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OFFICE OF REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
AGL

July 5, 2005

Ms. Cecelia L. Hunziker
Regional Administrator
Great Lakes Region
Federal Aviation Administration
2300 East Devon Avenue
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018

Mr. Michael MacMullen
Airports Environmental Program Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Chicago Airports District Office
2300 East Devon Avenue
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018

Re: FAA evaluation of Section 4(f)/6(f) properties and other FAA actions relating to Chicago's OMP and Phase One proposals

Dear Ms Hunziker and Mr. MacMullen:

I have previously submitted comments (my letter of April 6, 2005) and a Preliminary Statement (February 22, 2005) regarding FAA's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) relating to Chicago's proposed OMP and related Phase One. In this letter I am addressing FAA's *Draft Section 4(f) and section 6(f) Evaluation For The O'Hare Modernization Program*. In this letter, I also briefly address certain outstanding issues relating to proposed FAA actions, *i.e.*, 1) outstanding issues as to Phase One, 2) issues as to AIP funding for Phase One and the full build OMP-Master Plan, 3) issues as to PFC funding authorizations for Phase One and the full build OMP-Master Plan, 4) issues as to O'Hare Tower air traffic controllers' concerns about Phase One and alternatives to Phase One, and 5) issues as to FAA's continued refusal to comply with the requirements of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act in all of its actions regarding OMP.

RECEIVED BY THE REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR'S STAFF
JUL 8 2005

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I. Problems with Phase One

There appear to be several serious problems with Phase One of the OMP.

A. Cost and Financing Problems With Phase One

Lima Lima. First, as the Chicago Tribune reported on June 20, 2005 Chicago's stated $2.9 billion cost estimate for Phase One (and its related financing plan and airport layout plan) neglected to inform the public that Chicago has eliminated a key taxiway (Lima Lima) from Phase One. The Tribune article states that the cost of Lima Lima exceeds $200 million and Chicago has not presented to FAA and the public the financial plan to pay for the cost of Lima Lima and the remainder of Phase One.

The same Tribune article indicates that the airlines have refused to provide airline financing for Lima Lima — leaving Phase One with a more than $200 million funding gap.

Benefit-Cost Legerdemain. The Phase One financing problems don't stop with Lima Lima. To pay for the remaining cost of Phase One, Chicago seeks $300 million in discretionary federal AIP funds and over $1 billion in federal PFC funding authorization. While the PFC application has its own serious problems relating to inability to meet the statutory requirements for $4.50 PFC authorization, what is patently clear if Chicago's inability to demonstrate the fundamental requirement for AIP discretionary funding that the project benefits exceed the costs.

Chicago has sought $300 million in AIP funds on the claim that for every dollar of Phase One cost, there will be $2.13 in delay savings benefits. Chicago based this delay savings claim on a prediction of the future facts that Chicago and the FAA have themselves stated to be untrue.

Chicago's delay benefits claim is based on the presumption that traffic under Phase One (and indeed under the full build OMP-Master Plan) will never exceed 974,000 operations — the level of traffic at which FAA says traffic at the existing airport will cease growing. Chicago compared the delay that would be experienced at the existing airport at 974,000 operations and the delay that would be experienced under Phase One at 974,000 operations — and then, like the sorcerer's apprentice — marched this delay differential (based on an assumed constant limit of 974,000 operations) twenty years forward to the year 2028, without any growth in operations under Phase One.

In reality, FAA's and Chicago's own forecasts state that traffic (and delays associated with that traffic) will grow quickly beyond 974,000 operations so that shortly after Phase One opens, the delays will rise to the same levels of delay experienced at the existing airport. This rise in traffic and delays— coupled with the increased taxi times (and associated delay) involved in Phase One — means that the delay savings benefits attributed by Chicago to support its benefit-cost claims (and associated application for $300 million in AIP funds) disappear shortly after Phase One opens. Indeed, for most of the 20 year economic life used for benefit-cost analysis for Phase One (2007-2028) the delay costs (*i.e.*, number of operations X minutes of delay) under Phase One far exceed those of the existing airport.

The consequence of this deliberate overstating of benefits (*i.e.*, marching the delay savings at 974,000 fixed operations in lockstep to the year 2028) is that Chicago's delay savings benefits are grossly inflated. When FAA's and Chicago's own forecasts of delays and traffic increases are used in the analysis, the so-called "delay savings benefits" are far outweighed by the costs of Phase One. For very dollar of Phase One cost, the delay savings benefits are less than a penny! Given that reality, FAA is prohibited by statute from giving Chicago its requested $300 million AIP grant for Phase One[1].

