for these generic subcategories represent percentages within the category.

Table 8.3 Summary of Error Data by Error Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># of Errors</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy/Procedure</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slips/Lapses</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other skill-based errors</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(execution, coordination, piloting skills, timing, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bolded numbers under the “# of Errors” column represent the total number of times errors in each category occurred in the database. It is interesting to note that when the number of events in which a major category of error occurred are counted, the pattern of frequency across error categories is the same. That is, detection errors occurred in 18 events, interpretation errors occurred in 58 events, strategy/procedure errors occurred in 44 events, and execution errors
occurred in 47 events. As can be seen, multiple interpretation and execution type errors within an event were more likely than detection or strategy/procedure errors. The former two categories of error had the greatest number of sub-categories and thus provide greater opportunity to develop more detailed bases for the recommendations. This greater potential is reflected in the level of detail that could be provided for the workshop recommendations related to errors of interpretation and execution.

8.4 Validating Recommendations

8.4.1 General

The term “validation” as used here refers to the process of determining:

a. that there is a direct and documented link between the human behavior in PSM+ICR events and the workshop recommendations;

b. that the human factors analyses of the types of errors observed or inferred in the PSM+ICR events not only substantiate the recommendations but also provide sufficient guidance for specific actions which may be taken to implement the recommendations; and

c. that there are at least generic, if not specific, guidelines for human performance testing to assess the effectiveness of implemented recommendations in both training and design.

Accomplishing this validation process was the major task confronting the Human Factors Task Group (HFTG). Toward this end, an error model was developed and applied to the turbofan summary database (see Volume 2, Appendix 14). The error classification database developed from this application goes beyond the error classification work already done by the DC&ATG. The purpose of obtaining this additional detail in error classification was to provide needed insight into the cognitive aspects of PSM+ICR as a basis for detailed recommendations in training and design. Application of the error classification database to the recommendations of the project group is presented below.

8.4.2 Support for Workshop Recommendations

Taken together, the error classification data illustrated in Table 8.3 above and summarized in Volume 2, Appendix 14 show strong support from several perspectives for the workshop recommendations which relate to crew training and design. A detailed discussion follows of the error data as they can be applied to specific aspects of flight crew training. No specific recommendations are made at this time regarding flight deck design. However, the generic recommendations for how flight deck design issues should be addressed (e.g., the need to validate the effectiveness of current and future system malfunction annunciations) are included later, as are generic recommendations on the validation of training solutions which may grow out of workshop recommendations. A detailed mapping of error category data to the workshop recommendations follows. Also included here is a discussion of related applied research and
error classification efforts. This related research tends to verify the appropriateness of the workshop error classification work in that the pattern of results obtained here fits quite well in general with patterns obtained with other error models and pilot populations.

8.4.2.1 Detect

Most of the errors identified across events within this category were monitoring errors; that is, failure to monitor (“note”) control position (e.g., throttles, switches, levers) or engine instrument behavior, either as noting deviations from normal in a detect sense or failure to monitor these deviations over time. Recommendations here can focus on both training and design. Because of the differences in the details in type of engine parameter display behavior (EPDB) to be noted and differences in the root cause producing the non-normal EPDB, emphasis on detection and interpretation should be addressed in training. Throttle position, or, more generally, thrust asymmetry, can perhaps best be addressed with alerts. This design recommendation recognizes the role of very high workload, very low workload, and distractions as major contributing factors to this type of error.

8.4.2.2 Interpret

Errors in integrating and interpreting the data produced by propulsion system malfunctions were the most prevalent and varied in substance of all error types across events. This might be expected given the task pilots have in propulsion system malfunction (PSM) events of having to integrate and interpret data both between or among engines and over time in order to arrive at the information that determines what is happening and where (i.e., to which component). The error data clearly indicate that additional training, both event specific and on system interactions, is required. This training theme is to be found throughout the conclusions of the DC&ATG-Turbofan and overall recommendations of the workshop.

In twenty-two (22) events alone, crews reacted inappropriately on the basis of one or two very salient cues (e.g., loud “bangs”, yaw, vibration), thus failing to integrate all the data relevant to understanding what was happening and where. It should be possible to modify this behavior through training, given improved representation of PSM’s in simulators during initial training, recurrent training, and proficiency checks. This same failure to integrate relevant data resulted in seven (7) instances where action was taken on the wrong engine. These failures to integrate data occurred both when EPDB was changing quickly (and thus more saliently), as well as when it was changing more slowly over time. Training in turbofan airplanes needs to continually emphasize the necessity of taking the time to integrate all data relevant to a PSM in order to interpret the situation correctly and enhance the likelihood that appropriate action will be taken. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some operators may consciously or unconsciously establish training environments that tend promote too-rapid response to PSM’s. There is also potential for negative transfer of training and experience from turboprop to turbofan airplanes (e.g., in certain turboprop airplane engine malfunctions, immediate action is

---

3 In this context, “integrate” is taken to mean the process of gathering data which are relevant to the problem at hand in order to develop an accurate “picture” (individual data points plus the relationships among them) of the PSM.
required in order not to lose control of the airplane). Negative transfer issues such as this should be considered in detail in the development of training programs.

A second subcategory of errors related to interpretation involved erroneous assumptions about the relationship between or among airplane systems and/or the misidentification of specific cues during the integration/interpretation process. Errors related to erroneous assumptions should be amenable to reduction, if not elimination, through the types of training recommended by the workshop. Errors due to misidentification of cues need to be evaluated carefully for the potential for design solutions.

A third (and major) subcategory of errors leading to inappropriate crew responses under “interpret” was that of misinterpretation of the pattern of data (cues) available to the crew for understanding what was happening and where in order to take appropriate action. Errors of this type may be directly linked to failures to properly integrate cue data because of incomplete or inaccurate mental models at the system and airplane levels, as well as misidentification of cues. A number of the events included in this subcategory involved misinterpretation of the pattern of cues because of the similarity of cue patterns between malfunctions with very different root causes; in some cases, the root cause was not even in the propulsion system (e.g., blown tire interpreted as surge, or vice versa). This type of error behavior should be particularly amenable to modification through training of the types recommended by the project group.

A fourth subcategory here pertains to errors involving failure to obtain relevant data from crew members. Errors classified under this category might also be classified as being of the “partially or poorly integrated data” type. However, the separate callout of failing to integrate input from crew members into the pattern of cues is considered important for developing recommendations regarding crew coordination. It also highlights the fact that inputs to the process of developing a complete picture of relevant cues for understanding what is happening and where can and often must come from other crew members as well as from an individual’s cue-seeking activity. Understanding the crew coordination aspects of this fact should lead to specific impact on training programs when dealing with how to handle PSM’s. These errors are different from “not attending to inputs from crew members”, which would be classified as detection errors.

A fifth subcategory entitled “knowledge of system operation under non-normal conditions lacking or incomplete” was included apart from the “misinterpretation” subcategory because the evidence from the events in the DC&ATG-Turbofan summary database clearly supported the analysis, indicating that these errors were based on erroneous or incomplete mental models of system performance under non-normal conditions. The inappropriate crew responses were based on errors produced by faulty mental models at either the system or airplane level. Reduction in errors of this type can be achieved through more complete training on system operation and systems interaction during PSM’s.

8.4.2.3 Strategy/Procedure

---

4 No errors pertaining to the Establish Goals category could be inferred because of the very limited nature of the data in the Turbofan - DC&ATG Summary Database necessary to appropriately make such inferences.
The rationale for using both the “strategy” and “procedure” terms is illustrated in Figure 8.4 and Figure 1 Volume 2, Appendix 14. The term “procedure” is used to refer to those situations where a formal, written procedure or widely accepted “best practice” exists, or should exist, for dealing with a PSM which has been appropriately identified. The term “strategy” is used to infer the plan of action selected by a crew when no formal procedure or best practice existed or, at least, was known to the crew. Implementation of an inappropriate strategy would be classified as a knowledge-based error, whereas selecting the wrong procedure to use with a particular PSM would be a rule-based error. For the purpose of supporting Workshop recommendations, the error classification model breaks down the types of errors leading to inappropriate crew response in the Strategy/Procedure category well beyond the rule-based/knowledge-based error classification. By doing so, the relationship between the error classification data and the recommendations of the Workshop are much clearer.

Figure 8.4  Classification of Errors in the Presence of Propulsion System Malfunctions Which Lead to Inappropriate Crew Responses

---

5 Adapted from Rasmussen’s (1983) and Reason’s (1990) taxonomies for classifying information processing failures and interpreted within the framework of Shontz’s (1997) concept of the data transformation process.
By far, the greatest number of errors, in terms of number of events involved, were attributed to the selection of an **improper strategy/procedure** given the conditions under which the event occurred. There were a total of forty-three (43) events in which an improper procedure or strategy was chosen given the conditions. This category was divided into three subcategories that can be used to support different aspects of the workshop recommendations. These subcategories were:

- Choosing to execute a RTO above $V_1$ speed (21 events);
- Choosing to reduce power on one or both engines below safe operating altitude (5 events); and
- Selecting other strategies which deviate from “best practice” (17 events).

The number and nature of the errors in the first subcategory definitely validate the need for Recommendation 5 and 7 of the overall workshop recommendations (see section 11.0), as well as several points made by the DC&ATG-Turbofan in their list of “potential corrective action opportunities”. Those events in the second subcategory support the need for Recommendations 5 and 7 as well. The events containing errors relevant to Strategy/Procedure that have been placed in the third subcategory are so diverse in nature they represent something of an “other” category. This diversity defied efforts to aggregate the data in a way that would focus on particular recommendations. One might consider the errors represented as pertaining to poor “airmanship” if this could be considered as referring to the use of poor judgment over very diverse circumstances while flying airplanes.

Other subcategories under Strategy/Procedure contained too few events to warrant an interpretation of their relevance to the recommendations of the workshop.

### 8.4.2.4 Execute

The errors classified under this general heading produced inappropriate crew responses (ICR’s) that were inappropriate because of errors in execution as opposed to ICR’s which resulted from errors made in the processing and/or interpretation of data or those made in the selection of action to be taken. As such, the subcategories are quite diverse, and are therefore dealt with independently for the most part with respect to recommendations.

The first two subcategories represent the **classic “slip” and “lapse” errors**, as defined by Reason (1990). These are “carry out unintended action” and “failure to complete action”. There were eighteen (18) events in which errors of these types occurred. They represent instances in which switches or throttles affecting normally-operating engines were inadvertently thrown, closed, activated, etc, or, situations in which steps in a procedure were omitted with very serious consequences. Errors of these types do not lend themselves to elimination through training. They must be addressed through error-tolerant design or designs that preclude the slip from happening, or, through the use of designs that support the execution of procedures which preclude the inadvertent omission of procedure steps. These skill-based errors, according to Reason (1990), are the most frequent in occurrence but are also the most likely to be caught and recovered. This relationship also held in the HFEC database.
Errors that involved **poor execution of action** are much more amenable to training as a corrective action. There were thirteen (13) events containing errors of this type. They represent errors in technique rather than omission. For the most part, they represent the need to concentrate on the development and maintenance of the ability to properly execute non-normal procedures.

Events in which there was **poor/no crew coordination in carrying out action** were included here. There was some ambivalence as to whether this was an error type or contributing factor. A “poor/no crew coordination” category was also included under Contributing Factors. The event lists do overlap to some extent, but the distinction is between poor/no crew coordination in executing a particular action (execute error) versus lack of crew coordination in general (contributing factor). A total of twenty-one (21) events were classified as having errors involving lack of crew coordination in the action taken. These errors indicate the need for increased focus on the training of crews to coordinate their actions during PSM events. This recommendation is much more narrowly focused than one dealing with CRM in general.

A subcategory of **poor piloting skills** was also included to classify skill-based errors of this sort that were related to PSM events. A problem when including an error category of this nature is that of defining the error itself. This problem can best be understood by reviewing the items in this category as found in Volume 2, Appendix 14. If PSM events are represented more realistically and become a regular part of training and testing of pilots, perhaps potential for this type of error will be dealt with both specifically and more systematically.

A final subcategory under Execution was **failure to initiate action in a timely manner**. This category was included in an attempt to capture the timing aspect of errors. Nine (9) events were identified as containing this type of error. Timing errors have a tendency to exacerbate other errors that are occurring during a PSM event. The issue of timing needs to be addressed as a part of training to deal with all PSM events. It is more complex than simple admonishments to take one’s time in dealing with non-normal events. Crews need at least initial guidance on effective timing of actions and the variations in such timing as a function of specific PSM events.

### 8.4.2.5 Violations

Violations as errors are very different from the types of error described thus far. The difference is in intent. The types of inappropriate crew responses classified as violations during the error classification process involved specific violations of company policy or procedures. Needless to say this was very rare; at least evidence of it was very scarce in the DC&ATG-Turbofan Summary Database. Dealing with violations of this sort requires a) the very clear, concise statement of company policies and procedures; b) their dissemination to all flight crews; and c) an evaluation of the process which insures that flight crews have access to, understand, and abide by these policies and procedures.

### 8.4.2.6 Contributing Factors

These aspects of the events were identified and categorized for the purpose of providing “context” for the events. Relating contributing factors to the error data offers the possibility of
understanding at least some of the conditions which have relevance to or seriously impact human performance, and may provide a framework for better understanding the “why” of human error; particularly, the cognitive errors. Unfortunately, the resources were not available to develop the relational database that would be necessary to exploit the potential contribution of these data to our understanding of the “whys” of at least some of the errors contained in the database. Such a relational structure should be a critical component of any further efforts with the error classification database.

8.4.2.7 Relationship of Data to Related Research

There are several research efforts (Shontz, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 19976; Shappell & Wiegmann, 19977; Wildzunas, R.M., 19978; O’Hare, et al, 19949) in which the results relate to the error classification work done for the workshop. The patterns of error classification across these studies are remarkably similar even though the pilot populations are very different; i.e., Army helicopter pilots, general aviation pilots, military pilots (Navy), transport pilots, and instructor pilots (transport). The differences in patterns may be explained largely in terms of differences in definitions for similar categories of errors, as well as differences in the criteria investigators used in assigning errors to categories.

Wildzunas (1997) investigated wrong-engine shutdowns in Army helicopters using both a survey and simulator study. The pattern of errors by cognitive function was very similar to the PSM+ICR error data. The functions contributing the greatest number of errors were diagnostic (here, “interpretation”) and action (here, “execute”) as they were in the Human Factors Error Classification (HFEC) database. The largest difference was in the major contribution of strategy/procedure errors in the HFEC database, whereas there were very few goal, strategy, and procedure errors in Wildzunas’ simulator study. His survey data showed that pilots felt that improper diagnosis and lack of training were major factors affecting their actions on the wrong engine. This supports the recommendations of the workshop with regards to the need for enhanced training to improve crew performance in determining what is happening and where.

Wiegmann and Shappell (1997) compared several models of human error, including that of Rasmussen (1982) to parse error data from mishaps involving Navy and Marine pilots. Their database included 3293 mishaps attributed at least in part to human causes. The pattern of errors classified using the Rasmussen model was very similar to those shown in Table 8.3 for the HFEC database. When allowances are made for model differences and definitions, the patterns of error classification using the other models (including Reason’s) were also similar to those of the HFEC database.

---

O’Hare, et al. (1994) also used the Rasmussen model (1982) for error classification in one of the two studies reported. The pattern of errors by cognitive function was again similar to that obtained in the HFEC database. The exception was the very high proportion of serious accidents associated with errors in goal setting in their data. The HFEC database had no errors in this classification because there were no data on which to base inferences about goal setting in the DC&ATG-Turbofan Summary Database. Further comparisons between the O’Hare, et al., data and the HFEC database with regards to the relationship between error category and seriousness of the accident was not possible with the limited resources available to support the workshop effort, however, this might be of interest if there is support for further analyses in the future.

Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) have proposed yet another approach to human error analysis in airplane accident investigations which includes many categories of data not included in the models discussed above. The “contributing factors” of the HFEC database overlap somewhat with the Shappell and Wiegmann set of “unsafe conditions of the operator” and less with their “unsafe supervision” set. However, there is complete overlap of the HFEC database and their set called “unsafe acts of the operator”.

Shontz (1997) conducted a study of pilot reactions to high-power compressor stall/surges under conditions where the pilots were not expecting the event. (The pilots assumed they were only participating in a CFIT procedure validation process.) No inappropriate actions were taken on wrong engines during the event, but the interpretations of what was happening varied widely across pilots, as did the procedures called for and executed. Thus, the errors and inappropriate response categories for this study matched those of the HFEC database with the exception of execution errors.

This review of related research indicates that the HFEC model and analysis has produced results which are similar to those of both research studies (Wildzunas, 1997; Shontz, 1997) and error classification efforts (Wiegmann and Shappell, 1997; O’Hare, et al., 1994) with regards to the cognitive function categories used and the pattern of errors within these categories. The HFEC analysis and classification results can be improved with additional reliability and validity checks but the basic findings appear to be on target and the workshop recommendations appear to be relevant.
8.5 Generic Human Factors Recommendations for Validating Recommended Training and Design Solutions

8.5.1 Recommendations for Training

- Eventually, current training scenarios should be analyzed to avoid redundancy in the initiating propulsion system malfunction (PSM) events used (especially \(V_1\) cuts) so that recommendations for realistic PSM event recognition and recovery training can be implemented without increasing overall training time. Some preliminary efforts in this area are a part of the process of developing recommendations (see, for example, Volume 2, appendix 12).

- Cooperation of a selected set of airlines should be sought for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of training recommendations. Proficiency checks and LOFT scenarios for individual pilots should contain PSM’s which vary in both type and regularity of appearance within and across test sessions; i.e., pilots should not be able to anticipate getting the same PSM’s each time they receive proficiency checks - or even getting a PSM with every proficiency check. The PSM event simulation should be consistent for all pilots in the test group. Pilot behavior in the presence of unexpected PSM events should be recorded in detail and summarized across all pilots within PSM event in order to gauge effectiveness of the simulation and training. This would require de-identification of all performance behavior in terms of both individuals and airlines.

- Both the quality and extent of reporting of pilot behavior in response to PSM events that occur during revenue flights should be upgraded in order to develop the database necessary to evaluate training effectiveness. This should be a long-term effort involving as many airlines as possible. The objective would be to determine if, following training and/or dissemination of an “awareness package”, the rate of RTO’s and wrong-engine actions in the presence of surges actually decreases. The process established should be kept in place long enough to determine if the “boomerang effect”\(^{10}\) occurs; this is a common occurrence following efforts to enhance pilot awareness of appropriate responses to unsafe conditions through dissemination of awareness material or with one-shot training exercises.

8.5.2 Recommendations for Design

The validation of design recommendations per se may be more difficult in that it presumes that a design solution is more efficacious (at least in the long run) than a training solution. The evidence to support validation of a design recommendation typically must be stronger and more persuasive than that necessary to validate a training solution because the former have much greater economic implications than the latter and the evidence for greater safety impact is seldom

\(^{10}\) Accidents and incidents related to a particular unsafe condition appear to be reduced for a period of time following dissemination of “awareness” material but eventually return to or near the pre-dissemination rate of occurrence.
any stronger. The exception to this is when design solutions are actually tested by gathering human performance data under carefully-controlled conditions. Training solutions are typically assumed to be effective.

The validation of design recommendations should include evidence to support the contention that a design solution is in the best interests of all concerned. Generic requirements for this process are:

- Current design should have clear shortcomings in terms of information transfer capabilities that cannot readily or reliably be overcome with reasonable training and continuous testing via proficiency checks and LOFT scenarios.

- Target airplane models can be identified for the design recommendation, and potential value in terms of error reduction with the implementation of the design recommendation can be estimated.

- Credible design solutions can be generated from the recommendation(s).

- Credible testing procedures, metrics, and equipment (especially simulator capabilities) are available to evaluate design solutions.

With respect to the last requirement, it is recommended that combined government and industry support be provided to develop test methodology (procedures, metrics, and equipment) that produces results which are clearly and unequivocally valid for the civil aviation operational environment. Techniques from the research lab do not always meet this requirements. The group also needs metrics which represent system performance in terms that are meaningful for, and directly applicable to, the operational environment. Any number of efforts have attempted to achieve these objectives in venues other than the civil transport flight deck; these can provide both conceptual and technical guidance for achieving the methodological breakthroughs required. But, the requisite methodology does not yet exist - it must be developed, and should be, in a timely manner.
9.0 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

Commercial Transport airplanes designed and certified under Parts 23 or 25 of the FAR’s and JAR’s are required to be capable of continued safe flight following the failure of the most critical powerplant at the most critical point of the flight. From the analysis carried out by the group it has been identified that a primary cause of the powerplant-related accidents and incidents has been the fundamental inability of the flight crew to correctly identify and/or respond to the initial powerplant malfunction. Review of the regulatory requirements has shown that the requirements to train flight crews for abnormal propulsion system behavior are assigned to flight engineers under 14 CFR Part 63. Also, although training on handling thrust loss is assigned to pilots under 14 CFR Part 61 there are no references to 14 CFR Part 63 in Part 61. The industry adoption of two-man flight crews as a standard has left the issue of propulsion system malfunction recognition training essentially not addressed. A similar situation exists in both Transport Canada (TC) and Joint Airworthiness Authority (JAA) Regulations, based on preliminary reviews.

The task group considers that regulatory action may be appropriate in a number of areas to address this issue. The areas of consideration for regulatory review are threefold: first, a need to include both generic and type-specific engine malfunction recognition training at appropriate points in the training and checking curricula; second, the inclusion of specific requirements for realistic training simulator modeling of engine malfunction, including audio and tactile modeling; and third, possible changes to the powerplant instrument requirements contained in the airplane design codes.

9.1 Propulsion System Malfunction Recognition Training

With the significant increase in engine reliability, it is likely that many pilots will go through their entire careers without experiencing a serious propulsion system malfunction. The existing 14 CFR Part 61 training requirements concentrate on ensuring the pilot can handle the airplane in the event of an engine failure (thrust loss). This training is normally accomplished, either in a simulator or on the airplane, with a power cut and rapid loss of thrust at the critical point of flight ($V_1$). This is not representative of the most probable failures actually seen in operation such as high-power stall/surge or unidentified loss of thrust from a low-power situation.

The Task Group therefore proposes that ARAC be tasked to consider amending the training requirements to include engine failure recognition training at appropriate points in the syllabus. The following FAR’s are recommended for review to include engine failure recognition training:

14 CFR Part 61 Certification: Pilots and flight instructors
   Subpart E Paras 125 and 127
   Subpart E Paras 153, 155 and 157
   Appendix A, Appendix B

14 CFR Part 121 Operating requirements: Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations
   Subpart N Paras 403(a) (3), 419(a) (1) and (2), 439(b) (2)
   Subpart O
Appendix E, Appendix F

Appropriate changes to equivalent sections of 14CFR Part 135 Operating requirements: Commuter and on-demand operations, are also recommended.

Where training is carried out in the airplane rather than a training device, it is recommended that specific engine failure recognition ground training should be mandated. This is particularly relevant to 14 CFR Part 135 operations.

Equivalent changes to JAR-FCL 1, Subparts D, E and F, to require inclusion of engine failure recognition training as both generic and type-specific training are also recommended. Again, revision to JAR-OPS 1, Subpart N, Appendix 1 through 1.965, should be reviewed for inclusion of specific engine failure recognition ground training where use of the airplane, rather than a training device, is permitted.

9.2 Simulator Modeling

It has been established that engine failure models incorporated in training simulators, which in some cases cover a wide range of failures, are often of questionable realism. Only the rapid thrust loss after a fuel cut used for $V_1$ engine failure handling training was found to be generally accurate. This lack of accuracy may not only lead to a lack of awareness of actual engine failures, but may actually provide negative training that could lead flight crews to misinterpret symptoms of genuine engine failures.

It is recommended that the following regulations be reviewed with the intention of incorporating requirements that ensure engine failure modeling is properly representative of the failures likely to occur in service, particularly for the audio and tactile (vibration) aspects of such failures/malfunctions.

14 CFR Part 121 Operating requirements: Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations
Subpart N Paras 407, 424, 425 and 441(c)
Appendix H

AC 120-40 (as amended) and AC 120-45 (as amended) will require review to include the need for accurate simulation of engine failures.

It is also recommended that Appendix H include a requirement that the simulator model be based on data provided by the engine manufacturer. A method should be found to ensure that the models of propulsion system malfunctions provided by the simulator manufacturers are based on data for the most-probable malfunctions, as provided by the airframe and engine manufacturers.

Equivalent changes to JAR-STD and other affected regulations are also recommended.

9.3 Powerplant Instrumentation
A wide range of powerplant instrumentation is provided on multi-engine commercial airplanes. Some evidence is available regarding the effectiveness of the different ways in which powerplant information is presented to flight crews. It is proposed that ARAC be tasked with reviewing the requirements of FAR/JAR 23 and 25, paras 1305, 1321, 1337 and 1585, in order to produce an updated standard for powerplant instrumentation based on the information available. At this time, it is not expected, that retrospective application of a revised standard of instrumentation will be justified.
10.0 CONCLUSIONS

1. The purpose of flight training programs is aimed primarily at ensuring the pilot can exhibit the flying skills necessary to control the airplane satisfactorily at all times, including in the event of an engine failure. The pilot’s ability to handle engine failures is dependent on the sum of his or her training and service experience. With the significant increase in powerplant reliability, a pilot’s general exposure to in-service powerplant malfunctions can no longer be assumed to always be sufficient to ensure that the malfunction is properly identified and appropriately handled.

2. The information developed in this activity indicates there is a shortfall in some pilots’ abilities to recognize and/or handle propulsion system malfunctions. The shortfall from initial expectation is due to improved modern engine reliability, changing propulsion system failure characteristics (symptoms), changes in flight crews’ experience levels, and related shortcomings in flight crew training practices and training equipment.

3. Industry has not provided adequate pilot training processes or material to ensure pilots are provided with training for powerplant malfunction recognition. This shortfall needs urgent action to develop suitable text and video training material which can be used during training and checking of all pilots for both turboprop- and turbofan-powered airplanes.

4. The training requirements related to “Recognition and correction of in-flight malfunctions” are found in Appendix C of 14 CFR Part 63 for Flight Engineers. The disposition of the flight engineer’s recognition training requirements to pilots of airplanes where no “Flight Engineer” position exists is not apparent. However, the expectation does exist that the pilots will perform the duties of the flight engineer.

5. Concerns were also identified with the published propulsion system malfunction procedures, and the methods used for the validation of their correctness.

6. A substantial number of the turbofan accidents reviewed are related to propulsion system malfunctions resulting in high-speed aborts, including above V₁ and V_r. Accordingly, current pilot training may be deficient in addressing the symptoms of the malfunctions, particularly loud noises and the importance of V₁ and V_r speeds. There was only one RTO-related accident identified on turboprop airplane in the database.

7. A significant number of turboprop and turbofan accidents have been identified where training of propulsion system malfunctions on or near the runway was taking place.

8. The dominant cause of turboprop propulsion system malfunction and inappropriate crew response accidents is loss of control. The largest number of events occur during the take off phase of flight. There was only one turboprop rejected take off accident; this is a significant difference from the turbofan airplane accident data.

9. The review of simulator capabilities shows that the technology exists to better produce realistic propulsion system malfunction scenarios. However, at the moment, realistic
scenarios are often not properly defined nor based on airframe or powerplant manufacturers’ data. Rather, the scenarios are often based on the customers’ perceptions of the failure scenario. There is generally no airframe or powerplant manufacturers’ input into realistic engine failure/malfunction scenarios as represented in simulators. Furthermore, the engine failures currently addressed in most training do not cover loud noises and the onset of heavy vibration. Complete and rapid loss of thrust is currently being trained and is probably the most critical from an airplane handling perspective; however, this failure is not necessarily representative of the malfunctions most likely to be encountered in service. There is also evidence that this lack of realism in current simulations of turbofan propulsion system malfunctions can lead to negative training, increasing the likelihood of inappropriate crew response. Review of current simulators indicates that the tactile and auditory representation of airplane response to engine compressor stall/surge is very misleading.

10. Considerable effort was undertaken to review existing engine failure indication systems and their differences and similarities between airplane manufacturers. All airframe manufacturers of later turbofan-powered airplanes inhibit alerts as a function of phase of flight, but at somewhat different phases of flight. The group believes that standardization of the flight-phase inhibit points is desirable. In general, the propulsion system malfunction alerts are not inhibited on turboprop-powered airplanes. The group also believes that a review of powerplant instrumentation requirements could be beneficial. In particular, engine surge, asymmetric thrust, engine failure, and tire failure annunciations were thought to be worthy of consideration to assist the crew in determining what malfunction had occurred. However, there is currently no clear indication substantiated by review of service experience or human factors testing that establishes whether the propulsion system malfunction warning systems installed on current airplanes are either beneficial, neutral, or detrimental. Research on the issue is desirable.

11. Adequate data could not be found to link standards of engine failure/malfunction indications with the probability of inappropriate crew response. Design evaluation suggests that retrospective embodiment of engine failure/malfunction indications, particularly on non-FADEC engines, would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. There have been no human factors studies performed to determine if a link exists between engine failure/malfunction warning and a reduced level of engine plus crew error accidents/incidents. There are arguments that real or false warnings may exacerbate the problem in certain circumstances, particularly during the takeoff phase of flight. Clearly, training would still be required.

12. The group agreed that, unless propulsion system malfunction recognition training was an actual requirement, such training would likely not take place consistently across the industry. The group further agreed that requirements for better realism of simulator reproductions of powerplant malfunction/failure scenarios should also be mandated. The affected sections of the JAR’s and FAR’s which are recommended for review are identified in Section 9. This regulatory activity should be conducted under the ARAC umbrella and should be included in the harmonization work program. The review of the requirements should cover the following points:

- identification of propulsion system malfunctions to be trained;
• the design and use of flight crew training equipment;
• the inclusion of propulsion system malfunction recognition training in both
  training and checking programs; and
• powerplant instrumentation requirements.

13. Data suggest that various opportunities exist for negative transfer of trained pilot behavior
    and experience when transitioning between different airplane types.

14. Since the turboprop database is not data rich, many of the following specific conclusions are
    based on limited incident information received from manufacturers and operators represented
    in the group. The participants’ experience of actual incidents in both operation and
    simulations was used as a basis for reaching these conclusions.

    • Current constant attitude airplane stall recovery training may be detrimental to the
      pilot’s low air speed control during engine failure operations. The assessment of
      error types indicates that training and regulation could reduce skill- and rule-
      based errors by pilots.

    • The assessments of error types suggest that skill- and rule-based errors
      predominate.

    • Flight-idle and zero thrust are generally not the same. The use of flight-idle
      power settings in simulated engine-out training or as a precautionary power
      setting may result in negative thrust (increased drag) with an unfeathered
      propeller and expose the crew to an increased hazard.

    • The use of throttle chops to flight idle to simulate real engine failures has little
      training value in relation to training the pilots to identify real propulsion system
      malfunctions or failures. This practice is of benefit to train airplane handling.

    • During one engine inoperative operations priority should be placed on airspeed
      control. With an engine failed, speed can only be controlled by adjusting attitude,
      as power is already at the maximum. This technique may be in conflict with the
      basic stall recovery training, and may therefore cause confusion during low-speed
      flight with an engine failure.

    • Turboprop flight instrument displays are evolving. There appears to be
      weaknesses in the display of lateral acceleration slip. Flight director systems that
      are not specifically designed for takeoff and go-around could give inappropriate
      commands following propulsion system malfunction or failure.
11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The requirements need to be enhanced to recognize the need for pilot training in powerplant failure recognition. It is recommended that 14 CFR Parts 61 and 121 / JAR-OPS / JAR-FCL be amended to require inclusion of engine failure/malfunction recognition in pilot training syllabi.

2. Regulatory authorities should review the requirements and content of pilot training for propulsion system malfunction or failure and the control of the airplane immediately after takeoff.

3. The regulatory authorities should establish and implement a rigorous process to ensure that the following occurs during the development of a training program:

   • Identification of powerplant failure conditions that need to be trained;
   • Preparation of the training aids (Tools & Methods);
   • Establishment of the appropriate means to conduct the training;
   • Assurance that each flight crew member receives the appropriate training for both malfunction recognition and proper response to it, and
   • Validation of effectiveness, along with a feedback loop to improve/update training.

4. The performance of $V_1$ thrust cut training in the airplane has caused a number of hull loss/fatal accidents. The value of this training in the airplane should be scrutinized and only conducted with extreme care. It is the Project Group’s belief that this specific training could be better effected in simulators. Where suitable simulators are not available, the airplane handling task can be adequately and much more safely trained at altitude where recovery from extreme upset conditions can be accomplished.

5. The aviation industry should undertake the development of basic generic text and video training material on turboprop and turbofan propulsion system malfunctions, recognition, procedures, and airplane effects.

6. The regulatory authorities should establish a means to ensure that the simulators used to support flight crew training are equipped with the appropriate realistic propulsion system malfunctions for the purpose of “recognition and appropriate response training”, and that the simulated malfunctions are consistent with the propulsion system malfunctions identified as needing to be trained. As a minimum, the airframe and engine manufacturers should be involved in the development of the simulation of propulsion system malfunctions. The scenarios that need to be included in training programs should focus on the accident/incident data produced by this group. The industry needs to ensure that propulsion system malfunctions reproduced in simulators do not produce negative training.

7. The requirements for propulsion system instrumentation should be reviewed, and requirements and advisory material related to powerplant and propellers should be established:
• A review of propulsion system parameters should be completed to determine if improved engine and propeller displays or methods can be found to present information in a manner which would help the flight crew diagnose malfunctions.

• Failure and malfunction annunciation and warnings to provide improved means for crews to identify propulsion system malfunctions. The areas for consideration include, the types of annunciation and warnings (visual, aural, tactile, etc.), introduction of annunciations for engine surge, asymmetric thrust, engine failure, tire failure; and standardization of warning and annunciation inhibits.

• Standardization among the airplane manufacturers regarding engine caution and warning messages and inhibit strategies during different flight phases (reference ARP 450D) is recommended.

8. The retroactive embodiment of additional engine failure warning on existing airplanes would be both difficult and costly. Therefore, research and development are required prior to any possible recommendation for retroactive installation of such equipment. Methodologies are not yet available that would allow evaluation of the benefits or detriments of the introduction of additional annunciations of propulsion system malfunctions to existing airplane types. These must also be developed. (See item 10 below.)

9. Flight training departments should enhance training methodologies to educate and train pilots in propulsion system malfunction effects on airplane performance. This relates to both the frequency and quality of training given in this area. All pilots need solid understanding of the performance factors that drive $V_1$, $V_r$, $V_2$, and other important performance and handling requirements. It is essential that the specialized training materials developed in areas such propulsion system malfunction are properly communicated to the line-flying pilots.

• Industry should provide training guidelines of how to recognize and diagnose the engine problem by using all available data in order to form the best possible information about the state of the propulsion system.

• Circumstances of negative transfer from previous training or operations should be identified and their lessons learned should be communicated as widely as possible within the industry.

10. It is recommended that the aviation industry sponsor activity to develop appropriate human factors methodologies to address both annunciation and training effectiveness for turboprop and turbofan propulsion system failures.

11. The following recommendations are specific to turboprop airplanes:

• The use of flight idle on turboprop airplanes for simulated engine failures or in the event of a malfunction should be reviewed by industry because of the potential association with loss of control events if the engine is not shut down.
• Stall recovery training should be reviewed by industry and regulatory authorities for possible negative training effects in one engine inoperative situations.

• Industry should investigate the suitability of turn co-ordinator instruments in training airplane where commercial airplanes do not use these displays.

• There should be formal training and qualification requirements for instructors and maintenance test pilots.

• In terms of loss of control in turboprop airplanes, the certification requirements for the clear display of lateral acceleration should be reviewed.

• The use of a Flight Director display should not be allowed during takeoff or go-around unless it has been specifically approved for one engine inoperative takeoffs and landings because of possible incorrect pitch guidance.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS – APPENDICES

## Volume 1 Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix 1</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTSB Final Recommendations for Jetstream 31 Accident, 13 Dec. 1994</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter from FAA to AIA</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter from AIA to FAA</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Volume 2 Appendices *(not contained in Vol. 1 – see Vol. 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix 4</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Turbofan data</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbofan Training Accident Summaries</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of GE/CFMI Commercial Fleet RTO Study</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Turboprop data</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Turboprop Training events</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet survey of engine failure indications - turbofans</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet survey of engine failure indications - turboprops</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey of Simulators</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulator Malfunction List for Turbofans - Proposed</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C to CFR Part 63, Flight Engineer Training Course Requirements</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Factors</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbofan Statistical Difference Assessment</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 1

NTSB Final Recommendations for Jetstream 31 Accident, 13 DEC 94
Findings:

1. The flightcrew was properly certificated in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulations and company procedures.

2. The airplane was certificated and maintained in accordance with existing regulations, except for the improper installation of the FPA-80 as a substitute for a GPWS.

3. Air traffic control services were properly performed.

4. Weather was not a factor in the accident.

5. The captain associated the illumination of the left engine IGN light with an engine failure.

6. The left engine IGN light illuminated as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100 percent and the power levers were at flight idle.

7. There was no evidence of an engine failure. The CVR sound spectrum analysis revealed that both propellers operated at approximately 100 percent RPM until impact, and examination of both engine revealed that they were operating under power at impact.

8. The captain failed to follow established procedures for engine failure identification, single engine approach, single go-around, and stall recovery.

