

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Air Traffic Organization Policy

N JO 7210.885

Effective Date: August 17, 2015

Cancellation Date: December 10, 2015

SUBJ: Simultaneous Independent Parallel Approach Operations

1. Purpose of This Notice. The purpose of this notice is to implement new procedures for conducting simultaneous parallel approach operations. These changes account for new dependent separation standards, Runway Centerline Spacing (RCLS) standards, and the elimination of high update radar requirements. This change adds a requirement that facility directives must state that final monitor displays not be configured in FUSION when conducting final monitoring activities, removes provisions concerning simultaneous close parallel-high update radar not required, and revises Appendix 4 accounting for the change from waiver to Letter of Authorization.

2. Audience. This notice applies to the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service units: Air Traffic Services, Mission Support, and System Operations; and all associated terminal air traffic control facilities.

3. Where Can I Find This Notice? This notice is available on the MyFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/.

4. Background. Between 2011 and 2014, AFS released three technical reports that form the framework for the majority of the changes contained in this Notice. The changes account for new runway centerline spacing (RCLS) distances when operating with dual parallel runways or triple parallel runways. Additionally, they account for the inclusion of offset approaches to further reduce the RCLS without the need for high update radars and allows for the removal of the simultaneous independent close parallel approaches without high update radar paragraph due to the duplicative content. This change also includes language previously agreed to between Air Traffic Services (AJT), and the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV) that changes use of the term waiver in favor of a letter of authorization relating to continued use of simultaneous operations with glideslope outages greater than 29 days that was inadvertently not incorporated into this directive in 2013.

5. Procedures.

a. Amend the following paragraphs to read as follows:

10-4-6. SIMULTANEOUS INDEPENDENT APPROACHES

a. Simultaneous independent approaches may be conducted when:

1. Dual parallel runway centerlines are at least 3,600 feet apart, or dual parallel runway centerlines are at least 3,000 feet apart with a 2.5° to 3.0° offset approach to either runway and the airport field elevation is 2,000 feet MSL or less.

NOTE-

Airport field elevation requirement does not apply to dual parallel runways that are 4,300 feet or more apart.

2. Triple parallel approaches may be conducted under one of the following conditions:

(a). Parallel runway centerlines are at least 3,900 feet apart and the airport field elevation is 2,000 feet MSL or less; or

(b). Parallel runway centerlines are at least 3,000 feet apart, a 2.5° to 3.0° offset approach to both outside runways, and the airport field elevation is 2,000 feet MSL or less; or

(c). Parallel runway centerlines are at least 3,000 feet apart, a single 2.5° to 3.0° offset approach to either outside runway while parallel approaches to the remaining two runways are separated by at least 3,900 feet, and the airport field elevation is 2,000 feet MSL or less.

b. Instrument approach procedures are annotated with "simultaneous approach authorized".

c. Equipment required to maintain communication, navigation, and surveillance systems is operational with the glide slope exception as noted below.

d. During glide slope outages, facilities may continue to conduct simultaneous independent approaches without vertical guidance for a period of no more than 29 days, provided the following requirements are identified in an Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV) approved contingency plan. At a minimum, the following special provisions, conditions, and limitations must be identified in the plan, if applicable, along with any other facility–specific requirements:

1. An LOA with the ATCT (or facility directive for a combined facility) must contain a description of the procedures, requirements, and any limitations as specified in the facility contingency plan for glide slope out of service procedures.

2. The ATC facility must notify Technical Operations personnel of the glide slope outage.

REFERENCE-

FAAO JO 7210.3, Para 3-5-2, System Component Malfunctions

3. The ATC facility must notify arriving pilots that the glide slope is out of service. This can be accomplished via the ATIS broadcast.

4. Any other requirements specified in the local facility contingency plan for glide slope out procedures must be complied with before conducting simultaneous independent approach procedures.

5. Controllers must be trained and provided annual refresher training concerning the application of these procedures.

6. The ATC facility must record when the glide slope outage occurs and any adverse impact on the operation on FAA Form 7230–4, Daily Record of Facility Operation.

7. Any loss of separation or break out associated with operations under a contingency plan for glide slope out must be reported to the Director, Operations- Headquarters.

8. The facility must have radar coverage down to the decision altitude or minimum descent altitude, as applicable.

9. Approaches must be terminated to the runway without a glide slope whenever the reported visibility is below the straight–in localizer minimum for that runway.

