




U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

AFS-600
Regulatory Support Division

ADVISORY CIRCULAR 43-16A

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS



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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20590**

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS

The Aviation Maintenance Alerts provide a common communication channel through which the aviation community can economically interchange service experience and thereby cooperate in the improvement of aeronautical product durability, reliability, and safety. This publication is prepared from information submitted by those who operate and maintain civil aeronautical products. The contents include items that have been reported as significant, but which have not been evaluated fully by the time the material went to press. As additional facts such as cause and corrective action are identified, the data will be published in subsequent issues of the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts' readers prompt notice of conditions reported via Malfunction or Defect Reports. Your comments and suggestions for improvement are always welcome. Send to: FAA; ATTN: Aviation Data Systems Branch (AFS-620); P.O. Box 25082; Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

AIRPLANES


BEECH

Beech; Model B58P; Baron; Chafing Engine Exhaust Crossover Tube; ATA 8110

During a phase inspection, the technician discovered the left crossover tube (P/N 654892) was chafing on the engine-mount truss (P/N 102-910026-131).

The chafing was approximately half way through the thickness of the crossover tube. (Refer to the illustration.)

Part total time-1,187 hours.



Beech; Model 2000; Starship; Crack in Engine Nacelle; ATA 5400

The technician discovered an area that was cracked/delaminated in the production lap joint between molded halves of the closeout panel (P/N 122-910071-3). The area was approximately at the 6 o'clock position below the spinner cut-out and above the oil cooler exit duct.

The submitter stated that this area is usually dirty/greasy. To adequately inspect this area, it must be thoroughly cleaned and flexed apart. He suspects the normal airframe/propeller vibration level and/or heat caused this defect.

Part total time-2,470 hours.

CESSNA**Cessna; Model 180 Series; Rudder Control Cable Failure; ATA 2720**

The Airframe Propulsion and Services Branch (ACE-118W) of the Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), located in Wichita, Kansas, submitted the following article. (*This article is published as it was received.*)

Reports have been received of rudder control cables on the Model 182 airplanes being caught under the mounting bolt for the elevator control cable pulley at Station 156. Unsuccessful attempts were made to recreate the malfunction. While the malfunction could not be repeated by control movement, it was noted that maintenance on the airplane battery and/or avionics package, are both accessed through the same Station 156 panel and that it may be possible in some configurations to inadvertently push the rudder control cable down under the elevator pulley bolt during maintenance.

Failure to recheck the rudder control cables rigging following maintenance on the nose wheel steering or rudder trim systems could increase the potential for this to occur. Maintenance Manual procedures call for the cable rigging to be checked following work on these systems and must be adhered to.

Cessna; Model 310Q; Cracked Main Landing Gear Torque Tube; ATA 3230

During flight, the pilot noted the aircraft seemed slower and was yawing to the left. A fly-by inspection indicated the left main landing gear was down, while the right main and nose landing gears were retracted. The pilot selected the gear-down position, and all three gears indicated down-and-locked. He landed the aircraft at a maintenance base without incident.

An investigation revealed the left main gear torque tube (P/N 5045010-19) had cracked at the fork-bolt boss, and the crack had progressed around the torque tube in a spiral manner.

A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting Program data base revealed 15 additional failures of the main landing torque tube (P/N 5045010-19) that is used on the Cessna 300 and 400 series aircraft.

Part total time-5,000 hours.

Cessna; Model 414; Landing Gear Brake Failure; ATA 3240

The pilot reported that, upon landing, he noticed a loss of pressure on the right side brake.

The technician discovered the right brake master cylinder was empty. He found that there was a hydraulic leak underneath the copilot floor. Further investigation revealed a corroded aluminum brake line (P/N 5100107-69) was causing the leak. The aluminum brake line had made contact with the air distribution ducts, which caused the corrosion. The submitter also stated he found similarly corrosion on the oxygen lines in the headliner on the same aircraft. The corrosion is caused when the steel support wire, in the air distribution duct, make contact with the aluminum lines.

Part total time-5,323 hours.


DASSAULT-BREGUET**Dassault-Breguet; Model Falcon 10; Engine Starting System Failure; ATA 8000**

The pilot reported the number one engine would not start due to the lack of starter rotation.

The technician traced the problem to a melted starter/generator pylon feed-through plug (P/N SN239). The outboard terminal end plug and cable had melted. (Refer to the illustration.)

The submitter stated that the local area's Falcon Technical Representative said this is a common problem with both the Falcon 10 and Falcon 50 aircraft. The submitter also stated that this problem was addressed with Service News Letter, number 52, dated 12/1986, entitled *Connection of Starter-Generator Positive Wire*.

Part total time-7, 391 hours.




PIPER

Piper; Model PA-34-200T; Seneca II; Loose Rudder Mast; ATA 2720

While inspecting the rudder on an annual inspection, the technician discovered the rudder torque tube (P/N 96212-00) attach bolts were loose. A teardown inspection revealed the bolt holes were oversized and elongated. (Refer to the illustration.)

A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting Program data base revealed seven additional reports citing failure of the rudder torque tube on Piper PA-34-200T aircraft.

Part total time-5, 533 hours.



TWIN COMMANDER

Twin Commander; Model 690A; Water in Ram-Air Duct; ATA 2120

The pilot aborted the flight shortly after takeoff because of suspected smoke in the aircraft cabin. He detected the suspected smoke shortly after takeoff. He landed the aircraft safely and reported the incident.

The technician used ground runs to duplicate the malfunction. He determined the suspected smoke was only water vapor. The water vapor was the result of the aircraft being parked in the rain and the rainwater accumulating in the pressurization plenum via the ram-air duct (P/N 880224-11). He inspected

the ram-air duct drain line (P/N 880223-23) and determined it was unrestricted. He demonstrated that heavy rain can exceed the drain line capability and result in excess rainwater entering the pressurization plenum. After he removed the moisture from the pressurization ducting, the ground runs revealed no vapors in the cabin.

The diligent use of ram-air duct ground covers, during periods of rain, will likely prevent reoccurrence of this problem.

Aircraft total time-5, 342 hours.

HELICOPTERS

ENSTROM

Enstrom; Model 280C; Worn Tail Rotor Control Cables; ATA 6720

During an inspection, the technician discovered that both rear tail rotor control cable (P/N 28-1635-1) were worn where they pass through the plastic fairleads in the aft bulkhead of the tail boom.