9. The flightcrew failed to manage resources adequately; specifically, the captain did not designate a pilot to ensure aircraft control, did not invite discussion of the situation, and did not brief his intended actions; and the first officer did not assert himself in a timely and effective manner and did not correct the captain's erroneous statement about engine failure.

10. Although the first officer did perform a supportive role to the captain, his delayed assertiveness precluded an opportunity to avoid the accident.

11. Flight 3379 did not encounter any wake turbulence during the approach to runway 5L, or during the departure from controlled flight.

12. AMR Eagle training did not adequately address the recognition of engine failure at low power, the aerodynamic effects of asymmetric thrust from a "windmilling" propeller, and high thrust on the other engine.
13. AMR Eagle provided "negative simulator training" to pilots by associating the IGN light with engine failure and by not instructing pilots to advance both power levers during single engine go-arounds as required by the operation manual.

14. AMR Eagle and Flagship Airlines crew training records do not provide sufficient detail for management to track performance.

15. Flagship Airlines management was deficient in its knowledge of the types of crew records available, and in the content and use of such records.

16. Flagship Airlines did not obtain any training records on the accident captain from Comair. Further, Comair's standard response for employment history would not, had it been obtained, have included meaningful information on training and flight proficiency, despite the availability of such data.

17. The FAA did not provide adequate guidance for, or ensure proper installation of, the FPA-80 as a substitute for a GPWS on Flagship's fleet.

18. The structure of the FAA's oversight of AMR Eagle did not provide for adequate interaction between POIs and AMR Eagle management personnel who initiated changes in flight operations by the individual Eagle carriers.

Probable Cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were: 1) the captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed, and 2) the captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure of AMR Eagle/Flagship management to identify, document, monitor, and remedy deficiencies in pilot performance and training.

Recommendations:

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations:

--to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Publish advisory material that encourages air carriers to train flight crews in the identification of and proper response to engine failures that occur in reduced power conditions, and in other situations that are similarly less clear that the traditional engine failure at takeoff decision speed. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-98)

APPENDIX 1  -  NTSB Final Recommendations for Jetstream 31 Accident, 13 DEC 94
Review the organizational structure of the FAA surveillance of AMR Eagle and its carriers with particular emphasis on the positions and responsibilities of the Focal Point Coordinator and principal inspectors, as they relate to the respective carriers. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-99)

Ensure that all airplanes (other than the AMR Eagle J3201 fleet) that currently use a Collins FPA-80 in lieu of GPWS, under the provisions of 14 CFR 135.153, have installations that comply with Federal regulations. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-100)

Require all airlines operating under 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 and independent facilities that train pilots for the airlines to maintain pertinent standardized information on the quality of pilot performance in activities that assess skills, abilities, knowledge, and judgement during training, check flights, initial operating experience, and line checks and to use this information in quality assurance of individual performance and of the training program. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-116)

Require all airlines operating under 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 and independent facilities that train pilots for the airlines to provide the FAA, for incorporation into a storage and retrieval system, pertinent standardized information on the quality of pilot performance in activities that assess skills, abilities, knowledge, and judgment during training, check flights, initial operating experience, and line checks. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-117)

Maintain a storage and retrieval system that contains pertinent standardized information on the quality of 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 airlines pilot performance during training in activities that assess skills, abilities, knowledge, and judgement during training, check flights, initial operating experience, and line checks. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-95-118)

Require all airlines operating under 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 to obtain information, from the FAA’s storage and retrieval system that contains pertinent standardized pilot training and performance information, for the purpose of evaluating applicants for pilot positions during the pilot selection and hiring process. The system should have appropriate privacy protections, should require the permission of the applicant before release of the information, and should provide for sufficient access to the records by an applicant to ensure accuracy of the records. (Class II, Priority Action) A-95-119)
APPENDIX 2

Letter from FAA to AIA
APPENDIX 2 - Letter from FAA to AIA

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate
Aircraft Certification Service
1601 Lind Avenue, S.W.
Renton, Washington 98055-4056

06 March 1996

Mr. Howard Aylesworth, Jr.
Director, Airworthiness and Regulations
Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.
1250 Eye St. N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3922

Dear Mr. Aylesworth:

The purpose of this letter is to encourage the Aerospace Industries Association of America (AIA) to utilize data from previous AIA activity and a recent accident as a basis for initiating development of guidelines for an engine failure indication system.

On December 13, 1994, an American Eagle Jetstream Super 31 crashed near Morrisville, North Carolina. The National Transportation Safety Board investigation indicates that contributing causes of the accident were:
   a. The captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed.
   b. The captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery.

Studies conducted by the AIA under the Continued Airworthiness Assessment Methodology, PC 345 Committee, previously identified that inappropriate flightcrew response to an engine malfunction is a leading cause of propulsion system related accidents. The data showed that crew error related accidents following an engine failure on airplanes with three engines (which incorporate cockpit indication of engine failure) are roughly 1 accident in 7500 engine failure/shutdowns. Data for two engine airplanes that do not incorporate an engine failure indication show 1 accident in roughly 700 engine failure/shutdowns. Discussion of this data with members of the AIA indicates that further review of the accident history should be undertaken to better understand the factors that result in flightcrew error following an engine failure. The review would include identification of any deficiencies in current simulations available for flight crew training. This review may result in a recommendation that 14 CFR parts 25 and 23 should be amended to require new airplane designs to provide pilots with an unambiguous indication of engine failure.
APPENDIX 2 - Letter from FAA to AIA

The FAA believes that there may be a number of contributing factors involved in these historical events that should be investigated, such as:

a. Heightened crew concern following an engine failure on a two-engine airplane.
b. Reduced flightcrew response times needed to maintain directional control on airplanes with two wing-mounted engines, which necessitate rapid response to an engine out event.
c. Lack of guidance that establishes standards for engine manufacturers to provide a clear indication of "engine failure."
d. Reduced experience level of flightcrew operating airplane types involved in these accidents.
e. The absence of engine failure recognition training.
f. The absence of realistic engine failure or malfunction simulations for training.

The FAA encourage that the AIA undertake a project to:

a. Review relevant events and determine what factors influence crew error following an engine failure.
b. Define safety significant engine malfunctions.
c. Develop the guidelines for an appropriate engine failure indication system.
d. Define the process and guidelines for engine failure simulation.
e. Define guidelines for engine failure recognition training, and.
f. Identify the process for validating the effectiveness of these guidelines.

If the AIA study resulted in a finding that development of new regulatory requirements and/or guidance, these new requirements/guidance would apply to all new and possibly re-engined multi-engine FAR part 25 and part 23 (commuter category) aircraft, and embrace all types of propulsion systems. It is envisioned that this project would be started as an industry project that would be transferred to the appropriate Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee working group and involve harmonization with the other civil aviation authorities. To ease the transition of the recommendations into the regulatory processes, we encourage broad participation by all elements of the aerospace industry, including human factors specialists, engine manufacturers, airplane manufacturers, and flightcrew training specialists.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
DARRELL M. PEDERSON

Ronald T. Wojnar
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate
Aircraft Certification Service

file: MDostert\memo\aiaerror.doc
File: 8042-25
APPENDIX 3

Letter from AIA to FAA
March 7, 1997

Mr. Ronald T. Wojnar  
Manager  
Transport Airplane Directorate  
Federal Aviation Administration  
1601 Lind Avenue S.W.  
Renton WA  98055-4056

Dear Mr. Wojnar:

My letter of June 19, 1996 indicated that the AIA would undertake the activity you requested in your letter of March 6, 1996. The AIA planned to review accident and incident data associated with engine failures, coupled with inappropriate crew response, and examine the potential need for corrective action. The initial focus of the activity would be to assemble all relevant facts and data associated with historical accidents and incidents, experience with various mitigation approaches, fixed base and motion based simulator capabilities and programs, and other relevant information appropriate to a thorough study of engine failures coupled with inappropriate crew response. Once this had been accomplished, a follow-on phase would analyze and synthesize these data in order to draw appropriate conclusion.

Last June AIA had anticipated this project would be initiated before mid-September, and would be completed by August of 1997. The phase identifying causal factors and engine malfunctions would begin in January 1997, and be completed by October of 1997. It was recommended that G. P. Sallee of Boeing chair this activity. Your concurrence was requested before initiating the project as outlined.

The success of the workshop and the depth of material presented will minimize any schedule slippage due to a late start. The AIA TC Project chairman has requested that AIA ask AECMA to jointly sponsor, co-chair, and provide the focal point with respect to data collection and analysis of turboprop aircraft related events. This request is under active AIA review and I anticipate it will be positively received.

Based on the overall reaction to the workshop, AIA presumes that the TC Project plan meets the FAA’s need and has your approval. AIA will continue to report periodically on project status.

Sincerely,

Howard Aylesworth, Jr.
Director, Airworthiness and Regulations

HA:mps
PSM+ICR REPORT
APPENDICES

02 SEPT 98 - Draft

Appendix 1  NTSB Final Recommendations for Jetstream 31 Accident, 13 Dec. 1994 (book 1)
Appendix 2  Letter from FAA to AIA (book 1)
Appendix 3  Letter from AIA to FAA (book 1)
Appendix 4  Summary of Turbofan data
Appendix 5  Turbofan Training Accident Summaries
Appendix 6  Summary of GE/CFMI Commercial Fleet RTO Study
Appendix 7  Summary of Turboprop data
Appendix 8  Summary of Turboprop Training events
Appendix 9  Fleet survey of engine failure indications - turbofans
Appendix 10  Fleet survey of engine failure indications - turboprops
Appendix 11  Survey of Simulators
Appendix 12  Simulator Malfunction List for Turbofan
Appendix 13  Appendix C to Part 63, Flight Engineer Training Course Requirements
Appendix 14  Human Factors
APPENDIX 4 - Summary of Turbofan PSM+ICR Events
### APPENDIX 4 - Summary of Turbofan PSM+ICR Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>73/1ST/2/HF</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL</td>
<td>FAPP/G-A</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS, GO-AROUND EXECUTED + LOSS OF CONTROL (STALL)

**Summary of Narrative:**

THE AIRCRAFT WAS ON FINAL APPROACH AND CLEARED TO LAND BY THE TOWER. WHEN IT REACHED 90 METERS (300 FEET) HIGH, IT INITIATED A GO-AROUND WITH FULL POWER. THE AIRCRAFT PITCHED-UP IN EXCESS, STALLED BANKING TO THE RIGHT AND HIT THE GROUND ABOUT 2500 FEET TO THE RIGHT OF THE RUNWAY. NO.1 ENGINE HIT THE GROUND WITH NO POWER. NUMBER 2 ENGINE HIT THE GROUND WITH FULL POWER. PROBABLE CAUSE: PILOT FACTOR--FAILURE TO MAINTAIN FLYING SPEED. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR--POWERPLANT FAILURE/LOSS OF THRUST FROM ONE ENGINE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>*85/EWB/4/S</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>POWERLOSS (NO.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + FAILURE TO CORRECT FOR THRUST LOSS RESULTING IN AIRPLANE STALL

**Summary of Narrative:**

Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>95/2ND/2/HF</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL</td>
<td>GOAROUND</td>
<td>VIBRATION &amp; BANG (LOW POWER SURGE); THRUST LOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
SINGLE ENGINE POWERLOSS (FAN BLADE FRACTURE) + GOAROUND & LOSS OF CONTROL

Summary of Narrative:
The airplane was cleared for the approach to RWY30 at approximately 200 feet above ground level when the crew initiated a go-around (reported to the tower as some kind of a problem) and subsequently loss control of the airplane. The investigation revealed engine suffered a fan blade fracture which ultimately resulted in a powerloss. Witnesses and ATC indicate the airplane initiated a go-around but never gained altitude and rolled over and impacted the ground. The accident investigation report found the probable cause of the accident as follows: The probable cause of the accident is loss of control of the airplane over the course of attempting at restarting fuel (initiating go-around thrust) during landing with low power. Contributing causes to this situation; (1.) The structural failure of the first stage compressor blade from engine one, which led to a loss of power and a deviation from the landing trajectory. (2.) The slow or late execution of the fuel restarting (go-around) procedure while operating on a single engine, unknown to the crew, which led to an irreversible loss of speed. The commission holds that the crew initiated a fuel restarting (go-around) procedure to late, thinking that it always had available power to its two engines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>83/1ST/4/HF</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL - ASYM THRST</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>POWERLOSS SUSPECTED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
POWERLOSS + LOSS OF CONTROL

Summary of Narrative:
Airplane aborted takeoff and returned to hanger for engine maintenance. No.4 engine was producing popping sounds at power level above 1.7 EPR. Cargo was unloaded prior to an attempted flight to Miami. It was reported that operating normally and one engine was set at reduced thrust. Just after takeoff the airplane veered to the right and impacted in an industrial neighborhood. Three crew members were fatally injured as well as eleven persons on the ground.
Event #: ID Number: PSM+ICR Category: Phase of Flight: Engine Symptom:
50 88/EWB/3/I LOSS OF CONTROL - ON LANDING THRUST REVERSER TO GROUND UNLOCK POSITION

Summary of Event:
ASYMMETRIC THRUST DURING LANDING DUE TO FWD THRUST + FAIL TO RECOGNIZE - OFFSIDE RWY

Summary of Narrative:
AS THE CAPTAIN WAS DEPLOYING REVERSERS DURING LANDING, #2 & #3 REVERSERS UNLOCKED & DEPLOYED (GREEN LIGHT CONDITION), BUT #1 REVERSER WAS Binding & ONLY MOVED TO THE UNLOCK POSITION (AMBER LIGHT CONDITION). CAPTAIN WAS NOT WARNED OF THIS CONDITION, THOUGH 2ND OFFICER SHOULD HAVE MONITORED LIGHTS. CAPTAIN SAID HE REACHED TO CHECK #1 LEVER, AT ABOUT THAT TIME, AIRCRAFT YAWED RIGHT. DESPITE IMMEDIATE ACTION BY THE CAPTAIN, DIRECTIONAL CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS LOST DUE TO YAWING CAUSED BY INOP THRUST REVERSER. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED OFF RUNWAY, CROSSED 2 TAXIWAYS AND NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT AFTER TOUCHDOWN NO.1 ENGINE ACCELERATED WITH FWD THRUST AS #2 AND #3 ENGINE PROVIDED REVERSER THRUST. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, THE AIRCRAFTS NOSE LIFTED OFF THE RWY TO A 4 DEG ATTITUDE & THE AIRCRAFT WENT OFF THE RUNWAY. AN EXAM OF THE THROTTLE QUADRANT REVEALED THE S1-847 SW WAS CURLED / TWISTED & 2 SUPPORT SHAFTS (HOLDING THE SWS) WERE BENT CAUSING INTERMITTENT OPEN OF THE NO.1 THRUST REVERSER.

Event #: ID Number: PSM+ICR Category: Phase of Flight: Engine Symptom:
44 85/EWB/4/H LOSS OF CONTROL - ON LANDING THRUST REVERSER (NO.1) DID GROUND-ASYMMETRIC NOT TRANSITION TO "REV REVERSE THRUST;THRTL THRTL THRUST", YAW RIGHT, CABLE FAILED THRUST INCREASE TO FULL

Summary of Event:
ASYMMETRIC THRUST + FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE - OFFSIDE LANDING

Summary of Narrative:
DURING LANDING ROLLOUT THE AIRPLANE VEERED OFF RIGHT SIDE OF RUNWAY. AIRPLANE PASSED THROUGH A DRAINAGE DITCH, WENT OVER A GRASSY AREA, THEN ONTO A CONCRETE RAMP WHERE THE LEFT OUTBOARD WING STRUCK AN ILLUMINATION STANDARD. THIS CAUSED THE AIRPLANE TO SPIN AROUND COMING TO A STOP ON A 360 DEGREE HEADING 250 METERS TO THE RIGHT OF RUNWAY 14 CENTERLINE. WEATHER WAS NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT. ALL LANDING GEAR FOLDED AFT. THE BODY GEAR ARE IMBEDDED IN THE FUSELAGE TO STATION 1660, NOSE GEAR IN E/E COMPARTMENT, LH WING GEAR SEPARATED AND 100 METERS AWAY. ALL NACELLES RESTING ON GROUND. BOTH INBOARD STRUTS BUCKLED UPWARD. THE FUSELAGE IS BADLY BUCKLED AND BENT JUST AFT OF THE WING BETWEEN DOORS 3 AND 4. LOWER BODY IS SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED. WING LEADING EDGES ARE DAMAGED AS ARE WING TRAILING EDGES WHICH WERE STRUCK BY GEAR. IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT BEFORE THE ENGINES WERE PLACED IN REVERSE, THE #1 ENGINE THRUST CONTROL CABLE SEPARATED. IF THE CABLE PARTED BEFORE THE REVERSE THRUST LEVER SIGNAL "OPEN" TO THE SOLENOID CONTROLING THE AIR VALVE, THE ENTIRE MECHANICAL PART OF THE CABLE, QUADRANT, DIRECTIONAL VALVE, PUSH PULL CABLE AND FUEL CONTROL, WOULD BE DRIVEN TOWARD FULL FORWARD THRUST BY THE TENSION IN THE CAMPANION TIA CABLE. THE PILOT HAD NO IMMEDIATE MEANS TO CONTROL THE #1 ENGINE THRUST, EXCEPT TO CUTOFF FUEL. AND THE AIRPLANE DEPARTED THE RUNWAY BEFORE IT COULD BE STOPPED. THE FAA ISSUED AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR REPETITIVE INSPECTIONS UNTIL THE BRACKET IS REPLACED PER THE SERVICE BULLETIN. THE AIRPLANE IS CONSIDERED UNECONOMICAL TO REPAIR IS DECLARED A HULL LOSS.
## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>83/1ST/2/HF</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL - RETURN TO LANDING</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>POWERLOSS (UNRECOVERABLE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + RETURNING TO LANDING & LOSS CONTROL - CRASH

**Summary of Narrative:**

SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF ENGINE NO.1 FAILED, AND THE AIRPLANE TURNED BACK TO THE AIRPORT. WHILE BANKING TO THE FINAL APPROACH, A WING TIP CONTACTED THE GROUND INSIDE AIRPORT BOUNDARIES. THE FUSELAGE FRACTURED INTO THREE SECTIONS. ADDITIONAL DATA: FLIGHT WAS NORMAL UNTIL TRANSITION FROM TAKEOFF TO CLIMB AT WHICH TIME THE NO.1 ENGINE FAILED. THE CREW HAD NOT COMPLETED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TRAINING. THE CREW DID NOT APPLY PROCEDURES ADEQUATE TO THE EMERGENCY PRESENTED, THEY SELECTED RUNWAY 3 (DOWNWIND) GIVEN THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE RETURNED TO RUNWAY 21 OR CONTINUED AHEAD. THE FINAL APPROACH CONFIGURATION WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY (GEAR & FLAPS DOWN) CAUSED A REDUCTION IN AIRSPEED, DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SELECT TAKEOFF POWER, TRIED TO LAND DOWNWIND ON RWY 3 INSTEAD OF CLIMBING OUT IN THE BEST CONFIGURATION, THEN MAKING A LANDING APPROACH TO RUNWAY 21 AS ADVISED BY TOWER.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>*92/MNB/2/H</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL / STUCK THROTTLE</td>
<td>DESCENT</td>
<td>STUCK THROTTLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

ASYMMETRIC THRUST (STUCK THROTTLE) + FAIL TO RECOGNIZE- CONTROL LOSS

**Summary of Narrative:**

THE AIRPLANE IMPACTED A MOUNTAIN 630 METERS HIGH 32 KILOMETERS FROM THE AIRPORT DURING DESCENT. DFDR DATA INDICATE WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLE AND AUTOPILOT ENGAGED, THE RH THRUST LEVER WAS RESPONDING INTERMITTENTLY TO AUTOTHROTTLE COMMANDES. ON LEVEL OFF AT 7200 FEET THE LEFT THRUST LEVER RESPONDED NORMALLY BUT THE RIGHT DID NOT RESPOND AND REMAINED AT IDLE. THE AUTOPILOT ATTEMPTED TO COMPENSATE FOR ASSYMMETRICAL THRUST BY COMMANDING LEFT AILERON. THE HEADING STARTED TO DRIFT RIGHT AND AS THE LEFT ENGINE APPROACHED 80% THRUST, THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO BANK TO THE RIGHT. HEADING SELECT WAS ACTIVATED ON THE MODE CONTROL PANEL FOR 14 SECONDS AND THEN DESELECTED. THE AIRPLANE WAS NOW PASSING 50 DEGREES BANK. CONTROL WHEEL STEERING WAS ACTIVATED WITH A RIGHT WING DOWN INPUT OPPOSITE TO THAT WHICH THE AUTOPILOT WAS HOLDING. THE RIGHT THRUST LEVER WAS NOW ADVANCED AND THE RIGHT BANK AND NOSE PITCH ANGLE RAPIDLY WENT TO 78 DEGREES NOSE LOW. THE AIRSPEED INCREASED THROUGHOUT 300 KNOTS WITH THE ENGINE THRUST NOW NEARLY SYMMETRICAL AT 88%. LAST BANK ANGLE WAS APPROX 155 DEGS RIGHT ROLL, PITCH 78 DEGS NOSE LOW, AIRSPEED 413 KNOTS.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>*95/EWB/2/H</td>
<td>LOSS OF CONTROL / STUCK THROTTLE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>NO RESPONSE TO COMMANDED POWER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
ASYMMETRIC THRUST (STUCK THROTTLE) + CREW FAILED TO RECOGNIZE - CONTROL LOSS

Summary of Narrative:

IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO COUNTERACT THE OVERBANKING TENDENCY, WHICH WAS DUE TO THE THRUST ASYMMETRY, THE F/O MADE A RIGHT ROLL INPUT TO THE CONTROL WHEEL TO STABILIZE THE BANK ANGLE NEAR 20 DEGREES. HOWEVER, ABOUT 28 SECONDS LATER AND FOR UNEXPLAINED REASONS, THE F/O BRIEFLY MADE A LARGE LEFT ROLL INPUT TO THE CONTROL WHEEL (AN INPUT INTO THE TURN AND TOWARD THE ENGINE THAT WAS AT IDLE). THIS INPUT APPARENTLY CAUSED THE BANK ANGLE TO INCREASE FROM ABOUT 30 DEGREES TO 45 DEGREES. AT THIS POINT, THE F/O ASKED THE CAPTAIN TO ENGAGE AP1. THE A/P ENGAGED FOR ABOUT ONE SECOND. IT THEN DISENGAGED DUE TO THE PILOT APPLYING A PITCH INPUT FORCE GREATER THAN 33 POUNDS TO THE CONTROL WHEEL. IT IS SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE THAT, PRIOR TO LOSING CONTROL OF THE FLIGHT PATH, THE ROLL INPUTS TO THE CONTROL WHEEL NEVER EXCEEDED 50 PERCENT OF THE DEFLECTION THAT WAS AVAILABLE. ALSO, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY INPUT TO THE Rudder PEDALS THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT.
Event #: ID Number: PSM+ICR Category: Phase of Flight: Engine Symptom:
43 *85/2ND/2/H LOSS OF CONTROL-INCORRECT RUDDER CLIMB COMPRESSOR SURGE, AND POWERLOSS

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE (POWERLOSS) + INCORRECT FLIGHT CONTROL INPUT- CONTROL LOSS

Summary of Narrative:
WITNESS REPORTED THAT SOON AFTER TAKEOFF SMOKE AND FIRE WAS COMING FROM THE RIGHT ENGINE. THE AIRCRAFT CLIMBED TO 700 FEET AGL, (167KTS) THEN ROLLED INTO A STEEP RIGHT BANK AND CRASHED ON AIRPORT PROPERTY ONE FOURTH OF A MILE FROM THE RUNWAY IN A NOSE-DOWN ATTITUDE. INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT A RIGHT ENGINE COMPRESSOR BLADES AND SPACER EXITED THROUGH A 4 INCH BY 4 INCH HOLE IN THE ENGINE CASING AT THE 11 O'CLOCK POSITION. ANALYSIS OF THE VOICE AND CRASH RECORDER SHOWED THAT THE AIRPLANE YAWED RIGHT, WAS PULLED UP TO 2 G's AND STALLED BEFORE ROLLING RIGHT, POSSIBLE INVERTED AND CRASHING. NTSB PROBABLE CAUSE-----THE FLIGHTCREW'S IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN RESPONSE TO THE CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE RIGHT ENGINE DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT, WHICH LED TO AND ACCELERATED STALL AND LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE. CONTRIBUTING TO THE LOSS OF CONTROL WAS THE LACK OF CREW COORDINATION IN RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY. THE RIGHT ENGINE FAILED FROM THE RUPTURE OF THE 9TH TO 10TH STAGE REMOVABLE SLEEVE SPACER IN THE HIGH PRESSURE COMPRESSOR BECAUSE OF THE SPACER'S VULNERABILITY TO CRACKS. THE CREW APPLIED INCORRECT RUDDER 4-5 SECONDS AFTER THE ENGINE MALFUNCTION, INITIALLY THE RUDDER WAS DEFLECTED IN THE CORRECT DIRECTION. BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE RELATIVE INEXPERIENCED IN THE AIRPLANE.

Event #: ID Number: PSM+ICR Category: Phase of Flight: Engine Symptom:
6 71/1ST/4/H LOSS OF CONTROL-TRAINING TAKEOFF POWERLOSS

Summary of Event:
TRAINING FLIGHT-SIMULATED ENG-OUT + POWERLOSS (SE), CONTINUED TAKEOFF - LOSS OF CONTROL - IMPACTED GROUND

Summary of Narrative:
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>94/2ND/3/l</td>
<td>OTHER - ATC COMMUNICATION ERROR RESULTING IN SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

VIBRATION, POWERLOSS + RTO AND SHUTDOWN GOOD ENG (TOWER INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED)

**Summary of Narrative:**

SOON AFTER BEGINNING TAKEOFF ROLL. TOWER CALLED AND TOLD CAPTAIN THEY SAW FLAMES OUT WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS THE NO.1 ENGINE. AT THE SAME TIME, A/C BEGAN TO VIBRATE AND NO.1 ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN. TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AND DURING TAXI VIBRATION CONTINUED UNIT THE NO.2 ENGINE SHUT ITSELF DOWN. ON C1 BLADE WAS FOUND TO BE COMPLETELY LIBERATED FROM THE HUB AND MISSING. HEAVY DAMAGE TO BELLMOUTH; INLET CASE STRUTS BROKEN FROM OUTER CASING AND TWISTED. NO.1 FAN BLADE EVENT WAS CONTAINED. DAMAGE TO NO.1 ENGINE WAS PREVIOUS FOD WHICH WAS FOUND DURING BORESCOPE REQUIRED PRIOR TO FERRY FLIGHT. A/C FERRED TO SFO AND ENGINE REMOVED ON 3/15. ONE BLADE FRACTURED 3.5 INCHES ABOVE PLATEFORM. NO CASE PENETRATION. FOUR IGV'S BROKEN FREE AT OUTSIDE DIAMETER OF CASE. LAB ANALYSIS OF BLADE WILL BE REPORTED WHEN AVAILABLE. IN THIS EVENT IT DOES SHOW DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING WHICH ENGINE IS MALFUNCTIONING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>83/1ST/2/H</td>
<td>OTHER - FAILURE TO COMPLETE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, DISINTEGRATION + FAILURE TO COMPLETE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES - ON RWY

**Summary of Narrative:**

### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>96/1ST/4/HF</td>
<td>OTHER - FORCED LANDING</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE - POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

COMPRESSOR SURGE BEFORE V1+ SHUTDOWN (FIRE WARNING) OF ANOTHER ENGINE RESULTING IN FORCED LANDING

**Summary of Narrative:**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>91/2ND/3/I</td>
<td>OTHER - MIS-IDENTIFIED MALFUNCTION</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>HEAVY NOISE AND VIBRATION, COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

HEAVY NOISE & SHAKING, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO, CREW MIS-IDENTIFY AS TIRE FAILURE

**Summary of Narrative:**


NOTE: need to move to RTO stack.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>92/MWB/2/I</td>
<td>OTHER-ASYMMETRIC THRUST, STUCK THROTTLE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>NO RESPONSE TO COMMANDED POWER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

ASYMMETRIC THRUST (STUCK THROTTLE) + FAILED TO DETECT ASYMMETRY - AIRPLANE ROLLED, RECOVERED

**Summary of Narrative:**

AFTER LEVEL OFF AT A CRUISING ALTITUDE OF FL390, ITS AIRSPEED SLIGHTLY EXCEEDED THE DESIRED VALUE, AND THE AUTOTHROTTLES REDUCED THE POWER TO BRING THE AIRSPEED BACK TO THE PROPER SETTING. HOWEVER, WHEN POWER WAS AUTOMATICALLY REAPPLIED, THE LEFT ENGINE DID NOT RESPOND BUT REMAINED AT 0.98 EPR, THIS CAUSED THE RIGHT ENGINE TO REACH A MAXIMUM CRUISE THRUST OF 1.54 EPR AS THE AUTOMATIC SYSTEM ATTEMPTED TO HOLD AIRSPEED. THE FLIGHT CREW FAILED TO DETECT THE THRUST LOSS ON THE LEFT ENGINE, AND THE AIRSPEED BLED FROM 250 KTS TO 180 KTS DURING A PERIOD OF SEVEN MINUTES. THE AUTOPilot CONTINUED TO HOLD ALTITUDE AND GROUND TRACK DURING THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH AN INCREASING AMOUNT OF AILERON DEFLECTION WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO. THE AIRCRAFT ROLLED 15 DEGREES TO THE LEFT WHEN THE AUTOPILOT WAS NO LONGER ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL WITH THE ASYMMETRIC THRUST CONDITION. THE CREW DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPILOT AND TOOK RECOVERY ACTION. THE MALFUNCTIONING LEFT ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN AND A SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AT AN ALTERNATE AIRPORT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>82/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>OTHER-BEARING FAILURE + CREW FAILED TO SECURE ENG</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>EXCESSIVE AVM WARNING LIGHT, VIBRATION, COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

AVM EXCEEDANCE + FAILURE TO SECURE ENGINE RESULTED IN DISINTEGRATION

**Summary of Narrative:**

FROM RR THE "RED TOP" ON THIS INCIDENT ONLY REFERS TO SHUTDOWN OF ENGINE NO.2 DUE TO AN LP LOCATION BEARING FAILURE AT 6400 FT ON CLIMB OUT OF JEDDAH. THE AIRCRAFT DID AN ATB AND LANDED WITH 3 ENGINES OPERATING. ENGINE NO.1 WAS SHUTDOWN IN ERROR AND RESTARTED FOR LANDING AND WAS ALSO FOLED DUE TO INGESTION OF DEBRIS FROM THE LPT OF THE NO.2 ENGINE. SOME DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGE OF THE WING AND THE TOP OF THE WING INBOARD OF THE NO.2 ENGINE. RR BELIEVES THE EVENT TO BE A RELATED MULTIPLE DUE TO ENGINE+CREW-"DAVE ALLARD"-RR. AN AVM EXCEEDANCE AND VIBRATION ALERT OCCURRED ON NO.2 ENGINE APPROXIMATELY 10 SECONDS AFTER LIFT OFF. THE THROTTLE WAS CLOSED AND THEN POWER WAS RESTORED OVER A PERIOD OF 2 MINUTES. IT REMAINED AT POWER UNTIL THE ENGINE FAILED SOME 5 MINUTES AND 38 SECONDS AFTER THE INITIAL WARNING. (EMERGENCY PROCEDURES REQUIRE THROTTLE CLOSURE & START LEVER TO CUT-OFF IN RESPONSE TO HIGH ENGINE VIBRATION). AFTER ENGINE FAILLURE THE CAPTAIN ORDERED SHUTDOWN OF THE NO.2 ENGINE BUT THE FLIGHT ENGINEER PULLED THE NO.1 ENGINE FIRE HANDLE. ON SEEING THE NO.1 ENGINE FUEL VALVE LIGHT INDICATE CLOSED, HE THEN PULLED THE NO.2 ENGINE SHUTDOWN TEE HANDLE. THE NO.1 ENGINE WAS RESTARTED AND A THREE ENGINE LANDING ACCOMPLISHED. THE NUMBER 2 ENGINE FAILURE STARTED FROM A LP LOCATION BEARING FAILURE, FOLLOWED BY FAN SHAFT FAILURE, LP TURBINE OVERSPEED AND MAJOR ENGINE DAMAGE.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>*93/MNB/2/I</td>
<td>OTHER-COMPRESSOR</td>
<td>G-AROUND</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SURGE:UNABLE TO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISOLATE</td>
<td></td>
<td>WHICH ENGINE WAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AFFECTED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + DIFFICULTY ISOLATING WHICH ENGINE

Summary of Narrative:
The crew initiated a low approach and go-around at approximately 100 feet AGL with autothrottles and autopilot engaged and flap where retracted to 1 deg. Go-around airplane performance was normal (engine thrust, climb performance-ok). The airplane accelerated to 180 KTS and several hard engines surges were felt. Though, which engine was surging was not readily apparent. At 3500 feet the autothrottles where tripped off and both engine throttles were retarded to 1.03 to 1.05 EPR with continuous surges still occurring. Approximately 3 minutes later, visual and audible surges were identified as the right hand engine, and it was reduced to idle. The surging stopped at idle. An uneventful one engine inoperative landing was accomplished with flaps 20 and the RH engine at idle. No further surges occurred. The HPC damage was seen from about the eight stage rearward. Crew interviews stated that after the engine surges began the instruments appeared to have EPR, N1, and EGT oscillations but on both engines. It was not readily apparent which engine was in surge. It kinda look like the oscillations were greater on the RH than LH engine. The nature of the surge was sounding like, BOOM-BOOM,..., BOOM-BOOM,..., BOOM-BOOM, a double quality to the sound. As the crew was unable to determine positively which engine was surging, the flight analyst engineer went to the back to start looking in the lower hold, and he heard the bleed unloading on the RH engine and saw the RH engine oscillating (moving around relative to the wing). He then informed the flight crew and they retarded the throttle on the RH engine and surging stopped. 5 minutes after the start of surging the crew landed uneventfully.