House of Cards or Dominoes. The Lima Lima $200 million gap and the $300 million AIP gap have cascading consequences. Without the $500 million represented by these two sources, Chicago will be ineligible for the requested $1 billion PFC authorization under the applicable PFC statute because the non-PFC funding of the project is not assured. Without either one of: a) the Lima Lima funding shortfall, b) the AIP $300 million shortfall, or c) the $1 billion PFC shortfall, the Majority In Interest Airlines commitment to pay their share of the Phase One project falls apart because their commitment is based on Chicago's assurances that the remainder of the Phase One financing is assured.

B. Performance Problems With Phase One.

O'Hare Tower Controllers' Concerns. Financing problems are the least of Phase One's woes. The O'Hare Tower controllers have now twice spoken out forcefully to the public media about their concerns that Phase One raises major operational, safety, and delay problems. I have enclosed the transcripts of two NBC Ch. 5 news stories on the controllers' concerns.

Huge Bad Weather Delays Under Phase One. Moreover, the controllers' concerns are buttressed by the very own delay figures presented by FAA and Chicago as a result of TAAMs modeling done for the OMP and Phase One. As Administrator Blakey has emphasized, one of the key "problems"[2] at O'Hare is the discrepancy between good weather throughput and bad weather throughput — a discrepancy created by the added use of a converging arrival runway in good weather that cannot be used in bad weather. Yet FAA's and Chicago's modeling of Phase One shows that there will be massive bad weather delays under Phase One, shortly after in opens (*e.g.*, over 90 minutes <u>average</u> IFR delay under a key IFR configuration).

The Full Build OMP-Master Plan Is An Illusion. From every common sense and factual perspective, it increasingly appears (as I pointed out in my April 6th letter) that the full build OMP-Master Plan is an illusion that will never be built At a cost of over 14 billion dollars (a low-ball estimate never substantiated by the FAA; others have estimated a cost higher than $20 billion), the full build OMP-Master Plan is, in the

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[1] The same benefit-cost problems afflict the full build OMP-Master Plan. There is no way that the full build OMP-Master Plan can pass the benefit-cost requirement given the huge costs of that project.

[2] I put "problems" in quotes because it is widely recognized that much of the so-called delay "problem" at O'Hare is due to intentional over-scheduling by the major airlines using O'Hare, essentially a self inflicted problem that can be substantially eliminated by the stroke of a pen, *i.e.*, through FAA's exercise of its congestion management authority.

parlance of the dot-com craze of the late 1990s, simply "vaporware" — put forward by Chicago as a public relations initiative to create the appearance of addressing the region's aviation needs. The airlines refuse to commit to the funding of the more than $8 billion that FAA says is their share (through General Airport Revenue Bonds) and these same airlines have refused to give their lease approval (the so-called Majority In Interest (MII) approval to the major terminal components of the full build OMP-Master Plan (according to the Chicago Tribune, the MII airlines turned down Chicago's request to approve the multi-billion dollar World Gateway Program (WGP) terminal components of the full build OMP-Master Plan. These financial problems are coupled with the fact that the full build OMP-Master Plan fails any rational benefit-cost test and thus will — for the reasons stated for Phase One above— not be eligible for discretionary AIP funding and PFC authorization.

Since OMP is an illusion, a chimera[3], FAA should focus on whether Phase One — as compared to some other alternative such as the one put forward by the O'Hare traffic controllers or the other blended alternatives suggested by others— is a better response to O'Hare's and the region's aviation needs.

C. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Problems With Phase One.

I and others have repeatedly implored FAA to enforce and comply with the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act with regard to its various decisions as to Phase One and the remainder of the OMP. There is no question that both the full build OMP-Master Plan and Phase One itself call for the destruction of two religious cemeteries. Nor is there any question that destruction of these religious cemeteries will cause injury and harm (*i.e.,* a "substantial burden" within the meaning of RFRA and related religious freedom judicial precedent) to the religious beliefs and practices of the Religious Objectors whose families and loved ones are interred in the sacred consecrated ground of those religious cemeteries.