The submitter stated these cables have been wearing in this location constantly with an average of 300 to 400 hours before replacement.

A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting Program data base revealed three additional reports citing failure of the tail rotor control cables on the Enstrom 280C helicopters.

Part total time-493 hours.

ACCESSORIES

DEFECTIVE AVIATION HOSES

The Small Airplane Directorate's Continued Operational Safety Branch, ACE-113, submitted the following article. (*This article is published as it was received.*)

MIL-H-6000 low pressure hose is widely used in general aviation aircraft including engine oil and fuel hoses in both pressure and venting configurations. Several recent incidents remind us of the importance of properly inspecting these types of hoses on an annual basis for condition and integrity. One report stated that the aircraft experienced a sudden reduction in power during flight. Subsequent inspection by a maintenance technician revealed the surface walls of the MIL-H-6000 fuel line between the gascolator and the carburetor had deteriorated to the point of restricting flow through the hose assembly. The exterior of the hose showed no signs of the internal deterioration of the hose.

A similar incident occurred during flight that created a forced landing that resulted in damage to both a wing and the propeller. Again, a defective hose was found restricting fuel flow to the carburetor.

In many cases, these types of hose have been installed on the aircraft for many years. The hose is exposed to fuel and oil along with vibration and heat that can over a period of time cause the hose to deteriorate. Maintenance technicians should be aware of the date on hoses during routine

inspections to determine the age of the installed hoses. Hoses that are 5 years or older may require closer inspection by examining the internal portion of the hose for condition. Replace hoses that show any form of deterioration, flaking or swelling of the rubber material.

Many manufacturers have recommended replacement times for rubber hoses in their maintenance manuals or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Replacement times indicate expected length of time the hoses will remain airworthy. Maintenance technicians should consider this guidance when performing maintenance and inspection duties on aircraft.

AIR NOTES

ELECTRONIC VERSION OF MALFUNCTION OR DEFECT REPORT

One of the recent improvements to the Flight Standards Service Aviation Information Internet web site is the inclusion of FAA Form 8010-4, Malfunction or Defect Report. This web site is still under construction and further changes will be made; however, the site is now active, usable, and contains a great deal of information.

Various electronic versions of this form have been used in the past; however, this new electronic version is more user friendly and replaces all other versions. You can complete the form online and submit the information electronically. The form is used for all aircraft except certificated air carriers who are provided a different electronic form. The Internet address is:

<http://av-info.faa.gov/isdr/>

When the page opens, select "M or D Submission Form" and, when complete, use the "Add Service Difficulty Report" button at the top left to send the form. Many of you have inquired about this service. It is now available, and we encourage everyone to use this format when submitting aviation, service-related information.

SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTING PROGRAM

The objective of the Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) Program is to achieve prompt and appropriate correction of conditions adversely affecting continued airworthiness of aeronautical products fleet wide. The SDR program is an exchange of information and a method of communication between the FAA and the aviation community concerning inservice problems.

A report should be filed whenever a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance fails to function in a normal or usual manner. In addition, if a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance has a flaw or imperfection which impairs, or which may impair its future function, it is considered defective and should be reported under the program.

These reports are known by a variety of names: Service Difficulty Reports (SDR), Malfunction or Defect Reports (M or D) and Maintenance Difficulty Reports (MDR).

The collection, collation, analysis of data, and the rapid dissemination of mechanical discrepancies, alerts, and trend information to the appropriate segments of the FAA and the aviation community provides an effective and economical method of ensuring future aviation safety.

The FAA analyzes SDR data for safety implications and reviews the data to identify possible trends that may not be apparent regionally or to individual operators. As a result of this review, the FAA may disseminate safety information to a particular section of the aviation community. The FAA also may adopt new regulations or issue airworthiness directives (AD's) to address a specific problem.

The primary source of SDR's are certificate holders operating under Parts 121, 125, 135, 145 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, and the general aviation community which voluntarily submit records. FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors may also report service difficulty information when they conduct routine aircraft and maintenance surveillance as well as accident and incident investigations.

The SDR data base contains records dating back to 1974. Reports may be submitted on the Internet through an active data entry form or on hard copy. The electronic data entry form is in the Flight Standards Aviation web site. The URL is: <<http://av-info.faa.gov>>.

A public search/query tool is also available on this same web site. This tool has provisions for printing reports or downloading data.

At the current time we are receiving approximately 45,000 records per year.

Point of contact is:

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IF YOU WANT TO CONTACT US

We welcome your comments, suggestions, and questions. You may use any of the following means of communication to submit reports concerning aviation-related occurrences.

Editor: Isaac Williams (405) 954-6488

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Mailing address: FAA, ATTN: AFS-620 ALERTS, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

You can access current and back issues of this publication from the internet at: <<http://av-info.faa.gov>>. Select the General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts heading.

AVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS

The following are abbreviated reports submitted between September 23, 2003, and October 21, 2003, which have been entered into the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System data base. This is not an all inclusive listing of Service Difficulty Reports. For more information, contact the FAA, Regulatory Support Division, Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620, located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The mailing address is:

FAA
 Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620
 PO Box 25082
 Oklahoma City, OK 73125

These reports contain raw data that has not been edited. If you require further detail please contact AFS-620 at the address above.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Service Difficulty Report Data

Sorted by Aircraft Make and Model then Engine Make and Model. This Report Derives from Unverified Information Submitted By the Aviation Community without FAA review for Accuracy.