NOTE: Not included in event calculations, but included because of difficulty in identifying which engine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>88/2ND/2/HF</td>
<td>OTHER-DUAL ENG</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POWERLOSS;CONTINUOUS SURGING ENG'S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE, POWER REDUCTION + ADVANCED THROTTLES RESULTING IN TOTAL POWERLOSS RESULTING IN FORCED LANDING

Summary of Narrative:
Shortly after liftoff a large group of pigeons was encountered resulting in a reduction of EPR indication and surging on both engines. Captain moved the thrust levers to fully forward as the airplane appeared not to be climbing at 300 feet above the runway elevation. RWY ALT 6,020 FT. Both engines continued surging and the aircraft was now able to climb to 1400 feet AGL where the crew executed an air turnback turned downwind to set up a landing approach. As the captain turned to the base leg both engines quit running and a gear up landing was made in a small clearing. The left engine and the 41 section separated from the otherwise intact airplane. An intense fire quickly developed from released fuel. Many passengers were unable to evacuate before being overcome by smoke and fire. It was estimated from the engine damage that the left engine had ingested 15 birds, the right engine 11. Operating the engines in continuous surge caused the final stage compressor blades to separate, subsequently melting the turbine blades. Analysis of the engines indicated that surging free operation was possible by retarding the throttle to clear the surge condition even with the associated engine damage.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>91/MNB/2/H</td>
<td>OTHER-DUAL ENG</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>CONTINUOUS COMPRESSOR POWERLOSS;CONTINUOUS SURGING ENG'S</td>
<td>LOW HUMMING NOISE, COMPRESSOR SURGES + THROTTLE SLIGHTLY RETARDED WITHOUT CEASING SURGES - FORCED LANDING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Airplane crash landed in an open field 4:05 minutes after takeoff. Power was lost on both engines due to wings shedding ice during rotation. The airplane broke into 3 sections. No airframe fire. No.1 engine had a fire warning 1:31 minutes after takeoff. A pilot and 3 Pax saw ice coming off the wing on the RH side wing and suspect the same for the LH side. The accident investigation report is summarized as follows: Prior to takeoff the aircraft was deiced. The captain made a rolling takeoff which was normal up to the rotation. In connection with liftoff the captain heard an abnormal noise which he could not identify. The noise was recorded by the aircraft's CVR as a low humming noise. After approx 25 seconds flight the right engine started to surge. The captain throttled back on that engine somewhat, but without the surging ceasing. The surges continued until the engine stopped delivering thrust 51 seconds after the surges had started. When the flight had lasted 65 seconds the left engine also started to surge, which the pilots did not notice before this engine also lost thrust. This happened two seconds after the right engine had failed. When the engines had failed the crew prepared for an emergency landing. When the aircraft was entirely out of the cloud at a height of 300 to 250 meters the captain elected to try and land in a field in roughly the direction of flight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>88/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>OTHER-EXCESSIVE PITCH ATTITUDE 22DEG W/POWERLOSS</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
<td>LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + PITCH ATTITUDE EXCEEDED TARGET BY 11 DEGREES - RECOVERED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During takeoff, in conditions of squally crosswinds, as the main wheels of the aircraft left the runway the compressor of the No.4 engine surged, resulting in a thrust loss from that engine. The aircraft banked to the right and pitched up to an attitude of 22 deg, which was some 11 degrees greater than that recommended after an engine failure. With the stick shaker operating, the aircraft descended towards the high ground that lies due west of the airport until the commander, using max thrust from the three remaining engines, was able to establish a climb profile and the aircraft then achieved a safe height. The report concludes that the incident was caused by the following: A surge induced loss of thrust from the No.4 engine just after rotation. The commander delaying input of down elevator until the pitch had reached 22 degrees which was well above that recommended and consequently the scheduled three engine climb performance not being achieved.
## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>81/1ST/4/I</td>
<td>OTHER-POWERLOSS,ATB,UNCORD APPR &amp; LANDING/OFFSIDE - PILOTING SKILL</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, POWERLOSS + UNCOORDINATED APPROACH & LANDING / VEERED OFFSIDE AT 80 KTS

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING CLIMB, AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED NO.3 ENGINE COMPRESSOR SURGE (LOUD BANG) AND POWERLOSS AND FIRE WARNING. FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED AIRBORNE AND AIRCRAFT MADE AIR TURNBACK, LANDING 25,000 KG OVERWEIGHT AND 25 KTS FAST ONTO A WET RUNWAY WITH A 7.5 KTS TAILWIND. UNABLE TO STOP, AT 80 KTS THE PILOT ELECTED TO VEER OFF RUNWAY ONTO SOFT GROUND. ALL ENGINES WERE FOD'D AND THERE WAS SOME DAMAGE TO THE MLG TRUCK BEAMS. THE AIRCRAFT WAS NEVER REPAIRED SINCE IT WAS AT THE END OF IT'S ECONOMIC LIFE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>68/1ST/4/HF</td>
<td>OTHER-PYLON S/O VALVE NOT SECURED,UNCONTROLLED FIRE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

DISINTEGRATION + CREW FAILED TO SECURE ENG AND TURN OFF BOOST PUMPS RESULTING IN UNCONTROLLED FIRE AND ENGINE SEPEPARATION

**Summary of Narrative:**

ONE MINUTE AFTER TAKEOFF, NO.2 ENGINE FAILED. THE COMPRESSOR DISK CUT THE FUEL LINE RESULTING IN A FUEL FIRE AND THE CREW FAILED TO CLOSE SHUTOFF VALVE IN THE PYLON AND ALSO FAILED TO SHUTOFF BOOST PUMPS WHICH CONTINUED TO PUMP FUEL ONTO THE RAMP FOR 20 MINUTES. MADE AN IMMEDIATE RETURNED LANDING, ON APPROACH THE NO.3 ENGINE FELL OFF. EVACUATION STARTED AS SOON AS THE AIRPLANE STOPPED BUT FIVE WERE OVERCOME BY HEAT AND SMOKE AND DID NOT ESCAPE.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>81/1ST/4/H</td>
<td>OTHER-RETURN TO</td>
<td>LANDING</td>
<td>LOW OIL QUANTITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LANDING; UNCOORD</td>
<td>THRUST- BELOW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>APPR&amp;LNDG-LOC-ASYM</td>
<td>Vmcg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:

SINGLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN DUE OIL LOSS + UNCOORDINATED APPROACH & LANDING - CONTROL LOSS / OFFSIDE

Summary of Narrative:

AIRCRAFT RETURNED WITH NO.3 ENGINE SHUTDOWN DUE TO OIL LOSS. LANDED IN TYPHOON CONDITIONS—GUSTY WINDS, TAILWIND, AND CROSSWIND. LANDED TOO FAR DOWN RUNWAY AND INITIALLY REVERSED ENGINE 1 & 4 WHEN IT LOOKED LIKE HE MIGHT OVERRUN, PILOT BROUGHT UP NO.2 ENGINE IN REVERSE. AIRPLANE DEPARTED LEFT SIDE OF RWY, CROSSED GRASS, BROKE OFF NLG, AND ENDED UP ON HIGH SPEED TURNOFF. A/C SCRAPPED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>69/1ST/4/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO AT V1 RESULTING IN OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:

DURING TAKEOFF ROLL, THE AIRCRAFT HIT A FLOCK OF BIRDS (SEA GULLS). NO.2 ENGINE SURGED AND THE CREW ELECTED TO ABORT AT 138 KTS. V1=138, VR=145, V2=162. AIRCRAFT OVERRAN END OF THE RUNWAY BY 560 FEET INTO A MUD SWAMP. NO FIRE AND NO INJURIES. NO.1,2 AND 3 SHOWED SIGNS OF BIRD INGESTION WITH NO POWERLOSS. LEFT MAIN AND NOSE LANDING GEARS COLLAPSED, LOWER SURFACE OF FUSELAGE DAMAGED. FLAPS DAMAGED. NO.2 Pylon buckled outward. FUSELAGE BROKEN CIRCUMFERENTIALLY FROM WINDOW LINE TO WINDOW LINE WITH 3 INCH SEPARATION AT BODY STATION 550. ALL ENGINES DEVELOPED REVERSE THRUST DURING RTO 110%. THE CREW ACTIONS IN THE ABANDONED TAKEOFF PROCEDURES WERE TIMELY IN RESPECT OF THROTTLE CLOSURE, APPLICATION OF REVERSE THRUST AND ACTUATION OF SPEED BRAKES BUT THE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A DELAY IN APPLICATION OF WHEEL BRAKES BEYOND THAT DELAY ASSUMED IN THE ACCELERATE/STOP CERTIFICATION PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS. THE CAPTAIN WAS SCANNING THE ENGINE INSTRUMENTS DURING THE TAKEOFF (PFN) AT THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT STRUCK THE BIRDS AND LOSS OF POWER FROM NO.2 ENGINE OCCURRED. HE SAW THE NO.2 EPR DROP FROM ITS SETTING OF 1.85 TO 1.55 AND THIS INITIATED HIS DECISION TO ABANDON THE TAKEOFF. THE FLIGHT ENGINEER ALSO SAW THE EPR DROP TO 1.55 AND CALLED THAT THERE WAS A POWER LOSS.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

Event #: ID Number: PSM+ICR Category: Phase of Flight: Engine Symptom:
4 70/2ND/2/H RTO TAKEOFF COMPRESSOR SURGE

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE Vr RESULTING IN OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>72/2ND/2/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>TEMPORARY POWERLOSS DUE TO STANDING WATER INGESTION DURING T/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
POWERLOSS (TEMPORARY) DUE RUNWAY WATER INGESTION + RTO ABOVE V1, OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL IN RAIN, THE LEFT ENGINE APPEARED TO LOOSE POWER AT ABOUT 126 KTS. V1=128KTS, DECISION TO ABORT = 132 KTS, ABORT SPEED = 135 KTS. THE PILOT ELECTED TO ABORT BUT WAS UNABLE TO STOP ON THE RUNWAY. GROUND SPEED WAS ABOUT 10 MPH WHEN AIRPLANE OVERRUN END OF RUNWAY AND DOWN AN INCLINE INTO A SHALLOW SALT WATER SWAMP. ONLY THE GEAR AND LOWER FUSELAGE ENTERED THE WATER. FIVE DAYS TO REMOVE AIRCRAFT. THERE WAS NO FIRE. PILOT FACTOR - IMPROPER HANDLING OF AN ABORTED TAKEOFF. ENGINE RELATED DUE TO APPARENT POWERLOSS. CAA REPORT: TAKEOFF SPEED CALCULATED AS V1=135, Vr=136, AND V2=143. THE DRY V1 WAS CORRECTLY AMENDED TO THE WET RUNWAY VALUE OF 128KTS. HAVING BEEN ADVISED BY ATC OF STANDING WATER AT ABOUT THE MID POINT OF THE RUNWAY, TAKEOFF WAS PERFORMED WITH WATER INJECTION IN USE AND ENGINE IGNITORS ON. AT ABOUT 126KTS THE AIRCRAFT RAN INTO ONE OR BOTH POOLS OF STANDING WATER, WHICH WERE ASTRIDE THE CENTERLINE AND ABOUT 4 METERS DIAMETER AND 2 CM DEEP. ENTRY INTO THE STANDING WATER RESULTED IN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBLEMS, A HESITATION IN THE AIRCRAFT RATE OF ACCELERATION, AND A TEMPORARY LOSS OF THRUST PROBABLY FROM NO.1 ENGINE. THERE WAS AN INTERVAL OF ABOUT 5 SECONDS BETWEEN RUNNING THROUGH THE WATER AT 126KTS AND THE INITIATION OF ACTION TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF. BY THIS TIME THE ENGINE MALFUNCTION HAD CEASED AND IT WAS PROBABLY ACCELERATING AGAIN TOWARDS FULL THRUST. THE AIRCRAFT WAS ALSO ACCELERATING AGAIN AND ATTAINED A MAXIMUM SPEED OF 135KTS ABOUT 2 SECONDS AFTER THE ACTION TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF WAS TAKEN (ABOUT 132KTS). DECELERATION FROM THE PEAK SPEED OF 135 WAS CONSISTENT WITH BOTH ENGINES OPERATING CORRECTLY IN REVERSE THRUST AND WHEEL BRAKES FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND BEING CORRECTLY USED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>75/2ND/3/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>SUSPECTED POWER LOSS DUE TO AIRCRAFT DECELERATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
PERCEIVED POWERLOSS (STANDING RUNWAY WATER) + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
AT A LATE STAGE IN THE TAKEOFF FROM RUNWAY 28 (WHICH WAS VERY WET AS A RESULT OF RECENT RAIN), THE AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED AN AREA OF STANDING WATER AT V1. THIS RESULTED IN A PERCEIVED "MARKED DECELERATION" AND LEAD THE CAPTAIN TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF. IT COULD NOT BE STOPPED ON THE RUNWAY AND THE PILOT STEERED IT OFF TO ONE SIDE ON TO GRASS. THE PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DETERMINED AS THE PILOTS DECISION TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF ON A WET RUNWAY AT V1. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS WERE THE LOW EFFECTIVE BRAKING COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION AND THE FAILURE OF THE CAPTAIN TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT AND DEPTH OF WATER PRESENT ON THE RUNWAY PRIOR TO TAKEOFF. FDR DATA INDICATED: THE HIGHEST AIRSPEED WAS 127.1 KTS AT 1045 METERS FROM START OF ROLL. THE WET V1 CALCULATION WAS 117 KTS. ESTIMATED THE THROTTLES WERE CLOSED AT 122 KTS. NO.1 & 2 ENGINES SUFFERED POST-ACCIDENT INGESTION; ALL THREE ENGINES PERFORMED UP TO SPECIFICATION ON BENCH TEST. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PRE-CRASH MALFUNCTION. THE CAPTAINS DECISION TO ABANDON TAKEOFF WAS AN INSTANTANEOUS REACTION TO THE SENSATION HE EXPERIENCED - THAT OF A MARKED DECELERATION "COMPATIBLE WITH A LOSS OF ENGINE POWER". HOWEVER, THIS SENSATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE ENGINE GAUGES AND THE FDR INDICATES THAT HAD THE TAKEOFF NOT BEEN ABANDONED, THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE BECOME AIRBORNE NORMALLY. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF PRE-MISHAP TECHNICAL FAILURE.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>76/EWB/3/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE Vr - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

PILOT ABORTED TAKEOFF WHEN NO.2 ENGINE SURGED. AIRCRAFT WAS ROTATING WITH THE NOSE
LANDING GEAR OFF THE RUNWAY WHEN THE DECISION TO ABORT WAS MADE. THE AIRCRAFT WENT OFF
THE END OF THE RUNWAY ABOUT 200 FEET WITH THE MAIN LANDING GEAR REMAINING ON HARD
GROUND AND THE NOSE GEAR IN MUD UP TO THE STEERING CYLINDERS. PASSENGERS WERE REMOVED
FROM THE AIRCRAFT WITH MOBILE STANDS. WEATHER WAS BAD WITH RAIN, SLEET, SNOW, AND WIND.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>*77/EWB/3/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD NOISE, FLASH OF LIGHT, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE V1, (WET RWY) - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ON RWY 28 AT 155KTS (V1=144) THE "ENGINE FAILURE" WARNING LAMP CAME ON AND
THERE WAS A LOUD NOISE. THE CREW ABORTED THE TAKEOFF, ACTIONED THE BRAKES AND REVERSED
ALL ENGINES. THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN ABOUT 200 FEET, LAST PART OF RUNWAY Silted OVER.
TAKEOFF SPEEDS WERE V1=144KTS, VR=152, V2=165KTS. THE STALL WAS DUE TO A TEMPERATURE
SENSOR COLD SHIFT.
## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>77/2ND/3/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO AT Vr - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ROLL CAPTAIN HEARD LOUD BANG AT ROTATION. "ENGINE FAILURE" LIGHTS AND PACK TRIP LIGHTS CAME ON AND CAPTAIN ABORTED TAKEOFF. AIRPLANE CONTINUED ROLLING STRAIGHT AHEAD STOPPING PARTIALLY OFF END OF RUNWAY. LEFT MLG REMAINED ON RUNWAY. RIGHT MLG STOPPED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET OFF END OF RUNWAY AND NLG APPROXIMATELY 60 FEET OFF END. THERE WAS NO REPORTED AIRPLANE DAMAGE OR PERSONNEL INJURY. ENGINE WAS RUNUP TO TAKEOFF POWER TO SIMULATE FULL TIME RUN TO ROTATION. NO.2 ENGINE HAD SEVERE COMPRESSOR STALLS AT 25 SECONDS INTO RUNUP AT WHICH TIME IT SHOOK THE WHOLE AIRPLANE. ALL OTHER ENGINES OPERATED NORMALLY AND THE "ENGINE FAIL" LIGHTS CAME ON AT THE TIME OF RUNUP STALLS. AIRPLANE WAS FERRIED FOR UNSCHEDULED NO.2 ENGINE CHANGE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>78/2ND/2/H</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TOUCH&amp;GO</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>78/EWB/4/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD NOISE, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO AT V1 - OVRRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

TAKEOFF WAS DELAYED 15 MINUTES TO ALLOW BRAKES TO COOL. DURING TAKEOFF RUN AT 145 KTS THE NO.3 ENGINE SURGED. V1=145. ABORTED INITIATED AND REVERSE THRUST WAS OBTAINED ON #1 AND #2 ENGINE. THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO A STOP ABOUT 200 FEET PAST END OF RUNWAY WITH THE LEFT MAIN GEAR COLLAPSED AND SEPARATED. INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT TIRE PIECES STARTING AT 6000 FEET FROM THE START OF ROLL AND THE NO.3 ENGINE SHOWED DAMAGE DUE TO INGESTION OF THE TIRE. PROBABLE CAUSE: PILOT FACTOR DELAY IN APPLYING BRAKES AND REVERSE THRUST AFTER DECISION TO ABORT. TAKEOFF WEIGHT WAS 764,302 LBS. MAX IAS WAS 160KTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>78/EWB/3/I-2</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + RTO AT V1- OVRRUN (ICY RWY)

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ON RUNWAY 22 AN "ENGINE FAIL LIGHT" ILLUMINATED AT V1. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AND THE AIRPLANE OVERRAN THE RUNWAY COMING TO REST ABOUT 100 FEET BEYOND THE RUNWAY END AND JUST TO THE RIGHT OF CENTERLINE. ALTHOUGH BOTH AFT SLIDES WERE DEPLOYED, 59 PAX AND THE CREW DEPLANED NORMALLY THROUGH THE VENTRAL STAIRS. OBSERVATIONS OF THE LAST 200 TO 300 FEET OF RUNWAY SHOWED THAT IT WAS SNOW PACKED OVER PATCHES OF ICE. THERE WERE NO REPORTED INJURIES AND THE ONLY AIRPLANE DAMAGE WAS A BLOWN NO.4 TIRE DUE TO A SEVERE FLAT SPOTTING. THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN STEERED TO THE RIGHT TO AVOID THE APPROACH LIGHTS ALTHOUGH ONE LIGHT WAS STRUCK BY THE NOSE WHEEL. THE NO.2 ENGINE HAD INTERNAL DISTRESS AS EVIDENCED BY METAL IN THE TAILPIPE. WEATHER: WIND 220 AT IS TO 20KTS; TEMP 10 DEG F; CEILING 1200 OVERCAST; VISIBILITY - BLOWING SNOW WITH VIS AT 2.5 MILES ; DAYLIGHT AT 16:00 LOCAL TIME. NO INJURIES WITH MINOR DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT.
## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>*81/2ND/3/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, POWERLOSS + RTO ABOVE Vr - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

AT 1610 EDT A SCHEDULED PAX FLIGHT OVERRAN RUNWAY 9L WHEN THE CAPTAIN AT THE CONTROLS ABORTED THE TAKEOFF. THE ABORT ACTION WAS INITIATED WHEN THE FLIGHT CREW HEARD AN EXPLOSION AND OBSERVED A PARTIAL LOSS OF POWER ON THE NO.2 ENGINE IMMEDIATELY AFTER Vr CALLOUT AND AFTER NOSE GEAR LIFTOFF. V1=129 KTS, V2=144KTS. THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST 421 FEET BEYOND THE END OF THE RUNWAY SURFACE, 215 FEET TO THE LEFT OF THE RUNWAY CENTERLINE IN SOFT RAIN SOAKED GROUND WITH THE AIRCRAFT STRADDLING A SHALLOW DRAINAGE DITCH. THE PAX WERE EVACUATED VIA USE OF THE LEFT SIDE EMERGENCY CHUTES. SIX OF THE PAX SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES DURING THE EVACUATION OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT SUSTAINED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO ITS RIGHT MAIN LANDING GEAR. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE. THIRTY GROUND WITNESSES WERE INTERVIEWED AND MOST OF THEM DESCRIBED A SERIES OF LOUD BOOMING SOUNDS EARLY IN THE TAKEOFF ROLL. ABOUT 1/3 OF THE WITNESSES SAID THAT THE LOUDEST EXPLOSION OCCURRED AT OR NEAR THE TIME THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS ROTATED. TOGW=151,000 LBS. WEATHER AT THE TIME: 700 SCATTERED, ESTIMATED 4,000 BROKEN, 20,000 OVERCAST, VISIBILITY 5 MILES IN LIGHT RAIN, TEMP 79 DEG F, DEW POINT 70 DEG F, WIND 190 AT 15 KTS. ALTIMETER 29.69 INCHES HG. NO.2 ENGINE EXAMINATION: AIR INTAKE DUCT HOUSING INTERIOR DID NOT REVEAL ANY SIGNS OF CORROSION OR FAILED FASTNERS AND ALL VORTEX GENERATORS WERE IN PLACE AND INTACT. NO DAMAGE TO LPC AND FREE TO ROTATE. VISIBLE EXAMINATION OF TURBINE DID NOT REVEAL ANY DAMAGE OR OPERATING DISTRESS AND ALSO FREE TO ROTATE. INTERNAL BORESCOPE DID NOT REVEAL ANY INTERNAL OPERATING DISTRESS OR DISCREPANCIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>*83/EWB/4/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>EGT WARNING (AMBER AND RED)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

EGT WARNING LIGHT + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

Event #: ID Number:  PSM+ICR Category:    Phase of Flight:  Engine Symptom:
38 85/EWB/4/I-1  RTO  TAKEOFF  COMPRESSOR SURGE

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:

Event #: ID Number:  PSM+ICR Category:    Phase of Flight:  Engine Symptom:
40 85/1ST/4/H  RTO  TAKEOFF  FIRE WARNING

Summary of Event:
FIRE WARNING + RTO - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL FOR THE START OF A FERRY FLIGHT, THE CREW RECEIVED A NO.1 ENGINE FIRE WARNING. THE CREW INITIATED AN ABORTED TAKEOFF AND THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN RUNWAY END AND WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE. CREW REPORTEDLY ESCAPED INJURY. NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS AVAILABLE.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

**Summary of Turbofan Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>86/2ND/2/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>86/EWB/2/H</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE (POWERLOSS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO AT Vr - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

IN HEAVY RAIN NEAR V1 (AFTER INITIATION OF ROTATION ACCORDING TO ONE PAX) A FLOCK OF SEAGULLS WAS ENCOUNTERED. THE NO.1 ENGINE INGESTED AT LEAST ONE BIRD AND STALLED/FLAMED-OUT. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AND THE AIRPLANE DEPARTED THE RUNWAY AT A POINT 84 FEET PRIOR TO REACHING 6000 FOOT RUNWAY END. THE AIRPLANE CAME TO REST IN A MARSHY TERRAIN ABOUT 160 FEET PAST DEPARTURE END OF THE RUNWAY AND 96 FEET OFF OF THE RIGHT SIDE. LIGHT SKID MARKS BEGAN 50 FEET PRIOR TO THE POINT OF RUNWAY DEPARTURE.

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE Vr (AFTER LIFTOFF) - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ROLL, JUST AFTER ROTATION, LOUD BANG WAS HEARD ON THE RIGHT HAND ENGINE. AIRCRAFT WAS INITIATING IT'S TAKEOFF WHEN CREW DECIDED TO ABORT. HEAVY LATERAL VIBRATIONS WERE FELT AND HEARD. INSTRUMENTS COULD NOT BE READ BY THE CREW. THE CAPTAIN ASSUMED CONTROL AND BROUGHT THE NOSE BACK DOWN. THE AIRCRAFT WAS AIRBORN FOR ABOUT 4 SECONDS. THE CAPTAIN PULLED BACK THE THROTTLES AND SELECTED REVERSE THRUST. AIRCRAFT OVERRAN THE END OF THE RUNWAY. AIRCRAFT HIT HIGH INTENSITY LIGHT AND OTHER OBSTACLES. ALL LANDING GEAR SEPARATED AND AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST ON BOTH ENGINES AND UNDER CARRIAGE. ALL PAX EXITED USING SLIDES WITH EIGHT MINOR INJURIES. THE FLIGHT CREW REPORTED BIRDS ON THE RUNWAY DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL AND BIRD DEBRIS WAS FOUND IN THE KISS SEAL AREA OF THE PRE-COOLER FAN AIR DUCT ON RH ENG. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AFTER ROTATION. THE RH ENGINE HAD INGESTED A BLACK KITE BIRD. TWO FAN BLADES SUSTAINED TRANSVERSE FRACTURES DUE TO INGESTION OF THIS 2.2 LB BIRD.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>88/2ND/2/I</td>
<td></td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE-I + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
AT ABOUT 100 KTS, A FLOCK OF BIRDS SEEN TO BE OCCUPYING THE CENTER OF THE RUNWAY. AS THE AIRPLANE PASSED THRU THE BIRDS A RAPID DECREASE IN P7 WAS NOTED AND THE CAPTAIN CALLED STOP. CO-PILOT APPLIED REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKES. THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN THE END OF THE RUNWAY BY 161 FEET (49 METERS) INTO A CLEARWAY. DECISION TO ABORT DETERMINED TO BE 147 KTS. CREW FORGOT TO USE "LIFT DUMPERS".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>*88/EWB/4/S</td>
<td></td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
FIRE WARNING + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
FIRST OFFICER ABORTED TAKEOFF AT 170 KTS FOLLOWING #4 ENGINE FIRE WARNING, V1=156KTS. THE FIRST OFFICER REMOVED HIS HANDS FROM THE THROTTLES ABOUT V1. ABOUT 2 SECONDS LATER, NO.4 ENGINE FIRE WARNING ACTIVATED. THE CAPTAIN REACHED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE THROTTLES, A MOVE THE FIRST OFFICER INTERPRETED A SIGN TO ABORT. THE FIRST OFFICER VERY RAPIDLY TOOK HOLD OF THE THROTTLES, PULLING THEM BACK TO THE STOPS, APPLIED BRAKES AND PLACED ALL ENGINES IN REVERSE. GW 778,000 LBS. OVERRAN END OF RUNWAY ABOUT 300 METERS. SEPARATED ALL GEAR. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT - SEPARATED ALL ENGINES, NLG FOLDED INTO REAR OF WHEEL WELL. FUEL TANKS 2,3 AND 7 PUNCTURED. NO FIRE. UNDERSIDE OF FUSELAGE AND ALL T/E FLAPS DAMAGED. TWO TIRES FAILED DUE TO STRIKING RUNWAY LIGHTS, OTHER TIRES SEEM OK. BRAKES LOOK OK. #4 ENGINE HAS TURBINE CASE CRACK NEAR AFT FLANGE WELD. CRACK EXTENDS 9 THROUGH 12 TO 3 O'CLOCK. V1=156, Vr=172, V2=180 KIAS. RUNWAY 28 IS 12,500FT LONG AND HAS A PAVED 1000FT OVERRUN.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>88/MNB/2/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE Vr

Summary of Narrative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>90/1ST/4/H</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE + VISUAL SIGHTING OF BIRDS, SURGES ON NO.2 &amp; 3 ENGINES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO BELOW V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>91/EWB/2/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>SEVERE VIBRATIONS &amp; PERCEIVED POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

TIRE TREAD INGESTION, SEVERE VIBRATION & PERCEIVED POWERLOSS, + RTO ABOVE V1

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ROLL THE PILOT REPORTED SEVERE VIBRATION FROM THE NO.1 ENGINE AND A PERCEIVED POWERLOSS. HE THEN ELECTED TO ABORT. THE DFDR INDICATED THAT THE CALIBRATED AIRSPEED REACHED 172 KTS BEFORE THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED. THE AIRCRAFT OVERRAN THE RUNWAY END AND WAS BROUGHT TO A REST APPROXIMATELY 200 METERS BEYOND THE END OF THE RUNWAY AND 60 METERS TO THE LEFT OF RUNWAY CENTERLINE. THE PILOT USED NOSEWHEEL STEERING TO AVOID OBSTACLES BEYOND THE RUNWAY END LINE. THERE WAS NO FIRE REPORTED PRIOR TO, DURING, OR AFTER THIS EVENT AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE VISIBLE ON THE ENGINE OR AIRCRAFT. THERE WAS NO NON-CONTAINMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT. DUE TO THE TIRE TREAD INGESTION, ALL ENGINE RELATED DAMAGE WAS CONTAINED WITHIN THE ENGINE CASING AND NACELLE. HOWEVER, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE PILOT EXPERIENCED SEVERE VIBRATIONS FROM THE NO.1 ENGINE AND A PERCEIVED POWER LOSS. HE ABORTED THE TAKEOFF BASED ON THE PERCEIVED POWER LOSS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>91/MNB/2/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO AT Vr

**Summary of Narrative:**

THE AIRCRAFT WAS PRESENTLY BEING FERRIED. CREW PERFORMED A TAKEOFF ABORT WHICH WAS INITIATED AT Vr WHEN THE RIGHT ENGINE SURGED THREE TIMES AND THE AIRCRAFT YAWED. AIRCRAFT EXITED OFF RUNWAY 27L AT TURN OFF T2. THIS LOCATION IS APPROXIMATELY 7500 FT FROM THE RUNWAY START. TOTAL LENGTH OF RUNWAY IS 13002 FEET. BORESCOPE INSPECTION OF ENGINE NO.2 REVEALED COMPRESSOR STAGE 2 LINER DISTRESS AND BENT STAGE 2 BLADES.
**Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response**

Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>92/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF ROLL AT 165 KNOTS, ENGINE NO. 1 SURGED WITH A LOUD BANG AND OVERTEMP. A REJECTED TAKEOFF WAS PERFORMED AT 167 KNOTS (ABOVE V1). THE COMPRESSOR SURGE WAS CAUSED BY A BIRDSTRIKE TO THE ENGINE. THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO STOP WITH THE NOSE LANDING GEAR OFF THE RUNWAY ON THE GRASS. ALL OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRE FUSES RELEASED. AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION, MINOR INJURIES REPORTED TO 10 PEOPLE. MAINTENANCE CREW FOUND EVIDENCE OF BIRD REMAINS AT THE 3.0 BLEED VALVE AND PRECOOLER. NO FAN BLADES DAMAGED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>93/EWB/4/I-2</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

**Summary of Narrative:**

### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>93/MWB/3/I</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + CREW THROTTLED GOOD (ALL) ENGINES, CORRECTED AND CONTINUED TAKEOFF

**Summary of Narrative:**
DURING TAKEOFF ROLL, AT, NEAR, OR ABOVE V1 ONE OF THE ENGINES SURGED AND THE FIRST OFFICER (PILOT FLYING) INITIATED AN ABORT BY THROTTLING ALL ENGINES, THE CAPTAIN THEN TOOK CONTROL AND RE-ADVANCE THROTTLES AND CONTINUED THE TAKEOFF. THE INVESTIGATION SHOWED THE NO.3 ENG SURGING, THEN NO.1 AND NO.2 ENGINES BEING COMMANDED TO REDUCED POWER, THEN BEING RETURNED TO TAKEOFF POWER. IT COULD BE THAT THE POWER REDUCTION WAS THE NORMAL POWER RETARDED TO CLIMB POWER. THEN THE THROTTLES FOR NO.1 AND NO.2 APPEAR TO BE READVANCED TO TAKEOFF POWER. THE NO.3 THROTTLE MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BECAUSE EGT EXCEEDED LIMITS FOR LONG DURATION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>95/MWB/2/I-1</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>THRUST REVERSER &quot;REV UNLK&quot; LIGHT ON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**
RTO AT V1, T/R "REV UNLK" LIGHT ON, ABORT ON RUNWAY

**Summary of Narrative:**
TAKEOFF ABORTED AT 150 KTS DUE TO ENGINE NO.1 THRUST REVERSER TRANSIT LIGHT CAME ON. WHEELS DEFLATED. DECISION TO ABORT T/O WAS AT V1. ACTUAL ABORT OCCURRED AFTER V1 DUE TO REACTION TIME.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>95/EWB/3/S</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, SHUDDER, VIBRATIONS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + RTO ABOVE V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
The aircraft was on a scheduled flight. During the takeoff run, just after the aircraft accelerated through 167 knots, the crew heard a loud bang, felt considerable vibration and airframe shudder, and rejected the takeoff. The aircraft could not be stopped on the runway, and the nose gear collapsed as the aircraft rolled through the soft ground off the end of the runway 26. The board determined that the engine on the left wing lost power at a critical point in the takeoff run and that the rejected takeoff was initiated at a point and speed (above V1) where there was insufficient runway remaining to stop the aircraft on the runway. Contributing to this occurrence were the misidentification of the cause of the loud bang and lack of knowledge regarding the characteristics of engine compressor stalls. The compressor stall and loss of power, in the left engine, were the result of the failure of compressor blades in the high pressure compressor section of the left engine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>96/EWB/3/H</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>LOUD BANG (COMPRESSOR SURGE) &amp; POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, VIBRATIONS (COMPRESSOR SURGE) POWERLOSS + RTO ABOVE Vr

Summary of Narrative:
After the airplane commenced the takeoff roll, shortly after it pitched up some 11 degrees and lifted off at a speed of 171 knots, a loud bang was heard with an accompanied powerloss from the No.3 engine. The flight crew initiated an aborted takeoff above Vr. Based on the disassembly inspection of the engine, the damage was determined to be a fracture of a HPT stage 1 blade. The Vref speeds for the flight were calculated as follows: V1 149, Vr 157, V2 171. The airplane re-contacted the runway and departed the end of the runway. The airplane came to rest and caught fire and was destroyed. Airplane information: 211,300 kg with CG at 18.9% MAC (MTW = 251,744 KGS with a CG range 10.6% to 28.4%).
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>96/MWB/4/1</td>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>POWERLOSS + DECELSTALL/SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
POWERLOSS + RTO ABOVE V1

Summary of Narrative:
CREW REJECTED TAKEOFF AT 159 KNOTS DUE TO NO.4 ENGINE POWERLOSS ACCOMPANIED BY A DECEL SURGE. THE POWERLOSS WAS CAUSED BY A LEAKING/OPEN ENGINE CONTROL SENSE LINE. THE AIRPLANE WAS STOPPED ON THE TAXIWAY. THE TOWER INFORMED THE CREW THERE WAS SMOKE COMING FROM THE UNDERSIDE OF THE AIRPLANE. SLIDES R1, 2, and 4, L1,2,4,5, AND UPPER DECK WERE DEPLOYED. ALL PAX AND CREW DEPARTED WITH 2 PAX RECEIVING SERIOUS INJURIES. THERE WAS NO HULL DAMAGE AND 10 OF THE 16 MAIN GEAR TIRES DEFLATED DUE TO FUSE PLUGS BLOWING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>*81/EWB/4/S</td>
<td>RTO - STOP PROCEDURE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE, AIRPLANE SHUDDER, FLASH OF LIGHT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE, EGT LIGHT + RTO 5 KTS BELOW V1 - OVERRUN

Summary of Narrative:
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>70/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLimb</td>
<td>FIRE WARNING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
FIRE WARNING + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENG, RESTARTED ENGINE

Summary of Narrative:
FIRE WARNING ILLUMINATED ON NO.2 ENGINE SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. CREW INADVERTENTLY CLOSED FUEL CUTOFF LEVER FOR NO.1 ENGINE WHICH THEN HAD HIGH EGT. RETURNED NO.1 FUEL CUTOFF TO ON AND ENGINE RETURNED TO NORMAL. ATB JFK WITH NO.2 SHUTDOWN. FOUND 15TH STAGE BLEED DUCT WAS RUPTURED AT THE PRECOOLER.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>72/EWB/4/I-1</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLimb</td>
<td>FIRE WARNING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
FIRE WARNING + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

Summary of Narrative:
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>72/EWB/4/I-2</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

Summary of Narrative:
INITIAL REPORTS ARE THAT NO.1 ENGINE SURGE WITH POWERLOSS DUE TO FAILURE OF A FIRST STAGE TURBINE BLADE. NO.2 ENGINE WAS APPARENTLY SHUTDOWN FOR RISING EGT FROM APPARENT SURGE CONCURRENT WITH NO.1 SURGE AND AIRCRAFT YAW PRODUCED BY SHUTTING DOWN NO.1 ENGINE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE SHUTDOWN OF NO.2 ENGINE WAS INADVERTENT AND/OR NOT NECESSARY. NO.2 ENGINE RESTARTED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>75/EWB/4/I-1</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
SOUND HEARD, POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED BOTH ENGINES

Summary of Narrative:
AT FL370 A SOUND WAS HEARD AND NO.3 ENGINE N1 OBSERVED TO BE DECREASING. WHILE NO.3 ENGINE WAS BEING SHUTDOWN, NO.4 EGT WAS REPORTED AS RISING AND NO.4 SHUTDOWN. AIRPLANE DESCENDED, NO.3 RESTARTED AT FL250, NO.4 RESTARTED AT FL230 AND FLIGHT CONTINUED TO SIN. NOTHING FOUND WRONG. SUSPECT COMPRESSOR DETERIORATION AND CREW INADVERTENTLY SHUTDOWN NO.3-WRONG ENGINE.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>75/EWB/4/I-2</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>HI STAGE BLEED LIGHT, COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD NOISE, RAPID RISE IN EGT + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED BOTH ENGINES

Summary of Narrative:
SEVERAL SECONDS AFTER BEGINNING CRUISE AT FL390, THE HIGH STAGE BLEED BLUE LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON NO.3 ENGINE. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THERE WAS A STRONG STALL. EPR FELL WITH A RAPID RISE IN EGT. ONE OR TWO SECONDS LATER ALL PARAMETERS FELL ON NO.4 ENGINE. RESTART OF BOTH ENGINES WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT FL280. TIME ON TWO ENGINES WAS 3 MINUTES. ENGINES CHECKED OK. NO CAUSE FOUND. SUSPECT CREW ERROR - INADVERTENTLY SHUTDOWN OF NO.4 ENGINE WHEN TRYING TO SHUTDOWN NO.3 OR FUEL MANAGEMENT ERROR (OUT OF SEQUENCE).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>77/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD NOISE, COMPRESSOR SURGE, POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, UNSUCCESSFUL RESTART - TWO-ENGINE LANDING

Summary of Narrative:
DURING CLIMB AT FL280, ENGINES NO.1 AND 2 STALLED AND QUIT RUNNING. BOTH ENGINES SHUTDOWN. ATTEMPTS TO RELIGHT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. RETURNED TO HND AND OVERWEIGHT LANDING MADE. METAL IN CHIP DETECTOR OF NO.2 ENGINE. NO.1 NOTHING FOUND WRONG. SUSPECT NO.1 ENGINE SHUTDOWN INADVERTENTLY.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>78/2ND/3/I-1</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING CLIMB NO.3 ENGINE FLAMEDOUT. SUSPECT GEAR ACCESSORY SHAFT FAILURE. ESSENTIAL POWER SELECTED TO NO.1 ENGINE, BUT UNABLE TO SELECT, SO SWITCHED TO NO.2 ENGINE. NO.1 ENGINE THEN OBSERVED TO SPOOL DOWN AND STOP. APPROXIMATELY 2000 FEET LOST. RESTARTED NO.1 ENGINE AND AIR TURNBACK. NO OTHER INFORMATION. SUSPECT CREW ERROR ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFICULTIES OF NO.3 FLAMEOUT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>78/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

NOISE, POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

AFTER 4:55 HOURS OF FLIGHT NO.4 ENGINE SURGED AND OVERTEMP DUE TO 7TH STAGE HUB BROKE. NO.3 ENGINE INADVERTENTLY SHUTDOWN DURING THE RESTART ATTEMPT ON NO.4 ENGINE. TWO ENGINE TIME 4-7MINUTES. NO.3 RESTARTED AND NO.4 REMAINED SHUTDOWN DURING THE DIVERSION.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>79/EWB/4/I-1</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE AND OVERTEMP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

NOISE, COMPRESSOR SURGE, OVERTEMP + S/D GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED BOTH ENGINES

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING FLIGHT THE NO.2 ENGINE EXPERIENCED SURGE AND OVERTEMP. APPROXIMATELY 40 SECONDS LATER NO.3 ENGINE SPOOL DOWN AND FLAMED OUT. APPROX 8-10 MINUTES SINCE LAST FUEL HEAT AND FUEL TANK TEMP AT -20 DEG C. BOTH ENGINES RESTARTED AT FL280. SINCE NO CAUSE FOUND FOR NO.3 ENGINE, ASSUME NO.2 ENGINE HAD STEADY STATE SURGE DUE TO DETERIORATION AND NO.3 WAS AN INADVERTENT SHUTDOWN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>79/2ND/2/S</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD EXPLOSION, POWERLOSS, DECOMPRESSION + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED ENGINE

**Summary of Narrative:**

### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>80/EWB/3/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>DESCENT</td>
<td>NO RESPONSE TO THROTTLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Summary of Event:

NO THROTTLE RESPONSE, POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED ENGINE

#### Summary of Narrative:

ON DESCENT NO.3 ENGINE WOULD NOT RESPOND TO POWER LEVER. ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN AND RESTARTED BUT STILL NO RESPONSE, SO ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN AGAIN. AS NO.3 ENGINE RAN DOWN A MASTER CAUTION LITE AND ELECTRICAL CUE LIGHT CAME ON FOR NO.2 ENGINE. AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED. CREW NOTED NO.2 HAD FLAMED-OUT. ENGINE RESTARTED AFTER 20 TO 30 SECONDS. A THREE ENGINE LANDING ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER PROBLEM. MECHANICAL PROBLEM DISCUSSED ABOVE FOUND ON NO.3 BUT NO CAUSE FOUND FOR NO.2 ENGINE FLAMEOUT. NO.2 ENGINE INADVERTENTLY SHUTDOWN AS PART OF NO.3 ENGINE PROBLEMS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>81/2ND/2/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Summary of Event:

PERCEIVED BOTH ENGINES FAILED, POWERLOSS (SE) + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENG - RTO

#### Summary of Narrative:

ABORTED TAKEOFF DUE TO CREW REPORTED BOTH ENGINES FAILED. MAINTENANCE FOUND THE LH ENGINE HAD A FAILED FUEL PUMP SHAFT SHEARED. RH ENGINE SHOWED NO DISCREPENCIES SUSPECT INADVERTENT SHUTDOWN BY GRABBING TOO MANY HANDLES.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>81/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>POWERLOSS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

POWERLOSS + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

LOST POWER ON NO.1 ENGINE AND SHUTDOWN NO.2 ENGINE BY MISTAKE. RELIGHT NO.2 ENGINE AND CONTINUED ON FOR A THREE ENGINE LANDING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>82/EWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE (POWERLOSS) + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

**Summary of Turbofan Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>85/MWB/2/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CRUISE</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

NOISE (SHUDDER), VIBRATION, COMPRESSOR SURGE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE, RESTARTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING CRUISE AT FL390 AIRFRAME BEGAN TO SHUDDER. LEFT THROTTLE WAS RETARDED TO IDLE BUT BUFFET (SUSPECT COMPRESSOR STALL) CONTINUED. LEFT ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN BUT BUFFET CONTINUED. MADE A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING. STARTED APU AT FL350. BUFFET STOPPED AS DECENDING THROUGH FL290. STARTED LEFT ENGINE ON DRIFT DOWN. BORESCOPE #1 ENGINE AND NOTHING FOUND WRONG. #2 ENGINE BORESCOPED AND FOUND HPC DAMAGE. CREW SHUTDOWN THE WRONG ENGINE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>*89/MNB/2/H</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE, MODERATE TO SEVERE VIBRATION, BURNING SMELL, AND SOME VISIBLE SMOKE IN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

VIBRATION, SMELL, COMPRESSOR SURGE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE - TOTAL POWERLOSS - FORCED LANDING

**Summary of Narrative:**

### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
#### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>93/EWB/4/I-1</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE - TWO ENGINE LANDING

**Summary of Narrative:**

IT WAS REPORTED FROM THE FLIGHT CREW THAT DURING TAKEOFF AT FL004 THE NO.2 ENGINE SURGED WITH A PEAK EGT OF 870 DEGREES C. AT APPROXIMATELY FL006 THE NO.1 ENGINE SURGED WITH A PEAK EGT OF 889 DEGREES C. BOTH ENGINES WERE SHUTDOWN SOMETIME AFTER 1000 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL (AGL) APPARENTLY (FLT CRW RPRT) DUE TO EGT LIMIT EXCEEDANCE. EGT RED LINE LIMIT IS 670 DEGREES C. THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED THE TAKEOFF AND DUMPED FUEL (66,000 LBS) OVER THE WATER AND RETURNED FOR AN UNEVENTFUL TWO-ENGINE LANDING. FAILURE OF THE INLET SPINNER RESULTED IN 3 UNCONTAINED LOCATIONS (2, 6, 10 O'CLOCK) ON ENG NO.2 WERE EVIDENT IN THE INLET FORWARD OF THE "A" FLANGE. 1 LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT FOD WAS NOTED ON THE LH AIRCONDITIONING BODY FAIRING UNDER THE LH WING.

