

NOTICE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

N 8900.65

National Policy

Effective Date:
01/15/09

Cancellation Date:
01/15/10

SUBJ: FY 2009 Surveillance of Air Tour Operators (Maintenance)

- 1. Purpose of This Notice.** This notice establishes fiscal year (FY) 2009 special surveillance requirements for commercial air tour operators in response to a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation. This notice is applicable to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121, 135, and 91 operators conducting commercial air tours (Reference 14 CFR part 136, § 136.1). This notice requires Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) action.
- 2. Audience.** The primary audience for this notice is Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) aviation safety inspectors (ASI) (Airworthiness) responsible for part 121, 135 and 91 operators conducting commercial air tours. The secondary audience includes Flight Standards branches and divisions in the regions and in headquarters.
- 3. Where You Can Find This Notice.** Inspectors can access this notice through the Flight Standards Information Management System (FSIMS) at <http://fsims.avs.faa.gov>. Operators and the public may find this information on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Web site at: <http://fsims.faa.gov>. More information about the accident, NYC07MA073, is available on the NTSB's Web site at <http://www.nts.gov/nts/query.asp>.
- 4. Background.**

 - a. NTSB Investigation.** During the onsite investigation of a fatal air tour accident involving an Aerospatiale model AS350BA helicopter, NTSB investigators found the left lateral servo detached from its clevis mounting bolt. The NTSB determined the mechanic probably did not properly torque the locking nut when installing the servo on the aircraft. The NTSB noted that the helicopter had undergone several extensive and detailed inspections after the servo was installed without anybody detecting the unsecured servo. Furthermore, the NTSB noted the air tour operator's manual required that an inspection be performed following the installation of the servo. NTSB investigators found no maintenance record entry for the required inspection. The NTSB concluded that because there was no effective quality assurance program in place at the air tour operator, maintenance errors were not detected, which led to the accident.
 - b. NTSB Recommendation.** The NTSB made several recommendations to the FAA concerning this accident. One of the recommendations applicable to this notice pertains to FAA oversight. The NTSB recommended in safety recommendation A-08-34 that the FAA develop a

mechanism to provide direct surveillance of air tour maintenance at all locations where a company's maintenance is conducted.

5. Discussion. The current edition of Order 1800.56 contains Flight Standards Service (AFS) policy for developing and executing annual surveillance work programs. This order identifies specific work functions AFS personnel must accomplish to provide a baseline of information and the appropriate assurances to assess the soundness of the aviation system. However, Order 1800.56J (FY 2009) lacks specific air tour surveillance requirements for maintenance. Therefore, this notice serves to supplement FY 2009 surveillance requirements for air tour maintenance.

6. Action. Within 60 days after receipt of this notice perform the following:

- Unless previously accomplished for FY 2009, each Airworthiness ASI with air tour responsibility will amend their FY 2009 work programs to include at least one planned maintenance surveillance item for each air tour operator at each location where a company's maintenance is conducted. The purpose of the inspection is to verify the performance of maintenance in accordance with the air tour operator's manual and the regulations (for example, part 91 air tour operators without company manuals – in accordance with 14 CFR part 91, § 91.405). The surveillance required by this notice can be shared between the maintenance and avionics inspector; and
- FSDO Managers will verify the planned surveillance records have been created as specified in this notice.

7. PTRS Input. Inspectors must make a PTRS record entry to record the actions directed by this notice for each inspection of air tour operator at each location. PTRS activity numbers are not specified in this notice. Inspectors will choose an activity number that best represents the purpose of the inspection as noted in paragraph 6. It is essential to the tracking of this surveillance that inspectors enter the notice number into the National Use field as "NATOURSUR" (without quotes).

8. Disposition. We will permanently incorporate the information in this notice into FSIMS before the notice expires. Direct questions concerning this notice to the Air Carrier Maintenance Branch, AFS-330, at (202) 385-6443.

ORIGINAL SIGNED by
Chester D. Dalbey for

John M. Allen
Director, Flight Standards Service