| ACFT MAKE ACFT MODEL REMARKS | ENG MAKE ENG MODEL | COMP MAKE COMP MODEL | PART NAME PART NUMBER | PART CONDITION PART LOCATION | DIFF-DATE OPER CTRL NO. | T TIME TSO |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| AEROSP AS355F1 (AUS) TAILBOOM SKIN CRACKED IN AREA LOCATED AFT OF THE TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX. CRACK ORIGINATED FROM RIVET HOLE IN TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX COWL BRACKET. CRACKED HAD EXTENDED AFT FOR APPROX 50.8MM TO 76.2MM (2IN TO 3IN) IN AN AREA NOT NORMALLY VISIBBLE WITH VERTICAL STABILIZERS INST CRACK HAD ALSO EXTENDED FWD&DOWN APPROXIMATELY 50.8MM TO 76.2MM (2IN TO 3IN). 1ST 25.4MM (1IN) OR SO NOT NORMALLY VISIBLE WITH TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX COWL INST LAST 25.4MM (1IN) OR SO OF CRACK IN FWD & DOWN DIRECTION HAD PROTUDED FROM BENEATH TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX COWL MAKING IT VISIBLE DURING DAILY INSPECTION. TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX COWL ATTACHMENT BRACKET HAD BEEN FRETTING ON TAILBOOM SKIN CAUSING THE 1/8IN RIVETS (3OFF) TO BECOME LOOSE. | ALLSN 250C20F | | SKIN 355A2305000407 | CRACKED TAILBOOM | 09/11/2003 | |
| AGUSTA A119 DURING INSPECTION TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT BEARING WAS FOUND WITH SEAL AND RETAINING RING DISLODGED FROM BEARING. THIS BEARING IS CHECKED BY FLIGHT CREW. THIS IS THE SECOND BEARING REPLACED IN 72.1 HOURS. | PWA PT6* | | BEARING N651G10V1021 | DISLODGED T/R DRIVE | 08/14/2003 | 41 |
| AIRBUS A310300 (CAN) DURING TAXI, THE ECAM MESSAGE AILERON BLUE SYSTEM JAM CAME ON UPON THE FLIGHT CONTROL CHECK BY THE FLIGHT CREW. PROCEDURE PERFORMED AS PER CHECK LIST AND THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THE GATE DUE TO HARD DEFLECTION OF CONTROL WHEEL AND UUNABLE TO DETERMINE MOVEMENT OF RT AILERON. TROUBLE SHOOTING CONFIRMED THE RT AILERON SERVO AT FAULT. SERVO ASSY WAS REPLACED AND THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. UNIT ROUTED TO THE VENDOR FOR STRIP REPORT. | GE CF680C2* | | SERVO 31055150 | JAMMED AILERON | 09/10/2003 | |
| AIRTRC AT802A (CAN) DURING FLIGHT 1 HYDRAULIC PUMP LIGHT ILLUMINATED INDICATING LOW HYDRAULIC FLUID LEVEL. THE LANDING GEAR WAS EXTENDED NORMALLY AND THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THE AIRPORT FOR A NORMAL LANDING. DURING INVESTIGATION THE MAINTENANCE CREW FOUNUD A HYDRAULIC LEAK IN THE RT FLOAT MLG. THE O-RING WAS REPLACED AND A GEAR RETRACTION TEST WAS COMPLETED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. | PWA PT6A65AG | | O-RING MS28775314 | TORN MLG | 09/07/2003 | |