Under federal RFRA, FAA has a strict obligation to affirmatively demonstrate that: a) the destruction of the religious cemeteries is necessary to meet a compelling governmental need, and b) there are no other alternatives to accomplish the governmental need without destroying the religious cemeteries.

Moreover, FAA cannot meet this obligation by some administrative fiat such as the *ipse dixit* statements FAA has made that "blended alternatives" (which include demand management and the use of other airports, alternatives in widespread use throughout the country today, see discussion, *infra*) are not available and feasible. The federal RFRA statute requires the FAA to make the required demonstration in a judicial proceeding (*i.e.,* in an Article III court) before FAA can take any action (*e.g.,* AIP funding decisions, ALP approval, PFC authorizations).

Nor is federal RFRA the only religious freedom protection applicable to FAA's actions here. By singling out these two religious cemeteries to be stripped of their

[3] "something totally unrealistic or impractical: a figment of the imagination, for example, a wildly unrealistic idea or hope or a completely impractical plan.". (Encarta® World English Dictionary [North American Edition].

protection under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act— while preserving Illinois RFRA protection for every other religious institution in the State of Illinois, including all other religious cemeteries — Chicago has triggered the application of the First Amendment Free Exercise Guarantee. Chicago is asking FAA to help fund Chicago's destruction of the First Amendment religious rights of the Religious Objectors — asking FAA to provide funds for the violation of the Religious Objectors' constitutional rights.

Finally, it is also clear that the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is applicable here. Through its request that FAA approve its proposed Airport Layout Plan, Chicago is asking FAA to approve a change in the land use currently being used by the Religious Objectors (*i.e.,* for religious cemeteries) to a land use approved by the FAA (*i.e.,* for airport uses). Under RLUIPA, Chicago must make a similar demonstration that: a) the destruction of the religious cemeteries is necessary to meet a compelling governmental need, and b) there are no other alternatives to accomplish the governmental need without destroying the religious cemeteries. Again, the required RLUIPA demonstration must be made in a judicial proceeding (*i.e.,* and Article III court) and cannot be made by administrative fiat by the FAA.

I keep coming back to FAA's obligations under various religious freedom laws because — despite almost three years of requests by the Religious Objectors and me— FAA continues to ignore these clear legal obligations. It would be bad enough — and clearly illegal— if FAA chose to ignore these religious legal rights on the ground that Phase One represented and fulfilled some critical governmental need. But the evidence is overwhelming that Phase One will cause huge problems with congestion and delay. The evidence is equally overwhelming that there are numerous other alternatives— including the alternatives suggested by the O'Hare Tower controllers and the other blended alternatives suggested by the Religious Objectors— that would provide better air traffic results than Phase One while avoiding the destruction of the religious cemeteries.

I urge FAA to halt its precipitous and destructive toward approving Phase One and to engage in a thorough investigation and implementation of these less destructive alternatives.

II. Alternatives

FAA's Authority and Power To Implement Blended Alternatives. FAA continues to argue — without any support or justification — that FAA does not have the power or legal authority to impose "blended alternatives". On the contrary, there are numerous examples around the country where FAA is using blended alternatives, *i.e.,* a combination of the existing airport in conjunction with demand management and the use of other airports to handle excess demand.

Indeed, FAA is currently using just such a blended alternative at O'Hare, combining its August 2004 scheduling order with use of other airports to: a) control delays at O'Hare and b) accommodate air traffic demand. Further, FAA used a similar blended alternative in conjunction with use of other airports to accommodate demand at

O'Hare, LaGuardia, Newark and Reagan National throughout the multi-decade operation of the High Density Rule (HDR).

FAA is also currently using a current version of demand management at LaGuardia. Further, FAA has just approved a blended alternative structure for the Los Angeles metropolitan area in FAA's 2005 approval of the LAX Master Plan — which calls for a limited growth of LAX to that which does not exceed the capacity of the current LAX while sending excess traffic to other local airports.

In short, the central argument made by FAA to support its rejection of blended alternatives is FAA's *ipse dixit* ("its so because we say its so") statement that FAA has no legal authority to implement a blended alternative. That bald, unsupported claim by FAA is simply untrue and is contradicted by FAA's own actions. FAA can control traffic growth at any airport and cause the shifting of excess traffic (*i.e.,* traffic that cannot be satisfied at the base airport) by either its funding decisions (discouraging expansion in favor of blended alternatives) or its regulatory demand management alternatives.