ENGINE MANUFACTURE INVESTIGATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY STATES: PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE NO.2 ENGINE SURGE IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE LIBERATION OF THE INLET CONE ASSEMBLY. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE NO.1 ENGINE TO EXPLAIN THE SURGE (MAYBE A DECEL SURGE, FROM A THROTTLE CHOP) AND IFSD. NO.2 ENGINE. BORESCOPE INSPECTION CHECK OK, THE ENG WAS FLOWN BACK TO MAIN BASE WHERE THE NO.1 ENGINE WAS CHANGED DUE TO EGT OVERTEMPERATURE. A ENGINE OVERHAUL HOT SECTION WAS PERFORMED WITH NEGATIVE FINDING AND THE ENGINE WAS RE-ASSEMBLED AND RE-INSTALL AND HAS BEEN FLYING PROBLEM FREE SINCE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>93/MNB/2/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>APPROACH</td>
<td>STUCK THROTTLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

ASYMMETRIC THRUST (STUCK THROTTLE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE (BELIEVED IT FLAMED OUT))

**Summary of Narrative:**

EXPERIENCE AN INFLIGHT ENGINE SHUTDOWN NO.2 ENGINE DURING THE FINAL PHASE OF APPROACH AT 696 FEET. INITIAL CREW REPORTS INDICATED THAT ENGINE NO.2 HAD APPARENTLY FLAMED OUT. HOWEVER, THE CREW HAD APPARENTLY MISSED THE RETARDING OF ENGINE NO.2 THROTTLE LEVER BY THE AUTO THROTTLE TO BE THE ENGINE WINDING DOWN AND SO SHUTDOWN THE ENGINE. A SINGLE ENGINE LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

**Summary of Turbofan Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>94/MWB/4/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE; THREE ENGINE LANDING

**Summary of Narrative:**

FLIGHT CREW REPORTED THAT 1 MINUTE AND 50 SECONDS AFTER TAKEOFF THEY HEARD A LOUD BANG AND FELT THE AIRCRAFT SHUDDER. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THREE LOUD BANGS. ENGINE NUMBER 2 WAS SHUTDOWN AND THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO LANDING. ENGINE NO.2 WAS BORESCOPED AND NO PROBLEMS FOUND. FOLLOWING FURTHER REVIEW OF ONBOARD CMC MESSAGES, GROUND CREW DETERMINED ENGINE POSITION THREE (3) S/N 724441 (TT/TC 6998/1392 HAD EXPERIENCED SURGE. FROM DFDR DATA: NO.3 ENGINE SURGED DURING POWER REDUCTION FROM T/O PWR TO CLM PWR SETTING (AUTO/THROTTLE), ~1,800 FT AGL. NO.3 SURGED 3 TIMES THEN RECOVERED, 4 SECONDS AFTER THE THIRD SURGE ON NO.3 THE NO.2 THROTTLE WAS PULLED TO IDLE. 6 SECONDS AFTER NO.3 SURGE THE NO.2 ENGINE HAD A SURGE DETECT FLAG, IE.. ACCEL OR DECEL SURGE CONDITION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>95/MWB/2/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>STUCK THROTTLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

ASYMMETRIC THRUST (STUCK THROTTLE) + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE

**Summary of Narrative:**

Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>96/MNB/2/I</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>APPROACH</td>
<td>STUCK THROTTLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
ASYMMETRIC THRUST (THROTTLE STUCK AT IDLE) + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE

Summary of Narrative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #:</th>
<th>ID Number:</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category:</th>
<th>Phase of Flight:</th>
<th>Engine Symptom:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>85/EWB/4/I-2</td>
<td>SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE-TWO-ENG OUT</td>
<td>CLIMB</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + SHUTDOWN GOOD ENGINE - TWO-ENGINE LANDING

Summary of Narrative:
NO.3 ENGINE STALLED AT FL001 FEET WITH METAL IN THE TAILPIPE. INITIATED ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND AIR TURNBACK TO ALT. THEN THE FUEL FLOW TO NO.4 ENGINE DROPPED BY 2205 PPH. CREW THEN SHUTDOWN NO.4 ENGINE AND DECLARED AN EMERGENCY. THE SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN APPARENTLY OCCURRED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF CREW COORDINATION AND MISUNDERSTANDING AS THE ENGINE PARAMETERS DROPPED BECAUSE THE POWER LEVER HAD BEEN RETARDED. NOTHING WAS FOUND WRONG WITH THE ENGINE UPON INSPECTION.
### Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response

**Summary of Turbofan Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>*93/EWB/2/I</td>
<td>THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + CREW THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE, CORRECTED

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF AT 100 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL (AGL), NO.1 ENGINE COMPRESSOR SURGED. FLIGHT CREW RETARDED NO.2 THROTTLE. CREW CORRECTED NO.2 THROTTLE (RESTORED). CONTINUED TAKEOFF, COMPLETED AN UNEVENTFUL AIR TURNBACK TO THE FIELD. DFDR DATA INDICATES THE FOLLOWING: NO.1 EPR DROPPED FROM TARGET EPR OF 1.48 TO 1.05 DURING THE SURGE FOR A PERIOD OF 2 SECONDS. NO.2 EPR WAS REDUCED BY THE CREW FROM A TARGET EPR OF 1.48 TO 1.28 ERP THEN RESTORED TO 1.46 DURING A 10 SECOND PERIOD. IT APPEARS THAT NO.2 POWER LEVER ANGLE (PLA) WAS RETARED 13 DEGREES FOR A PERIOD OF 6 SECONDS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>*93/MWB/2/I-</td>
<td>THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of Event:**

LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE+THROTTLED (ALL) GOOD ENGINES-Corrected

**Summary of Narrative:**

DURING TAKEOFF AT 500 FEET ABOVE GROUND LEVEL, THE NO.2 ENGINE COMPRESSOR SURGED. THE CREW THROTTLED BOTH ENGINES, THEN RE-ADVANCED THROTTLES. NO.2 ENGINE SURGED AGAIN AND POWER WAS REDUCED ON NO.2 ENGINE. TAKEOFF WAS CONTINUED AND RESULTED IN AN UNEVENTFUL AIR TURNBACK. DFDR ANALYSIS INDICATES THE FOLLOWING: 1.5 SECONDS AFTER THE NO.2 COMPRESSOR SURGED, THE NO.1 & NO.2 THROTTLES WERE REDUCED FROM 80 DEGREES TO 50 DEGREES, THEN RETURNED TO 75 DEGREES OVER A PERIOD OF 4 SECONDS. THEN NO.2 ENGINE COMPRESSOR SURGED AGAIN, THEN NO 2 THROTTLE RETARDED TO LESS THAN 40 DEGREES TLA. N1 ROTOR SPEED ON NO.2 ENGINE DROPPED FROM APPROX 100% TO 62% IN ABOUT 1 SECOND. NO.1 ENGINE ROTOR SPEED WAS COMMANDED FROM 100% TO 84% FOR A PERIOD OF 4 SECONDS. EGT DID NOT EXCEED LIMIT.
Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>94/MWB/2/I-2</td>
<td>THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANG, COMPRESSOR SURGE + CREW THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE, CORRECTED

Summary of Narrative:
AT ROTATION, CREW REPORTED NO.1 ENGINE STALLED. DFDR DATA INDICATES THE RH ENGINE POWER REDUCED FROM APPROX 1.5 TO 1.3 EPR DURING THE TAKEOFF NEAR ROTATION. ANALYSIS OF THE CYCLE DECK SHOWS AT +20 ISA THE RH ENGINE LOST 30% OF COMMANDED THRUST FOR THOSE CONDITIONS (12,621 LBS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>94/MWB/2/I-1</td>
<td>THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of Event:
LOUD BANGS, COMPRESSOR SURGE + CREW THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE

Summary of Narrative:
THE AIRPLANE EXPERIENCED A LEFT ENGINE SURGE JUST AFTER TAKEOFF AT 290 FEET ALT. AFTER THE SURGE, THE CREW RETARDED THE THROTTLE. THE CREW THEN ADVANCED THE THROTTLE, NO FURTHER SURGES AND ALL PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL. WHAT'S NOT STATED IN THE REPORT IS THE FACT THAT THE DFDR DATA INDICATION THE RH ENGINE WAS ALSO RETARDED FROM EPR=1.55 TO EPR=1.21 (48% OF COMMANDED THRUST LOSS) DELTA Fn=21,852 POUNDS. THE SURGED ENGINE EPR REDUCED TO 1.03 THEN RECOVERED. THE CREW ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE FLIGHT. AN EGT EXCEEDANCE WAS RECORDED ON LH ENGINE WITH THE MAX TEMP = 670. EGT EXCEEDANCE.
## Propulsion System Malfunction + Inappropriate Crew Response
### Summary of Turbofan Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event #</th>
<th>ID Number</th>
<th>PSM+ICR Category</th>
<th>Phase of Flight</th>
<th>Engine Symptom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>69/2ND/2/H</td>
<td>THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE - FORCED LANDING</td>
<td>TAKEOFF</td>
<td>COMPRESSOR SURGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Summary of Event:

POWERLOSS (SE)+THROTTLED GOOD ENGINE TO IDLE RESULTING IN FORCED LANDING

### Summary of Narrative:

APPENDIX 5 - Turbofan Training Accidents
## APPENDIX 5 - Turbofan Training Accidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>Cruise</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Substantial Damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While practicing two-engine-out minimum control speed condition, at 119-120 knots (10k below threshold speed), aircraft entered a spin to the right. Successful recovery from spin resulted in loss of no. 4 engine and strut from wing. Aircraft landed successfully with no further incidents. Recovery was accomplished at 5000 feet altitude after a loss of 3000 feet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>Final Approach</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During a training flight, the crew made a no flaps wave-off and continued around the traffic pattern with the gear extended. The crew then simulated a failure of nos 3 and 4 engines and on final approach, the aircraft entered a severe yaw, and crashed into the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>CV880</td>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During takeoff, daylight training flight, #4 engine throttled back prior to takeoff. Airplane nosed up rapidly, stalled. Left wing dropped briefly then rolled to right vertical bank & crashed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>CV880</td>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On takeoff for training #4 throttle pulled to idle as trainee rotated, corrective rudder applied. Lift off ok. Captain then adjusted power on #1&2 slightly, right wing dropped and could not correct stalled. Airplane crashed with no injuries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>DC8</td>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Routine training takeoff simulated #4 engine failure shortly after rotation right wing dropped. Airplane failed to accelerate and slipped inward to ground, cartwheeled & disintegrated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>CV880</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During takeoff for a daylight, VFR training flight, #1 engine was throttled back to simulate engine failure. Pilot trainee lost control and allowed left wing and #1 engine to contact ground in nose-high attitude. Airplane then pitched over abruptly, separating landing gear and all engines. An immediate fuel fire prevented escape.
## Turbofan Training Accidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Substantial Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st touch &amp; go made on ILS. #1 engine throttled back, trainee under the hood, screen removed at 200' and slightly left of centerline. Alignment correction &amp; touched down hard and bounced on nose wheel. Found fuselage buckled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>DC8</td>
<td>Final Approach</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Crashed during simulated 2 engine out landing approach. Killed 13 on ground as well as all aboard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>DC8</td>
<td>Final Approach</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Two engines out (throttle to idle) on 1 side approach being practiced. Right wing dropped sharply before impact. Hit inverted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>DC8</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training flight simulating 2 engines out, allowed airspeed to drop below VMC. 200 ft after touchdown, swerved off runway 3500 feet across grass &amp; ditch. All gear &amp; engines separated. Fire consumed. All escaped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>CV880</td>
<td>Climb</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>While on a training flight, the flight instructor reduced power on No. 4 engine on downwind side just after liftoff. The airplane rose to 125 ft and the right wing dropped, hitting the runway. The airplane slid 3000 ft across open terrain stopping on taxiway and burst into flames. The pilot had not input sufficient rudder to maintain directional control with asymmetric thrust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>Go Around</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>During a training flight, the airplane was making a three engine approach with No. 4 engine in idle. The instructor called for a missed approach at decision height and the go-around was started. At this time a senior captain observer announced the loss of hydraulic system. in accordance with procedures, all hydraulic pumps were turned &quot;off&quot;. Without hydraulic rudder control, directional control could not be maintained with asymmetric thrust. The aircraft rolled to the right, lost altitude, and impacted the ground, right wing low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>Landing</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Substantial Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training flight simulated one engine out full stop landing. Inboards engines reversed ok - came out of reverse at 80 kt. decel with brakes only appeared marginal so again reversed. Crew could not slow for turnoff and overran at 30 mph across ditches. Nose &amp; right MLG &amp; No.3 engine separated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turbofan Training Accidents

1971  707  Takeoff  Region: Asia  Hull Loss

Doing simulated heavy weight takeoff. After V1, engine No.4 was throttled to idle. At the same time, No.3 engine lost power. The airplane started to veer right. Pilot rotated and ventral fin hit runway. The airplane departed the runway at 30 degree angle, and went 4000 ft across rough ground shedding parts. Fire destroyed the airplane but no injuries were reported.

1973  720  Final Approach  Region: USA  Substantial Damage

During type-rating flight check the airplane stayed in traffic pattern for another landing. Power on No. 1 & No.2 engines retarded for 2 engine landing. Airplane hit hard and both LH and RH main bounced and airplane bounced, nose gear collapsed. No fire.

1975  DC9  Landing  Region: Europe  Substantial Damage

A trainee was being checked for captain rating. During a landing rollout in which single engine reversing was being demonstrated, directional control was lost, the airplane ran off the side of the runway, coming to rest 400 meters off the runway in a ditch. The runway was reported to have been wet.

1975  737  Takeoff  Region: S. America  Substantial Damage

The aircraft was engaged in a training flight to checkout 3 new first officers. A department of civil aviation check pilot occupied the RH seat, a company pilot was in the observers seat. The pilot in the LH seat was to expect an engine cut at takeoff. During the takeoff roll the check pilot cut No.1 engine at V1. The pilot in the LH seat rotated the aircraft to the desired attitude (14 degrees) and the gear was raised. The pilot in the center seat noticed the aircraft nose drop to about 6 degrees and advised the pilot in the LH seat to raise the nose. At about this time the check pilot in the RH seat took over the controls as the airplane settled on to the runway with the gear up. the airplane came to rest about 70 meters short of the far end of the runway. Time from V1 to contact with the runway was about 11 seconds. The airplane slid parallel to the runway centerline on the left engine for 1300 feet. At this point the forward fuselage contacted the runway and slid another 1100 feet and at this point the right engine contacted the runway. At this point the airplane veered to the left and came to rest after another 250 ft slide. Late in the veer the LH engine separated and rolled under the wing. A small fire occurred in the left engine but was quickly extinguished.

1977  707  Takeoff  Region: Europe  Hull Loss

During a training flight, a crosswind takeoff, No. 1 engine was retarded by the instructor pilot in the left seat to simulate engine failure just as the airplane became airborne. A large yaw and left roll developed and the instructor pilot took control but was unable to recover. The airplane hit the ground and all engines and landing gear were torn off. Fire destroyed the aircraft, but all aboard evacuated, with one captain trainee suffering a broken heel.
Turbofan Training Accidents

1979  DC9  Takeoff  Region:  USA  Hull Loss

Crashed just after airborne while practicing a takeoff with total loss of the airplane while a student pilot in the LH seat lost control and stalled during a simulated left engine out after V1.

1979  727  Landing  Region:  Africa  Substantial Damage

Airplane on a re-position flight, with apparently some crew training. During approach to land, the airplane was configured with #1 engine intentionally shut down, "A" system hydraulics isolated, & all 3 generators off. Touched down on runway 19 about 3600 ft beyond threshold and rolled off right side of runway into soft dirt, rolled parallel to runway, across intersecting runway 11, & made slow pivot to left, skidding across runway 19. Left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed into their wheel wells. Flaps, lower wing surface and lower fuselage were damaged severely.

1979  707  Takeoff  Region:  Middle East  Hull Loss

On a training flight to upgrade first officers to captain, there was a training captain, a flight engineer, and 4 trainee captains. On takeoff after the third touch and go landing, the airplane rotated normally but then yawed back and forth in a nose high attitude and stalled. The right wing struck the ground and the airplane turned upside down and slid to a stop, on fire. the cockpit voice recorder indicates a possible simulated engine out on takeoff with some error by the trainee pilot and confusion during relinquishing of control.

1979  747  Landing  Region:  USA  Substantial Damage

On landing, all engines went into reverse normally. No.4 EGT went to 820 degrees and throttle lever kicked back and could not be moved. No fire warning, but first officer saw fire on #4 engine. Engine shut down, fuel shutoff valve in wing closed and both fire bottles discharged. Airplane rolled to stop clear of runway on a taxiway, and fire extinguished by ground equipment. No evacuation was conducted. Pylon forward (firewall) bulkhead of No. 4 engine had separated allowing the forward end of the engine to drop, rupturing the main fuel line in the pylon, resulting in fuel fire.

1980  CV880  Takeoff  Region:  S. America  Hull Loss

On a training flight with 3 crew and one instructor, lost engine power on takeoff and crashed.
Turbofan Training Accidents

1983  737  Climb  Region: S. America  Hull Loss

A cargo flight with a crew of 2 was making a takeoff when the airplane failed to gain any significant altitude, and crashed. The crash site was approximately 300 meters beyond the end of the runway about 300-400 meters to the left of the runway centerline, and about 100 feet below runway elevation. Ground marks indicated that the airplane impacted in an inverted attitude and approximately 50 degrees nose down. The voice recorder transcript does not reveal any problem during the takeoff roll, however, just before the call "rotate" there was a distinct sound of engine deceleration and directly after the call "gear up" the landing gear warning horn began sounding. Approximately 1.5 seconds after the warning horn sound, there was a comment, "it is sinking", about 5 seconds later the warning horn stopped. The first officer was in the left seat making the takeoff and was training for being upgraded to captain. Unconfirmed indications are that this was an engine cut on takeoff exercise.

1988  737  Takeoff  Region: Asia  Substantial Damage

During the takeoff, on a daylight training flight on runway 17, the instructor pilot reduced the left engine power to idle at V1 to simulate engine failure. The takeoff was continued but the aircraft yawed and rolled to the left, dragging the left wing tip and fracturing the left wing spars at aileron mid-span. One of the pilots advanced the left engine power but the aircraft veered off the runway. The left engine contacted the ground and the landing gear was damaged. The wind was reported as 70 degrees left crosswind, 20 kts, gusting to 27 kts. No injuries were reported.

1991  707  Inflight  Region: Oceania  Hull Loss

At 5000 ft on a training flight, while demonstrating a two-engine out Vmca maneuver, control was lost and the airplane did a three turn spin/spiral into the sea. According to Boeing analysis of the flight data and voice recorders, the maneuver was entered with power reduced on the No. 1 and 2 engines, rudder boost off, and at about 150 knots. The recommended speed for this maneuver is about 200 knots. The rudder effectiveness was significantly reduced with the boost off, and in combination with the low airspeed and thrust asymmetry, control was lost.

1993  DC9  Landing  Region: USA  Substantial Damage

Apparent confusion during a training flight touch and go. One engine may have been in reverse. Directional control was lost and airplane departed off the runway side. Nosewheel well structure was damaged and left wing top surface skin wrinkled.

1994  737  Takeoff  Region: Asia  Hull Loss

During local training following the fourth or fifth touch-and-go on liftoff the airplane turned to the left and impacted the ground near the international terminal. Debris from the 737 impacted an Aeroflot IL-86 parked at the terminal. Both airplanes were destroyed by impact and post impact fire. Operator reports simulated engine failures (simulated by low thrust) were being practiced during the touch-and-go’s. Four fatalities were from the 737 and the rest from the IL-86 or ground personnel.
## Turbofan Training Accidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>DC8</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>S. America</td>
<td>Hull Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Airplane crashed one minute after takeoff. Captain was conducting F/O training and pulled No. 1 engine back during the takeoff roll. He then pulled No. 2 back after rotation. F/O allowed the airplane nose to get too high and the airplane stalled and went into a flat spin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>RJ-145</td>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Substantial Damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control lost during takeoff at Jefferson county regional airport, Beaumont, Texas, during simulated engine failure on rotation during a crew training flight. The port wing hit the runway, aircraft impacted grass alongside the runway and undercarriage collapsed, damaging both port and starboard wings, the fuselage and fan sections of both engines, which ingested large quantities of mud. Of the four on board, one was seriously injured, two others sustained minor injuries and the fourth escaped unharmed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 6 - Summary of GE/CFMI Commercial Fleet RTO Study
APPENDIX 6 - Summary of GE/CFMI Commercial Fleet RTO Study

CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY* OF RTO ABOVE V1, BY SYMPTOM FOR A HIGH BYPASS TURBOFAN FLEET

*CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
CALCULATED AS # RTOS ABOVE V1 WITH GIVEN PRIMARY SYMPTOM, DIVIDED BY NUMBER OF SYMPTOM OCCURRENCES IN HIGH SPEED PORTION OF TAKEOFF ROLL, NORMAL OPERATION.
Conditional Probability* of RTO above V1
showing 3 year average

Conditional probability calculated as # of propulsion-caused RTOs above V1, divided by # of events in the high speed portion of the takeoff roll with symptoms conducive to rejecting the takeoff.
APPENDIX 7 - Summary of Turboprop PSM+ICR Events
## APPENDIX 7 - Summary of Turboprop PSM+ICR Events

### PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01-Sep-98</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4-Dec-85</td>
<td>Palma de Mallorca, Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airplane</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Hazard Level:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aero Commander 680T</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Overrun

**Summary of Event:** Overran after power loss on takeoff run

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight

**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff

**Flight Phase Detail:** Runway

**Initiating Event Altitude:** 0

**VmC infringed:** N

**Pilot Flying (C/FO):**

**Weather:**

**Runway:**

**Engine/Propeller:** TPE331-43A

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**

**Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted:** Y

**Autofeather/autocoarsen armed:** Y

**No of Engines:** 2

**Engine Position:**

**Engine/Propeller:** Low power

**Propulsion System:**

**Crew:** Aborted takeoff but failed to prevent overrun

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (K):** S, R

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):** N

**Narrative:** Pilot reported low power on one or both engines on TO. Hit small concrete wall after running off runway. Collapsed nose gear & one main gear. Prop strike on both engines & one prop went thru fuselage. 5 on board.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date: 15-Apr-88 Location: Seattle, WA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Dash 8 Event H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second Hazard Level: 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of directional control


Type of Airline Operation (FAR 121) Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb

Initiating Event Altitude

Vmc infringed N

Pilot Flying (C/FO):

Weather Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/ Propeller PW120

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?: Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 2

Engine/ Propeller Power loss, then fire

Propulsion System Gross fuel leakage from improperly fitted HP fuel filter cover

Crew Failed to shut off fuel supply to engine in accordance with fire drill

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff crew noted RH eng power loss. Decided to return for landing. Large fire seen in RH nacelle when gear lowered. After landing, directional control & all braking lost. Aircraft left LH side of runway when power lever set to Flight Idle. Aircraft rolled onto ramp - struck ground equipment & jetways. Destroyed by fire. Cause found to be fuel leak from improperly installed HP fuel filter during overhaul, not discovered following engine installation.
01-Sep-98

Event No: Geographical Region of Europe
Date: 21-Jan-89 Location: Dragoer, Denmark
Airplane Metro II Event H
Airplane Second Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Crashed on approach following engine shutdown. Prop did not feather.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Cruise
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather Day/Icing
Runway
Engine/Propeller TPE331-3U

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/Propeller Low oil pressure & torque. Severe vibration

Propulsion System
Crew Lost control during single engine approach

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: One eng began to lose oil pressure & torque. Aircraft was in icing so elected to keep eng running. Finally shut down eng after severe vibration encountered. Prop did not feather. Crashed on approach short of runway in weather.
01-Sep-98

Event No: Geographical Region of Asia
Date: 18-Apr-97 Location: Tanjungpandan,
Airplane ATP Event HF
Airplane Second Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Engine failure on descent. Failed prop not feathered. Control lost when good engine power increased to

Type of Airline Operation (FAR)
Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Descent
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude 4000
Vmc infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/ Propeller PW126A

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed N
No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 1

Engine/ Propeller

Propulsion System None found. Fire damage precluded complete investigation of engine accessories

Crew Failed to recognise engine failure and to follow engine shutdown drill to feather prop.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: During descent at 4000ft, pilot retarded both power levers to Flight Idle. The LH eng flamed out. RH eng continued to operate normally. LH eng Np continued at 80% due to windmilling. 40 secs later, LH low oil pressure warning light illuminated. Prop still not feathered. Descent continued at 160kIAS. At 800ft, gear & flap selected. Airspeed started to fall. At 140kIAS, LH Np started to droop below 80%, indicating prop blades on FI stop. IAS continued to fall to 100kts. RH power lever then fully advanced & max power applied on RH eng. Likely that control lost at this point & aircraft fell rapidly to ground.
Event No: 003  Geographical Region of N America
Date: 31-May-85  Location: Nashville, TN
Airplane Gulfstream G-159  Event HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff climb
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude 100
Vmc infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather Night/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller Dart 529
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed N
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System No 1 engine failed because HP cock lever was in wrong position

Crew Failed to feather prop before applying max power to remaining engine.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N
Narrative: During initial TO climb LH eng lost power. Crew attempted to continue climbout but after applying water meth pilot lost directional control. A/C banked left, entered descent & impacted between parallel runways. No pre-impact system malfunction found. CVR indicated pre-takeoff checks not properly completed. LH HP cock lever found between Fuel Off & Feather. This shut down engine and disarmed autofeather system.
Event No: 004  Geographical Region of S America
Date: 23-Jun-85  Location: Juara, Brazil
Airplane Embraer 110  Event HF
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Stalled during single engine approach
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Approach
Flight Phase Detail: Finals
Initiating Event Altitude 200
Vmc infringed N
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller PT6A-34
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted N
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed N
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller Crew saw fuel leak from engine
Propulsion System Faulty fuel nozzle damaged turbine hardware, leading to fuel line rupture
Crew Crew shut down engine on approach but stalled short of runway
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Event No: 006  |
Date: 4-Aug-85  |
Airplane: Embraer 110  |
Location: Mocoa, Brazil  |
PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control  |
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff climb  |
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N  |
Phase of Flight: Takeoff  |
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb  |
Initiating Event Altitude: 100  |
Vmc infringed: Y  |
Pilot Flying (C/FO):  |
Weather  |
Runway  |
Engine/ Propeller: PT6A-34  |
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  |
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: N  |
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: N  |
No of Engines: 2  |
Engine Position: 2  |
Propulsion System: Engine exploded  |
Crew  |
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S  |
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N  |
Narrative: On takeoff at V2 LH eng exploded. A/C continued in uncontrolled flight & collided with trees 1600m from runway.
Event No: 007  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 25-Aug-85  Location: Auburn, MN
Airplane: Beech 99  Event: HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Crashed after engine failure on approach
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight: N
Phase of Flight: Approach
Flight Phase Detail: Finals
Initiating Event Altitude: 150
Vmc infringed: N
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway

Engine/Propeller: PT6A-27

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: N
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: N
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position:

Engine/Propeller
Propulsion System: Engine failed

Crew

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: Engine failure on finals, aircraft crashed, post crash fire. All 8 on board killed.
01-Sep-98

Event No: 010  Geographical Region of USSR
Date: 2-Mar-86  Location: Bugulma, Russia
Airplane An 24  Event HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Stalled during single engine approach
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Approach
Flight Phase Detail: 5 miles out
Initiating Event Altitude 1500
Vmc infringed N
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather IMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller AL24A
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System Electrical fault caused prop to feather & eng to stop.

Crew Failed to apply control inputs to counter thrust asymmetry following engine failure.
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N
Narrative: During IMC approach, 1 second after flap extension, No 1 eng stopped & the prop feathered. Crew did not counter asymmetric thrust. Airspeed decreased & A/C stalled & crashed 8 km from runway. Failure of autofeather sensor C/B caused prop to feather & eng to stop.
Event No: 011  Geographical Region of: Asia
Date: 30-Mar-86  Location: Pemba, India
Airplane: An 26  Event: HF
Airplane: First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff climb

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): N
Engine Training Flight: N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Climb
Initiating Event Altitude: 1000
Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO): Weather
Runway

Engine/ Propeller: AL24A
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: ?
No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: Engine/ Propeller Problems
Propulsion System

Crew

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: A/C crashed & burned shortly after TO from Pemba. Crash occurred seconds after crew reported engine problems & that emergency landing would be attempted.
Event No: 013  Geographical Region of: Asia
Date: 15-Dec-86  Location: Lanzhou, China
Airplane  An 24  Event  HF
Airplane  First  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Crashed on approach after engine failure during climb

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135:
Engine Training Flight  N
Phase of Flight:  Climb

Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather  Severe icing
Runway

Engine/ Propeller  AL24A
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed  ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System  Failed

Crew  Lost control during single engine approach

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Severe icing occurred during climb. RH eng failed & prop was feathered. A/C returned for landing but crashed during approach.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No: 016</th>
<th>Geographical Region of: N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date: 18-Feb-87</td>
<td>Location: Quincy, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane: Westwind E18S</td>
<td>Event: HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard Level: 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Stalled and crashed during return to airport shortly after TO.