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|---|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------|------|
| BEECH 1900D | PWA PT6A67D | GUIDE 131819TCAC420 | BROKEN ELEVATOR | 09/16/2003 | |
| WHILE CHECKING ELEVATOR TRIM WE FOUND INTERMITTENT BINDING OF ELEVATOR TRIM WHEN MANUALLY OPERATING TO NOSE DOWN DIRECTION. BINDING WAS OF SUCH THAT IT WOULD MOMENTARILY HANG BEFORE RELEASING. IT OCCURED AT PRETY MUCH THE SAME POSITION EACH TIME. (WHEN MOVING FROM 6 TO 3 ON THE ELEVATOR TRIM WHEEL). HEARD POPPING IN FLOOR UNDER SEAT 8A. REMOVED SEAT AND FLOOR PANELS AND FOUND ELEVATOR TRIM CABLE TURN BARREL HANGING UP ON THE ABOVE REFERENCED GUIDE TUBE. REMOVED AND REPLACED GUIDE TUBE RESET CABLE TENSIONS AND SAFTIED TURN BARREL. OPERATIONALLY CHECKED | | | | | |
| BEECH 1900D | PWA PT6A67D | SELECTOR 1013841377 | FAILED MLG | 08/30/2003 | |
| (CAN) AIRCRAFT WENT ON LOCAL FLIGHT, WHEN GEAR SELECTED DOWN ON PREPARATION FOR LANDING GEAR DID NOT GO DOWN, CREW MANUALLY PUMPED GEAR DOWN AND RECEIVED 3 GREEN INDICATION. AFTER LANDING, AIRCRAFT WAS PLACED ON JACKS AND GEAR SWINGS CARRIEED OUT. GEAR FUNCTIONED CORRECTLY ON FIRST 7 RETRACTION/EXTENSION CYCLES. ON EIGHTH EXTENSION GEAR DID NOT START TO EXTEND. GEAR HANDLE 'JIGGLED' IN DOWN POSITION AND GEAR OPERATED AT THIS POINT. NEW SELECTOR ASSEMBLY INSTALLED GEAR RE-SWING NUMEROUS TIMES AND FOUND TO OPERATE NORMALLY. WIRING IN AREA DISTURBED PREVIOUSLY DURING AVIONICS MODIFICATIONS OR INTERIOR REFURBISHMENT. | | | | | |
| BEECH 200BEECH | PWA PT6A41 | FRAME 1014300263 | CRACKED FUSELAGE | 08/26/2003 | |
| (AUS) FUSELAGE FRAMES PN 1014300263 LT AND PN 10143002611 RT CRACKED. FOUND DURING INSPECTION IAW AD/BEECH200/65 AMDT1. | | | | | |
| BEECH 9555 | CONT IO470* | SCREW AN51588 | BROKEN MLG BRACE ASSY | 07/21/2003 | 6350 |
| SCREW BROKEN, ALLOWING TRUNNION PIN TO BACK OUT. RETRACT BRACE BECAME LOOSE ALLOWING DOWN AND LOCK TO (UNLATCH). WHEN THAT HAPPENED THE RT MAIN GEAR COLLAPSED (ON ROLL OUT) AND DAMAGED THE RIGHT FLAT, WING TIP, AND BRAKE ASSEMBLY. PROPELLER STRUCK THE GROUND AS WELL. (GK15200314901) | | | | | |
| BEECH A100 | PWA PT6A28 | LINE FUEL CELL | BLOCKED | 08/20/2003 | |
| (CAN) AIRCRAFT HAD LT ENGINE SHUTDOWN IN FLIGHT. AFTER EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING FOUND THAT AN INTERNAL PATCH ON FUEL BLADDER HAD COME OFF AND BLOCKED THE LINE TO NACELLE TANK. ALL TANKS WERE INSPECTED AND 2 OTHER TANKS HAD INTERNAL PATCHES. FUEL CELL REPAIRER TOLD US THAT INTERNAL PATCHES ARE COMMON PRACTICE. WE HAVE INSTITUTED AN INSPECTION OF ALL BLADDER MACHINES TO DOCUMENT PATCHED TANKS AND PUT THEM ON A 12-MONTH INSPECTION. | | | | | |
| BEECH A100 | PWA PT6A28 | RIB LT & RT ELEVATOR | CRACKED | 08/23/2003 | |
| (CAN) LT AND RT ELEVATOR I/B RIBS CRACKED DUE TO COUNTER BALANCE WEIGHT INCORRECTLY POSITIONED BY MANUFACTURER AND THEN COPIED BY AMO AT LAST REPAIR. | | | | | |
| BEECH A100 | PWA PT6A28 | PUMP 025323101 | FAILED FUEL SYSTEM | 09/04/2003 | |
| (CAN) WHILE CLIMBING AFTER TAKEOFF, NOTICED LOSS OF TORQUE AND OIL PRESSURE. SECURED THE LT ENGINE. FAILURE TROUBLE SHOT TO LOSS OF FUEL FLOW. HIGH PRESSURE FUEL PUMP AND FUEL CONTROL UNIT REMOVED AND EXAMINED. FOUND THE INPUT GEAR OF THE PPUMP HAD STRIPPED SPLINES AND REPLACED HIGH PRESSURE FUEL PUMP WITH OVERHAULED UNIT AND REASSEMBLED ENGINE. ENGINE GROUND RUN SERVICEABLE AND AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. TEAR DOWN REPORT ON FAILED UNIT WILL BE REQUESTED FROM OVERHAUL SHOP. | | | | | |
| BEECH A2324 | LYC IO360A1B | MOUNT ENGINE | WRONG PART | 03/04/2003 | |
| (AUS) INCORRECT ENGINE MOUNTS FITTED. MANUFACTURER'S ILLUSTRATED PARTS CATALOGUE (IPC) INDICATES INCORRECT NUMBER. CORRECT PART NUMBER AND INSTALLATION PROCEDURES ARE FOUND IN THE MM. IPC. | | | | | |
| BEECH E55 | CONT IO520C | BOLT AN2415M | MISINSTALLED MLG | 09/08/2003 | |
| (AUS) LH LANDING GEAR PUSH-PULL ROD BOLT INCORRECTLY FITTED. BOLT HEAD WAS INSTALLED IN THE WRONG DIRECTION CAUSING HEAD TO FOUL ONINBOARD END RIB IN THE LH WHEEL WELL. CORRECT FITMENT DIRECTION OF THE BOLT WAS CLEARLY PLACARDED. PERSONNEL/MMMAINTENANCEERROR. | | | | | |
| BELL 206L1 | ALLSN 250C28B | ATTACH FITTING 206031329103 | CRACKED TAILBOOM | 08/13/2003 | |
| (CAN) ON SCHEDULED 100 HR INSPECTION, VISUAL INSPECTION OF TAILBOOM ATTACH FITTINGS. UPPER LT AIRFRAME FITTING FOUND CRACKED. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION AFT AIRFRAME BULKHEAD FOUND CRACKED AT UPPER LT LOCATON. SUSPECTED CAUSE LONG IDLE TIMES AT 60 PERCENT N1 AND HEAVY SLING LOADS. MANUFACTURING DEFECTS POSSIBLY A FACTOR ALSO. SHORTEN IDLE TIMES TO ONLY NECESSARY COOL DOWN AND WARM UP TIMES. WHEN IDLING FOR PERIODS OF TIME, USE 70 PERCENT N1. | | | | | |
| BOEING 717200 | RROYCE BR700715A130 | SKIN 593614318 | CRACKED VERTICAL STAB | 09/20/2003 | |
| (AUS) VERTICAL STABILISER TIP SKIN CRACKED IN TWO PLACES ON RT SIDE. ONE CRACK WAS APPROXIMATELY 304.8MM IN LENGTH RUNNING VERTICALLY ALONG THE RIVET LINE JUST AFT OF STA YV157 APPROXIMATELY 12.7MM AFT OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER RUB STRIP. THE SECOND CRACK WAS APPROXIMATELY 25.4MM IN LENGTH AND RUNS HORIZONTALLY ALONG THE LOWER EDGE OF THE SKIN. BOTH CRACKS GO COMPLETELY THROUGH THE SKIN AND ARE VISIBLE ON THE INSIDE OF THE STABILIZER. | | | | | |
| CESSNA 172R | CESSNA 071100159 | HINGE PIN PAX DOOR | SHEARED | 09/15/2003 | 515 |
| DOOR HELD IN PLACE BY LOWER HINGE, DOOR STOP SPRING, & PASSENGER. INSP REVEALED UPPER HINGE PIN OF RT CABIN DOOR WAS SHEARED COMPLETELY. LWR HINGE PIN (P/N 0517019-12) WAS FOUND TO BE BENT, BROKEN, AND PARTIALLY INSTALLED. LOWER HINGE & ADJACENT STRUCTURE WAS BENT & BROKEN. RT CABIN DOOR WINDOW SEPARATED FROM DOOR IN FLT & WAS LOST. RT FUSELAGE WAS DAMAGED BEHIND AFT DOOR FRAME, AS RESULT OF CONTACT WITH DOOR OR WINDOW. HINGE PIN MATERIAL OF SHEARED UPPER HINGE PIN HAS BRASS COLOR. HINGE PIN MATERIAL OF BENT LOWER HINGE PIN HAS SILVER COLOR. UPPER HINGE PIN ON LT CABIN DOOR SHOWS SOME MINOR WEAR, METHOD OF INSTALLATION PREVENTS DISASSEMBLY FOR INSP. PIN MUST BE REPLACED AFTER REMOVAL. | | | | | |
| CESSNA 172R | LYC IO360L2A | SPAR 052309608 | CRACKED RT WING | 09/09/2003 | 1075 |
| DURING MAINTENANCE OF THE AIRCRAFT IN, WHICH THE RIGHT FUEL TANK WAS OPENED UP, A CRACK WAS FOUND IN THE AFT SPAR. THE CRACK EXTENDS FROM WS 33.0 TO 34.375 AND IS APPROX 1.375 INCHES LONG. THE CRACK IS LOCATED IN THE UPPER BEND RADIUS OF TTHE AFT SPAR. | | | | | |
| CESSNA 177RG | STALL S16722 | MALFUNCTIONED LT WING | 09/03/2003 | 2557 | |
| STALL WARNING SYSTEM FUNCTION TEST AT ANNUAL INSPECTION WAS CORRECT. SYSTEM WOULD NOT OPERATE WHEN PITOT HEAT WAS SWITCHED ON. REMOVED STALL SWITCH AND CLEANED CORROSION FROM GROUND. BOTH STALL WARNING AND PITOT HEAT WOULD OPERATE CORRECCTLY THEN. PREVIOUSLY, THE STALL WARNING SYSTEM WOULD FIND A GROUND THROUGH THE PITOT HEATER VIA THE STALL WARNING HEATER. WHEN THE PITOT HEAT WAS TURNED ON, THE STALL WARNING WOULD NOT GROUND. | | | | | |