Finally, FAA must explore blended alternatives because Phase One will reach high congestion levels shortly after it opens in 2007 (2009 for full Phase One). Since full build OMP-Master Plan is a financial chimera, Phase One is what Chicago will be living with and Phase One will require the use of a blended alternative (*i.e.,* demand management and the use of other airports to handle excess demand) shortly after it opens.

Indeed, even the full build OMP-Master Plan — assuming the major airlines and FAA were foolish enough and had the billions necessary to fund it — will suffer from serious delays and congestion shortly after it opens. If FAA had used the more current 2003 or 2004 Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) — instead of the low-ball 2002 TAF— and used the more realistic standards of acceptable delay set forth in other FAA and DOT publications, it would be readily apparent that the full build OMP-Master Plan will run out of capacity and suffer from major delays shortly after it opens. This major capacity shortfall and delay problem with the full build OMP-Master Plan stems from the fact that the runways in the full build OMP-Master Plan are too close together, creating a major discrepancy between good weather throughput and bad weather throughput. Thus, even the full build OMP-Master Plan would require a blended alternative of congestion management controls and use of other airports to service excess demand.

The Controller's Alternative. According to media reports, the O'Hare Tower controllers have expressed severe reservations about Phase One and have put forward their own alternative which would consist of a single southern runway. They say this alternative would perform far better than Phase One.

FAA's only basis for rejection of a full exploration of this (and other) alternatives is FAA's rigid mantra that FAA does not have authority to implement blended alternatives, *i.e.,* a combination of the controllers' proposal and congestion management in conjunction with the use of other airports. For the reasons I have stated above, FAA's categorical refusal to explore and implement blended alternatives — on the basis of FAA's claim that it has not legal authority to implement blended alternatives — is untrue, unsupportable and contradicted by numerous examples of the FAA's own actions.

The Religious Objectors and Communities Objectors Alternatives. The same reasoning requires that FAA's rejection of the blended alternatives offered by the Religious Objectors and the Community Objectors (Bensenville and Elk Grove Village) must also be reversed. FAA explicitly acknowledges in its Draft 4(f) evaluation that the "L Related Alternatives" are "potentially feasible" (Draft Evaluation at 1-23). The only reason why FAA was able to reject the "L Related Alternatives" (as well as Alternatives H-K) was that FAA continues to rely upon its unsupported and untrue claim that FAA has no power to implement blended alternatives.

The Base Case For Alternative Analysis. Throughout FAA's DEIS and §4(f) Draft Evaluation, and throughout Chicago's LOI application Benefit-Cost submittal in support of Chicago's AIP application, the assumption is made that the existing O'Hare is allowed to grow and operate at close to 15 minutes Average Annual All Weather Delay (AAAW). In the DEIS, FAA suggests that this level of delay is the delay level that existed in 2003. Similarly, in the Chicago Benefit-Cost analysis, Chicago points to FAA's OPSNET data to claim that O'Hare is the most delayed airport in the country based on 2003 data and cites a statistic of 152.6 flights per 1,000 in November 2003 as evidence of these unacceptable delays. (Chicago LOI Application at II-13)

Yet this central premise throughout the DEIS, the Draft Evaluation and Chicago LOI application are all based on conditions that occurred prior to the implementation August 2004 scheduling order which, according to OPSNET statistics, shows a dramatic reduction in delays at O'Hare— when comparing late 2004-2005 data with the peak periods of 2003.

It is obvious from the comments and Federal Register discussion on the March 25, 2005 NPRM that the high delay conditions in 2003-2004 were based on a dramatic increase in over-scheduling of additional flights by United and American. Once FAA installed congestion management controls, delays dropped dramatically.

The Base Case of the existing airport (which is the case against which all alternatives are evaluated) should include the demand management controls and use of other airports which are the elements of the August 2004 scheduling order and the March 25, 2005 NPRM.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me reiterate several points in this letter and my earlier correspondence. First, the questions I posed in my April 6, 2005 letter relating to FAA's enforcement of and compliance with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act remain unanswered[4]. The FAA's DEIS and Draft Evaluation of 4(f) and 6(f) properties ignore the central religious freedom laws which protect the religious cemeteries.

