SUBJECT: Accomplishing safety-related functions in Part 135 operations

PURPOSE: To stress the importance of two operating procedures by flightcrew (pilots) in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 135 operations: (1) clearly identifying to passengers those crew members who are safety-qualified and those who are not, and (2) accomplishing all functions relating to passenger safety when no safety-qualified flight attendant is on board.

DISCUSSION: In a high-profile accident a turbojet operating as a part 135 charter flight ran off the departure end of the takeoff runway. No one was killed, but some occupants sustained serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post-impact fire. The accident investigation revealed that a person provided as a cabin aide to perform passenger service functions was inadequately trained in safety related functions, such as opening the cabin door to evacuate passengers. The passengers and the pilots presumed that this person was trained as a required flight attendant.

A person employed to perform cabin services is not necessarily required by part 135 regulations to be trained and qualified in safety related functions, unlike a required flight attendant (required on an airplane seating 20 or more passengers). Such a person might be mistaken by passengers as a fully qualified flight attendant. Therefore, in such cases when there is no flight attendant on board pilots should be perfectly clear in their required safety briefings to cabin occupants – passengers and cabin service people alike – that all safety functions will be accomplished by the pilots themselves.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Directors of operations, chief pilots, trainers, flight attendants, pilots, and people employed to perform cabin services in part 135 operations should be aware of the circumstances of the accident described in this SAFO. For more information:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/A_Acc1.htm


Additionally, they should insist that operating manuals, training programs, and operational control procedures ensure that no ambiguity exists during part 135 operations about which crew members are safety-qualified and which ones are not.

FOR MORE INFORMATION regarding these recommendations go to this FAA public web:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/A_Acc1.htm