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|----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------|------|
| CESSNA 208B | PWA PT6A114A | VENT LINE 260010148 | CHAFED FUEL SYSTEM | 09/15/2003 | 4398 |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------|------|

THIS AIRCRAFT IS EQUIPPED WITH OPTIONAL INBOARD FUEL FILLER CAPS. THE FUEL FILLER CAP ADAPTER ASSY. (P/N C156005-0105) HAS A SPRING LOADED FLAPPER WHICH IS DEPRESSED BY THE FUEL DISPENSING NOZZLE WHILE FILLING THE TANK. THE FLAPPER HAS BEEN HITTING ON THE (P/N 2600101-48) VENT LINE ASSY INSIDE THE TANK BAY AND HAS WORN THE VENT LINE APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY THROUGH ITS DIAMETER. DEFECT WAS DISCOVERED BECAUSE FUEL FILLER ADAPTER WAS REMOVED FOR MAINTENANCE.

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|----------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------|--|
| CESSNA 208B | PWA PT6A114A | TUBE 26620185 | WORN TE FLAP CONTROL | 09/12/2003 | |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------|--|

(CAN) THE ROD CONNECTING THE LT AND RT FLAP BELL CRANKS WAS FOUND WORN WHERE IT PASSES OVER THE PASSENGER READING LIGHT MOUNTING BRACKET ON THE LT SIDE OF THE CABIN. TWO WEAR MARKS WERE NOTED. THE WEAR CORRESPONDING TO THE FLAP UP POSITION WAS THE DEEPEST WITH THE SECOND ONE AT BEING AT THE FULL DOWN FLAP SETTING. THE FLAP SYSTEM WAS DETERMINED TO BE INSTALLED AND RIGGED CORRECTLY BUT POSITIONING OF THE READING LIGHT BRACKET CAUSED INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE.

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| CESSNA 208B | PWA PT6A114A | SUPPORT 26111441 | CRACKED FLAP ACTUATOR | 08/21/2003 | 18416 |
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(CAN) ON APPROACH, FLAPS WERE SELECTED TO 30 DEGREES. FLAP INDICATION WAS SHOWING 20 DEGREES & AIRSPEED CONFIRMED FLAPS WERE INOPERATIVE. FLAP MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS POPPED & STANDBY FLAP MOTOR WAS TRIED WITH NO RESULTS. A SUCCESSFUL LANDING WAS MADE & FLAPS WERE FOUND STUCK IN THE 20-DEGREE POSITION. INSPECTION REVEALED FLAP ACTUATOR SUPPORT ASSY TORN & CRACKED. TRANSMISSION HAD TWISTED SUPPORT ASSY & JAMMED. ATTEMPTED USE OF ALTERNATE FLAP MOTOR BY CREW HAD SHEARED DRIVE COUPLING. MM CALLS UP AN INSPECTION OF FLAP SUPPORT ASSY EACH 400 HRS. SUPPORT ASSY APPEARED TO HAVE NUMEROUS CRACKS PRESENT PRIOR TO BREAKING POINT, LEADING TO INCREASED STRESS & UNSUPPORTABLE LOAD.

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| CESSNA 210C | CONT IO470* | CONTROL 0513167200 | BROKEN COCKPIT | 07/14/2003 | |
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CONTROL WHEEL BROKE ON LT TOP .7500 INCH FROM CORNER ON LIFT OFF VX ON PILOTS SIDE. THIS IS THE OLD SQUARE CONTROL WHEEL AND IS ORIGINAL PART, 40 YEARS OLD. BROKEN CONTROL WHEEL SHATTERED, PUSH TO TALK SWITCH FASTENED TO CONTROL AT SAME LOCATION. CONTROL WHEEL IS WHITE PLASTIC WITH B LACK PLASTIC COATING OVER ALL SURFACES.

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| CESSNA 337G | CONT IO360G | STRUCTURE CORRODED | TAILBOOM CORRODED | 09/08/2003 | |
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(AUS) LT TAILBOOM LOWER STRUCTURE CORRODED IN AREA OF ATTACHMENT TO WING STRUCTURE. CORROSION IS BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL. RT TAILBOOM CONTAINED INTERNAL CORROSION ONLY.

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| CESSNA 402C | CONT TSIO520VB | SIGHT GLASS 511700712 | CRACKED HYD QTY | 09/15/2003 | |
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(AUS) HYDRAULIC SYSTEM SIGHT TUBE CRACKED. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.

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| CESSNA 501 | LINE 551701055 | CORRODED HYD SYSTEM | 08/28/2003 | 6650 | |
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DURING GEAR RETRACTION AND GEAR EXTENSION, HYDRAULIC FLUID LEAKED UNDER PRESSURE. FOUND THIS LINE CORRODED SO BADLY THAT A HOLE HAD BEEN FORMED IN THE LINE. THE CORROSION WAS DUE TO PREVIOUS ROUTING OF AIR CONDITIONING DUCT TY-WRAPPED TO THE FOUR LANDING GEAR HYDRAULIC LINES. CONDENSATION INSIDE THE DUCT AND THE DUCT WIRE SPIRAL OF THE DUCT MAKING CONTACT WITH THE HYDRAULIC LINES CREATED THIS SEVERE CORROSION AND HYDRAULIC LINE FAILURE. ALL FOUR (4) LANDING GEAR HYDRAULIC LINES WERE REPLACED DUE TO CORROSION. THIS IS AN INSTALLATION PROBLEM WITH THE FREON AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM.