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[4] I closed my April 6, 2005 letter with the following request: "I am particularly anxious to receive FAA's responses to my questions on the protection of the Religious Freedom rights of the Religious Objectors. Please get back to me promptly with answers to the religious freedom questions as well as my other questions." FAA has declined to answer my questions as well as similar questions asked over the past two years by the Religious Objectors.

Second, both Phase One and the full build OMP-Master Plan have major financial and operational problems. It is unlikely that Chicago — which proudly claims it is using other people's money (FAA and the airlines) to fund both Phase One and full build OMP-Master Plan — can afford assemble the necessary funds for either project. Moreover, the controllers and FAA's own modeling data show that Phase One will be an operational nightmare— leading to huge bad weather delays.

Finally, the central premise behind FAA's summary rejection of the controllers' alternative as well as Alternatives H-L posited by the Religious Objectors and the Community Objectors— *i.e.,* FAA's claim that it does not have the power to implement a "blended alternative" — is simply untrue. FAA has and is implementing blended alternatives throughout the country. Further, both Phase One and the full build OMP-Master Plan will require the use of blended alternatives, *i.e.,* congestion management with the use of other airports to handle excess demand.

Once that false premise is discarded, every blended alternative suggested by the controllers and the Religious Objectors and Community Objectors becomes feasible — since these blended alternatives are each premised on demand management and use of other airports that FAA has used for decades at O'Hare and other airports.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours,

Henry Hyde

Henry J. Hyde

NBC5.com

Air Traffic Controllers Warn O'Hare Plan Invites Disaster

More Planes Will Cross Active Runways While Plans Take Off, Land

POSTED: 11:17 am CDT May 12, 2005
UPDATED: 6:23 pm CDT May 12, 2005

CHICAGO -- *The following report aired at 10 p.m. Wednesday, May 11. It is presented here verbatim.*

Video: More Planes Will Cross Runways

The new O'Hare expansion plan promises less delays and more flights. But tonight, you'll meet people who say the runways are putting you at risk. Here's Unit5's Phil Rogers.



O'Hare Expansion Plan

Allison, this is a warning coming from the very people responsible for keeping airplanes separated on the ground -- the air traffic controllers at the O'Hare tower. They contend the city's design for new runways almost invites a catastrophe.

Air traffic controllers will tell you that runways should be used for landings and takeoffs, that anytime you roll another aircraft across an active runway, you increase the chance of a disaster.

Craig Burzych: "It's scary. As a controller, that is the biggest issue for us at the airport. We do everything we can today to avoid crossing active runways."

Craig Burzych is president of the Air Traffic Controllers' union with 14 years at the O'Hare tower.

He and his fellow controllers contend the city's new design for runways at O'Hare increases the chance for what is known as a runway incursion, or accidentally putting a plane on an active runway in the path of landing or departing aircraft.

Craig Burzych

Burzych says the plan to expand O'Hare would increase the number of runway crossings, which right now average about 100 a day.

Burzych: "Under O'Hare expansion, that number increases 17 fold. It will come out to 1,700 runway crossings a day."

Incursions are a danger which have become a prime focus for the FAA and aviation safety officials around the world.

This runway collision four years ago between a business jet and a Scandinavian Airlines jetliner in Milan, Italy, killed 114 people.

But Burzych says since the new O'Hare is to feature a parallel runway plan, the only way to get aircraft to and from the terminals will be to taxi them across the active runways.

Burzych: "It has to be done at the right time and at the right spot. If a controller makes a mistake and accidentally clears an airplane to taxi across a runway while another airplane is landing or departing, or if that pilot does it on his own, you have the potential for a collision."

The FAA disagrees. Spokesman Tony Molinaro maintains more runway crossings don't necessarily mean more runway incursions.

Molinaro: "We have airports such as Dallas -- high number of runway crossings -- continually one of the lowest number of runway incursions in the whole country."

But the controllers note that officials in Dallas are considering spending $1 billion to build new perimeter taxiways around the runways to decrease the number of crossings they now have.

At O'Hare, there isn't enough land, and that isn't an option.

Burzych: "They are building an airport and they are designing the potential for an accident."

"They" are the City of Chicago. And airport design chief Rosemarie Andolino says she is confident the city's design is safe.

Andolino: "Phil, as you know, the FAA will not approve an unsafe airport. They will only approve an airport that operates safely."

Rosemarie Andolino

Ironically, the FAA just recently produced this brochure for airport planners cautioning them to avoid closely spaced parallel runways and layouts that require aircraft and vehicles to cross runways, warning that "every crossing represents a potential runway incursion."