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight  
**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Initial climb  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** 400  
**Vmc infringed:** Y  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** FO  
**Weather:** Day/VMC  
**Runway**  
**Engine/ Propeller:** PT6A-20  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 1  
**Engine/ Propeller**  
**Propulsion System**  
**Crew**  
**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** S, R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** A/C on initial climb after TO near to gross weight. Witness said engs sounded normal. At 400' A/C seen to pitch up 10 deg then level off & enter LH turn. A/C made another LH turn & pilot reported he was returning to field. Did not state problem. Witness said A/C was in 30 deg LH bank turning toward airport when A/C stalled & descended to ground in vertical nose down attitude. LH prop found feathered. No eng problem found. Previous LH eng problem on 28/1/87 - NFF.
Event No: 019  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 23-Apr-87  Location: Wilmington, NC
Airplane: SA226TC  Event: HF
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after uncontained eng failure on TO

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight: N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude: 150
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO): FO
Weather: Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/Propeller: TPE331-3

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2

Engine/Propeller
Propulsion System: Uncontained 3rd stage turbine failure

Crew: Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: During TO co-pilot said they had lost RH eng. Witnesses heard loud noise & saw flame shoot from RH eng. Saw A/C nose high cross end of runway at 150ft before hitting trees. RH eng had uncontained 3rd stage turbine failure. Some loss of electrical power resulted from eng failure. Pilot should have been able to land back on runway after eng failure.
Event No: 020  
Geographical Region of: Europe

Date: 26-Apr-87  
Location: Blackbushe, UK

Airplane: Cessna 441  
Event: HF

Airplane Second  
Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Crashed on go-around from short finals. Engine failure suspected.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)  
Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Go-around

Flight Phase Detail:

Initiating Event Altitude 200

Vmc infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather

Runway

Engine/ Propeller TPE331-8

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 1

Engine/ Propeller

Propulsion System

Crew Lost control after aborting go-around in favour of immediate landing

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: A/C cleared to land. On short finals reported that he had problem & was going around. Pilot's next call was that he was "going in". Controller saw A/C veer to left & crash. Invest’n found go-around initiated due to unsafe MLG indication. Curved flight path of A/C from go-around to impact & progressive increase in bank angle suggests asymmetric thrust most probable cause.
# Event Details

**Event No:** 023  
**Geographical Region of:** Europe  
**Date:** 12-Sep-87  
**Location:** Southend, UK  
**Airplane:** Beech 200  
**Event:** HF  
**Airplane:** Second  
**Hazard Level:** 4

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control

**Summary of Event:** Loss of control after engine failure during climb

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91):** Engine Training Flight - N

**Phase of Flight:** Climb

**Flight Phase Detail:** 2 miles out

**Initiating Event Altitude:** Vmc infringed

**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C

**Weather:** Night/IMC

**Runway**

**Engine/Propeller:** PT6A-41

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**

- Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted - N
- Autofeather/autocoarsen armed - N

**No of Engines:** 2

**Engine Position:** 1

**Engine/Propeller Propulsion System:** Ruptured diaphragm in LP compressor bleed valve, causing engine instability

**Crew:** Failed to maintain control following engine shutdown after takeoff

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S**

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):** N

**Narrative:**

A/C much lower than usual during initial climb. Witnesses reported uneven engine sounds & loud bang. In-flight fire seen. LH prop found feathered, RH prop rotating at high rpm at fine pitch. LH shutoff valve found closed. Likely that LH eng was shut down. No pre-impact damage to LH eng rotating assy found. Only damage was ruptured diaphragm in the LP compressor bleed valve. Previous similar failures of valve (on other A/C) caused dramatic flux of TQ & ITT requiring eng shutdown.
### Event Data

**Event No:** 029  
**Geographical Region of:** N America  
**Date:** 29-Dec-87  
**Location:** Telluride, Col  
**Airplane:** SA226  
**Event:** S  
**Airplane Second:**  
**Hazard Level:** 2

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of directional control  
**Summary of Event:** Applied asymmetric reverse thrust on landing, departed runway  
**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Landing  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Landing roll  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** 0  
**Vmc infringed:** N  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):**  
**Weather:** Crosswind  
**Runway:** Icy  
**Engine/ Propeller:** TPE331-10  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 2  
**Engine/ Propeller:** No beta light on landing  
**Propulsion System**

**Crew**  
**Applied reverse thrust despite having evidence of prop control malfunction**

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):** N  

**Narrative:** During approach pilot felt downdraughts & crosswind. After touchdown pilot said he did not get RH beta light. Said he applied reverse power on both engs. A/C drifted left, pilot corrected with brakes & nosewheel steering, then applied TO power. A/C veered right, ran off RH side of runway. Witness said A/C landed fast & long. No eng or prop malfunction found. Reverse not recommended on icy runway or when beta light not lit on one eng.
Event No: 032  
Geographical Region of: Europe

Date: 25-Jan-88  
Location: E Midlands, UK

Airplane: Beech King Air  
Event: HF

Airplane: Second  
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Stalled following engine failure on go-around

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91: N

Phase of Flight: Go-around

Flight Phase Detail:

Initiating Event Altitude: 100

Vmc infringed: Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather: IMC

Runway

Engine/Propeller: PT6A-28

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throtled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: N

Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: N

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 2

Engine/Propeller

Propulsion System: Split in RH eng compressor bleed valve diaphragm

Crew: Failed to maintain control during go-around following engine failure

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: A/C on short finals in low visibility ILS approach. Pilot called for go-around. A/C crashed 600m beyond threshold & caught fire killing sole occupant. Checks on engs found small split in RH eng compressor bleed valve diaphragm. Would have caused 300ft.lb torque loss at go-around. Pilot failure to control this condition, plus possible disorientation in poor visibility, caused A/C to stall.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 035  Geographical Region of N America
Date: 25-Mar-88  Location: Decatur, TX
Airplane Jetstream 31  Event H
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: After precautionary shutdown, aircraft could not maintain altitude & made forced landing

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Descent
Flight Phase Detail: 4000ft
Initiating Event Altitude 4000
Vmc infringed N
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather Day/VMC

Runway
Engine/ Propeller TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted N
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed N
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller Torque fluctuations of up to 30%
Propulsion System No actual malfunction found

Crew Failed to verify that torque flux was real (rather than indication fault). Applied wrong shutdown drill.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Narrative: LH torque flux seen during descent, but no yaw noticed. Elected to shut down eng. LH prop did not feather & drag increased until a/c could not maintain altitude. Eng restarted & descent rate increased (even with full power on RH eng). Shut down LH eng again. Descent continued and forced landing made in a field. No eng defects found. LH prop found on start locks. Likely cause was inadvertent use of ground shutdown drill, putting prop on start locks, resulting in high drag.
## PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

**01-Sep-98**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No: 036</th>
<th>Geographical Region of N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date: 24-May-88</td>
<td>Location: Lawton, OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane Embraer 110</td>
<td>Event H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane Second</td>
<td>Hazard Level: 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff climb  
**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Initial climb  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** 100  
**Vmc infringed:** Y  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C  
**Weather:** Day/VMC  
**Runway**  
**Engine/Propeller:** PT6A-34  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 1  
**Engine/Propeller Propulsion System:** Turbine blade separation  

**Crew**  
**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** S  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**  
**Narrative:** LH eng failed during takeoff. A/C yawed sharply left & climbed to 100ft before losing height. Struck ground & ran several hundred feet before coming to rest. Examination of LH eng showed turbine blade separation. Prop had autofeathered.
Event No: 038  
Geographical Region of: S America

Date: 6-Jul-88  
Location: Barranquilla, Colombia

Airplane: CL 44  
Event: HF

Airplane First  
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Crashed after uncontained engine failure on takeoff

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Rotation

Initiating Event Altitude 25

Vmc infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO):

Weather

Runway

Engine/ Propeller Tyne

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?

No of Engines: 4

Engine Position:

Engine/ Propeller

Propulsion System Uncontained failure

Crew Lost control after losing engines #3 & #4.

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S

Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Narrative: Immediately after rotation #4 eng had uncontained failure. Flew circuit & approach but lost control & crashed short of runway. Reported that #3 eng also had to be shut down & RH wing on fire prior to crash.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>043</th>
<th>Geographical Region of: N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>20-Jan-89</td>
<td>Location: Buena Vista, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Convair 580</td>
<td>Event: S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Hazard Level: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM+ICR Category:</td>
<td>Loss of thrust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Event:</td>
<td>One engine was shut down. Crashed after remaining engine failed when pilot inadvertently shut off fuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):</td>
<td>Engine Training Flight N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase of Flight:</td>
<td>Cruise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Phase Detail:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating Event Altitude:</td>
<td>Vmc infringed N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Flying (C/FO):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
<td>Day/VMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine/ Propeller:</td>
<td>Allison 501D13H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Engines:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Position:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine/ Propeller:</td>
<td>Low oil pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propulsion System:</td>
<td>Not confirmed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew:</td>
<td>Shut down good engine during clean-up drills following first engine shutdown. Used wrong restart procedure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge</td>
<td>S, R</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot engaged (Y/N):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative:</td>
<td>During flight, crew shut down RH eng for low oil pressure. Shortly after, LH eng lost power (tank shutoff valve switch was near crossfeed switch). Attempts to restart LH eng failed. With no AC power, pilot could not unfeather RH prop for restart. Emergency landing made on uneven ground. Check of RH eng did not show malfunction. Exam’n of LH eng showed severe turbine heat damage. Pilot set power lever ahead of Flt Idle during LH restart, against Flt Manual caution to set AT Flt Idle.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 044
Geographical Region of N America

Date: 8-Apr-89
Location: Tampa, FL

Airplane: Beech C45H
Event: S

Airplane: First
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of thrust

Summary of Event: Loss of thrust resulting in forced landing immediately after becoming airborne

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91

Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb

Initiating Event Altitude 100

Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather: Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/ Propeller PT6A-20

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 1

Engine/ Propeller

Propulsion System Fuel contamination

Crew Failed to continue takeoff after engine failure

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: LH eng failed after take-off due to fuel contamination. Pilot made forced landing off departure end of runway with RH eng still developing power, as seen from prop strike marks on ground. Post accident fuel analysis showed sand & fibre contamination. Pilot had just refuelled but source of contamination was not determined.
Event No: 048  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 5-Nov-89  Location: Dallas, TX
Airplane: Jetstream 31  Event: S
Airplane  Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Heavy landing

Summary of Event: Heavy landing due to mis-selection of flaps following engine failure en-route.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight: N

Phase of Flight: Climb
Flight Phase Detail: En-route
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed: N

Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway

Engine/Propeller: TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y

No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2

Engine/Propeller: Low oil pressure

Propulsion System: Damaged seal on prop piston allowing oil leakage into bleed air

Crew Selected wrong flap setting for single engine landing at diversion airfield

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: At 6000ft, smoke entered cabin & pax panicked. Shortly after, RH oil pressure fell & RH eng was shut down. During diversion, mis-selection of flaps resulted in hard landing with tailcone hitting ground. Veered off runway. Prop had recent maintenance on dome O-ring. Extensive oil contam in cowl. Piston seal found damaged. Oil entered ECS causing smoke.
### PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

#### 01-Sep-98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>050</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>9-Jan-90</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Jacksonville, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Mu 2B</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Hazard Level:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of thrust  
**Summary of Event:** Forced landing. Engine shut down, unable to apply full power on remaining engine.

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Cruise  
**Flight Phase Detail:**  
**Initiating Event Altitude:**  
**Vmc infringed:** N  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):**  
**Weather:**  
**Runway:**  
**Engine/Propeller:** TPE331-10

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O):**  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:**  
**Engine/Propeller:** Fluctuating torque  
**Propulsion System:** None found  

**Crew:** Failed to confirm engine malfunction before shutting down  
**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** S, R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** In cruise, shut down an eng for fluctuating torque. Unable to get more than 40% torque from remaining eng. Landed in marsh. Investg’n did not find any eng malfunction
Event No: 051  Geographical Region of: N America

Date: 19-Jan-90  Location: Broomfield, CO

Airplane: Mu 2B  Event: S

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Engine malfunction on takeoff roll. Lost control & departed runway.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Takeoff roll

Initiating Event Altitude: 0

Vmc infringed: Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather: Day/IMC, heavy snow showers

Runway: Snow covered

Engine/Propeller: TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y

Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 1

Engine/Propeller: Lost RPM

Crew: Failed to maintain direction control on runway

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S

Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Event No: 052  Geographical Region of N America
Date: 9-Feb-90  Location: Rapid City, SD
Airplane Mu 2B  Event HF
Airplane Second Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91)
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude 100
Vmc infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller TPE331-10
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System Coupling shaft failed in fatigue
Crew Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N
Narrative: Shortly after lift-off, aircraft entered steep nose-up attitude at low IAS. Pilot witness said a/c reached height of approx. 100ft, slowed & entered Vmca roll & crashed inverted, nose down, left of runway. Invest'n showed coupling shaft in LH eng failed thru' fatigue. LH prop had feathered.
Event No: 054  Geographical Region of: Asia
Date: 3-Apr-90  Location: Libuhanraio, Indonesia
Airplane: DHC 6  Event: H
Airplane: First  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: Engine oversped during takeoff, aircraft lost height & hit hill
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed N
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller: PT6A-27
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller: Engine oversped
Propulsion System
Crew: Failed to maintain climb performance following eng failure on takeoff
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N
Narrative: Soon after takeoff, LH eng oversped, aircraft lost height & struck crest of hill, crashing into trees.
Event No: 055      Geographical Region of S America
Date: 18-Apr-90      Location: Contadora Is., Panama
Airplane DHC 6      Event HF
Airplane First      Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb

Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather

Runway

Engine/ Propeller PT6A-27

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y

No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2

Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System

Crew Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S

Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff, RH eng failed & aircraft entered descending right turn which continued until impact with the sea
Event No: 056  Geographical Region of: S America
Date: 10-May-90  Location: Tuxla Gutierrez, Mexico
Airplane  F27  Event: HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: Crashed after engine failure on approach
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Approach
Flight Phase Detail: 4.5km out
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller Dart 522
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed  ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System

Crew Failed to maintain approach flight path after engine failure

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: RH eng failed on approach. Aircraft struck trees and crashed 4.5km from airport
PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

Event No: 057  Geographical Region of Asia
Date: 18-May-90  Location: Manila, Philippines
Airplane Beech 1900  Event HF
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Climb
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller PT6A-65
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position:
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System

Crew Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Crashed & burned in residential area shortly after takeoff, reportedly following an engine failure
Event No: 058  Geographical Region of N America
Date: 23-Aug-90  Location: Houston, TX
Airplane: Gulfstream G-159  Event: HF
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller Dart 529
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1

Crew Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Pax & witnesses said that during takeoff, aircraft yawed both left & right after lift-off. Then veered left & contacted ground LH wing low. Invest'n showed LH eng had partial power loss due to faulty fuel pump. Power loss not enough to trip autofeather. Manual feathering had been started, but blades had not reached full feather before impact.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No: 059</th>
<th>Geographical Region of: N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date: 24-Aug-90</td>
<td>Location: Mattapan, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane PA31</td>
<td>Event HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard Level: 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of height

**Summary of Event:** Crashed on approach following engine shutdown

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** N

**Phase of Flight:** Go-around

**Flight Phase Detail:**

- Initiating Event Altitude: Vmc infringed
- Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
- Weather: Day/IMC

**Runway**

**Engine/Propeller:** PT6A-28

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O):**

- Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: ?
- Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: ?

**No of Engines:** 2

**Engine Position:** 1

**Engine/Propeller Overtorque indication**

**Propulsion System:** Fuel pump drive shaft failure

**Crew**

- Failed to maintain approach flight path after engine failure

**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (K):** S

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:**

Pilot noted LH eng overtorque as aircraft was on ILS approach. Made go-around & started another approach with eng shut down. Unable to maintain height & descended. Crashed into 2 houses 6 miles from airport. Exam of LH eng showed fuel pump drive shaft sheared at plastic coupling. Driveshaft bearings also failed, allowing shaft to move & cause overtorque.
Event No: 060  Geographical Region of N America
Date:  6-Sep-90  Location: Nashville, TN
Airplane  Mu 2B  Event  HF
Airplane  Second  Hazard Level:  5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: Took off with known low power defect on one engine. Failed to climb. Crashed.
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91
Engine Training Flight  N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed  Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO):  C
Weather  Day/VMC 95 deg F
Runway
Engine/ Propeller  TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed  Y
No of Engines:  2
Engine Position:
Engine/ Propeller  Low power
Propulsion System  None found

Crew Took off with known engine defect.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: On previous flight, low power noted in RH eng. RH fuel flow 5 Gal/hr less than left & RH ITT 50 deg less.
Decided to ferry aircraft. Aircraft remained low after takeoff, then rolled right & dropped sharply. Impacted RH wing low 2 miles from end of runway. No pre-impact failure found. Both engs had evidence of rotation at impact. Maintenance not informed of engine problem before flight.
### Event No: 062  
#### Geographical Region of: N America  
#### Date: 29-Nov-90  
#### Location: Des Moines, IA  
#### Airplane: PA31  
#### Event: HF  
#### Airplane First Hazard Level: 5

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Loss of control after engine failure on approach

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight  
**Phase of Flight:** Approach  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Finals  
**Initiating Event Altitude:**  
**Vmc infringed:** Y  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C  
**Weather:** Day/VMC  
**Runway:**

**Engine/ Propeller:** PT6A-35  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** ?  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** ?  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 1  
**Engine/ Propeller Propulsion System:** None found

**Crew:** Failed to feather prop after engine failure  
**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** On final approach, pilot told controller he might have to shut down an eng. Did not declare emergency. On short finals, aircraft rolled left & descended into terrain. Exam showed LH eng was not developing power, although LH prop was not feathered. Evidence that RH was producing high power at impact. No mechanical defect in LH eng or prop found.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>063</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>N America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>17-Dec-90</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Chattanooga, TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Jetstream 31</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Hazard Level:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of directional control  
**Summary of Event:** Landed with one engine stuck at full power. Departed runway  
**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Climb  
**Initiating Event Altitude:**  
**Vmc infringed:**  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C  
**Weather:** Night/VMC  
**Runway:** Dry  
**Engine/ Propeller:** TPE331-10  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:**  
**Engine/ Propeller:** Engine stuck at full power  
**Propulsion System:** Power lever disconnect  
**Crew:** Failed to shut down engine prior to landing  
**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**  
**Narrative:** Power lever disconnected after takeoff, leaving eng stuck at full power. Pilot elected not to shut down eng until after touchdown, upon which directional control was lost. Aircraft left runway & was damaged in outfield.
Event No: 064  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 22-Feb-91  Location: Tulsa, OK
Airplane Mu 2B  Event: HF
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91: Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude: 500
Vmc infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather: Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-10
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarse fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarse armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/ Propeller: None found
Propulsion System
Crew: Failed to apply rudder trim after engine failure

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: Aircraft doing test flight after replacement of both engines. Witnesses said takeoff roll & initial climb appeared normal, but at 500ft aircraft entered right bank until wings were vertical. Nose fell thru’ & aircraft hit ground inverted in steep nose down attitude. Exam showed RH eng shut down & feathered. No evidence of pre-impact failure of either eng or airframe systems. Gear was up & LH spoiler deployed. Rudder trim should have been used to prevent spoiler deployment. Rudder trim found in neutral position. Pilot was not regular line pilot.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>065</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>S Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>18-Apr-91</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Tahiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Do 228</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Hazard Level:</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM+ICR Category:</td>
<td>Loss of thrust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Event:</td>
<td>One engine failed, crew shut down the other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)</td>
<td>Engine Training Flight N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase of Flight:</td>
<td>Cruise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Phase Detail:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating Event Altitude</td>
<td>Vmc infringed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Flying (C/FO):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine/Propeller</td>
<td>TPE331-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autofeather/autocoarsen armed</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No of Engines:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Position:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine/Propeller</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propulsion System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew</td>
<td>Did not correctly identify failed engine. Shut down remaining good engine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge</td>
<td>R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopilot engaged (Y/N)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative:</td>
<td>During flight one eng failed &amp; crew shut down remaining eng by mistake. Made emergency landing with no motive power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Event No: 067  
Geographical Region of: Africa  
Date: 10-Jun-91  
Location: Luanda, Angola  
Airplane: Hercules L100  
Event: HF  
Airplane: First  
Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control  
Summary of Event: Loss of control after engine failure on takeoff

Type of Airline Operation (FAR):  
Engine Training Flight: N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff  
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb

Initiating Event Altitude  
Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO):  
Weather

Runway  
Engine/ Propeller: Allison 501

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: N  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: N

No of Engines: 4  
Engine Position: 1

Crew  
Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R  
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: LH eng reportedly failed shortly after takeoff. Control lost. Aircraft exploded on impact
Event No: 068  Geographical Region of: S America
Date: 7-Oct-91  Location: Moron, Argentina
Airplane: IAI 101  Event: S
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of directional control
Summary of Event: No reverse on one engine during landing. Attempted to take off again. Crashed.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Landing
Flight Phase Detail: Landing roll
Initiating Event Altitude: 0
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller: PT6A-36

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1

Engine/ Propeller: Prop did not apply reverse thrust

Propulsion System
Crew: Failed to cancel reverse thrust when asymmetry experienced on runway. Wrongly decided to take off again
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Aircraft was making touch & go landings & had landed for final touchdown. When reverse thrust applied engine accelerated but prop did not go into reverse. RH eng responded normally. Lost directional control. To avoid veering off runway, aircraft was lifted off but fell violently to ground. Bounced & deviated 1000m from centreline, struck 2 cement posts & hit wire fence.
Event No: 070  Geographical Region of CIS
Date: 9-Feb-92  Location: Guryev, Kazakhstan
Airplane An 24  Event S
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of airspeed
Summary of Event: Attempted single-engine approach after go-around. Landed (very) short of runway

Type of Airline Operation (FAR)
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Descent
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather IMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller AL24A
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeathering/ autocoarsen fitted ?
Autofeathering/ autocoarsen armed ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1

Engine/ Propeller Propulsion System
Crew Failed to maintain airspeed after engine failure

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Go-around flown with LH eng failed. On second approach aircraft lost speed & landed 6km short of runway. Attributed to combination of eng failure, approach in conditions below minima & lack of radar control on final approach.
Event No: 072  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 22-Apr-92  Location: Perris Valley, CA
Airplane  DHC 6  Event  HF
Airplane  First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of thrust
Summary of Event: Engine failure on takeoff. May have shut down wrong engine

Type of Airline Operation (FAR): 135
Engine Training Flight  N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude
VmC infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather: Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/Propeller: PT6A-20

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed  Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/Propeller
Propulsion System: Gross fuel contamination

Crew  May have shut down remaining good engine

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative:
Ground loader fuelled aircraft from fuel truck. Said flight crew did not sump tanks after fuelling. Immediately after takeoff RH eng lost power, RH wing lowered to 90 deg & aircraft hit ground beside runway. Forward fuel tank, which feeds RH eng, found to contain 8 gals mixture of water, emulsifier & bacteria. LH prop control found siezed in feather position. LH prop blades near feather.
01-Sep-98

Event No: 073       Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 16-Jun-92       Location: New Castle, DE
Airplane: Beech 200       Event: HF
Airplane: First       Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135) Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Go-around
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
VmC infringed Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/Propeller PT6A-41
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted N
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed N

No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1

Engine/Propeller
Propulsion System Turbine blade failure

Crew Failed to maintain control during go-around following engine failure

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Witnesses saw aircraft on normal final approach, then saw it drop low and slow, retract the gear & roll to the left into trees. Exam of LH eng showed failure of turbine blade. RH eng OK. Radar confirmed drop in airspeed before hitting trees.
## PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

### Event No: 075

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Airplane</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-Aug-92</td>
<td>Gainesville, GA</td>
<td>Cessna 441</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PSM+ICR Category: Partial loss of thrust

**Summary of Event:** Birdstrike after takeoff. Lost power on one engine. Forced landing

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91):** Engine Training Flight N

**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff

**Flight Phase Detail:** Initial climb

**Initiating Event Altitude:** 50

**Vmc infringed:** N

**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C

**Weather:** Day/VMC

**Runway**

**Engine/ Propeller:** TPE331-8

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**

- Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
- Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y

**No of Engines:** 2

**Engine Position:** 2

**Engine/ Propeller:** Partial power loss

**Propulsion System:** Birdstrike damage to turbine section

**Crew:** Failed to establish single-engine climb configuration (raise gear)

**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** R

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N)**

**Narrative:** Pilot said that after takeoff he hit a flock of birds. Said RH eng immediately had a partial loss of power. Did not try to raise gear or flaps, & aircraft would not maintain altitude. Exam of engs showed rotational scoring of RH turbine housing only.
Event No: 076  
Date: 25-Aug-92  
Location: Hot Springs, AK  
Airplane: SA227  
Event: HF  
PSM+ICR Category: Partial loss of thrust  
Summary of Event: Lost power & crashed shortly after takeoff  
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91): N  
Phase of Flight: Takeoff  
Vmc infringed  
Pilot Flying (C/FO):  
Weather  
Runway  
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-10  
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y  
No of Engines: 2  
Engine Position:  
Crew  
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)  
Narrative: Aircraft reportedly lost power & crashed shortly after taking off on test flight following maintenance
In cruise at 20000ft pilot shut down LH eng & feathered prop due to fluctuating oil pressure. Declared emergency & was executing single-eng approach when he noted his sink rate was high so he retracted the gear & flaps. Aircraft crashed short of runway. Chip detector on LH eng found broken due to brittle condition from manufacture.
Event No: 081  Geographical Region of: CIS
Date: 19-Oct-92  Location: Ust'nem, Russian
Airplane: An 28  Event: HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Aircraft crashed following engine failure on takeoff

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)
Engine Training Flight: N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway

Engine/ Propeller: TVD-10S
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position:
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System

Crew

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Aircraft crashed following engine failure on takeoff
Event No: 082  
Geographical Region of: S America  
Date: 21-Oct-92  
Location: L Caballocha, Peru  
Airplane: DHC 6  
Event: HF  
Airplane: First  
Hazard Level: 5  

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height  
Summary of Event: Engine failure en route. Made forced landing on lake and sank  
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N  
Phase of Flight: Cruise  
Flight Phase Detail:  
Initiating Event Altitude:  
Vmc infringed  
Pilot Flying (C/FO):  
Weather:  
Runway:  
Engine/ Propeller: PT6A-27  
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: ?  
No of Engines: 2  
Engine Position:  
Engine/ Propeller:  
Propulsion System:  

Crew:  
Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  
Autopilot engaged (Y/N):  
Narrative: Whilst en route pilot reported an eng had failed. Aircraft subsequently crashed into lake & sank during attempted forced landing.
## Event No: 083  
### Date: 9-Jan-93  
### Location: Surabaya, Indonesia  
### Airplane: HS 748  
### Event: HF  
### Hazard Level: 5  
### PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control  
### Summary of Event: Crashed during attempted return following engine failure after takeoff  
### Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135)  
- Engine Training Flight: N  
### Phase of Flight: Takeoff  
### Flight Phase Detail:  
- Initiating Event Altitude:  
- Vmc infringed:  
### Pilot Flying (C/FO):  
- Weather: Day/VMC  
### Runway:  
### Engine/Propeller: Dart 552  
### Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  
- Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y  
- Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y  
### No of Engines: 2  
### Engine Position: 2  
### Autopilot engaged (Y/N):  
### Crew  
- Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S  
### Narrative: Shortly after takeoff RH engine believed to have failed. Pilot attempted to return to airport but aircraft crashed into swamp, overturned, broke in two & caught fire.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>084</th>
<th>Geographical Region of:</th>
<th>CIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>16-Jan-93</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Kustanay, Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>An 24</td>
<td>Event:</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Hazard Level:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control

**Summary of Event:** Crashed short following engine failure on approach

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR):**

Engine Training Flight: N

Phase of Flight: Approach

Flight Phase Detail:

| Initiating Event Altitude | 1300 |

Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO):

Weather

Runway

| Engine/ Propeller |

| Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?: |

| Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted | ? |
| Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed | ? |

| No of Engines: |
| Engine Position: |
| Engine/ Propeller |
| Propulsion System |

**Crew**

**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge**

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** On approach at 1300ft agl, 7.5 miles from airfield, LH eng suddenly shut down & prop feathered. Crew did not report problem to ATC & continued approach. On finals at 200ft, began to veer to left. ATC told crew to go around. Captain increased power on RH eng & retracted gear. Aircraft continued to lose height & struck ground in left bank 200yds short & 500yds left of runway. Slid into ramp & hit another aircraft. Visibility was 3000yds, cloud base 1000ft.
### Event No: 090 Geographical Region of: S America

**Date:** 12-May-93  
**Location:** Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

**Airplane:** Embraer 120  
**Event:** S

**Airplane**  
**Second**  
**Hazard Level:** 4

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Landed hot with one engine stuck at full power. Overran.

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):**  
Engine Training Flight N

**Phase of Flight:**  
Approach

**Flight Phase Detail:**  
Finals

**Initiating Event Altitude:** 300

**VmC infringed:** N

**Pilot Flying (C/FO):**

**Weather:** Day/VMC

**Runway**

**Engine/ Propeller:** PW118

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**

**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** N

**No of Engines:** 2

**Engine Position:** 2

**Engine/ Propeller:** Sudden uncommanded power increase on RH engine.

**Propulsion System**

**Crew**  
Failed to establish suitable engine power condition for landing. Should have elected to go around.

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** R

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** During final visual approach, at 300ft power suddenly increased on RH eng. Crew tried to reduce power on both engs. LH responded normally, but RH stayed at high power. Pilot continued approach & touched down 1000ft along runway 30kts higher than normal. Aircraft overran & collided with rocks just beyond end of runway.
Event No: 091  Geographical Region of CIS
Date: 5-Jul-93  Location: Ramenskoye, Russia
Airplane IL 114  Event HF
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Lost power & stalled shortly after takeoff

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91)
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Takeoff roll
Initiating Event Altitude 0
Vmc infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller TV 7-117

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/ Propeller Loss of thrust

Propulsion System

Crew Continued takeoff with evident loss of thrust on one engine
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: During takeoff run, RH eng failed to produce enough thrust & there was also an electrical system fault warning. Takeoff continued but as soon as aircraft became airborne it was seen to roll then pitch up steeply. Stalled and crashed.
**Event No:** 092  
**Geographical Region of:** Europe  
**Date:** 28-Dec-93  
**Location:** Ampuria, Spain  
**Airplane:** Shorts Skyvan  
**Event:** HF  
**Airplane** First  
**Hazard Level:** 4

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Aircraft struck trees & crashed during attempted go-around

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Approach  
**Flight Phase Detail:**  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** Vmc infringed  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C  
**Weather:**  
**Runway:**  
**Engine/ Propeller:** TPE331-2  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** ?  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:**  
**Engine/ Propeller**  
**Propulsion System** Fuel starvation

**Crew**  
**Failed to maintain control during go-around following engine failure**  
**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (K):** R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** Aircraft struck trees & crashed during attempted go-around. At impact, one eng not developing power & was believed to have been shut down earlier in approach. Suspect that eng failed due to lack of fuel.
Event No: 094, Geographical Region: Europe

Date: 25-Feb-94, Location: Uttoxeter, UK

Airplane: Viscount, Event: HF

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height

Summary of Event: Forced landing after multiple engine failures and ice accretion

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91): Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Descent

Flight Phase Detail:

- Initiating Event Altitude: 15000
- Vmc infringed: N
- Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
- Weather: Night/ Severe icing

Runway

Engine/ Propeller: Dart 530

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

- Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
- Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y

No of Engines: 4

Engine Position:

- Engine/ Propeller: Flameout
- Propulsion System: Multiple flameouts due to ice ingestion

Crew: Failed to avoid extreme icing conditions. Failed to follow checklists to relight failed engines.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N): Y

Narrative: On descent at 15000ft, #2 eng failed & prop autofeathered. One minute later, #3 eng started to run down. Attempts to restart both were initially unsuccessful, but eventually #2 restarted. At this point #4 eng failed. Despite further attempts, #3 & 4 never restarted. Aircraft unable to maintain height & latterly yaw control was lost. Aircraft struck ground & broke up. Cause found to be multiple eng failures due to extreme ice encounter. These were compounded by poor crew actions in completing emergency drills, preventing successful recovery of available engine power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>095</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>4-Apr-94</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Amsterdam, Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Saab 340B</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>HF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Hazard Level:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Made approach and go-around with one engine at Flight Idle. Lost control due to asymmetry.

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight  N  
**Phase of Flight:** Climb  
**Flight Phase Detail:**  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** 16500  
**Vmc infringed:** Y  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** C  
**Weather:** Day/VMC  
**Runway:**  
**Engine/ Propeller:** CT7-9B  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed:** N  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 2  
**Engine/ Propeller Low oil pressure warning light**  
**Propulsion System:** No engine defect. Oil pressure switch was faulty, giving erroneous warning.  
**Crew:** Failed to follow checklist regarding oil pressure warning. Failed to apply rudder to counter asymmetric thrust during go-around  
**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** S, R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):** Y  

**Narrative:** During climb thru 16500ft crew saw RH low oil pressure warning light. Elected to return to departure airport on ILS approach with RH eng at Flight Idle. During approach captain applied little or no rudder & aircraft drifted to right of runway. Go-around was executed but during climb no rudder was applied to counter high asymmetric thrust & aircraft rolled to right. Pitch increased, IAS fell & bank angle increased. Captain lost control & aircraft hit ground in 80 deg bank. Cause found to be inadequate use of flight controls during asymmetric go-around, resulting in loss of control. Crew criticized for being unaware of consequences of making an approach with one eng in Flight Idle.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 096  Geographical Region: N America
Date: 18-Jun-94  Location: Fort Frances, Ontario
Airplane: Cessna 441  Event: H
Airplane: Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Birdstrike after takeoff. Lost power on one engine. Lost control & crashed

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Rotation
Initiating Event Altitude: 0
Vmc infringed: Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-8
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller
Propulsion System

Crew: Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: On takeoff just after rotation, bird struck LH eng. LH eng lost power but pilot continued takeoff. Aircraft veered to left, LH wing tip struck ground & aircraft crashed.
Event No: 097

Geographical Region of Asia

Date: 5-Jul-94
Location: Dera Ismail Khan,

Airplane F27
Event H

Airplane First
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height

Summary of Event: Power loss on approach. Go-around attempted but lost height & made forced landing

Type of Airline Operation (FAR)

Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Approach

Flight Phase Detail: Finals

Initiating Event Altitude

Vmc infringed N

Pilot Flying (C/FO):

Weather Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/ Propeller Dart 522

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller Lost power

Propulsion System

Crew Failed to properly configure aircraft for single-engine go-around

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: During finals on visual approach, LH eng began to lose power. At 200ft, elected to go-around. Applied full power to RH eng & retracted flaps & gear. Aircraft continued to lose height & pilot made successful forced landing in paddy field.
Event No: 098
Date: 17-Jul-94
Airplane: Beech 90
PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Lost control on approach with one engine feathered
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Approach
Initiating Event Altitude: Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather: Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller: PT6A-20
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?:
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Propulsion System: Loss of fuel pump drive
Crew:
Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)
Narrative: Aircraft was on approach with LH eng feathered due to loss of fuel pump drive. Lost control 200m short of runway & crashed on beach.
Event No: 099  
Geographical Region of: N America  
Date: 4-Aug-94  
Location: Williamstown, MA  
Airplane: Beech A100  
Event: HF  
Airplane: First  
Hazard Level: 4  

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control  
Summary of Event: Lost control after engine failure on takeoff climb  
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91): Engine Training Flight  
Phase of Flight: Takeoff  
Flight Phase Detail:  
Initiating Event Altitude:  
Vmc infringed:  
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C  
Weather: Day/VMC  
Runway: Dry  
Engine/Propeller: PT6A-28  
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  
Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: ?  
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: ?  
No of Engines: 2  
Engine Position: 1  
Automated/Propeller: None found  

Crew: Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff  

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (S, R): S, R  
Auto/Pilot engaged (Y/N):  

Narrative: Aircraft had had maintenance for slow acceleration on RH eng. LH & RH fuel controls swapped over. On subsequent takeoff, witnesses reported aircraft was slow and low. LH prop blades seen nearly stopped. Aircraft turned left & LH wing tip hit ground. Complete disassembly of both engines revealed no defects. LH prop blades found at feather at impact.
Event No: 100  Geographical Region of S America
Date: 2-Sep-94  Location: Fortaleza, Brazil
Airplane Embraer 110  Event S
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Stalled onto runway during go-around with one engine at idle power
Type of Airline Operation (FAR
Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller PT6A-27
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller LH engine power dropped to idle
Propulsion System Engine control linkage to fuel control disconnected

Crew Failed to feather prop of failed engine

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: After takeoff, LH eng power dropped to idle. Turned back. During final approach with gear/flaps down, LH eng at idle, pilot lost runway alignment & attempted go-around. Gear selected up & full power applied to RH eng. Aircraft did not react & stalled. Found ball end fitting of fuel control linkage disconnected. Nut & washer found in cowling. Cotter pin not found.
Event No: 101  
Geographical Region of: N America  
Date: 13-Dec-94  
Location: Raleigh-Durham, NC  
Airplane: Jetstream 32  
Event: HF  
Airplane: Second  
Hazard Level: 5  

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control  
Summary of Event: Stalled during attempted go-around with one engine at Flight Idle  
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight  
Phase of Flight: Approach  
Flight Phase Detail:  
Initiating Event Altitude: 2100  
Vmc infringed: N  
Pilot Flying (C/FO): C  
Weather: Night/IMC  
Runway  
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-12  
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y  
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y  
No of Engines: 2  
Engine Position: 1  
Engine/ Propeller: Ignition light illuminated  
Propulsion System: None. Engine was functioning properly at all times up to impact.  