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| CESSNA 550 | PWA JT15D4 | BOLT S346151 | WRONG PART QUALITY CONTROL | 06/26/2003 | |
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(CAN) BOLTS ORDERED FROM CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY UNDER PROPRIETARY PN S346151 WERE RECEIVED AND DETERMINED TO BE INCORRECT. THE ORIGINAL BOLTS REMOVED FROM THE ENGINE MOUNT INSTALLATION WERE STAMPED WITH PN NAS464P864. REPLACEMENT BOLTS ORDERED FROM CESSNA UNDER PN S346151 WERE RECEIVED AND FOUND STAMPED WITH P/N NAS6208-64D AND PHYSICAL INSPECTION SHOWED THAT THEY WERE .125 LONGER THAN THE ORIGINALS. CESSNA CITATION CUSTOMER SUPPORT OFFICE WAS CONTACTED TO DETERMINE IF THE BOLTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO INSTALL WITH THE ADDITION OF EXTRA WASHERS. CESSNA ENGINEERS CONSULTED ENGINEERING DRAWING PN 6550000 AND DETERMINED THAT PN NAS464P864 WAS THE ONLY CORRECT PN. CESSNA ENGINEERING ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD CONTACT.

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| CESSNA U206G | CONT IO520F | ATTACH FITTING 12116013 | CRACKED MLG | 09/03/2003 | |
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(AUS) LT MAIN LANDING GEAR OUTBOARD ATTACHMENT FITTING CRACKED IN AREA OF UPPER REAR RADIUS.

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| CIRRUS SR20 | CONT IO360E | AAR 12843004 | DOOR FRAME 12843003 | CRACKED FUSELAGE | 09/12/2003 |
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(AUS) LT ENTRY DOOR FRAME PN 12843003 AND RT ENTRY DOOR FRAME PN 12843004 CRACKED IN AREA ABOVE SIDE WINDOW. CRACK LENGTHS APPROXIMATELY 457.2MM (18IN).

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| CIRRUS SR22 | CONT IO550N | ATTACH BOLT FIREWALL | IMPROPER PART | 08/26/2003 | |
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FOUND LOWER ENGINE MOUNT TO FIREWALL BOLTS LOOSE. BOTH LOWER BOLTS WERE TOO LONG AND GRIP LENGTH TOO LONG. REPLACED BOTH BOLTS WITH PROPER SIZE AND TORQUED TO SPECS.

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| CIRRUS SR22 | CONT IO550N | LANYARD PARACHUTE | MISROUTED 100 | 10/13/2003 | 940 |
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THE AIRCRAFT CAME INTO OUR FACILITY FOR AN ANNUAL INSPECTION. WHILE PERFORMING THE INSPECTION IT WAS NOTED THAT THE PARACHUTE LANYARD CABLES THAT CONNECT THE ROCKET PICK-UP COLLAR TO THE PARACHUTE WERE MISROUTED. THIS WAS MOST LIKELY DONE WHEN ACCOMPLISHING CAPS SYSTEM MAINTENANCE. IT IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN SINCE CABLE MISROUTING WOULD MOST LIKELY RENDER THE PARACHUTE INEFFECTIVE. THE CABLES WERE REROUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIRRUS AIRFRAME PARACHUTE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUAL.

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| CNDAIR CL6002B19 | ODOR 601R9500115305 | | DETECTED ECS SYSTEM | 09/03/2003 | |
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(CAN) WHILE CLIMBING TO FLIGHT LEVEL 360 THE CREW NOTICED A VERY STRONG ODOR INDICATIVE OF EITHER AN ECS SYSTEM OVERHEATING OR ELECTRICAL FIRE. THE ECS & ELECTRICAL SYNOPTIC PAGES SHOWED NO ANOMALIES. THE ODOR INCREASED IN INTENSITY AND THE CREW DECLARED AN EMERGENCY, THEN PROCEEDED WITH A HIGH SPEED DESCENT. THE ODOR SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED AT LOWER ALTITUDES AND THE AIRCRAFT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER OCCURENCES. UPON SHUT DOWN, THE CAPTAIN AND FIRE CHIEF OPENED THE AFT EQUIPMENT BAY AND EXPERIENCED THE SAME ODOR THAT WAS PRESENT DURING THE FLIGHT, BUT ONLY STRONGER. AFTER THE ECS SYSTEM WAS TESTED AS PER FTP 601R2103 WITH NO FAULT FOUND. THE WATER SEPARATOR BAGS WERE VERIFIED FOR

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| CNDAIR CL6002B19 | GE CF343A1 | PIN HSP115P0941400 | FAILED CARGO DOOR | 09/05/2003 | |
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(CAN) DURING CLIMB THROUGH 15,000 FT CARGO DOOR CAUTION MESSAGE CAME ON. PRESSURIZATION NORMAL. PIN FOUND SHEARED ON LATCH TO STOW DOOR HANDLE. PIN REPLACED CHECKS SERVICABLE. NOTE: SAME PIN ON PASS

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| CNDAIR | GE | DOOR | MISSING | 09/13/2003 |
| CL6002C10 | CF348C1 | CC67010520 | MLG | |

(CAN) THE RT MLG DOOR WAS FOUND MISSING ON POST FLIGHT INSPECTION. DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE FUSELAGE, RT INBOARD FLAP AND WING LOWER SKIN. REPAIR SCHEM WILL BE GIVEN FOR THE FUSELAGE AND THE FLAP.

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| DHAV | PWA | CONNECTING | BROKEN | 08/24/2003 | 27532 |
| DHC8101 | PW120A | 83231027001 | FWD MLG DOOR | | |

(CAN) LT MLG DOOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT. CREW WITNESSED FWD MLG DOOR WAS OPEN. LANDING COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON INSPECTION BY ENGINEERING IT WAS FOUND THAT THE FWD MLG DOOR CONNECTING ROD ASSY HAD SHEARED. THE CONNECTING ROD WAS REPLACED AND AN OPERATION CHECK PERFORMED ON THE MLG SYSTEM. AIRCRAFT WAS RELEASED BACK INTO SERVICE.

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| DHAV | PWA | LINE | RUPTURED | 09/05/2003 |
| DHC8101 | PW121 | 82920010307 | HYD SYSTEM | |

(CAN) DURING TAXI-OUT, FUSELAGE HYDRAULIC LINE RUPTURED AT A POINT OVERHEAD ROW 4 - 5 (CA. FS X407.7 + 2') JUST FORWARD OF THE PRESSURE FITTING AND BELOW THE 90 DEGREE BEND ROUTING THE LINE DOWNWARD. 7 PASSENGERS WERE ON BOARD (1 PASSENGER AND 1 FA WERE TAKEN TO HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT). THE HYDRAULIC LINE WAS REPLACED. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT PRESSURE CHECK, THE ADJACENT LINE (P/N 82920010263 / NLG RETRACT) WAS FOUND TO BE SEEPING AT THE BULKHEAD PRESSURE FITTING SWAGE. THE OPERATOR HAS EXPRESSED THEIR INTENT TO VISUALLY INSPECT THEIR FLEET FOR LEAKAGE IN THIS AREA.