10. Any required equipment for the approach with the glide slope out of service must be operational, such as DME or VORTAC.

e. Simultaneous approaches with the glide slope unusable must be discontinued after 29 days unless granted a Letter of Authorization by AOV. (See Appendix 4.)

f. When simultaneous approaches are being conducted, the pilot is expected to inform approach control, prior to departing an outer fix, if the aircraft does not have the appropriate airborne equipment or they do not choose to conduct a simultaneous approach. Provide individual handling to such aircraft.

g. Facility directives must state that final monitor displays not be configured in FUSION, when conducting final monitor activities.

OLD 10-4-7. SIMULTANEOUS INDEPENDENT CLOSE PARALLEL APPROACHES – HIGH UPDATE RADAR NOT REQUIRED. **DELETE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH**

NEW 10-4-7. SIMULTANEOUS WIDELY-SPACED PARALLEL OPERATIONS

a. Simultaneous independent approaches to widely-spaced parallel runways without final monitors may be conducted when:

1. Instrument approach procedures are annotated with "Simultaneous Approach Authorized" .

2. A separate approach system is required for each parallel runway. A minimum distance of more than 9,000 feet between centerlines is required when approaches are conducted at airports with field elevations at or below 5,000 feet MSL, or 9,200 feet between runway centerlines is required with a field elevation above 5,000 feet MSL. Other integral parts of the total Simultaneous Approach System include radar, communications, ATC procedures, and appropriate airborne equipment.

3. Weather activity is closely monitored that could impact the final approach course. Weather conditions in the vicinity of either final approach course may dictate a change of the approach in use.

4. All turn-ons and final approaches are monitored by radar. Since the primary responsibility for navigation rests with the pilot, instructions from the controller are limited to those necessary to ensure separation between aircraft. Information and instructions are issued as necessary to contain the aircraft on the final approach course. Aircraft which are observed deviating from the assigned final approach course are instructed to alter course left or right, as appropriate, to return to the desired course. Unless altitude separation is assured between aircraft, immediate action must be taken by the controller monitoring the adjacent parallel approach course to require the aircraft in potential conflict to alter its flight path to avoid the deviating aircraft.

5. Missed approach procedures are established with climbs on diverging courses. To reduce the possibility of error, the missed approach procedure for a single runway operation should be revised, as necessary, to be identical with that of a simultaneous approach operation.

6. Separate radar and local control positions are established for each final approach course.

b. Record the time the operation begins and ends on the facility log.

c. Where possible, establish standard breakout procedures for each simultaneous operation. If traffic patterns and airspace permit, the standard breakout altitude should be the same as the missed approach altitude.

d. Provide individual handling to an aircraft when the crew informs you that the aircraft does not have the appropriate airborne equipment or they choose not to conduct a simultaneous approach.

OLD Appendix 4. Glide Slope Outage Waiver Request <u>NEW</u>

Appendix 4. A Letter of Authorization Request to Conduct Simultaneous Independent Approaches with Glide Slope Out after 29 days.

Request for Authorization to Conduct Simultaneous Independent Approaches with Glide Slope Out after 29 days.
Submit via Email to:
AJT-2 9-AJT-HQ-Correspondence@faa.gov
Section 1
Facility Identification: (KXYZ)
Runway (###) Glideslope OTS:
Dates of Expected Outage: (xx/xx/xx to xx/xx/xx)
Reason Glideslope is OTS:
Section 2
(Simultaneous) Approaches Impacted:
Runway Usage Percentage:
IFR Limits/Weather Minimums:
RNAV capability/Equipage:
Peak IFR Airport Arrival Rate:
Section 3
Impact if Authorization is Not Granted:

Facility Manager must include a narrative of the operational impact if continuation of this procedure is not approved.

Section 4

Attach a copy of the facility Contingency Plan for Glide Slope Out Procedures.

7. Distribution. This notice is distributed to the following ATO service units: Air Traffic Services; Mission Support, and System Operations; the Office of ATO Safety and Technical Training; the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service; the William J. Hughes Technical Center; and the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center.

Original s/ by Maurice Hoffman for Heather Hemdal

Heather Hemdal Director, Air Traffic Procedures Mission Support Services June 27, 2015

Date Signed

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