Crew: Failed to follow drills for engine failure identification, go-around & stall recovery.  
Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R  
Autopilot engaged (Y/N):  

Narrative: Aircraft was on ILS approach. At 2100ft captain noticed an ignition light had come on. Concluded that LH eng had flamed out, but did not follow emergency procedures for eng failure. Elected to carry out missed approach. Called for max power on RH eng. Aircraft turned to left. LH eng was at Flight Idle. IAS dropped & stall warning horns sounded. FO told captain to lower nose. Soon after, descent rate increased dramatically. Captain lost control & aircraft crashed 4 miles southwest of runway. Probable causes were captain's improper assumption that an engine had failed, and captain's subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single-engine approach & go-around, & stall recovery.
**Event No:** 102  
**Date:** 20-Jan-95  
**Geographical Region of:** CIS  
**Location:** Krasnoyask, Russia  
**Airplane:** Let L-410  
**Event:** HF  
**Hazard Level:** 4  

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Lost control after engine failure on takeoff climb  

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR):** Engine Training Flight N  
**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Initial climb  

**Initiating Event Altitude:**  

**Vmc infringed**  

**Pilot Flying (C/FO):**  
**Weather:** Night/VMC  
**Runway**  

**Engine/ Propeller:** M 601  

**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:**  

**Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?**  
**Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?**  

**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:** 2  
**Engine/ Propeller**  

**Propulsion System:** Fuel contamination ?  

**Crew**  
**Failed to maintain control following eng failure on takeoff**  

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge** R  

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**  

**Narrative:** Shortly after takeoff in darkness but normal weather, aircraft began to veer to right. Control not regained & aircraft struck trees 1000m beyond end of runway & 450m to right. On impact, RH eng was not developing power & RH prop was feathered. Aircraft believed to be 440 lb above MTOW. Possibility of fuel contamination.
Event No: 105  
Geographical Region of: N America  
Date: 13-May-95  
Location: Boise, ID  
Airplane: Hercules C130  
Event: HF  
Airplane: First  
Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Crashed after takeoff following reported #2 engine fire

Type of Airline Operation (FAR): Engine Training Flight  
N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb

Initiating Event Altitude

Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO):

Weather

Runway

Engine/Propeller: T56

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted  
N

Autofeather/autocoarsen armed  
N

No of Engines: 4

Engine Position: 2

Engine/Propeller

Propulsion System: Engine fire

Crew: Failed to maintain control following eng fire on takeoff

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff pilot declared emergency & reported fire in #2 eng. Shortly after, contact lost. Witnesses reported seeing aircraft go out of control & "nose over".
Event No: 107  Geographical Region of: Asia
Date: 3-Oct-95  Location: Bakangan-Tapak Tuan,
Airplane CASA 212-100  Event: HF
Airplane First  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: Unable to maintain height after engine failure en-route. Crashed into trees.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Cruise
Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller TPE331-5
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller Loss of oil pressure
Propulsion System

Crew

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: About 30 min after takeoff crew reported they had shut down LH eng due to loss of oil pressure & were unable to maintain height. Continued to make calls until 500ft agl. Just before impact with tree tops pilot shut down RH eng. Aircraft was close to max weight
### Event No: 111

**Geographical Region of Operation:** N America  
**Date:** 19-Jan-96  
**Location:** West Columbia, SC

**Airplane:** Mu 2B  
**Event:** H  
**Hazard Level:** 4

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control

**Summary of Event:** Lost control on approach after engine shutdown during flight

**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91):** Engine Training Flight  
**Phase of Flight:** Cruise  
**Flight Phase Detail:**

- **Initiating Event Altitude:** Vmc infringed
- **Pilot Flying (C/FO):** Weather Day/VMC
- **Runway:**
- **Engine/Propeller:** TPE331-10
- **Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**
  - Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y
  - Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y
  - No of Engines: 2  
  - Engine/Propeller: Would not restart. No fuel or ignition  
  - Propulsion System: Fuel shutoff valve found closed

**Crew:** Failed to use proper engine restart drill.

**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (K):** R

**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**

**Narrative:** On maintenance test flight pilot performed NTS check on LH eng. Two attempts to restart LH eng unsuccessful. Each time prop came out of feather & started to windmill but there was no fuel or ignition. Aircraft returned to land. On short finals witness saw aircraft pitch up then down, then heard sound of power increase. Aircraft rolled to left, pitched nose down & impacted ground. Exam of LH eng found no sign of pre-impact failure or malfunction. LH eng fuel shutoff valve found in closed position.
Event No: 112  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 16-May-96  Location: Houston, TX
Airplane: Mu 2B  Event: S
Airplane: Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91): Engine Training Flight N
Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail:
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C
Weather: Day/VMC

Runway
Engine/Propeller: TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/autocoarsen armed: Y

No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/Propeller: Fluctuating torque

Propulsion System
Crew: Failed to follow single engine flying procedures

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Pilot reported that after takeoff aircraft yawed to left & LH indicated torque was fluctuating. Shut down & feathered LH eng & returned to airport. At 115kts, 20 deg flap, pilot claimed he could not climb. Required configuration is 140kts, 5 deg flap. Approached runway at 90 degrees then made 90 deg turn to align. Delayed gear extension to reach runway. Landed before gear fully down. Gear collapsed & slid off runway.
Event No: 113  
Geographical Region of: N America

Date: 20-Jul-96  
Location: Scottsdale, AZ

Airplane: Mu 2B  
Event: H

Airplane Second  
Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height


Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91: Engine Training Flight N

Phase of Flight: Takeoff

Flight Phase Detail: Rotation

Initiating Event Altitude: 50

Vmc infringed: N

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather: Day/VMC

Runway: Dry

Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-10

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position: 2

Engine/ Propeller Propulsion System: Uncontained rotor failure

Crew: Failed to follow single engine flying procedures

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: Just after lift-off, RH eng had uncontained failure as gear was retracting. Aircraft would not climb & pilot elected for forced landing. Aircraft destroyed by fire.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No:  114  Geographical Region of  Asia
Date:  7-Dec-96  Location:  Banjarmasin, Indonesia
Airplane  CASA 212  Event  HF
Airplane  First  Hazard Level:  5

PSM+ICR Category:  Loss of control
Summary of Event:  Engine fire shortly after takeoff. Lost control and crashed.
Type of Airline Operation (FAR)
Engine Training Flight  N
Phase of Flight:  Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail:  Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway
Engine/ Propeller  TPE331-5
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed  Y
No of Engines:  2
Engine Position:
Engine/ Propeller  Engine fire
Propulsion System
Crew  Failed to follow fire drill and fly the aircraft
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative:  Crew reported engine fire shortly after takeoff. Witnesses on ground saw fire while aircraft was still airborne. Aircraft crashed into factory.
APPENDIX 8 - Summary of Turboprop Training Events
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No:</th>
<th>Geographical Region of</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Do-228</td>
<td>Event H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>Second Hazard Level:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of thrust  
**Summary of Event:** Crashed after instructor failed one engine and student shut down the other on training flight  
**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91):** Engine Training Flight Y  
**Phase of Flight:** Takeoff  
**Flight Phase Detail:** Initial climb  
**Initiating Event Altitude:** Vmc infringed N  
**Pilot Flying (C/FO):** FO  
**Weather:** Day/VMC  
**Runway:**  
**Engine/Propeller:** TPE331-5  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen fitted:** Y  
**Autofeather/autocoarsen armed:** Y  
**No of Engines:** 2  
**Engine Position:**  
**Engine/Propeller:**  
**Propulsion System:**  
**Crew:** Did not correctly identify failed engine. Shut down remaining good engine.  
**Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge (K):** R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):**  
**Narrative:** Training instructor failed an engine at low altitude. Student shut down good engine.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Training Event Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 018  
Geographical Region of:  
N America

Date: 8-Apr-87  
Location:  
Travis AFB, CA

Airplane: Hercules L100  
Event:  
HF

Airplane: First  
Hazard Level: 5

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control

Summary of Event: Loss of control after 2 engs failed to respond during go-around.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR)

Engine Training Flight: Y

Phase of Flight: Go-around

Flight Phase Detail:

Initiating Event Altitude

Vmc infringed: Y

Pilot Flying (C/FO): C

Weather: Day/VMC

Runway

Engine/ Propeller: Allison 501-D22A

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: N

Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: N

No of Engines: 4

Engine Position:

Engine/ Propeller: Engs failed to respond when throttles advanced

Propulsion System: Bleed valves contaminated with oil/tar

Crew: Failed to maintain control following eng failures on go-around

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative:

A/C crashed during go-around after baulked landing. Nos. 1 & 2 engs failed to respond when throttles advanced. Both engs decelerated & airspeed decreased during go-around. Flaps were retracted causing reduction in hydraulic pressure. Instructor could not maintain Vmc & lost control. A/C destroyed by fire. Heavy oil & tar residues found on bleed valves & No. 1 & 2 compressors, limiting eng response to throttle movement. Recent oil leak marks found.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Training Event Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 024  Geographical Region of N America
Date: 24-Sep-87  Location: Twin Falls, ID
Airplane SA227AC  Event H
Airplane Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Simulated V1 cut, unable to gain height. Flaps mis-set.

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135
Engine Training Flight Y

Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Initial climb
Initiating Event Altitude 25
VmC infringed Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO): FO
Weather Night/VMC

Runway
Engine/Propeller TPE331-11

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?
Autofeather/autocorssen fitted N
Autofeather/autocorssen armed N
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2

Engine/Propeller
Propulsion System Simulated engine cut by check pilot.

Crew Failed to maintain control following (simulated) eng failure on TO, compounded by mis-set flaps.

Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge S, R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N) N

Narrative: Check pilot conducting captain proficiency on another company pilot under night conds. Pilot in command started TO, check pilot simulated eng cut after TO. PIC unable to accel to V2, climb or maintain directional control. A/C levelled off, lost IAS & drifted right. Check pilot failed to take control or terminate eng cut simulation. A/C hit ILS tower, lost RH wing tip & lost control. Hit ground & slid to stop. Flaps & flap handle found at 1/2 pos’n instead of 1/4.
# PSM-ICR Turboprop Training Event Data, Jan 1985 - present

**Event No:** 034  
**Geographical Region of:** N America  
**Date:** 9-Feb-88  
**Location:** Springfield, Ohio  
**Airplane:** Jetstream 31  
**Event:** HF  
**Airplane**  
**Second**  
**Hazard Level:** 4

**PSM+ICR Category:** Loss of control  
**Summary of Event:** Aircraft pitched up, rolled & crashed on go-around  
**Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135):** Engine Training Flight  
**Phase of Flight:** Go-around  
**Flight Phase Detail:**  
- **Initiating Event Altitude:** 150  
- **Vmc infringed:** Y  
- **Pilot Flying (C/FO):** FO  
- **Weather:**  
- **Runway:**  
- **Engine/Propeller:** TPE331-10  
**Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O)?:**  
- **Autofeather/autocoresen fitted:** N  
- **Autofeather/autocoresen armed:** N  
- **No of Engines:** 2  
- **Engine Position:** 2  
- **Propulsion System:** Simulated engine cut by check pilot.  
**Crew**  
- **Failed to maintain control following (simulated) eng failure on go-around, compounded by mis-set flaps.**  
**Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge:** S, R  
**Autopilot engaged (Y/N):** N  
**Narrative:**  
Training flight. A/C on finals, but started to climb & began to oscillate in yaw & roll. Pitched up, rolled right & entered vertical descent. Rolled thru’ 270 deg & hit ground steep nose down. RH eng found operating at reduced power. LH at full power. Flaps found retracted contrary to AFM. No evidence of system malfunction. Training pilot known to be harsh towards students, esp. during one-eng go-arounds.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Training Event Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 046  Geographical Region of: S America
Date:  3-Jul-89  Location: Manaus, Brazil
Airplane  Embraer 110  Event  H
Airplane  Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of thrust
Summary of Event: Forced landing after instructor failed one engine and student shut down the other on training flight
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91
Engine Training Flight  Y
Phase of Flight: Go-around
Flight Phase Detail: Climb
Initiating Event Altitude  1500
Vmc infringed  N
Pilot Flying (C/FO): FO
Weather  Day/VMC
Runway
Engine/ Propeller  PT6A-34
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted  Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed  Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller  Second engine flamed out after first engine was failed

Propulsion System
Crew  Did not correctly identify failed engine. Shut down remaining good engine.

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge  R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: After missed approach, instructor cut LH eng at 1500ft. Few seconds later RH eng flamed out. Attempts to restore power unsuccessful, & pilot made forced landing with gear up on a road 1 mile from threshold. Aircraft caught fire. Wrong engine secured?
Event No: 080  Geographical Region of: Europe
Date: 6-Oct-92  Location: Prestwick, Scotland
Airplane: Jetstream 32  Event: HF
Airplane: Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of control
Summary of Event: Aircraft rolled & crashed following simulated V1 cut

Type of Airline Operation (FAR 91): Engine Training Flight
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Rotation
Initiating Event Altitude: 0
Vmc infringed: Y
Pilot Flying (C/FO): FO
Weather: Day/VMC
Runway: Dry
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-12

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 2
Engine/ Propeller: Retarded to Flight Idle
Propulsion System: None

Crew: Focussed on engine identification, failed to raise gear & maintain attitude

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N):  

Narrative: During takeoff run captain simulated an eng failure by retarding RH power lever to Flight Idle once control had been passed to first officer. Aircraft rotated & climbed slightly steeper than usual with gear still down. Approx 10 secs after rotation FO reminded to raise gear. Captain made Up selection on FO's command 2 secs later. Gear warning & stall warning horns sounded simultaneously. Two secs later captain took controls & restored power to retarded eng but aircraft continued to roll right & struck ground inverted. No evidence of aircraft malfunction or medical factors.
Event No: 087  Geographical Region of: N America
Date: 19-Apr-93  Location: Merced, CA
Airplane: Jetstream 31  Event: H
Airplane: Second  Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of height
Summary of Event: Crashed following simulated engine failure after takeoff
Type of Airline Operation (FAR 135): Engine Training Flight Y
Phase of Flight: Takeoff
Flight Phase Detail: Rotation
Initiating Event Altitude: 0
Vmc infringed
Pilot Flying (C/FO): FO
Weather: Night/VMC
Runway: Dry
Engine/ Propeller: TPE331-10
Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:
Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted: Y
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed: Y
No of Engines: 2
Engine Position: 1
Engine/ Propeller: Retarded power lever to near Flight Idle
Propulsion System: None

Crew: Failed to maintain climb performance following eng failure on takeoff
Crew Error Class’n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge: R
Autopilot engaged (Y/N): N

Narrative: Shortly after becoming airborne, check pilot retarded LH power lever approx to Flight Idle to simulate engine failure. Aircraft heading drifted left by 70 degrees. Pilot then returned aircraft to correct heading. VSI showed climb rate of 500fpm. Shortly after, aircraft levelled then began to descend at 500fpm. IAS increased from 120 to 130kts. Aircraft struck ground 1/4 mile from runway. Both engines later found to be operating at point of impact.
PSM-ICR Turboprop Training Event Data, Jan 1985 - present

01-Sep-98

Event No: 108 Geographical Region of CIS
Date: 1-Nov-95 Location: Chimkent, Kazakhstan
Airplane An 24 Event S
Airplane First Hazard Level: 4

PSM+ICR Category: Loss of thrust
Summary of Event: Forced landing after instructor failed one engine and student shut down the other on training flight

Type of Airline Operation (FAR)
Engine Training Flight Y

Phase of Flight: Approach
Flight Phase Detail: Finals
Initiating Event Altitude
Vmc infringed

Pilot Flying (C/FO):
Weather
Runway

Engine/ Propeller AL24

Engine Shut Down (SD), Throttled (T), Failed (F) or Other (O) ?:

Autofeather/ autocoarsen fitted ?
Autofeather/ autocoarsen armed ?

No of Engines: 2

Engine Position:
Engine/ Propeller Shut down
Propulsion System

Crew Did not correctly identify failed engine. Shut down remaining good engine.

Crew Error Class'n - Skill (S), Rule (R) or Knowledge R

Autopilot engaged (Y/N)

Narrative: During crew training, on final approach instructor shut down LH eng to simulate eng failure. IAS decreased & instructor called for power to be increased on RH eng. Student attempted to increase power on LH eng & shut down remaining eng. Aircraft touched down hard 1100m short of runway.
APPENDIX 9 - Fleet Survey of Engine Failure Indications - Turbofans
Airbus Alert Inhibit Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ELEC PWR</td>
<td>1st ENG STARTED</td>
<td>2nd ENG TO_PWR</td>
<td>80 KTS</td>
<td>LIFT OFF</td>
<td>1500 FT</td>
<td>800 FT</td>
<td>TOUCHDOWN</td>
<td>80 KTS</td>
<td>LAST ENG SHUT DN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ENGINE FAILURE INDICATIONS FOR AIRBUS FLEET

(3 = Master Warning, 2 = Master Caution, 1 = No Master Caution, No = Nothing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WARNING CAUTIONS MESSAGE / INHIBITS</th>
<th>A300 / A310</th>
<th>A319 / A320 / A321</th>
<th>A340</th>
<th>A330</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB IDLE</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SURGE-BANG</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,4,5,7,8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sub Idle</td>
<td>Sub Idle</td>
<td>High Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENGINE FAIL</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RPM OVER RED LINE</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EGT OVER RED LINE</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVM HI</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENGINE THRUST</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N₁ Lim Validation only</td>
<td>N₁ Lim validation only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVERSE THRUST</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(uncommanded)</td>
<td>(uncommanded)</td>
<td>(uncommanded)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,5,8,9</td>
<td>4,5,8,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVERSE UNLOCK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REVERSE ARMED</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TIRE FAIL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Rotation through 5° pitch angle used for default if CAS not available: 80 kts if V1 not available.
2. Resettable Landing Gear Warning inhibit ends at 800' or 140 sec, whichever occurs first.
3. Inhibit option: to 800' or 30 sec after rotation.
4. Basic: any on-ground engine start to 30 min after liftoff or ESI. Option from takeoff thrust to 800' or 30 sec after rotation or groundspeed < 75 knots.
5. CABIN ALERT message not inhibited
6. Engine Start Inhibit applies to all Cautions and Advisories except eng start critical msgs.
7. Inhibit option to 800' or 30 sec after rotation or groundspeed < 75 knots.

Note TCAS advisories are inhibited from on-ground to 1000' for all resolution type and traffic advisory voice alerts, to 1200' for "decelerate" type and 1450' for "increase descent" types.
9. Except for AUTOPILOT, NO AUTOLAND, SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED, AUTOTHROTTLE DISC.
10. Except Cabin Alert.
11. Touch & Go condition only.
12. Takeoff/Go Around Inhibit. - Inhibit enabled when takeoff/go around thrust selected, 5 (or 10) minute timer started when rotor or EGT limit is exceeded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning/Cautions</th>
<th>B747-400</th>
<th>B777</th>
<th>B747</th>
<th>B767/757</th>
<th>B737</th>
<th>B707</th>
<th>B727</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Idle</strong></td>
<td>ENG X FAIL Caution message a-&gt;e, k-&gt;l</td>
<td>ENG FAIL L/R Caution message</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>767 L/R ENG FAIL Optional Caution message a-&gt;e, k-&gt;l 757 no message</td>
<td>6/7/800 ENG FAIL (Eng Display) 1/2/3/4/500 no message</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surge</strong></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engine Fail</strong></td>
<td>Time Critical ENG FAIL (PFD) a,b, e-&gt;l Thrust Shortfall ENG THRUST Caution message a-&gt; d, k-&gt;l</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>-100_1-200_2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine is producing less the commanded thrust</td>
<td>Limited by overspeed governor. ENG X RPM LIMIT. Advisory Message If redline exceeded, red gage on display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>Limited by overspeed governor. ENG RPM LIMITED L/R Advisory Message If redline exceeded, red gage on display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>(N1 TACH) round dial: indicators have a “max indications” pointer. Vertical scale: illuminates amber light on the indicator.</td>
<td>Limited by overspeed governor. For 767, L/R ENG RPM LIM Advisory Message If redline exceeded, red gage on display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>3/4/5/6/7/8 Limited by overspeed governor If redline exceeded, red gage on display 6/7/800 b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l 1/200 no overspeed governor</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM over red line</td>
<td>Limited by overspeed governor. ENG X RPM LIMIT. Advisory Message If redline exceeded, red gage on display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>Limited by overspeed governor. ENG RPM LIMITED L/R Advisory Message If redline exceeded, red gage on display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>Round dial EGT: indicators display an amber light. Vertical Scale indicators have amber and red, 2 mode of over temperature.</td>
<td>Red Gage on Display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>6/7/800 Red Gage on Display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT over red line</td>
<td>Red Gage on Display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>Red Gage on Display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>Round dial EGT: indicators display an amber light. Vertical Scale indicators have amber and red, 2 mode of over temperature.</td>
<td>Red Gage on Display b-&gt;g, h+, i-&gt;l</td>
<td>3/4/500 Red light</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADEC fault</td>
<td>ENG X CONTROL Advisory Message</td>
<td>ENG CONTROL Advisory Message</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>767 L/R ENG CONTROL Advisory Message</td>
<td>6/7/800 ENG CONTROL (Light) d-&gt;k+ 1/2/3/4/500 N/A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADEC no dispatch faults</td>
<td>ENG CONTROL Advisory Message L/R d-&gt;k+</td>
<td>ENG CONTROL Advisory Message RR N/A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>767 L/R ENG CONTROL Advisory Message</td>
<td>6/7/800 ENG CONTROL (Light) d-&gt;k+ 1/2/3/4/500 N/A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVM Hi</td>
<td>reverse video at 2.5 scalar units pop-up d-&gt;f</td>
<td>reverse video at 4 scalar units pop-up d-&gt;f</td>
<td>no6</td>
<td>RR RB211-524 has vib monitor. amber/white video at 2.5 scalar units(RR) pop-up</td>
<td>6/7/800 over/under reverse video at 2.5 scalar units pop-up d-&gt;f</td>
<td>no6</td>
<td>no6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Thrust</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>see above</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Thrust</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display. Option 7,8,9</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Green REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Unlocked</td>
<td>Amber REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Amber REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>Amber REV on Eng Display. Option 7,8,9</td>
<td>Amber REV on Eng Display</td>
<td>6/7/800 Amber REV on Eng Display 1/2/3/4/500 N/A</td>
<td>amber light</td>
<td>amber light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Armed</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire Fail</td>
<td>Tire Pressure Caution Message f-&gt;k</td>
<td>Tire Pressure Advisory Message</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Tire Pressure Optional Advisory Message</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: 1. No indication. 2. Engine FAIL illuminates. Bleed air <105 psi. 3. Red line indication only. 4. Red line indication only, no overspeed governor to limit RPM. 5. Some 727's and 737-100/-200 have EGT indicators with internal amber over temp light. 6. Option only. Also called AVM (Airborne Vibration Monitor). Monitored at the Flight Engineer (FE) panel, indication only. FE has a test switch to verify the operational integrity of the engine vibration system. 7. Amber light for REV operating, blue for reverser in transit. 8. Amber light for reverser unlock, blue for reverser in transit. 9. Amber light only - steady for stowed and full reverse position, flashing while in transit.
Douglas Alert Inhibit Points

Brake Release  60 KTS  80 KTS  V1  V1 - 20 KTS  400 FT  1000 FT  1000 FT  1000 FT  100 FT  80 KTS  STOP

a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h  i  j
# ENGINE FAILURE INDICATIONS FOR DAC AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning / Caution Message (Inhibited)</th>
<th>MD-11</th>
<th>DC-10</th>
<th>MD-95</th>
<th>MD-90</th>
<th>MD-80</th>
<th>DC-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub Idle (a-&gt;e; h-&gt;j)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surge-bang (a-&gt;e; h-&gt;j)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine Fail N1 Diff (e-&gt;j)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N1 Diff (Flt Rev Thrust)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM over red line (d, e, i)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT over red line (d, e, i)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Small light on gage (TBD)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVM HI (a-&gt;f, h, i)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReverseThrust (none)</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display (TBD)</td>
<td>Eng Display (none)</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Unlock (none)</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display (TBD)</td>
<td>Eng Display (none)</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
<td>Eng Display</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Armed (d, e, h, i)</td>
<td>GE only</td>
<td>Some GE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire Fail (no inhib)</td>
<td>2 Aural</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 10 - Fleet Survey of Engine Failure Indications - Turboprop
## APPENDIX 10

### Fleet Survey of Engine Failure Indications - Turboprop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/C Manufacturer</th>
<th>Aircraft Model</th>
<th>Engine Model</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Engine Failure Indication</th>
<th>Triggering Mechanism</th>
<th>Simulator</th>
<th>Autofeather System With Uptrim</th>
<th>Auto Relight or Auto Ignition</th>
<th>Low Pitch / Beta Light</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATR 42-300</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW120</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light or look-up panel light. Decaying parameters, A/C system alerts, &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 42-320</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW121</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, except for mod kit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 42-500</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW127E</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 72</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW124B</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 72-200</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW127</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR 72-210</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW127F</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetstream Super 31</td>
<td>2 X Garrett TPE331-12UAR</td>
<td>19+2</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, negative torque, A/C system alerts, &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NTS with uptrim</td>
<td>No, yes for -32</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetstream 41</td>
<td>2 X Garrett TPE331-12UAR</td>
<td>29+3</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetstream 61</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW127D</td>
<td>70+4</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, A/C systems alert &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW126A</td>
<td>72+2</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombardier</td>
<td>de Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-20/27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>No engine light or look-up panel light. Decaying parameters &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Havilland Dash 7-150</td>
<td>4 X P&amp;WC PT6A-50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Glare panel amber &quot;Engine Fail&quot; light</td>
<td>Torque pressure falls below 30 psi.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Havilland Dash 8-100</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW120A</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; indication. Decaying parameters, A/C systems alert, &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Low oil pressure triggers when less than 52 psi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Havilland Dash 8-200</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW123C</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Manufacturer</td>
<td>Aircraft Model</td>
<td>Engine Model</td>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>Engine Failure Indication</td>
<td>Triggering Mechanism</td>
<td>Simulator</td>
<td>Autofeather System With Uptrim</td>
<td>Auto Relight or Auto Ignition</td>
<td>Low Pitch / Beta Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Havilland Dash 8-300</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW123B</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>C212-300 Aviocar</td>
<td>2 X Garrett TPE331-10R</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, system alerts &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>light in CLA handle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA/IPTN</td>
<td>CN-235-100</td>
<td>2 X GE CT7-9C</td>
<td>44/45</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convair</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>2 X Allison 501-D13</td>
<td></td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>light in CLA handle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>640</td>
<td>2 X RR Dart</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Low torque light&quot;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>light in CLA handle</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairchild Dornier (Sweringen)</td>
<td>228-212</td>
<td>2 X Garrett TPE331-5A-252D</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. A/C yaw, torque, and EGT are prime indications. LOP and Torque goes negative, low EGT, oil pressure below 40 psi, generator drops off at 62% Ng.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NTS, no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>328</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW119B</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out' light. Decaying parameters, system alerts, &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (B &amp; C models, no uptrim)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro 23-12/III</td>
<td>2 X Garrett TPE331-12UAR</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Aircraft yaw followed by amber SRL light, low oil pressure, hydraulic pressure and generator off-line</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NTS, no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embraer</td>
<td>EMB-110P1-41 Bandeirante</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, A/C systems alerts, &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB 120 Brasilia</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;W PW118</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB 120ER Advanced Brasilia</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;W PW118A</td>
<td>30+3</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker Aircraft</td>
<td>Fokker 50</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;W PW125B</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>&quot;L ENG OUT&quot; or &quot;R ENG OUT&quot; lights on the central annunciator panel along with Master Caution</td>
<td>Nh less than 60% sends a signal to the Integrated Alert System and Auto-ignition.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/C Manufacturer</td>
<td>Aircraft Model</td>
<td>Engine Model</td>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>Engine Failure Indication</td>
<td>Triggering Mechanism</td>
<td>Simulator</td>
<td>Autofeather System With Uptrim</td>
<td>Auto Relight or Auto Ignition</td>
<td>Low Pitch / Beta Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker 50</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PW127B</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>&quot;L ENG OUT&quot; or &quot;R ENG OUT&quot; lights on the central annunciator panel along with Master Caution</td>
<td>Nh less than 60% sends a signal to the integrated Alert System and Auto-ignition.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker F27</td>
<td>2 X RR Dart 6/7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>&quot;Low Torque Light&quot;</td>
<td>Torque less than 50 Psi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMC</td>
<td>Y-12-11</td>
<td>17+2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cockpit gages are the only indication. No special lights.</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed</td>
<td>Electra</td>
<td>4 X Allison 501-D13</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L100</td>
<td>4 X Allison 501-D22A</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raytheon Aircraft</td>
<td>Beech 1900C</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-65B</td>
<td>19+2</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters and A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech 1900D</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-67D</td>
<td>19+1/2</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but no uptrim</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAB</td>
<td>340B</td>
<td>2 X GE CT7-9B</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, system alerts &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Auto corsen</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2 X Allison AE2100A</td>
<td>50(58)</td>
<td>Red EICAS &quot;ENG OUT&quot; message and Master Warning Light</td>
<td>Gas generator speed decreases below 56% triggers the FADEC to check appropriate signals.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorts Brothers</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-45R</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>No dedicated &quot;Engine out&quot; light. Decaying parameters, system alerts &amp; A/C yaw.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>2 X P&amp;WC PT6A-67R</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX - 11  Survey of Simulators
## APPENDIX - 11 Survey of Simulators
### Turbofan Aircraft Simulator Worldwide Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRPLANE MODEL</th>
<th>Number of Simulators*</th>
<th>FAA Certified Simulators†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A300</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A300-600</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A310</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A320</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A330</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A340</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astra</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avro RJ (all)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B707</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B727</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B737</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B747</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B757</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B767</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B777</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC 1-11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAe 146</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beechjet (BE-400)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caravelle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger (all)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citation (all)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concorde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC-10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F70/100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falcon (all)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulfstream (all)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il-86/96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetstar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-1011</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learjet</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-80+</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU-2/300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA-265</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premier 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabreliner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-204</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westwind I/II</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL TURBOFAN SIMULATORS** 781 373
## Turboprop Aircraft Simulator Worldwide Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRPLANE MODEL</th>
<th>Number of Simulators*</th>
<th>FAA Certified Simulators*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATR42/72</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAe ATP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAe 125</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAe HS 748</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech 1900A/B/C/D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech Bonanza</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech Baron</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 172/182</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 300/400</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna Caravan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna Centurion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna Conquest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convair 440</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN325 (Casa)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dash 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dash 7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dash 8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do-228/328</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB-110/120</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-159</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawker 700/800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetstream (all)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Air (incl. C12, U-21)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-382</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro (all)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mooney (252)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilatus PC-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Cheyenne (all)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Malibu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Navajo Chieftain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piper Seneca</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-226/227</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saab 340 (all)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saab 2000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorts 360</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viscount</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian Y7-100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL TURBOPROP SIMULATORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>174</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Rotorcraft Simulator Worldwide Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRPLANE MODEL</th>
<th>Number of Simulators*</th>
<th>FAA Certified Simulators*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AS332/SA330</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 200 series (all)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 400 series (all)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheyenne (all)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinook</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3-DGAC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-61N</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ROTORCRAFT SIMULATORS</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX - 12 Simulator Malfunctions For Turbofan
APPENDIX - 12 Simulator Malfunctions For Turbofan

TURBOFAN /TURBOFAN POWERED AIRCRAFT

MALFUNCTION AND FAILURE CONDITIONS THAT FLIGHT CREWS NEED TO CONSIDER (BE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANT MODES

Single Engine Flameout - Single engine flameout will result in overall airplane thrust loss, thrust asymmetry and resulting aircraft yaw proportional to the thrust difference and moment arm (engine installation position relative to airplane centerline). It will cause loss of engine provided services from the flamed-out engine, i.e., generator trip to ‘off’. The failure condition may not produce a change of noise cue but may result in a lessening of the overall engine noise level. Fuel flow will drop to the minimum level (not zero) and the rotor speeds will drop to levels lower than idle while EGT will also drop. The aircraft yaw, indications of electrical power loss, and low and decreasing levels of rotor speed, pressure ratio, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow are key cues which should lead to recognition. (Frequency of Single engine flameout is between 1 per 10,000 and 1 per 100,000 airplane flights.)

Multiple Engine Flameouts - Multiple (two or more) engine flameouts will result in a relatively larger overall thrust loss and may or may not produce thrust asymmetry and resulting airplane yaw. The flameouts of all engines will produce loss of engine-provided services, i.e., electrical power. The loss of engine noise, decreasing engine parameters*, generator trips to off, and loss of pressurization are all cues. Loss of aircraft speed, in all modes but descent, will also be a cue requiring the airplane to be pitched over to retain speed. All of the engine parameters will be decreasing. The majority of total power loss events will be as the result of fuel management error or encounter with environmental factors like severe rain, hail, volcanic ash, or icing. While the order of flameout may appear random, they are essentially simultaneous. (Frequency of multiple engine power loss will depend on the number of engines installed, but will range from 1 per 100,000 to 1 per million aircraft flights). The cues should lead flight crews to confirm that fuel is flowing to all engines and to immediately attempt to inflight re-start the engines. Sequential engine flameouts, those not due to a common cause, are much less likely to occur (less than 1 per 100 million aircraft flights and slightly more likely on four and three engine aircraft than on twin engine aircraft).

Engine Seizure - Inflight engine rotor seizure is a rare event and requires that significant internal damage has occurred. (Engine rotor seizure events reported as found on the ground, after flight, are not proof that the rotor stopped turning while inflight.) Seizure is sudden stoppage of the rotation of any of the engine rotors. The failure will occur very quickly and the affected rotor RPM will drop to zero, significant airplane/engine vibration and EGT will rise above limits (at least initially). Thrust loss and resulting yaw will be immediate cues.

If the Fan rotor seizes (likelihood between 1 per 10 million and 1 per 100 million aircraft flights), there will be mild buffet and some incrementally increased drag over the drag level that occurs for a windmilling engine (about 25% increase of normal windmilling engine drag). The
aircraft drag for a locked fan rotor will vary with flight speed, and the required rudder deflection will be slightly increased but there will be no difficulty in controlling the airplane (based on service experience). There will be a slight decrease, less than 5%, in airplane range performance. The high pressure rotor will continue to rotate but at a reduced speed from normal windmilling.

If the high pressure rotor seizes, immediate thrust loss will occur, the high rotor speed will drop to zero, and no services will be provided for the locked up engine. EGT will rise initially above redline. Windmilling drag, however, will not be noticeably affected.

**Engine Stall / Surge** - Engine surge at high power settings will cause a loud noise (equivalent to cannon fire at a distance or shotgun blasts at 10 feet from your ear) which will have one or more bangs or reports. There will be yaw-coupled aircraft vibration. EGT may increase towards redline but is no longer a key cue since surge recovery logic in modern controls may have restabilized the engine airflow. Engine spool speeds will fluctuate while the engine is surging and will stabilize upon recovery. The key cue is “loud noise” and yaw vibration coupling. Which engine has surged may not be detectable from the flight deck parameter displays. Severe engine failures will usually be announced by an engine surge and be immediately followed by a permanent thrust loss and rising EGT. Surge by itself, breakdown in engine airflow, will usually self-recover so that the pilot is left with the loud noise along with yaw-coupled vibration followed by “situation normal”. Over reaction to the loud noise and yaw-coupled vibration should be avoided. Look for other cues including continuing thrust oscillations or permanent thrust loss or rising EGT prior to taking action. (An engine surging will be experienced between 1 per 10,000 and 1 per 100,000 airplane flights.)

**Engine Thrust Runaway (fuel control failure mode)** - Engine fuel control failure modes that cause engine thrust runaway will cause engine thrust to increase with fuel flow going to the maximum level. All related engine parameters will be increasing, and some may exceed limits. Asymmetric thrust and the resulting yaw may be experienced with the level of yaw dependent on flight speed and degree of thrust difference between engines on the airplane. The normal response of reducing thrust through power lever reduction may not be occur. The crew may need to shut the engine down with the fuel cut off switch/lever or fire handle. (This engine fuel control system failure condition occurs about 1 per 10 million aircraft flights.)

**Engine Thrust Failed Fixed (fuel control failure mode)** - Engine thrust will not respond to movement of the throttle or may respond in one direction only. (This engine fuel control system failure condition occurs about 1 per 10 million aircraft flights).

**Engine Separation** - When an engine separation occurs, thrust loss, yaw and coupled roll (for wing mounted engines) will result, reflecting the loss of powerplant weight as well as thrust. Engine parameter flight deck indications will indicate loss of signal (wires will have separated) and electrical, hydraulic and pneumatic system performance will reflect loss of supply. Engine separations can occur on aft body mounted engine airplanes (i.e. 727) without significant audio or tactile cues that they have separated. Separation of engines while running normally is likely to cause severe consequences while separation at low (flight idle or below) forward thrust are more
likely to be benign. (Frequency of occurrence between 1 in 10 million and 1 in 100 million aircraft flights).

**Severe Damage** - Severe engine damage events will result in loss of thrust, yaw due to thrust asymmetry, vibration, loud noise, engine parameters of rotor speed and pressure ratio fall to windmilling levels or near zero, EGT rises to redline, fuel flow decreases. EGT may then fall indicating flameout. A fire warning may occur on some but not all events. Severe engine damage events come in several types:

1. **Engine Severe Damage - 1**: N1 and N2 fall rapidly to below idle levels, fuel flow and EGT rise into red zone with no response to throttle, and vibration may continue due to out of balance loads.

2. **Engine Severe Damage - 2**: Loud noise, N1 and N2 fall rapidly to below idle levels, fuel flow drops, EGT rise into red zone with no response to throttle, and fire warning goes off - no effect for initial fire bottle discharge. (Severe engine failures will occur at a rate between 1 and 5 per million aircraft flights.)

**Onset of Severe Engine Vibration** - The onset of engine vibration will be detected by tactile cues or by annunciations, and indicates an internal engine failure. A core engine blade failure will be accompanied by engine surge with rotor speed disagreements with other engines and an EGT increase may occur. Thrust loss may also occur and may vary from non-detectable to significant yaw. A fan blade failure will be accompanied with an engine surge (loud noise), vibration and perhaps odor in the cabin. The vibration may continue after engine shutdown. (Engine vibration associated with failures will occur between 5 and 10 per million aircraft flights.)

**Engine Thrust Reverser Deployment** (Inadvertent) - Inadvertent thrust reverser deployment on older aircraft types (non high bypass ratio engine powered) have demonstrated that the aircraft can be controlled with thrust reverser deployed at low engine power. “Rev “ annunciation display with immediate reduction of power to idle coupled with severe yaw (depending on engine installation and distance from airplane centerline) will serve as cues. (Frequency of occurrence is between 1 per million and 1 per 10 million aircraft flights.) Inadvertent thrust reverser deployment on some high bypass ratio engine powered airplanes is considered to be a hazardous or worse failure condition. Retrospective design changes and new designs have been made to preclude the occurrence of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment in flight. (No training is required or should be required for an extremely improbable and uncontrollable failure condition.)
Power Lever Failure (mechanical systems) - Power lever failure comes in several varieties as follows:

a) Power lever can not be moved - engine operating normally;

b) Power lever movers but no engine response, and

c) Power lever mechanism fails causing engine to accelerate or decelerate and also not respond to power lever motion.

Crew may need to use the fuel shutoff switch/lever or fire handle to shut engine down.

(Power lever failures occur at a 1 per 10 million to 1 per 100 million aircraft flights.)

Engine Idle Disagree - Not a safety significant failure mode.

Fire and Overheat Warning - Fire and Overheats are annunciated and warned as appropriate. Fire may or may not be a part of severe engine failures. (Inflight fires occur about 1 per million aircraft flights.)