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| DHAV | PWA | CONNECTING | BROKEN | 08/24/2003 |
| DHC8102 | PW120A | 83231027001 | LT MLG | |

(AUS) LT MAIN LANDING GEAR CONNECTING ROD BROKEN AT NECK END.

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| EMB | HAMLTN | BUTTON | CRACKED | 09/26/2003 |
| EMB135ER | 60277 | FILTER MODULE | | |

INDICATOR BUTTON FAILURE OCCURED ON THREE UNITS AND CRACKS CLEARLY EVIDENT ON TWO OTHERS IN SAME AREA OF BREAKAGE. ONCE BROKEN, A SECTION OF THE BUTTON CAN TRAVEL BEYOND THE SEALED AREA OF THE HOUSING AND HAS THE CAPABILITY OF ALLOWING A FUEL LEAK OF UP TO 1.5 GALLONS PER MINUTE. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS INDICATES A LOW CYCLE FATIGUE SITUATION (FATIGUE CRACKS VISIBLE WITH A MICROSCOPE EXAM AT 7-30X). CEP PERFORMED A FEA SIMULATING THE BUTTON RESTRAINED IN THE CAP HOUSING WHICH SHOWS THE FAILURE TO BE IN THE LOW CYCLE FATIGUE REGION FOR 7075-T6 ALUMINUM. FUEL FILTER MODULE, PN 60500 & PN 4951960 / SN'S: C0072, C0213, C0383, C0390, C0528

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| GRUMAV | WRIGHT | HINGE | BROKEN | 08/19/2003 |
| S2F | 982C9HE2 | 89W121CSM1001 | LT AILERON | |

(CAN) AIRCRAFT PERFORMED FIREBOMBING MISSION. UPON RETURN, THE PILOT COMPLAINED OF FLUTTER IN THE CONTROLS. INITIAL INSPECTION REVEALED NO DAMAGE. FURTHER IN-DEPTH DETAILED INSPECTION REVEALED A BROKEN LT WING INBOARD AILERON HINGE. DUE TO THE CONDITION OF THE HINGE, IT WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE HAPPENED SOME TIME BEFORE. BECAUSE IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED WHEN THE FAILURE OCCURRED, BOTH HINGES WERE REPLACED DUE TO POTENTIAL STRESS THE BREAKAGE APPLIED ON THE UNDAMAGED HINGE. THE AILERON HINGES WERE NDT'ED 315.9 HOURS PREVIOUS DURING THE AIRCRAFT'S AIRFRAME EXTENSION PROGRAM.

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| GRUMAV | WRIGHT | ACTUATOR | LEAKING | 09/07/2003 |
| S2F | 982C9HE2 | 89H10528 | MLG DOOR | |

(CAN) AIRCRAFT DEPARTED ENROUTE TO A FIRE. PILOT OF ANOTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE GROUP NOTICED RH MLG DID NOT FULLY RETRACT AND GEAR DOORS DID NOT CLOSE. THE GEAR WAS CYCLED BUT NO CHANGE SO AIRCRAFT FLEW AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE CREW REPLACED THE MLG DOOR ACTUATOR, A GEAR SWING WAS COMPLETED AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

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| HUGHES | ALLSN | DOUG | PIN | FAILED | 08/13/2003 |
| 369D | 250C20B | | | M/R BLADE | |

(CAN) PIN FAILURE, SHEARED AT TOP THREAD OF THREADED SHANK FOR ADJUSTER NUT. CHIEF ENGINEERS COMMENTS: THIS IS THE SECOND PIN TO SHEAR ON THIS AIRCRAFT, SEEMS BOTH PINS WERE MANUFACTURED AT ABOUT THE SAME

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| HUGHES | ALLSN | FIREWALL | CRACKED | 09/15/2003 | 5373 |
| 369E | 250C20B | 369A3018 | ENGINE BAY | | |

UPON REMOVING THE UPPER ENGINE COMPARTMENT HEAT SHIELD FOR REPLACEMENT, A 4 INCH CRACK WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TOP OF THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT, ALONG THE RIVET LINE, WHERE THE TAIL BOOM STRUCTURE ATTACHES TO THE FIRESHIELD. OUR 2 OTHER M.D. 3699E HELICOPTERS WERE INSPECTED AND ALSO HAD SIMILAR CRACKS IN THE SAME AREA. (N5247S, SN 0119E, 6066.0 HRS. 11463 LANDINGS AND N6508U, SN 0084E, 2793.0 HRS. 6816 LANDINGS) THIS AREA IS USUALLY COVERED BY THE HEAT SHIELD BLANKET, WHICH IS NOT REMOVED FOR NORMAL INSPECTIONS. RECOMMEND THE MANUFACTURER ISSUE A SB OR AD TO THE INSPECTION CHECKLIST TO INSPECT THIS.

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| PAC | CONT | INSERT | WRONG PART | 09/03/2003 |
| CT4B | IO360HB | PROPELLER HUB | | |

(AUS) ENGINE CRANKSHAFT FLANGE CRACKED AND LEAKING AROUND FACE. CRACK ORIGINATED AT DOWEL HOLE AND PROGRESSED APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THE WAY AROUND THE FLANGE. INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE PROPELLER HAD BEEN MODIFIED BY THE FITMENT OF A STEEL INSERT IN THE MAIN BORE OF THE HUB. THE INSERT DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED INTERNAL CHAMFER FOR CORRECT MATING WITH THE PROPELLER FLANGE SO THAT WHEN THE PROPELLER BOLTS WERE TORQUED THE RESULTING BENDING LOADS CAUSED THE FLANGE TO CRACK. PERSONNEL / MAINTENANCE ERROR. UNAPPROVED PART.