Yet, the city is so confident the FAA is going to approve their plan, this clock in the airport planning office is counting down the days to that expected approval in September.

The controllers contend it's a plan they were presented only after it was designed.

Burzych: "You would think that if you were going to build or reconstruct an airport or redesign an airport, the first people they would go to would be air traffic controllers for advice, but they didn't.

NBC5's Phil Rogers: "They say they were presented with this plan and essentially told, 'Make it work.'"

Andolino: "There was a conceptual plan. They've been involved with all of the detailed planning of this program.

Burzych: "No, nobody ever came to us and asked for any kind of advice or recommendations or anything."



Airline Delays

Rogers: "Why would they complain about this if it's going to be a solution that's going to make things better?"

Andolino: "Again, this does exactly what we want it to do, Phil. It reduces delays and increases capacity at our airports."

Burzych: "We want expansion, but this plan is not the way to go. It just doesn't work."

The FAA insists traffic on adjacent parallel runways would be staggered, and that 88 percent of runway crossings would actually be behind any aircraft preparing to take off. The controllers say efforts to do that will waste fuel and, perhaps more important to travelers, time.

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WMAQ NBC 5 Chicago
June 29, 2005
Transcript of newscast 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.

Live from Chicago's NBC 5, this is NBC 5 news at 6".
- Intro Announcer

"Some where along the line, the number one priority, went from fixing O'Hare; to making it into a huge, long, expensive project."
- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"It is a project that some say will cost as much as $20 billion. But those who control the air traffic over O'Hare Airport say all of that money just isn't necessary. The controllers say they have an easier and cheaper solution. Good evening, I'm Warner Saunders."
- Warner Saunders, NBC 5 News, Anchor

"And I'm Allison Rosati. Well what is that solution? NBC 5's Phil Rogers is in our control room tonight with what the flight controllers have to say. Phil."
- Allison Rosati. NBC 5 News, Anchor

"Alison, its no secret that the O'Hare controllers have not been big fans of the city's plans for airport expansion. But today, the men and women who manage arrivals and departures at O'Hare came out with their strongest statement to date, essentially; they said, 'don't build the Mayor's plan, build ours.'"
- Phil Rogers, NBC 5 News, Reporter

"[You know] It's a simple fix, the reason why it's not being done is because the people who are building O'Hare expansion - the city of Chicago - never came to us."
- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"The city wants to spend an estimated $15 billion,,some say more, to change the O'Hare configuration to six parallel runways. Controllers contend that's a waste of money. They say a single new runway on the airport's South end would accomplish the same benefits at a fraction of the cost."
- Phil Rogers, NBC 5 News, Reporter

"This would help immediately. If this runway would open tomorrow, you would see an immediate reduction or elimination of poor weather arrival delays."
- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"Look again. This is the existing airfield, this is the multi-billion dollar plan the city wants to build with six parallel runways. The controllers contend they can accomplish the same thing with an existing airfield and a single, new parallel runway right here".
- Phil Rogers, NBC 5, Reporter

"Parallel numbers four (4), five (5) and six (6) is overkill. Parallels four (4), five (5) and six (6) do not add any benefit to the arrival delay situation at O'Hare."
- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"But there's more. The city's plan would be built in phases; with the first new runway to go here (he points to a map on a screen) on the North side. But again, the controllers want only one new runway, here on the South end of the field. They contend the Mayor's plan is exactly the opposite of what they need and what would work."

- Phil Rogers, NBC 5, Reporter

"It's impossible for us to land airplanes on that North runway and depart other runways at the same time. It's impossible. It's not safe, it's against the rules and it won't happen."

- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"Suburban leaders proposed a varied of the controllers plan in their filings with the FAA. It was summarily rejected. Men and women in the towers say that's a mistake."

- Phil Rogers, NBC 5, Reporter

"This is the quickest, cheapest and safest fix to fixing O'Hare airport today."

- Craig Burzych, Controllers' Union President

"Now again, the FAA examined a variation of the controllers plan and rejected it saying it would require too much coordination with crossing runways and would not provide needed growth. The controllers note they're the ones that manage the traffic and say that the FAA's criticisms are simply wrong. The City of Chicago stands by their plan but agrees this is clearly the FAA's call."

- Phil Rogers, NBC 5, Reporter