Fuel Leakage / Loss of Fuel Quantity - Fracture of a fuel pipe or component after the fuel flow measuring device on the engine will result in a high fuel flow being indicated without equivalent or appropriate response of the engine. The fuel flow will be high and fuel quantity in the tank may confirm the differences. Cues are higher than normal fuel flow for other engine parameter indications (N1, N2, EGT, EPR), fuel flow higher than other engines, and/or sudden decreases in and loss of fuel quantity. (Rate of fuel leakage/ loss of fuel quantity events are about 1 per million aircraft flights.)

Inflight Restarting - Inflight restarting is a response to multiple engine flameout or shutdown and is accomplished using windmill restarting, quick restarting or power assisted restarting procedures (either engine or APU). If a total power loss occurs, the flight crew should attempt to restart engines in accordance with published inflight restarting procedures. However, since the engine response will be SLOWER than on the ground, pilots may be confused about the successfulness of the restart. The engine will spool up very slowly, and crew awareness of how engines will normally behave during an altitude inflight restart is recommended. (Inflight engine restarting occurs at the rate of 1 per 100,000 to 1 per 1 million aircraft flights based on service history.)
Engine Oil Indications:

**Oil Filter Delta Pressure** - annunciated cue may be due to blockage or instrumentation failure.

**Loss of Oil Quantity** - annunciated cue may be due to leakage or high oil consumption.

**High Oil Temperature** - annunciated cue may be due to leakage, trapped/blockaded flow, or cooler failure.

**Engine Low Oil Pressure** - annunciation cue of low oil pressure.

Engine Oil Indications should be ignored during the takeoff until safety altitude is reached. Oil pressure loss can occur for a variety of reasons: from leakage, seal failure or pump failure. The loss of oil quantity or increase in oil temperature should be used to confirm oil systems malfunctioning. Engine Low Oil in combination with increasing vibration and fluctuating or dropping rotor speed is a much more substantive “situation” and may indicate the progression of a bearing failure. (Engine oil indication will occur between 1 per 10,000 and 1 per 100,000 airplane flights. Precautionary shutdown may be indicated to minimize engine repair cost.) Ignoring engine oil malfunction indications for more than a few minutes may lead to severe engine failure or seizure with the cues defined above.

**Engine Starting Malfunctions.** Engine starting malfunctions on the ground will occur at a rate of about 5 to 10 per 10,000 airplane flights.

**Hot Start.** - Hot start is indicated by rapidly rising EGT at a faster rate than normal and is usually accompanied with a slower than normal rate of rotor speed increase.

**Hung Start** - Rotor speed acceleration rate is very slow and may not continue to rise after starter cut out speed is achieved.

**Inflight Restarting** (See above.)
APPENDIX 13 - Appendix C to Part 63 Flight Engineer Training Course Requirements
(a) Training course outline--(1) Format. The ground course outline and the flight course outline are independent. Each must be contained in a looseleaf binder to include a table of contents. If an applicant desires approval of both a ground school course and a flight school course, they must be combined in one looseleaf binder that includes a separate table of contents for each course. Separate course outlines are required for each type of airplane.

(2) Ground course outline. (i) It is not mandatory that the subject headings be arranged exactly as listed in this paragraph. Any arrangement of subjects is satisfactory if all the subject material listed here is included and at least the minimum programmed hours are assigned to each subject. Each general subject may be broken down into detail showing the items to be covered. (ii) If any course operator desires to include additional subjects in the ground course curriculum, such as international law, flight hygiene, or others that are not required, the hours allotted these additional subjects may not be included in the minimum programmed classroom hours. (iii) The following subjects and classroom hours are the minimum programmed coverage for the initial approval of a ground training course for flight engineers. Subsequent to initial approval of a ground training course an applicant may apply to the Administrator for a reduction in the programmed hours. Approval of a reduction in the approved programmed hours is based on improved training effectiveness due to improvements in methods, training aids, quality of instruction, or any combination thereof.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Classroom hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Aviation Regulations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Flight and Aerodynamics</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane Familiarization</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To include as appropriate:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specifications.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction features.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight controls.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumatic systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-icing and de-icing systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressurization and air-conditioning systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot static systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instrument systems.
Fuel and oil systems.
Emergency equipment.

Engine Familiarization 45
To include as appropriate:
  Specifications.
  Construction features.
  Lubrication.
  Ignition.
  Carburetor and induction, supercharging and fuel control systems
  Accessories.
  Propellers.
  Instrumentation.
  Emergency equipment.

Normal Operations (Ground and Flight) 50
To include as appropriate:
  Servicing methods and procedures.
  Operation of all the airplane systems.
  Operation of all the engine systems.
  Loading and center of gravity computations.
  Cruise control (normal, long range, maximum endurance)
  Power and fuel computation.
  Meteorology as applicable to engine operation

Emergency Operations 80
To include as appropriate:
  Landing gear, brakes, flaps, speed brakes, and leading edge devices
  Pressurization and air-conditioning.
  Portable fire extinguishers.
  Fuselage fire and smoke control.
  Loss of electrical power.
  Engine fire control.
  Engine shut-down and restart.
  Oxygen.

Total (exclusive of final tests) 235

The above subjects, except Theory of Flight and Aerodynamics, and Regulations must apply to the same type of airplane in which the student flight engineer is to receive flight training.

(3) Flight Course Outline. (i) The flight training curriculum must include at least 10 hours of flight instruction in an airplane specified in Sec. 63.37(a). The flight time required for the practical test may not be credited as part of the required flight instruction.
(ii) All of the flight training must be given in the same type airplane.
(iii) As appropriate to the airplane type, the following subjects must be
taught in the flight training course:

Subject

NORMAL DUTIES, PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONS

To include as appropriate:
Airplane preflight.
Engine starting, power checks, pretakeoff, postlanding and shut-down procedures.
Power control.
Temperature control.
Engine operation analysis.
Operation of all systems.
Fuel management.
Logbook entries.
Pressurization and air conditioning.

RECOGNITION AND CORRECTION OF IN-FLIGHT MALFUNCTIONS

To include:
Analysis of abnormal engine operation.
Analysis of abnormal operation of all systems.
Corrective action.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN FLIGHT

To include as appropriate:
Engine fire control.
Fuselage fire control.
Smoke control.
Loss of power or pressure in each system.
Engine overspeed.
Fuel dumping.
Landing gear, spoilers, speed brakes, and flap extension and retraction.
Engine shut-down and restart.
Use of oxygen.

(iv) If the Administrator finds a simulator or flight engineer training device to accurately reproduce the design, function, and control characteristics, as pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of a flight engineer on the type of airplane to be flown, the flight training time may be reduced by a ratio of 1 hour of flight time to 2 hours of airplane simulator time, or 3 hours of flight engineer training device time, as the case may be, subject to the following limitations:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this paragraph, the required
flight instruction time in an airplane may not be less than 5 hours.

(b) As to a flight engineer student holding at least a commercial pilot certificate with an instrument rating, airplane simulator or a combination of airplane simulator and flight engineer training device time may be submitted for up to all 10 hours of the required flight instruction time in an airplane. However, not more than 15 hours of flight engineer training device time may be substituted for flight instruction time.

(v) To obtain credit for flight training time, airplane simulator time, or flight engineer training device time, the student must occupy the flight engineer station and operate the controls.

(b) Classroom equipment. Classroom equipment should consist of systems and procedural training devices, satisfactory to the Administrator, that duplicate the operation of the systems of the airplane in which the student is to receive his flight training.

(c) Contracts or agreements. (1) An approved flight engineer course operator may contract with other persons to obtain suitable airplanes, airplane simulators, or other training devices or equipment.

(2) An operator who is approved to conduct both the flight engineer ground course and the flight engineer flight course may contract with others to conduct one course or the other in its entirety but may not contract with others to conduct both courses for the same airplane type.

(3) An operator who has approval to conduct a flight engineer ground course or flight course for a type of airplane, but not both courses, may not contract with another person to conduct that course in whole or in part.

(4) An operator who contracts with another to conduct a flight engineer course may not authorize or permit the course to be conducted in whole or in part by a third person.

(5) In all cases, the course operator who is approved to operate the course is responsible for the nature and quality of the instruction given.

(6) A copy of each contract authorized under this paragraph must be attached to each of the 3 copies of the course outline submitted for approval.

(d) Instructors. (1) Only certificated flight engineers may give the flight instruction required by this Appendix in an airplane, simulator, or flight engineer training device.

(2) There must be a sufficient number of qualified instructors available to prevent an excess ratio of students to instructors.

(e) Revisions. (1) Requests for revisions of the course outlines, facilities or equipment must follow the procedures for original approval of the course. Revisions must be submitted in such form that an entire page or pages of the approved outline can be removed and replaced by the revisions.

(2) The list of instructors may be revised at any time without request for approval, if the requirements of paragraph (d) of this Appendix are maintained.

(f) Ground school credits. (1) Credit may be granted a student in the ground school course by the course operator for comparable previous training
or experience that the student can show by written evidence: however, the course operator must still meet the quality of instruction as described in paragraph (h) of this Appendix.

(2) Before credit for previous training or experience may be given, the student must pass a test given by the course operator on the subject for which the credit is to be given. The course operator shall incorporate results of the test, the basis for credit allowance, and the hours credited as part of the student's records.

(g) Records and reports. (1) The course operator must maintain, for at least two years after a student graduates, fails, or drops from a course, a record of the student's training, including a chronological log of the subject course, attendance examinations, and grades.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this section, the course operator must submit to the Administrator, not later than January 31 of each year, a report for the previous calendar year's training, to include:
   (i) Name, enrollment and graduation date of each student;
   (ii) Ground school hours and grades of each student;
   (iii) Flight, airplane simulator, flight engineer training device hours, and grades of each student; and
   (iv) Names of students failed or dropped, together with their school grades and reasons for dropping.

(3) Upon request, the Administrator may waive the reporting requirements of paragraph (2) of this section for an approved flight engineer course that is part of an approved training course under Subpart N of Part 121 of this chapter.

(h) Quality of instruction. (1) Approval of a ground course is discontinued whenever less than 80 percent of the students pass the FAA written test on the first attempt.

(2) Approval of a flight course is discontinued whenever less than 80 percent of the students pass the FAA practical test on the first attempt.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, approval of a ground or flight course may be continued when the Administrator finds--
   (i) That the failure rate was based on less than a representative number of students; or
   (ii) That the course operator has taken satisfactory means to improve the effectiveness of the training.

(i) Time limitation. Each student must apply for the written test and the flight test within 90 days after completing the ground school course.

(j) Statement of course completion. (1) The course operator shall give to each student who successfully completes an approved flight engineer ground school training course, and passes the FAA written test, a statement of successful completion of the course that indicates the date of training, the type of airplane on which the ground course training was based, and the number of hours received in the ground school course.

(2) The course operator shall give each student who successfully completes an approved flight engineer flight course, and passed the FAA practical test,
a statement of successful completion of the flight course that indicates the
dates of the training, the type of airplane used in the flight course, and
the number of hours received in the flight course.

(3) A course operator who is approved to conduct both the ground course and
the flight course may include both courses in a single statement of course
completion if the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section are
included.

(4) The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to an air carrier or
commercial operator with an approved training course under Part 121 of this
chapter providing the student receives a flight engineer certificate upon
completion of that course.

(k) Inspections. Each course operator shall allow the Administrator at any
time or place, to make any inspection necessary to ensure that the quality
and effectiveness of the instruction are maintained at the required
standards.

(l) Change of ownership, name, or location. (1) Approval of a flight
gineer ground course or flight course is discontinued if the ownership of
the course changes. The new owner must obtain a new approval by following the
procedure prescribed for original approval.

(2) Approval of a flight engineer ground course or flight course does not
terminate upon a change in the name of the course that is reported to the
Administrator within 30 days. The Administrator issues a new letter of
approval, using the new name, upon receipt of notice within that time.

(3) Approval of a flight engineer ground course or flight course does not
terminate upon a change in location of the course that is reported to the
Administrator within 30 days. The Administrator issues a new letter of
approval, showing the new location, upon receipt of notice within that time,
if he finds the new facilities to be adequate.

(m) Cancellation of approval. (1) Failure to meet or maintain any of the
requirements of this Appendix for the approval of a flight engineer ground
course or flight course is reason for cancellation of the approval.

(2) If a course operator desires to voluntarily terminate the course, he
should notify the Administrator in writing and return the last letter of
approval.

(n) Duration. Except for a course operated as part of an approved training
course under Subpart N of Part 121 of this chapter, the approval to operate a
flight engineer ground course or flight course terminates 24 months after the
last day of the month of issue.

(o) Renewal. (1) Renewal of approval to operate a flight engineer ground
course or flight course is conditioned upon the course operator's meeting the
requirements of this Appendix.

(2) Application for renewal may be made to the Administrator at any time
after 60 days before the termination date.

(p) Course operator approvals. An applicant for approval of a flight
gineer ground course, or flight course, or both, must meet all of the
requirements of this Appendix concerning application, approval, and
continuing approval of that course or courses.

(q) Practical test eligibility. An applicant for a flight engineer certificate and class rating under the provisions of Sec. 63.37(b)(6) is not eligible to take the practical test unless he has successfully completed an approved flight engineer ground school course in the same type of airplane for which he has completed an approved flight engineer flight course.


14 CFR 63 * Amendment 63-30 * Dec. 28, 1995
APPENDIX 14 - Human Factors
APPENDIX 14 - Human Factors

HUMAN FACTORS ERROR CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY AND DATABASE

SUMMARY

Error Classification Model Development Based on Turbofan Data

Error Classification Model

Before discussing the error classification scheme, it is important to make a distinction between what happens in human error and why it happens. The inappropriate crew response (ICR) term which is a prominent part of the workshop title refers to “what” happened in terms of human behavior. An ICR can be intentional or unintentional. As was discussed in Human Factors Section 7.0, we are most concerned about the intentional ICR’s based on faulty cognitive processes because the inappropriateness of these responses is much more difficult for the flight crew to detect and correct. Errors in cognitive processes are the primary concern here because understanding the “why” of these errors will lead to properly focused solutions in terms of training or design. The ICR’s of the accidents and incidents analyzed here can be found in the Turbofan Summary Database. The cognitive errors inferred from that database are to be found in the Human Factors Error Classification database in this appendix. It is the combined analysis of cognitive errors plus contributing factors which ultimately enable us to understand the “why” of airplane accidents and incidents which have been attributed to “pilot error”.

An error classification scheme for modeling cognitive errors in conjunction with propulsion system malfunctions was developed as part of the human factors function for the PSM+ICR Workshop series. The objective was to provide a vehicle whereby the error data derived from the event databases could be mapped onto the recommendations developed through the Workshop; thus providing a direct link to the event data. The model developed is an adaptation of Rasmussen’s (1982)\textsuperscript{11} and Reason’s (1990)\textsuperscript{12} taxonomies for classifying information processing failures and interpreted within the framework of Shontz’s (1997)\textsuperscript{13} concept of the data transformation process. It represents a cognitive approach to human error analysis with the emphasis on understanding the “why” of human error as well as the “what”. The extremely limited data available in the Turbofan-DC&ATG Summary Database on which to base inferences about why cognitive errors occurred in a particular event mean that the attempt to understand “why” can have only limited success. Nevertheless, the attempt provides a much richer database for developing and supporting recommendations and allows the development of more detailed recommendations for addressing the issues of PSM+ICR.

The model developed is illustrated below in Figure 1. The primary error categories are represented by the terms located around an “inverted U-shaped function”. The higher-level classifications of skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based errors are shown in approximate relationship to the primary categories. The mapping of these relationships, however, is only approximate as can be seen by reviewing the detailed classification of errors as shown in the second major section of this appendix. Sub-categories within each of the primary error categories were also developed to provide for a finer-grained analysis which could support more detailed recommendations. The Turbofan-DC&ATG Summary Database contains accident/incident events which occurred between 1968 and 1996. References to time frame (early, middle, late) are made within this range without fixed boundaries. However, the time frames the terms refer to are roughly “early” (late ‘60s and ‘70s), “middle” (‘80s), and “late” (‘90s).

The number of sub-categories under each of the primary categories varies. The objective was to develop meaningful breakdowns in the data which could be used to support recommendations. Most of the sub-categories contain at least two additional groupings of the error data. Since the model is a work in progress, a few sub-categories were retained which have no event-driven error data as yet.

In addition to the categories shown above and their attendant sub-categories, “contributing factors” were identified when possible that may have influenced crew behavior during the event. Mapping contributing factors to the errors identified or inferred in the events can strengthen the inferences that must be made when attempting to analyze the cognitive behavior in a PSM event. Clearly, developing a relational database and instantiating it with the descriptions of error behavior would provide the ideal vehicle for the analysis. Unfortunately, the resources required for such an activity were not available to support this workshop activity. However, a similar but more qualitative and limited activity was accomplished using a spreadsheet format containing the ICR and contributing factor data.

Summary of Error Classification Data

At this point, a caveat regarding the error classification database found in this appendix should be noted. While continuing members of the Human Factors Task Group (HFTG) have reviewed the database, they have not verified the individual error/event assignments by a detailed review of the turbofan event summary database. The error model and assignment of error behaviors to categories was accomplished by a single member of the HFTG. Constraints placed on distribution of the database by its contributors precluded sending detailed copies of the turbofan event summary database to individual HFTG members. Other members of the task group were not available to come to Boeing-Seattle where the turbofan database is kept in order to accomplish the verification task. However, members of the HFTG have reviewed the error classification data as shown in this appendix, and concur with the classifications based on the data presented. While the HFTG does not consider this situation to invalidate

---

14 Adapted from Rasmussen’s (1983) and Reason’s (1990) taxonomies for classifying information processing failures and interpreted within the framework of Shontz’s (1997) concept of the data transformation process.
the error classification database, the support provided for the recommendations must be tempered with this knowledge.

Summary statements regarding the error classification database are presented below by primary category and sub-category.

Detect

Errors classified under this general category relate to the initial process of gathering data needed to ascertain “what is happening and where” during a non-normal event. Errors committed here can affect the entire process of transforming data into information as the basis for decisions and actions.

Data not attended to (cues, annunciations, context, wx information, etc.)

These errors relate to a failure to obtain the data necessary to ascertain system state. It was generally difficult, if not impossible, to determine “why” data were not obtained given the level of detail available in the Turbofan-DC&ATG Summary Database. However, the fact that the necessary data was not used in determining action taken was usually quite obvious. The answer to the “why” question of crew behavior often lies in integrating relevant information about Contributing Factors from the event report. While events have been assigned to the Contributing Factor categories where the determination could be made from direct report in the summary database or through inference based on the same source, resources were not available to set up a relational database with the error classification and contributing factor data. Therefore, inferences as to the “why” of crew errors are not a part of this analysis but could be if resources became available in the future. This statement applies to all the categories of the error classification analysis.

There are two additional sub-categories within this category.

Failure to monitor throttle position and/or engine parameter display behavior (EPDB).

There were seven (7) instances of this type of error spread across the database from the latest to the earliest entries and across three generations of airplanes. Crews failed to monitor either throttle position or engine parameter displays for up to several minutes until upset occurred or the crew took wrong engine action. Workload conditions on the flight deck preceding the event varied across events from very high (initial climb) to very low (cruise). Thus while the context varied considerably across these events, the results where the same - lack of systems awareness.

Failure to monitor EPDB over time between/across engines.

There were also seven (7) instances of this type of error occurring across the time frame of the database and airplane types. The time available to monitor EPDB also varied widely but this error was recorded when it was clear that the engine performance data was available but not used in determining what action to take. It should be emphasized that what was available was data dispersed over the engine displays not information about what was happening and where.

Data attended to then forgotten

These memory lapse errors are difficult to identify or infer unless there is a direct report of their occurrence by the crew. It was not possible to make this determination on any of the events from the summary database. Nevertheless, it is a possible explanation for behavior, particularly decision making behavior, in many of the events. Therefore the sub-category is retained in the error classification database for possible use in the future.

Data misperceived

This category is meant to cover those instances where the crew misread, mishear data/cues in the process of trying to ascertain “what is happening and where”. This is also very difficult to infer and differentiate from “not attending to” and “partially or poorly integrated” error classifications. Examples are:
- Look at one parameter and encode it mentally as another, e.g., observe eng. #1 parameters decreasing but label them eng. #2 for further action; or
- Misperceive callout of “eng. #2 fail” as “eng. #1 fail”.


There were four(4) instances of this type of error occurring. The evidence for the occurrence of the type of error was very direct including self report data. It is the type of error against which there is little defense other than crew coordination and cross-checking.

**Interpretation**

This category contains more errors than any of the others. The integration and interpretation functions of the data transformation process are most sensitive to rule and knowledge base errors. These errors are cognitive errors and as such very difficult to verify as to their exact nature because their classification depends so heavily on inference. The strength of the inferences varies across events as a function of the availability of the human factors related data that is typically included in accident, incident, and occurrence reports.

**Data partially or poorly integrated** (key relationships not noted)

These errors represent failure to properly and adequately complete the integration function in transforming data (as individual cues) into information (as the answer to the questions “what’s happening and where is it happening; i.e., system or component affected). The accident/incident/occurrence event typically occurs because of a combination of system malfunction plus crew error in terms of incorrect interpretations of system state (based on incomplete data) coupled with actions taken on the basis of these incorrect interpretations. It is extremely difficult to differentiate between “not attended to” and “partially or poorly integrated” cognitive behavior - given the database. Thus, classification of this inferred behavior may, in some cases, be arbitrary or even redundant between these two types of error. Proper completion of the integration function is critical to accurate interpretation. Failures may be the result of lack of knowledge, time constraint, or perceptual inadequacies (e.g., can’t read instruments due to vibration).

*Action taken on the basis of one or two cues (e.g., loud bang, bang + yaw, bang + vibration, yaw + vibration, etc.)*

This was one of the largest categories of error in the error classification database with twenty two (22) events containing errors associated with this type of inappropriate crew response (ICR). Most, but not all, of the events in which this ICR occurred were RTO overrun events. The ICR occurred throughout the time frame of the database and with glass cockpit as well as earlier generations of airplanes. Dealing with this type of ICR is one of the central concerns addressed by recommendations from the AIA Workshop.

*Action taken on wrong engine based on interpretation of incomplete or poorly integrated pattern of cues.*

The six (6) ICR’s are identified here as a subgroup because they all relate to taking action of some sort on the wrong or unaffected engine during an event. The ICR’s occurred across the middle and late time frame of the database and across all three generations of airplanes.

*Failure to integrate EPDB and other cues over time (difficult to differentiate from “data not attended to” errors)*

The errors associated with the four (4) events assigned to this category represent failures in crew monitoring behavior which occurred over time and clearly indicated a failure to integrate data over time. In most of the events, monitoring over time was required in order to ascertain what was happening and where. In one instance, integrating environmental conditions (runway) with EPDB was required for arriving at the appropriate decision/action.

*Assumptions about data relationships incorrect*
These errors are due to either a) limited or inaccurate mental model at the system level and possibly the airplane level (i.e., relationship between propulsion and other systems), or b) misidentification of individual cues leading to misinterpretation of the nature of the event and selection of inappropriate action.

**Erroneous assumption(s) about system or cue relationships**

Assignment of the errors to this category was based on direct crew reports. This error was found in two events.

**Misidentification/interpretation of cues**

Assignment of the errors to this category was also based on direct crew reports. This error was also found in two events.

**Data pattern misinterpreted**

Errors of this type may be directly linked to failures to properly integrate cue data because of incomplete or inaccurate mental models at the system and airplane levels as well as misidentification of cues. Time constraints and workload are also contributing factors in this type of error. There are useful distinctions to be made between the former and latter causes of the errors but it was difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between or among causes based on the data available in the database. Initial attempts to make this distinction were abandoned.

Twenty three (23) errors involving misinterpretation of the pattern of cues available to the crew during an event were assigned to this category. The assignment was clearly warranted based on inappropriate action taken and/or direct crew report. Designation of error to this level can be used to support more detailed recommendations than error data based on less substantial evidence.

**Failure to obtain relevant data/information from crew members**

Errors classified under this category might also be classified as being of the “partially or poorly integrated data” type. However, the separate callout of failing to integrate input from crew members into the pattern of cues is considered important for developing recommendations. These errors are different from “not attending to inputs from crew members” which would be classified as detection errors. These errors could be lumped under a poor crew coordination category but again specificity would be lost. Errors assigned to the “poor crew coordination” category are more complex and usually refer to crew activity throughout the event.

Errors in this category can be further sub-divided into failures of captains to obtain specific, relevant inputs from the crew or for crew members failing to inform the captain of data crucial to understanding what is happening and where. In either case, important data does not get integrated into the overall pattern of cues surrounding or generated by the event. Nine (9) of these errors were identified from the database.

**Failure to interpret condition (event + context) as non-normal**

This error classification is used when crews failed to realize that the airplane was in an unsafe or non-normal condition.

Two instances of this type of error were identified.

**Nature of relationships among cues/annunciations not understood**

The behavior that would dictate a classification difference between this category and “data pattern misinterpreted” were impossible to come by from the database as it exists. The “bewilderment” aspect of behavior during an event would support this error classification. While identification of this type of error would be particularly useful in developing specific recommendations for training, it was not possible to break the classification down to this level. The category is retained here as a place holder for errors of this type when they can be identified.

**Knowledge of system operation under non-normal conditions lacking or incomplete**
These errors are based on erroneous or incomplete mental models of system performance under non-normal conditions. There is some apparent overlap with the third Interpretation category, but the link to faulty mental model is clearer in the behavior representing errors in this category.

This category contained ICR’s based on faulty mental models at the system level (propulsion) or the airplane level (relationships among airplane systems). There were eleven (11) instances of knowledge-based errors of this type in the database.

**Establish Goal**

Errors classified under this general category are knowledge-based errors. The turbofan summary database was too limited to permit useful inferences about these types of errors. The categories are included here to illustrate this aspect of the error classification scheme.

**Established an inappropriate goal**

RTO events would be listed here only if there were no airline published policy or procedure and the crew was never exposed to the Boeing Takeoff Safety Training Aid. Otherwise the RTO events are rule-based errors.

**Failure to properly prioritize goals** (Selection of a goal for first action blocks achievement of other important goals)

**Failure to recognize conflicting goals**

**Strategy/Procedure**

The terms strategy and procedure are used here to indicate two different types of errors. When the term “procedure” is used, the inference is that a written procedure or widely recognized “best practice” is available for implementation when proper interpretation of a cue pattern occurs. Errors where this is the case are rule-based errors. When the term “strategy” is used it refers to the case where no procedure exists so the crew must devise a strategy for action when they encounter the event. Employing an inappropriate strategy is a knowledge-based error if the situation has no precedent for the crew to follow in terms of either written procedure or best practice. The recommendations will be different for these two different types of errors.

**Improper strategy/procedure chosen**

These are rule-based errors where the crew chose to execute an inappropriate procedure for the conditions or a strategy which deviated from “best practices”. Aborting a takeoff above V1 is an example of the former; reducing power on engines below safe altitude is an example of the latter.

Of the 43 instances of strategy and procedural error, 49% involved aborting takeoffs above V1, 12% involved power reductions below safe operating altitudes, and 29% were other strategies involving deviation from best practices. Combined, these represent the largest sub-category of errors leading to ICR’s in the database.

**Strategy/procedure could not be achieved due to lack of appropriate skill/knowledge**

These errors are knowledge-based. The goal selected may have been appropriate but the crew did not have the knowledge or skill to implement an appropriate strategy.

Two events in the database involved errors of this type.

**Choosing not to implement appropriate procedure**

These are rule-based errors where correct procedures or strategies were clearly available but disregarded. They are often the flip side of choosing an improper procedure/strategy.

Two events in the database involved errors of this type.

**Execute**
The number of errors in the general area of execution of actions taken in the presence of propulsion system malfunctions rivaled that of the general area of Interpretation. There were seven sub-categories of errors in this general area.

**Carry out unintended action**
These are the classic “slip” errors as defined by Reason (1990).

Most of the fifteen (15) ICR’s classified under this heading involved moving the wrong throttle or fuel valve then following through with the engine shutdown steps. Indications were that the action began with a slip and then continued without verification of correctness of the initial act.

**Failure to complete action**
These errors are typical “lapse” errors or errors of omission (Reason, 1990) where all steps in a procedure are not carried out; usually because of workload or interruptions.

There were three (3) of these errors identified across the events in the database involving fire handles, fire extinguishers, or fuel shutoff valves.

**Poor execution of action**
These are errors of technique rather than omission. The action taken was poorly executed.

This sub-category contains thirteen (13) instances of ICR’s representing a wide variety of poorly executed actions. Assignment of some of the errors to this category versus one on “poor piloting skills” can be argued depending on the breadth or narrowness of one’s definition of piloting skills. These errors tend to be in the way a procedure or step(s) in the procedure are executed as opposed to airplane handling skills. The latter errors are classified as poor piloting skills here.

**Failure to initiate action**
These errors may be caused by inattention or a failure to recognize a cue pattern as indicating a non-normal condition. They are the action side of failure to recognize.

One event contained an error that could clearly be categorized as being of this type.

**Poor/no crew coordination in carrying out action**
There is some ambivalence as to whether this is an error type or contributing factor at this point. There is also a “poor/no crew coordination” category under Contributing Factors. The event lists do overlap to some extent, but the distinction is between poor/no crew coordination in executing a particular action (here) vs. lack of crew coordination in general (contributing factor). It is further distinguished from an earlier discussed error category which focused on failures to communicate specific cue data between Captain and crew.

This was another large sub-category of errors which spanned the time frame of the database as well as airplane generation. In other words, it continues to be a contributor to PSM+ICR events. There were twenty-one (21) errors in this category.

**Poor piloting skills (closed-loop control skills)**
These errors are specifically related to controlling the flight path of the airplane.

There were ten (10) errors of this type in the database events with the majority occurring in events which happened during in middle years of the database time frame.

**Failure to initiate action in a timely manner**
This is an attempt to capture the timing aspect of errors.
The nine (9) errors identified in this section represent instances where the timing error played a major role in the poor performance in dealing with the event. Timing may also have played a part in other errors identified elsewhere.

**Violations**

Reason (1990) defines two levels of violations. His terms are used here but the definitions are specific to this application. Crew actions in these events were assigned to the following categories when specific evidence of a violation was documented in the database. Needless to say, this was very rare. Inferred violations were not recorded.

**Routine**
These are the more “minor” violations of company policy or procedures but which can have a major impact on the course of an event.

Two violations of the sort could be positively identified from the turbofan summary database.

**Exceptional**
This category was used when the violation was of a more serious nature and made a direct contribution to the event.

Two violations of the sort could be positively identified from the turbofan summary database

**Factors That Contribute to Errors**

These aspects of the events were identified and categorized for the purpose of providing “context” for the events. Relating contributing factors to the error data offers the possibility of understanding at least some of the conditions which have relevance to or seriously impact human performance and may provide a framework for better understanding the “why” of human error.

Seventeen different “contributing factors” were identified as being present and having played a part in enhancing the potential for errors. These were:

*Data not present or unreadable* - present in four (4) events

*Workload due to: weather or ATC and Dispatch communication requirements* - One event

*Lack of training on condition (event + context)* - Twenty one (21) events; all but one inferred from time frame and/or availability of training aids.

*Little or no experience with condition(s)* - Thirteen (13) events; inferred from actions or time in position data.

*Fatigue* - Two events

*Weather* - Twelve (12) events; this factor was generally reported for all events.

*Runway conditions* - Nine (9) events; this factor was also reported if other than bare and dry.

*Loss of situation awareness* - Three events; strong evidence available to support inference. May have been present at some level in most, if not all, events.

*Poor/no crew coordination* - Twenty four (24) events. The classification of poor crew coordination as a contributing factor is based on evidence and inference of its poor quality or absence based on overall crew performance.
System(s) fail to operate because of MEL action - One event.

Bird strike or assumed bird strike - Nine (9) events. Usually the assumption made was that more than one engine had been affected by bird strike.

Conditions not as calculated (weight, wind speed/direction, etc.) - one event

Night - One event. There may have been a number of events which occurred at night but in only one was it considered a contributing factor to the event itself.

Equipment failure - Ten (10) events; where the equipment failure contributed to the severity of the event. All events began with some type of propulsion system malfunction.

Maintenance error(s) - One event

Design - four events; all involving lack of alert for thrust asymmetry

Negative transfer - Three events; all inferred from previous pilot experience (sometimes extensive) with “outside in” ADI where pilots were flying “inside out” ADI at the time of the event.

Inadequate/inappropriate procedures in place for the conditions - two events

Procedure not available (no formal procedure exists) - database detail too limited support identification of this condition as a contributing factor at this time.
BACKGROUND

The attached material is an attempt to classify cognitive errors based on analysis of the Turbofan Summary Database in such a way as to support the development of detailed recommendations on solutions for addressing PSM+ICR issues. The “model” used as adapted from Rasmussen (1982) is shown in Figure 1. It illustrates the now ubiquitous error classification levels of skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based errors as well as Rasmussen’s inverted U components. The error categories identified within this context include only the basic cognitive functions. The transitions between functions are illustrated with arrows. Application of the model to accident/incident data has resulted in the identification of varying numbers of specific error types (sub-categories) within the basic categories. Additional error types may be defined and refinement of existing definition wording can be expected also with any future work on the model.

The primary weakness in the error classification process is the variability in the amount of human performance data in the accident/incident reports upon which to base error classification interpretations. In some cases, the classifications are highly inferential while in others the conclusions are well supported by the data available. The rationale for assigning the cognitive errors in a particular event (accident/incident/occurrence) to a particular error classification category are illustrated by general descriptive material plus behavioral statements or statements of conditions. These statements are labeled with an alpha-numeric ID which matches the event ID on the Turbofan-DC&ATG Summary Database. Thus, the error judgments are tied directly to the database. Most of the error categories have examples of crew behavior or assumptions about crew behavior (i.e., inappropriate crew responses) that support the assignment of a particular error category to a particular event.

The items that are listed at the end under “Factors That Contribute to Errors” are a partial listing of the “ecological” variables that must be considered in solving human-machine interface problems. As Vicente (1997) proposes, we must take an ecological as well as cognitive approach to developing the interface. This applies whether the solutions proposed are training, procedural, or design.

TYPES OF ERRORS (With Explanations and Examples)

Detect (D)

Errors classified under this general category relate to the initial process of gathering data needed to ascertain “what is happening and where” during a non-normal event. Errors committed here can affect the entire process of transforming data into information as the basis for decisions and actions.

1. Data not attended to (cues, announcements, context, wx info, etc.)
These errors relate to a failure to obtain the data necessary to ascertain system state. It is generally difficult, if not impossible, to determine “why” data were not obtained. However, the fact that the necessary data was not used in determining action taken is usually quite obvious. The answer to the “why” question often lies in integrating relevant information about Contributing Factors from the event report. There are two additional sub-categories within this category.

a. Failure to monitor throttle position and engine parameter display behavior (EPDB).

96/MNB/2/I - Engine indications showing #1 eng. at flight idle not flamed out as assumed by crew; #1 eng. throttle at idle position.
95/EWB/2/HF - Engine indications showing #1 eng. thrust settings lower than #2 and decreasing; #1 eng. throttle retarding toward idle while #2 throttle remains at high thrust level.

b. Failure to monitor EPDB over time between/across engines.

89/MNB/2/HF - Vibration indication on #1 eng. ignored; Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) of both engines not monitored closely due to numerous radio communication interruptions and initiatives. Missed erratic behavior of N1 on #1 eng.
88/MNB/2/S - Capt. as PNF apparently not monitoring engine instruments
88/EWB/3/I - F/E not monitoring reverser unlock lights
86/2ND/2/I - Engine operating status not determined following bird strike
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Failed to acquire relevant EPDB before abort decision
75/2ND/3/S - Capt. failed to obtain input on status of propulsion system prior to abort decision.
70/2ND/2/H - Capt. as PNF failed to carefully scan engine instruments before acting

2. Data attended to then forgotten
These memory lapse errors are difficult to identify or infer unless there is a direct report of their occurrence by the crew.

3. Data misperceived
This category is meant to cover those instances where the crew misread, mishear data/cues in the process of trying to ascertain “what is happening and where”. This is also very difficult to infer and differentiate from “not attending to” and “partially or poorly integrated” error classifications. Examples are:
- Look at one parameter and encode it mentally as another; e.g., observe eng. #1 parameters decreasing but label them eng. #2 for further action; or
- Misperceive callout of “eng. #2 fail” as “eng. #1 fail”.

81/EWB/4/I - Apparent misperception of Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) cues
81/2ND/2/I - Both engines perceived as failed, only #1 eng. had in fact failed
70/2ND/2/H - Capt. misinterpreted F/O rudder over-correction to right as #2 eng. fail and incorrectly “perceived” #2 eng. instruments spooling down.
94/2ND/3/I - Tower personnel misperceived affected engine and gave incorrect identification of affected engine to the crew.

Interpretation (I)
This category contains more errors than any of the others. The integration and interpretation functions of the data transformation process are most sensitive to rule and knowledge base errors. These errors are cognitive errors and as such very difficult to verify as to their exact nature because their classification depends so heavily on inference. The strength of the inferences varies across events as a function of the paucity of the human factors related data that is typically included in accident, incident, and occurrence reports.