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| PIPER | LYC | LINE | CHAFED | 09/02/2003 |
| PA23250 | IO540C4B5 | 1771703 | HYD SYSTEM | |

(CAN) AFTER TAXIING THE AIRCRAFT FOR MAINTENANCE WE NOTICED HYDRAULIC FLUID ON THE FLOOR UNDER THE RT WING ROOT. AFTER REMOVING THE BELLY PANEL FOR INSPECTION THE LEAK WAS FOUND TO BE LOCATED ABOUT 20 INCHES AFT OF THE LEADING EDGE OF THE RT WING WHERE THE LANDING GEAR HYDRAULIC EXTENSION LINE PN 1771703 IS CROSSED BY THE AILERON CABLE. INSUFFICIENT CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE HYDRAULIC LINE AND CABLE APPEAR TO HAVE ALLOWED FOR THE CABLE TO CHAFE THROUGH THE HYDRAULIC LINE. CLOSE CONSIDERATION WHILE INSPECTING THIS AREA SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT.

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| PIPER | PWA | JANITROL | COMBUSTION | CRACKED | 08/27/2003 |
| PA31T1 | PT6* | | | HEATER | |

DURING PRESSURE DECAY TESTS OF ELECTRO SYSTEMS JAN-AERO HEATERS, PN FR10E21-EL, WE HAVE DISCOVERED PRESSURE LEAKS IN THE CERAMIC COATED COMBUSTION TUBES. THIS HAS OCCURED ON 4 SEPARATE OCCASIONS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PERIODIC PRESSURE DECAY TEST REQUIRED BY AD 96-20-07 (DOES NOT APPLY TO) HEATER SERIES B3500 WITH (CERAMIC COATED) COMBUSTION TUBES. ALTHOUGH THE PERIODIC PRESSURE DECAY TEST IS (NOT) REQUIRED BY AD 96-20-07 FOR CERTAIN HEATERS WITH (CERAMIC COATED) COMBUSTION TUBES. MM CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND PERIODIC PRESSURE DECAY TEST OF THE HEATER COMBUSTION TUBES REGARDLESS OF THE HEATER CONFIGURATION.

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| PIPER | PIPER | TRUNNION | CRACKED | 09/16/2003 |
| PA44180 | 67054003 | DRAG LINK | | |


(CAN) DURING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE, CREW DETECTED A LATERAL CRACK IN THE NOSE GEAR TRUNNION ASSEMBLY WHERE THE DRAG LINK ASSEMBLY ATTACHES TO THE NOSE GEAR TRUNNION. PART REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH NEW ASSEMBLY.

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| REIMS | CONT | BULKHEAD | CRACKED | 09/09/2003 | |
| F182Q | O470U | 07125033 | FUSELAGE | | |
| (CAN) DURING ANNUAL INSPECTION, TAIL INSPECTED, STA 124.0 FOUND BULKHEAD CRACKED IN CORNER. REPLACED WITH NEW. DURING REPLACEMENT FOUND ALSO BULKHEAD P/N 0712511 ON STA 140.0 CRACKED ON LT CORNER. REPLACED WITH NEW. POSSIBLE HARD LANDING DDAMAGE. | | | | | |
| RKWELL | FRAME | | CRACKED | 09/19/2003 | 9808 |
| NA26565 | 265312264004 | | FUSELAGE | 9808 | |
| CRACK FOUND UPON ROUTINE INSPECTION. CRACK IS APPROXIMATELY FOURTEEN INCHES INTO FRAME. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FRAME IS FS 264. | | | | | |
| ROBSIN | LYC | BUCKLE | CRACKED | 08/08/2003 | 1695 |
| R44 | O540* | C6284 | PAX SEAT BELT | | |
| THE LT REAR PASSENGER SEAT BELT BUCKLE ASSY WAS INSPECTED DURING A 100-HOUR INSPECTION AND WAS FOUND TO BE CRACKED. THE CRACK HAD DEVELOPED IN THE STAINLESS STEEL STRAP AT THE BUCKLE TO STRAP RIVET ATTACH POINTS. THIS STRAP IS FORMED IN AA HORSESHOE SHAPE AROUND THE BUCKLE WITH TWO RIVETS ATTACHED TO ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE STRAP. THIS ALLOWS MORE FLEXING OF THE BUCKLE DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT CRACKING OF THE STRAP. THIS AREA IS HIDDEN BY A PLASTIC COVER AND MUST BE INSPECTED CLOSELY, AS THIS IS NOT THE FIRST BUCKLE OF THIS TYPE TO HAVE BEEN FOUND CRACKED. | | | | | |
| SOCATA | LYC | SPAR | CORRODED | 09/08/2003 | |
| TB10TOBAGO | O360A1A | 635 | RT WING | | |
| (AUS) RT WING MAIN SPAR AFT LOWER WEB CONTAINED EXFOLIATION CORROSION. CORROSION WAS MAINLY LOCATED IN AREA ADJACENT TO MAIN LANDING GEAR LEG. | | | | | |
| TMPSON | CONT | BRACE | CRACKED | 07/02/2003 | 2671 |
| NAVIONG | IO470* | 143331853 | MLG | | |
| BRACE WAS FOUND TO HAVE TWO CRACKED OUT WELD JUST BELOW UPPER WRIST. THE FIRST CRACK PROCEEDED 150 DEGREES AROUND THE WELD AND THE SECOND 150 DEGREES ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE. THE TWO CRACKS DO NOT MERGE. THE CRACKS WERE FOUND DURING ANNUAL INSPECTION WITH THE NAKED EYE, A DYE PENETRATE INSPECTION CONFIRMED THE INITIAL FINDING. UNIT WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE. | | | | | |
| UNIVAR | CONT | BRACKET | CORRODED | 08/09/2003 | 3970 |
| 415C | C8512 | 13034 | LT WING | | |
| REMOVED AND REPLACED (2) ANGLE BRACKETS IN LT WING WALKWAY THAT WERE ATTACHED TO THE RIB. THESE WERE FOUND CORRODED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF INSPECTION PANELS BEING INSTALLED TO COMPLY WITH AD 02-26-02. IT APPEARED WATER HAD BECOME TRAPPED INSIDE TRAILING EDGE OF WALKBOX AND CORROSION HAD SET IN. THE RIB WAS NOT AFFECTED. AIRCRAFT NEEDS SMALL DRAIN HOLE IN THIS AREA FOR DRAINAGE. | | | | | |
| UROCOP | TMECA | COMPRESSOR | FOD | 07/10/2003 | |
| EC120B | ARRIU2F | ENGINE | | | |
| (AUS) ENGINE VIBRATION DURING START. POWER BELOW LIMITS. FOUND DURING TEST RUNS FOLLOWING CENTRIFUGAL COMPRESSOR CHANGE DUE TO FOD. | | | | | |

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
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