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APPENDIX: 4

BULLETIN TYPE: Flight Standards Information Bulletin
(FSIB) or Air Transportation (FSAT)

BULLETIN NUMBER: FSAT 95-20

BULLETIN TITLE: Aircrew Operating Procedures and
Inflight
Checklist Compliance Emphasis

EFFECTIVE DATE: 08/11/95

TRACKING: NTSB Recommendation A-95-46

1. PURPOSE. This bulletin directs Flight Standards principal operations inspectors (POI) to reemphasize to their assigned air carrier(s) (FAR Parts 121 and 135) the need to adhere to the company's flight crew operating procedures and to strictly comply with its inflight checklist procedures. This guidance contains information and a recommendation from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding adherence of an operator's flight crewmember employees to company operating procedures and rigorous compliance with checklist procedures. This guidance is effective immediately.

2. BACKGROUND. A Douglas DC-9-31, N954VJ, operated by USAir, collided with trees and a private residence near the Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, on July 2, 1994. The accident occurred shortly after the flightcrew executed a missed approach from the instrument landing system (ILS) approach. The NTSB has determined that the probable causes of this accident, among others, included: (1) the flightcrew's decision, contrary to guidance contained in the manual for the use and guidance of flight and ground operations personnel (flight manual), to continue an approach into severe convective activity that was conducive to a microburst; and (2) the flightcrew's failure to properly follow approved flight checklist procedures to establish and maintain the proper airplane attitude and thrust setting necessary to escape the windshear, all of which led to an encounter with and failure to escape from a microburst-induced windshear.

A. As a result of this accident, NTSB issued the following recommendation:

A-95-46. "Require that Principal Operations Inspectors (POI's) ensure that their respective air carrier(s) adhere to the company's operating procedures and emphasize rigorous compliance to checklist procedures."

B. Over the years, NTSB has investigated a number of catastrophic accidents in which standard operating procedures were either overlooked or discounted. For example, on May 10, 1988, NTSB determined that the probable cause of an accident, during takeoff, was the flightcrew's failure to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff. As a result of that accident, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-88-67 urging the FAA to require that all FAR Parts 121 and 135 operators and principal operations inspectors emphasize the importance of disciplined application of standard operating procedures and, in particular, emphasize rigorous adherence to prescribed checklist procedures.

3. ACTION. POI's will contact their respective air carrier(s) and have them reemphasize the importance for flight crewmembers to strictly adhere to company flight operating procedures and to inflight checklist procedures.

4. PROGRAM TRACKING AND REPORTING SUBSYSTEM (PTRS) INPUT. POI's shall make a PTRS entry to record the actions directed by this bulletin with each of their operators as outlined in HBA 94-08, Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) Documentation of Action Required by Flight Standards Bulletins. The PTRS entry shall be listed as Activity Code No. 1381 and entered into the "National Use" field as "FSAT9520." POI's should use the comments section to record comments of interaction with the operators.

5. INQUIRIES. This FSIB was developed by AFS-210. Any questions or comments should be directed to AFS-210 at (202) 267-7480.

6. EXPIRATION. This FSIB will expire on 08-31-96.

/s/

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