1. Data partially or poorly integrated (key relationships not noted)
These errors represent failure to properly and adequately complete the integration function in transforming data (as individual cues) into information (as the answer to the questions “what’s happening and where is it happening; i.e., system or component affected). The accident/incident/occurrence event often occurs because of a combination of system malfunction plus pilot error in terms of incorrect interpretations of system state (based on incomplete data) coupled with actions taken on the basis of these incorrect interpretations. It is extremely difficult to differentiate between “not attended to” and “partially or poorly integrated” cognitive behavior - given
the database. Thus, classification of this inferred behavior may, in some cases, be arbitrary or even redundant between these two types of error. Proper completion of the integration function is critical to accurate interpretation. Failures may be knowledge-driven, the result of time constraint, or perceptual (e.g., can’t read instruments due to vibration).

a. Action taken on the basis of one or two cues (e.g., loud bang, bang + yaw, bang + vibration, yaw + vibration, etc.)

96/MWB/4/I - Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; yaw, noise
94/MWB/2/I-1 - Crew could not readily determine which eng. was affected. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; yaw, noise.
94/MWB/4/I - Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; noise
93/MWB/2/I-3 - Retarding of both throttles at low altitude (500 ft) indicates pilot not sure which engine is surging.
93/MWB/3/I - Speed of reaction to noise and yaw cues precluded analysis of what actually was happening.
93/MNB/2/I - Failed the correlate throttle position/movement, A/T engaged, and EPDB to properly identify the problem. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; eng. parameters winding down
93/MWB/3/I - Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; yaw, noise
88/MNB/2/S - Quick scan by F/O as PF missed any Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) to indicate what was happening where. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; two loud bangs and slight yaw to left
88/EWB/4/S - Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; action taken based on Capt. hand movement toward throttles.
86/EWB/2/H - Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; loud noise, heavy vibrations.
85/2ND/2/HF - Malfunctioning engine not properly identified by both crew members. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; yaw and noise.
85/MWB/2/I - Buffet cue was difficult to isolate to an engine. Other cues not properly integrated to identify affected engine. Action taken on vibration alone.
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Failed to integrate and interpret Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) reflecting engine performance before initiating RTO procedures. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; birds present, loud bang.
81/EWB/4/S - F/E based response to Capt. query re what was happening on EGT limit light only. Called “Engine Fire”.
81/2ND/3/S - EPDB data not integrated over time. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; loud Bang(s) partial power loss on affected engine.
78/EWB/4/S - Capt. apparently was not certain whether #3 or #4 eng. was affected. Failed to deploy thrust reversers on #3 and #4 eng. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; loud Bang
76/EWB/3/I - EPDB not integrated for accurate assessment of propulsion system status. Action taken on loud bang only.
75/2ND/3/S - No additional data other than perceived “marked deceleration” cue used in making abort decision.
75/EWB/4/I-1 - Interpretation of #3 eng. failure based only on “N1 decreasing”
72/2ND/2/S - Time between hitting pools of standing water and decision to abort was adequate to evaluate engine performance; power recovery under way. Action taken in reaction to one or two ambiguous cues; momentary reduction in rate of acceleration plus some directional control difficulties from hitting pools of standing water.
70/2ND/2/H - Capt. reacted to Bang and F/O induced yaw to the right without reference to EPDB.
69/2ND/2/H - Pilot-in-command (PIC) did not integrate all aspects of EPDB on both engines before calling “throttle it” command (or suggestion) based only on perceived 20 degree C discrepancy in EGT between #1 and #2 engines.

b. Action taken on wrong engine based on interpretation of incomplete or poorly integrated pattern of cues.

94/MWB/2/I-2 - Discrepancy between eng. crew reported surged and eng. throttled
94/2ND/3/I - Failed to verify incorrect identification of affected engine by tower.
89/MNB/2/HF - EPDB not monitored closely so pattern of parameter behaviors not observed. Failed to include vibration and erratic N1 behavior indications over time in decision to shut down an engine.
85/EWB/4/I-2 - All Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) on #4 eng. not considered in shutdown decision. Drop in fuel flow not related to thrust reduction for ATB.
81/EWB/4/I - Apparent failure to integrate EPDB cues to correctly identify affected engine.
81/2ND/2/I - EPDB on #2 eng. not integrated over time

2. Assumptions about data relationships incorrect

These errors are due to either a) limited or inaccurate mental model at the system level and possible the airplane level (i.e., relationship between propulsion and other systems, or b) misidentification of individual cues leading to misinterpretation of the nature of the event and selection of inappropriate action.

a. Erroneous assumption(s) about system or cue relationships

89/MNB/2/HF - Assumed air-conditioning to cockpit provided by #2 eng. so thought smoke and smell coming from #2 eng.
75/2ND/3/S - Association of marked deceleration cue with engine failure incorrect under the conditions (substantial standing water on runway).

b. Misidentification/interpretation of cues

88/MNB/2/S - Capt. decision to abort made on assumption that loud bang was a blown tire when stall/surge occurred due to turbine blade failure.
81/2ND/3/S - Capt. decision to abort made on assumption of uncontained engine failure.

3. Data pattern misinterpreted

Errors of this type may be directly linked to failures to properly integrate cue data because of incomplete or inaccurate mental models at the system and airplane levels as well as misidentification of cues. Time constraints and workload are also contributing factors in this type of error. There are useful distinctions to be made between the former and latter causes of the errors but it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between or among causes based on the data available in the database. Initial attempts to make this distinction were abandoned.

96/MNB/2/I - Interpreted failure of engine to spool up from flight idle as engine flameout. A/T engaged, #2 eng. throttle advanced while #1 eng. throttle at idle; #1 eng. EPDB indicating flight idle not flameout/failure.
95/EWB/2/HF - At one point, large left roll input made into eng. with low thrust while bank angle in that direction was already at least 30 degrees.
95/MWB/2/I-2 - #1 eng. Engine Parameter Data Behavior (EPDB) interpreted as eng. fail rather than as the result of A/T inputs.
94/MWB/4/I-1 - #3 eng. surged, #2 eng. shutdown; commanded thrust rollback on #2 interpreted as result of surges.
93/EWB/2/I - Misidentified affected eng. and retarded good eng. throttle at very low altitude (100 ft)
93/MNB/2/I - A/T actions in retarding throttle to maintain approach speeds interpreted as eng. failure
92/MNB/2/HF - Large aileron input in the wrong direction during attempt to recover created an unusual attitude condition possibly due to misinterpretation of ADI. Attempt to engage Heading Select to correct drift. Large
aileron input toward the low wing (opposite of what A/P was holding). ADI may have been misread due to negative transfer.

91/2ND/3/I - Cues misinterpreted as tire problem when actually an engine turbomachinery damage problem.

89/MNB/2/HF - Comparison of engines’ N1 done intermittently at just the wrong time when both values were fairly close together. Thus misinterpreting relative N1 behavior of the two engines. Misinterpreted EPDB as indicating #2 eng. malfunctioning when #1 eng. was bad. Vibration and erratic N1 behavior of #1 eng. nor considered.

88/MNB/2/S - Two Bangs and yaw were a surge misinterpreted as blown tire(s). RTO initiated because Capt. thought airplane had blown tire(s). Absence of Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) indicating engine failure.

85/2ND/2/HF - Affected engine misidentified by at least one crew member (based on first correct then incorrect rudder inputs). Yaw plus EPDB cues would establish what was happening and where.

85/MWB/2/I - Deliberate shut down of wrong engine assumed to be based on misinterpretation of EPDB observed. Lower EGT on #1 eng. interpreted as indicating affected engine where as higher EGT on #2 eng. actually indicated affected engine. Buffet continued after #1 eng. shut down.

85/EWB/4/I-2 - Drop in fuel flow on #4 eng. attributed to engine failure instead of thrust reduction.

81/EWB/4/I - EPDB may have been misinterpreted.

81/EWB/4/S - EGT limit light misinterpreted to indicate engine fire by F/E.

81/2ND/3/S - Loud bang of engine surge interpreted as a (possible) uncontained engine failure with extensive collateral damage.

81/2ND/2/I - EPDB data on #2 eng. misinterpreted by crew as engine failure.

75/2ND/3/S - Perceived “marked deceleration” caused by standing water on the runway misinterpreted as engine failure.

75/EWB/4/I-1 - Misinterpreted decreasing N1 as engine failure (also I-1 error).

72/EWB/4/I-2 - Quick action to shut down #2 eng. based on misinterpretation of poorly integrated data.

72/2ND/2/S - Loss of acceleration and directional control problems misinterpreted as loss of thrust to degree takeoff was no longer feasible and RTO initiated.

70/2ND/2/H - Capt. misinterpreted F/O rudder over-correction to right as #2 eng. fail and incorrectly “perceived” #2 eng. instruments spooling down.

69/2ND/2/H - PIC misinterpreted EPDB and erroneously identified #1 eng. and the affected engine.

4. Failure to obtain relevant data/information from crew members (D-1). Errors classified under this category might also be classified as being of the “partially or poorly integrated data” type. However, the separate callout of failing to integrate input from crew members into the pattern of cues is considered important for developing recommendations. These errors are different from “not attending to inputs from crew members” which would be classified as detection errors.

a. Failure of Captain to obtain all relevant inputs from crew.

91/MNB/2/H - Crew unaware of clear ice on wings (input from ground crew).

89/MNB/2/HF - Failed to ask cabin crew for help in identifying affected engine.

85/EWB/4/I-2 - Failed to check among flight crew members for actions that would account for fuel flow reduction in #4 eng.

85/EWB/4/I-1 - Capt. failed to obtain EPDB interpretation from F/E.

75/2ND/3/S - Capt. failed to obtain status of propulsion system from F/E.

70/2ND/2/H - Capt. failed to obtain input from F/O who was PF as to what he thought was happening.

b. Failure of crew members to provide relevant data or failure to cross-check erroneous data.


81/EWB/4/S - Capt. based abort decision on incorrect diagnosis of engine fault made by F/E.

69/2ND/2/H - Failure to verify the PIC’s identification of the affected engine.

5. Failure to interpret condition (event + context) as non-normal

This error classification is used when crews failed to realize that the airplane was in an
unsafe or non-normal condition.

95/EWB/2/HF - Airplane in a climbing left turn as required for departure being flown; fail to recognize that combination of stuck throttle and A/T system behavior was producing desired flight path and not pilot inputs.

85/EWB/4/S - Crew failed to note sub-idle condition of #4 eng.

6. Nature of relationships among cues/annunciations not understood
The behavior that would dictate a classification difference between this category and “data pattern misinterpreted” will be hard to come by from the database as it exists. The “bewilderment” aspect of the behavior would support this error classification. It may simply not be meaningful to break the classification down to this level.

7. Knowledge of system operation under non-normal conditions lacking or incomplete
These errors are based on erroneous or incomplete mental models of system performance under non-normal conditions. There is some apparent overlap with the I-3 category, but the link to faulty mental model is clearer.

a. Faulty mental model at the system level

88/2ND/2/HF - Simultaneous or alternate (as appropriate) reduction of power on the engines may extend their operating life somewhat under these circumstances.

86/EWB/2/H - PF not aware of (or did not believe) information about engine capabilities following bird strike.

86/2ND/2/I - PF not aware of (or did not believe) information about engine capabilities following bird strike.

85/EWB/4/I-1 - PF not aware of (or did not believe) information about engine capabilities following bird strike.

72/2ND/2/S - Decision to reject takeoff based on incorrect assessment of thrust producing capability of the engines.

b. Faulty mental model at the airplane level

89/MNB/2/HF - Major factor in shutting down of #2 eng. was erroneous assumption as to source of smoke and smell.

83/EWB/4/S - F/E apparently not aware of effect of gradually reducing throttle on V1 speed/distance relationship.

83/1ST/2/HF - Lowered Gear & flaps simultaneously causing loss of airspeed at critical time.

78/EWB/3/I-2 - Abort decision triggered by onset of “Engine Fail Light” when crew had a flyable airplane.

77/2ND/3/I - “Engine Fail” light interpreted as not having flyable airplane.

77/EWB/3/I - “Engine Fail” light interpreted as not having flyable airplane.

Establish Goal (EG)
Errors classified under this general heading are knowledge-based errors.

1. Established an inappropriate goal
RTO events would be listed here only if there were no airline published policy or procedure and pilots were never exposed to the Boeing Takeoff Safety Training Aid. Otherwise the RTO events are rule-based errors.

2. Failure to properly prioritize goals (Selection of a goal for first action blocks achievement of other important goals)

3. Failure to recognize conflicting goals

Strategy/Procedure (S/P)

1. Improper strategy/procedure chosen
These are rule-based errors where the crew chose to execute an inappropriate procedure for the conditions or a strategy which deviated from “best practices”. Aborting a takeoff above V1 is an example of the former; reducing power on engines below safe altitude is an example of the latter.

a. Execute RTO procedure when airplane has achieved V1 speed or higher

96/MWB/4/I - Chose to abort TO above V1 for surge
93/MWB/3/I - F/O chose to abort takeoff for surge at or above V1; Capt. intervened and continued takeoff.
93/EWB/4/I-2 - F/O chose to abort takeoff for surge at or above V1 and assumed FOD had occurred
92/EWB/4/I - Chose to execute an RTO for surge at a speed above V1
91/MNB/2/I - Chose to execute RTO for surge at Vr (with plenty of runway)
91/EWB/2/I - Chose to execute RTO for vibration and perceived power loss well above V1.
88/MNB/2/S - Attempted RTO above V1. Takeoff should not have been aborted for either surge or blown tire.
88/EWB/4/S - F/O initiated RTO well above V1 on own initiative following engine fire warning
88/2ND/2/I - Chose to initiate RTO well above V1 when potential for bird strikes was obvious well before V1
86/EWB/2/H - Chose to initiate RTO at Vr following bird strike
86/2ND/2/I - Chose to initiate RTO at Vr following bird strike
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Chose to initiate RTO 19 kts above V1 on wet runway following a ’bird strike with two reversers inoperative.
81/2ND/3/S - Chose to initiate RTO at Vr + with nose gear off the ground.
78/EWB/3/I-2 - Given runway conditions and two good engines, an RTO initiated at V1 would not have been the correct procedure to chose. Although RTO purported to have been initiated at V1, snow pack over ice at stopping end of runway reduced braking efficiency. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.
78/EWB/4/S - Chose to initiate RTO well above V1
77/2ND/3/I - Chose to initiate RTO at VR with flyable airplane. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions
77/EWB/3/I - Chose to initiate RTO at VR + with flyable airplane. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.
76/EWB/3/I - Chose to initiate RTO above Vr with flyable airplane on contaminated runway. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.
75/2ND/3/S - Chose to initiate RTO near Vr with flyable airplane on wet runway. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.
72/2ND/2/S - Chose to initiate RTO above V1 with flyable airplane on a wet runway. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.
70/2ND/2/H - Capt. chose to assume control of airplane and initiate a RTO 50-100 ft off the ground and above V2. Airplane could not be stopped on the runway under these conditions.

b. Power reduction below safe operating altitude

94/MWB/2/I-1 - Chose to reduce thrust on both engines at very low altitude (290 ft) following surge in left eng.
94/MWB/2/I-2 - Chose to reduce thrust on one eng. near Vr to clear surge
93/MWB/2/I-3 - Chose to reduce thrust on both engines at low altitude (500 ft) during takeoff
93/EWB/2/I - Chose to retard throttle below 400 ft.
69/2ND/2/H - Pilot-in-charge rapidly closed identified throttle below 200 ft.

c. Other strategies which deviate from “best practice”

96/1ST/4/HF - Continued TO after losing one, possibly two engines, before V1
96/MNB/2/I - Chose to close fuel shutoff lever when engine at flight idle because of malfunctioning A/T.
95/EWB/2/HF - Tried to engage A/P while in 45 degree bank as a recovery strategy.
93/MNB/2/I - Chose to shut down good eng.
91/MNB/2/H - Crew chose to take off with clear ice on wings. During takeoff, the ice came loose and was ingested into both engines causing FOD and unrecoverable surging.
92/MNB/2/HF - Actions taken created an unusual attitude at night.
89/MNB/2/HF - Chose to shut down good engine and leave it shut down on final approach, thus relying on power from severely damaged engine.
88/2ND/2/HF - Applying continuous max power with heavy FOD is not conducive to sustained engine operation.
85/1ST/4/H - RTO initiated at high speed with insufficient runway remaining.
85/MWB/2/I - Strategy to reduce vibration and save engine not achieved because of wrong engine shutdown.
83/1ST/2/HF - Chose to execute downwind landing. Gear & flaps down simultaneously caused reduced airspeed. Did not immediately select takeoff power.
83/EWB/4/S - F/E attempted to control EGT by gradually reducing throttle on affected engine instead of calling for an abort fairly early in the takeoff run (80 kts). No V1 call.
82/EWB/4/I - Capt. reduced then restored power to malfunctioning engine till engine failed. Procedure is to shut it down for high vibration.
81/1ST/4/I - ATB procedure executed inappropriate for the conditions. Attempted landing overweight, 25 kts fast onto wet runway, with tailwind.
81/1ST/4/H - PF Created thrust imbalance at low speed by bringing in #2 eng. reverser with #3 eng. shut down.
81/EWB/4/S - F/E’s failure to set full takeoff power prior to 80 kts moved V1 distance point further down the runway making a successful RTO more difficult if not impossible. Takeoff roll started 150 meters down the runway also moving calculated V1 point. (Overrun was 20 meters)
79/2ND/2/S - Capt. shut down both engines and descended 15,000 ft before restarting good engine.

2. Strategy/procedure could not be achieved due to lack of appropriate skill/knowledge
These errors are knowledge-based. The goal selected may have been appropriate but the crew did not have the knowledge or skill to implement an appropriate strategy.

88/2ND/2/HF - ATB would not be successful without careful management of thrust applications
83/1ST/2/HF - Crew committed several piloting errors in addition to loss of control.

3. Choosing not to implement appropriate procedure
These are rule-based errors where correct procedures or strategies were clearly available but disregarded. They are often the flip side of choosing an improper procedure strategy.

96/1ST/4/HF - Did not execute RTO with engine fail below V1
83/EWB/4/S - F/E chose to reduce power on affected engine rather than call “engine fail”.

4. Failure to reconcile conflicting strategies/procedures
No errors recorded so far that could serve to operationally define this type of error.

Execute (E)

1. Carry out unintended action
These are the classic “slip” errors as defined by Reason (1990).

94/MWB/2/I-1 - #2 eng. throttle reduced inadvertently when #1 throttle pulled back in response to surge.
94/MWB/4/I - Intention aspect inferred; reached for #3 and shutdown #2 (or see E-1).
94/MWB/2/I-2 - #1 eng. reported as having surged, #2 eng. throttle reduced 30% at rotation.
85/2ND/2/HF - Assume wrong rudder inputs not intentional
82/EWB/4/I - F/E pulled fire handle on #1 eng. instead of #2 eng. as ordered.
81/EWB/4/I - Engine shutdown could have been a slip
80/EWB/3/I - Possible inadvertent shutdown of #2 eng. during shutdown of #3 eng. Nobody admitting it.
79/EWB/4/I-1 - Possible inadvertent shutdown of #3 eng. while executing shutdown procedure on #2 eng.
78/EWB/4/I - #3 eng. inadvertently shut down in process of shutting down #4 eng
78/2ND/3/I-1 - #1 eng. shut down inadvertently while trying to shift essential power source to #2 eng. after first trying to select #1 eng.
77/EWB/4/I - Possible inadvertent shutdown of #1 eng. when #2 eng. failed. Inability to restart #1 makes this questionable.
75/EWB/4/I-2 - inadvertent cutoff of fuel to #4 eng. (fire handle or fuel shutoff valve) while shutting down #3 eng. following compressor surge.
72/EWB/4/I-1 - Fuel valve for #2 eng. inadvertently closed during shutdown procedure being executed for #3 eng.
70/EWB/4/I - Fuel cutoff valve on #1 eng. inadvertently closed when engine fire warning occurred in #2 eng.
69/2ND/2/H - In process of reducing #1 throttle to idle, #2 throttle partially closed

2. Failure to complete action
These errors are typical “lapse” errors or errors of omission where all steps in a procedure are not carried out; usually because of workload or interruptions.

95/MWB/2/I-2 - #1 eng. shutdown with fire handle. Fire handle not returned to OFF position before attempting to restart #1.
83/1ST/2/H - Crew failed to discharge fire extinguishers as part of shutdown procedure.
68/1ST/4/HF - Failed to close fuel shutoff valve in pylon; failed to shut off booster pumps.

3. Poor execution of action
These are errors of technique rather than omission. The action taken was poorly executed.

90/1ST/4/H - Failed to execute RTO procedure adequately; poor braking technique
88/MNB/2/S - Slammed nose gear back on runway while both pilots applied maximum braking causing nose gear to collapse.
88/2ND/2/I - Failed to deploy spoilers as part of RTO procedure
88/EWB/4/I - Allowed airplane to over-rotate by 11 degrees and right wing drop when surge in #4 eng. occurred at rotation.
85/2ND/2/HF - Control inputs resulted in high speed stall and rudder into the dead engine.
83/1ST/2/HF - Did not select takeoff power immediately. Gear & flaps lowered simultaneously.
81/1ST/4/H - Unstable approach; landed long
81/EWB/4/S - F/E did not bring engines up to full takeoff power before 80 kts. Capt. did not apply maximum continuous braking during RTO. No indication of reversers being used.
78/EWB/4/S - PF delay in applying brakes; reversers on #3 and #4 eng. not deployed
78/EWB/4/I - Engine shutdown procedure not properly executed (fire handle or fuel switch for #3 eng. inadvertently moved during shutdown of #4 eng.)
69/1ST/4/S - Delay in applying brakes on top of overload, rolling takeoff, and a reduction in reported head wind led to overrun.
69/2ND/2/H - Poor execution of engine shutdown procedures resulted in fire and fatalities
68/1ST/4/HF - Poor execution of engine shutdown procedures resulted in fire and fatalities

4. Failure to initiate action
These errors may be caused by inattention or a failure to recognize a cue pattern as indicating a non-normal condition. They are the action side of failure to recognize.

95/EWB/2HF - Stuck throttle condition existed for 42 seconds with no action taken to correct problem; no rudder input throughout entire event.

5. Poor/no crew coordination in carrying out action
There is some ambivalence as to whether this is an error type or contributing factor at this point. There is also a “poor/no crew coordination” category under Contributing Factors. The event lists do overlap to some extent, but the distinction is between poor/no crew coordination in executing a particular action (here) vs. lack of crew coordination in general (contributing factor).
93/MWB/3/I - No evidence of formal transfer of control from F/O to Capt.
89/MNB/2/HF - Failed to coordinate with cabin crew; Capt. and F/O working independently, Capt. did not cross-check and verify F/O identification of affected engine.
88/MNB/2/S - Capt. took control of airplane during RTO without verbal call for control resulting briefly in conflicting control inputs
88/EWB/3/I - F/E failed to advise Capt. immediately of status of reverser unlock lights
88/EWB/4/S - Capt. did not call for RTO, F/O assumed Capt. hand movement toward throttles a signal to abort takeoff.
88/2ND/2/I - No cross-check to assure proper execution of procedure
85/2ND/2/HF - Assume two pilots making control inputs or giving directions for control inputs which are not correlated with required control inputs for the situation.
85/EWB/4/I-2 - Coordination among crew on thrust reduction and apparent failure of #4 eng. did not occur.
83/EWB/4/S - F/E did not advise Capt. of actions/intentions. No V1` call out made. No V1 speed bug used.
83/1ST/2/H - No cross-check by crew on proper and complete execution of shutdown procedure.
81/EWB/4/I - Poor coordination between Capt. and F/E in accomplishing engine shutdown.
81/EWB/4/S - Capt. did not call for RTO, F/O assumed Capt. hand movement toward throttles a signal to abort takeoff.
81/2ND/3/S - F/E failed to advised Capt. that engine had not failed completely.
81/2ND/2/I - Crew failed to coordinate interpretation of Engine Parameter Display Behavior (EPDB) for correct analysis of event.
78/2ND/2/H - Instructor pilot attempting Go-Around while student pilot was applying brakes.
78/2ND/3/I-1 - Assume action on procedure shared among crew members.
72/EWB/4/I-2 - Malfunction diagnostic process not well coordinated among crew
71/1ST/4/H - Total lack of crew coordination during loss of control event.
70/2ND/2/H - Capt. as PNF did not perform his duties of scanning engine instruments to determine what was happening where; F/O stayed on the controls after Capt. assumed control and called for control verbally.
69/2ND/2/H - PIC should not have intruded into flying the airplane and dealing with the engine malfunction.
68/1ST/4/HF - Poor crew coordination in dealing with malfunction.

6. Poor piloting skills (closed-loop control skills)
These errors are specifically related to controlling the flight path of the airplane.

92/MNB/2/HF - Poor systems monitoring
90/1ST/4/H - Poor execution of braking action
88/EWB/4/I - Poor airplane control during surge at rotation
85/2ND/2/HF - Elevator and rudder inputs where exactly the opposite of what they should have been.
83/1ST/4/HF - Poor airplane control on lift off with #4 eng. set at reduced power for ferry flight
83/1ST/2/HF - Lost control during final approach, wing tip caught the ground.
81/1ST/4/H - Lost control when created imbalance by bringing in #2 reverser with #3 eng. shut down
81/1ST/4/I - Unstable approach
73/1ST/2/HF - Loss of control during Go-Around. Strange, would have expected plane to go in to the left.
71/1ST/4/H - Loss of control during simulated heavy wt. takeoff.

7. Failure to initiate action in a timely manner
This is an attempt to capture the timing aspect of errors.

92/MNB/2/HF - Failed to advance #2 throttle manually at level off; failure to assume manual control during thrust asymmetry recovery
92/MWB/2/I - Failed to address rollback to subidle when it occurred (action delayed for over 7 minutes.
88/EWB/3/I - Failed to immediately reduce power on all engines
88/2ND/2/I - Failed to immediately deploy “lift dumpers” (spoilers)
88/EWB/4/I - Failed to correct properly for surge in #4 eng. at rotation
85/EWB/4/S - Failure to recover from unusual attitude before losing 32,000 ft.
83/EWB/4/S - F/E failed to advise Capt. of engine failure in a timely manner.
78/EWB/4/S - Delay in initiating RTO at or very near V1 when surge occurred
68/1ST/4/HF - Failure to turn off booster pumps resulted fuel being pumped onto the ramp for 20 minutes.
Violations (V)

Reason (1990) defines two levels of violations. His terms are used here but the definitions are specific to this application. Crew actions in these events were assigned to the following categories when specific evidence of a violation was documented in the database. Needless to say, this was very rare. Inferred violations were not recorded.

1. Routine

These are the more “minor” violations of company policy or procedures but which can have a major impact on the course of an event.

88/MNB/2/S - RTO procedures not briefed before takeoff
83/EWB/4/S - F/E Reduced throttle instead of calling “engine fail”. No V1 call

2. Exceptional

This category was used when the violation was of a more serious nature and had a direct contribution to the event.

70/2ND/2/H - Company procedures and applicable flight manuals dictate that crew should have continued takeoff with one engine inoperative.
69/2ND/2/H - Pilot-in-charge took action on the throttles below 700 ft in direct violation of company policy (training manual)

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ERRORS

These aspects of the events were identified and categorized for the purpose of providing “context” for the events. Relating contributing factors to the error data offers the possibility of understanding at least some of the conditions which have relevance to or seriously impact human performance and may provide a framework for better understanding the “why” of human error; particularly the cognitive errors.

1. Data not present or unreadable

91/EWB/2/I - Pilot reported vibration so bad couldn’t read instruments (however, also reported perceived loss of power.)
86/EWB/2/H - Crew reported lateral vibrations so heavy could not read instruments
85/2ND/2/HF - Outside horizon not visible from this airplane during this phase of flight.
78/EWB/3/I-2 - Condition of runway at stopping end may not have been available to the crew although should have been expected given the location and time of year.

2. Workload due to: wx, ATC and Dispatch interface requirements

89/MNB/2/HF - F/O and Capt. talking to ATC and Dispatch several times during the event. These communications interrupted crew’s attempt to coordinate on several occasions. F/O trying unsuccessfully to reprogram FMC in decent and initial approach.

3. Lack training on condition (event + context)

96/MWB/4/I - Inferred from general lack of training across airlines on surges
96/MNB/2/1 - Inferred from general lack of training across airlines on subtle A/T failures
95/EWB/2/HF - Inferred from general lack of training on event across airlines; F/O as PF was low time
92/MNB/2/HF - No unusual attitude recovery training available to crew
92/EWB/4/I - Takeoff Safety Training Aid not available
91/MNB/2/H - Conditions outside crew training experience
89/MNB/2/HF - Conditions outside crew training experience
88/2ND/2/HF - Crew lacked training on procedures with multiple engine FOD
88/EWB/4/I - PF lacked training for surge at this point in takeoff under adverse wind conditions.
86/EWB/2/H - Crew lacked training on RTO decision criteria; Takeoff Safety Training Aid not published yet.
85/2ND/2/HF - Extensive review of crew training by NTSB documented this
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Inferred from general lack of training on event across airlines
83/1ST/4/HF - Conditions outside crew training experience
83/1ST/2/HF - Crew had not completed emergency procedures training
81/EWB/4/S - F/E lacked training and/or skill on engine malfunction identification.
81/2ND/3/S - Capt. lacked takeoff safety training to counter earlier experience.
78/2ND/2/H - Student pilot not trained on engine loss procedure for takeoff or Go-Around
77/2ND/3/I - Crew lacked training on criteria for RTO’s (assumed based on time frame)
77/EWB/3/I - Crew lacked training on criteria for RTO’s (assumed based on time frame)
76/EWB/3/I - Crew lacked training on criteria for RTO’s (assumed based on time frame)
73/1ST/2/HF - Conditions outside crew training experience

4. Little or no experience with condition(s)
   96/1ST/4/HF - Inferred from action taken
   96/MWB/4/I - Inferred from event occurrence frequency
   95/EWB/2/HF - Inferred from action or lack of action taken. Low time F/O as PF. Same event occurred on
   same airplane on the previous flight.
   92/MNB/2/HF - Lack of experience with condition inferred from actions
   89/MNB/2/HF - Low time crew members in both positions
   88/MNB/2/S - First RTO for either pilot
   88/2ND/2/HF - Inferred from action taken
   86/EWB/2/H - Inferred from action taken
   85/2ND/2/HF - Both pilots low time in type
   85/EWB/4/I-1 - Inferred from action taken
   83/1ST/4/HF - Inferred from actions taken
   83/1ST/2/HF - Inferred from series of inappropriate actions taken.
   78/2ND/2/H - Student pilot’s lack of experience caused startle reaction and inappropriate response (applying
   brakes during go-around)

5. Fatigue
   96/1ST/4/HF - Inferred from night TO
   69/2ND/2/H - fatigue cited as possible factor in poor judgment displayed by PIC’s

6. Weather
   95/EWB/2/HF - Departure in snow storm
   91/MNB/2/H - Clear ice on wings
   88/EWB/4/I - Squally crosswinds on takeoff
   86/2ND/2/I - Heavy rain
   85/EWB/4/I-1 - Heavy rain showers before event
   81/1ST/4/H - Typhoon conditions for landing, gusty tail and crosswinds
   81/1ST/4/I - unstable ?
   78/EWB/3/I-2 - Blowing snow
   76/EWB/3/I - Rain, sleet, snow, wind
   75/2ND/3/S - Recent rain
   72/2ND/2/S - Raining
   69/1ST/4/S - Shifting winds

7. Runway conditions
   86/2ND/2/I - Very wet runway (standing water?)
   85/EWB/4/I-1 - wet runway
   81/1ST/4/H - wet runway
   81/1ST/4/I - 7.5 kt tailwind
   78/EWB/3/I-2 - Snow pack over ice at stopping end of runway
   77/EWB/3/I - Wet runway
   76/EWB/3/I - Runway contaminated (sleet, rain, snow)
75/2ND/3/S - Wet runway with extensive area of standing water
72/2ND/2/S - Wet runway with pools of standing water

8. Loss of situation awareness
95/EWB/2/HF - Neither member of the crew was aware of why airplane was flying the way it was.
92/MNB/2/HF - Crew not aware of A/T and A/P inputs in response to thrust asymmetry produced by malfunctioning throttle system
85/EWB/4/S - Capt. lost situational awareness while dealing with inflight malfunction

9. Poor/no crew coordination
96/1ST/4/HF - Inferred
95/EWB/2/HF - No cross-check by PNF of PF actions or inaction
93/MWB/3/I - Inadequate RTO criteria briefing before takeoff (Inferred from actions)
92/MNB/2/HF - No cross-check of airplane system conditions by both pilots
89/MNB/2/HF - Lack of crew coordination from onset of event to crash
88/MNB/2/S - Capt. as PNF not doing engine instrument scan during takeoff roll; no positive call out indicating Capt. was taking control to execute a RTO.
88/EWB/4/S - No clear understanding of criteria or signal for RTO briefed before takeoff. On taxi out, F/O had asserted emphatically that if an RTO were required, HE would execute the procedure.
88/2ND/2/I - No cross-check of procedure items by crew to assure proper completion
85/EWB/4/I-2 - Poor coordination and cross-checking by crew on true status of engines and who was doing what to which engine.
85/EWB/4/S - Crew failed to monitor and cross-check engine and flight instruments.
83/EWB/4/S - F/E failed to keep Capt. advised of his actions/intentions. No V1 callout.
83/1ST/2/HF - Crew failed to carry out basic airmanship tasks.
82/EWB/4/I - Procedural errors and slips by Capt. and F/E. Lack of crew coordination.
81/EWB/4/S - Poor coordination of engine shutdown procedure between Capt. and F/E.
81/EWB/4/S - Poor coordination of RTO procedures
81/2ND/3/S - Capt. not advised by F/E on affected engine EPDB status.
81/1ST/4/I - Crew did not plan effective ATB strategy.
78/2ND/2/H - Student pilot not briefed for this event
78/2ND/3/I-I - Non-normal procedure execution not coordinated
76/EWB/3/I - Crew failed to coordinate info exchange on propulsion system status
75/2ND/3/S - Crew failed to coordinate info exchange on propulsion system status
72/2ND/2/S - - Crew failed to coordinate info exchange on propulsion system status
70/2ND/2/H - Both pilots were on the control during the RTO; no verification of airplane status between crew members.
69/2ND/2/H - Affected engine identified by senior pilot in jump seat whose real purpose was to supervise co-pilot. Senior status of PIC gave too much weight to his “suggestion”. Decisions and flying the airplane should have been done by the pilot-in-charge.

10. System(s) fail to operate because of MEL action
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Two outboard thrust reversers could not be used - one inop.

11. Bird strike or assumed bird strike
93/EWB/4/I-2 - Two large common buzzards in #2 eng.
92/EWB/4/I - Bird strike initiated surge; no fan blade damage
88/2ND/2/HF - Multiple bird strikes in both engines
88/2ND/2/I - Assumed multiple bird strikes from flock of birds on runway
86/EWB/2/H - Ingested black kite bird in #2 eng.
86/2ND/2/I - Bird strike in #1 eng., at least one seagull
85/EWB/4/I-1 - Feathers present but no fan blade damage
78/2ND/2/H - Bird strike on #1 eng. during Go-Around
69/1ST/4/S - Bird strikes in three of four engines, one with FOD
12. Conditions not as calculated (weight, wind speed/direction, etc.)
   69/1ST/4/S - Fuel overload due to faulty hydrometer

13. Night
   92/MNB/2/HF

14. Equipment failure
   95/EWB/2/HF - #2 throttle stuck at high power setting with A/T engaged.
   93/MNB/2/I - Defective torque switch in A/T system suspected; Turbomachinery damage
   93/EWB/4/I-1 - Turbomachinery damage and collateral damage to second engine
   92/MNB/2/HF - #2 eng. throttle failed to respond to A/T inputs
   92/MWB/2/I - #1 eng. went to subidle at level off to cruise
   91/EWB/2/I - Tire tread ingested into #1 eng., FOD and heavy vibration
   89/MNB/2/HF - Turbomachinery damage on #1 eng.
   88/MNB/2/S - Turbomachinery damage on #1 eng.
   85/EWB/4/H - Throttle cable parted at just the wrong time resulting in full forward thrust just as other three engines went into reverse on landing.
   85/2ND/2/HF - Uncontained engine failure

15. Maintenance error(s)
   72/EWB/4/I-1 - Maintenance error produced leaking O-rings; fuel ignited and caused engine fire #3 eng.

16. Design
   96/MNB/2/I - No alert for thrust asymmetry
   95/EWB/2/HF - No alert for thrust asymmetry
   92/MNB/2/HF - No alert for thrust asymmetry
   92/MWB/2/I - No alert for thrust asymmetry

17. Negative Transfer
   92/MNB/2/HF - Previous planes flown by pilots were Russian with ADI horizon indication the opposite of airplane being flown.
   85/EWB/4/S - Failure to recover from unusual attitude before so much altitude was lost may be due to negative transfer from Russian to USA ADI’s.
   95/EWB/2/HF - Low time F/O as PF. Possible Eastern Block ADI experience involved.

18. Inadequate/inappropriate procedures in place for conditions

   91/MNB/2/H - Company policy and procedures for dealing with clear ice removal were inadequate.
   72/2ND/2/S - No policy or procedures in operators manual to provide guidance for pilots with regards to isolated pools of standing water on the runway.

19. Procedure not available(no formal procedure exists)