Federal Aviation Administration
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Air Carrier Operations Issue Area
Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group

Task 1 – Preplanned Rest in Cockpit
Task Assignment
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee; Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee; Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of establishment of Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group.

SUMMARY: Notice is given of the establishment of a Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group by the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. This notice informs the public of the activities of the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. R. Curtis Graeber, Manager, Flight Deck Research Avionics/Flight Systems, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, MS 33HH, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone (206) 393-6688; fax (206) 477-8778.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (56 FR 2190, January 22, 1991) which held its first meeting on May 23, 1991 (56 FR 20412, May 3, 1991). The Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee was established at that meeting to provide advice and recommendations to the Director, FAA Flight Standards Service, on air carrier operations, pertinent regulations, and associated advisory material. At its October 1, 1991, meeting (56 FR 46349, September 11, 1991), the subcommittee established the Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group.

Specifically, the working group's task is the following:

To determine the feasibility of preplanned rest in the cockpit during long-range flights and, if feasible, determine the criteria for the establishment of such rest periods.

The Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group will be comprised of experts from those organizations having an interest in the task assigned to it. A working group member need not necessarily be a representative of one of the organizations of the parent Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee or of the full Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. An individual who has expertise in the subject matter and wishes to become a member of the working group should write the person listed under the caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT expressing that desire and describing his or her interest in the task and the expertise he or she would bring to the working group. The request will be reviewed with the subcommittee chair and working group leader, and the individual advised whether or not the request can be accommodated.

The Secretary of Transportation has determined that the formation and use of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee and its subcommittees are necessary in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the FAA by law. Meetings of the full committee and any subcommittees will be open to the public except as authorized by section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Meetings of the Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group will be not be open to the public, except to the extent that individuals with an interest and expertise are selected to participate. No public announcement of working group meetings will be made.

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 17, 1991.

David S. Potter, Executive Director, Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

[FR Doc. 91-25441 Filed 10-22-91; 8:45 am]
Recommendation Letter
March 10, 1993

Mr. Anthony J. Broderick  
Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification  
Federal Aviation Administration  
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20591

Subject: Proposed Advisory Circular, Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck

Dear Mr. Broderick:

The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee Air Carrier Operations Interest Area met in January to discuss, among other issues, a proposed Advisory Circular (AC) entitled Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck. A final copy of the proposed AC is included as Attachment 1. This proposed AC was prepared by the Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group.

The working group was established by the FAA on October 23, 1991 and was assigned the following task:

To determine the feasibility of preplanned rest in the cockpit during long-range flights and, if feasible, determine the criteria for the establishment of such rest periods.

Dr. Curt Graeber of the Boeing Company was the working group chairman. The working group drew heavily from a research study performed by NASA. The report of this study, "Effects of Planned Cockpit Rest on Crew Performance and Alertness in Long-Haul Operations", is currently being published. This study demonstrates that naps during flight significantly improve post-nap performance. Throughout the working group discussions on this proposed AC, the group felt that the AC would propose measures to alleviate fatigue arising from flight operations and should in no way serve as a basis for modification or easing of those regulations pertaining to flight time limitations and rest requirements.

When this proposed AC was first presented to the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee, several objections were raised by the Allied Pilots Association (APA). Among other issues, APA objected strenuously to the proposed allowance of controlled rest on two-crew airplanes. The working group discussed the objections and made revisions to the proposed AC in an attempt to be responsive to the APA concerns.

In November, 1992, APA published a report entitled "The Allied Pilots Association’s Objections to the Proposed ‘Controlled Rest’ Advisory
Circular ("Cockpit Napping") for U.S. Certificated Air Carriers. A copy of that report was transmitted to me on January 13, 1993 and is Attachment 2. In the interest of brevity, Appendix B of their report contains reports or operational summaries from three NASA Technical Memoranda and is not included in the attachment. If you would like a copy of Appendix B, it is available from APA.

The proposed AC, as revised, was discussed at the January 13, 1993 meeting of the Air Carrier Operations Interest Area. The objections raised by APA were discussed and/or addressed at the meeting. Among their objections were the following:

- The Task Authority of the Working Group Was Exceeded.
- NASA Research Does Not Support the Proposed Advisory Circular.
- The Proposed Advisory Circular Goes Far Beyond Available Data:
  a. Critical Differences Between Two- and Three-Crew Operations Ignored,
  b. Current In-Flight Crew Rest Practices Would be Degraded,
  c. NASA did not Study Two-Pilot Operations or Domestic Operations, and
- Regulatory and Legal Concerns.
- Sleeping on Duty is Not the Answer; the Flight/Duty Time Regulations Need to be Overhauled.

These objections are discussed in detail in the APA report.

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) shares some of the concerns expressed by APA. In a letter sent to me February 1, 1993, these concerns were enumerated. According to ALPA, controlled rest on the flight deck should be used only on aircraft certificated for three crew members involved in long range operations up to twelve hours duration. Several recommended changes are offered to the January 14, 1993 version of the proposed AC which will address ALPA's concerns. In addition, ALPA proposes two additional areas which should be addressed by the FAA prior to implementation of the proposed AC. These are initiation of further research which would demonstrate the ability of crewmembers to respond to an emergency situation when a crewmember is resting and establishment of FAA policy regarding a captain's authority and responsibility while resting on the flight deck. A copy of the ALPA letter is Attachment 3.

Dr. Graeber discussed the proposed AC at the January 13, 1993 meeting of the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee. The objections of APA and ALPA were also presented and discussed. A number of the members of the working group were also present at the meeting. After lengthy discussion of the issues and objections, the working group made several changes to the AC. It was not possible to develop a complete
consensus on the proposed AC, even with the changes. The working group presented the AC to the subcommittee with the recognition and discussion of the remaining objections.

The subcommittee felt it was appropriate to send the proposed AC, as modified at the meeting, to the FAA with the acknowledgement that there are objections to it. These objections had been addressed but not resolved. Dr. Graeber sent me a letter on January 14, 1993 in which he discussed the issues, objections, and need for the advisory circular. He included a letter from one of the NASA researchers who performed the controlled rest research and which addresses some of the APA objections to the proposed AC. He also included a copy of the proposed AC, as revised. Dr. Graeber's letter is Attachment 4.

We would like to be able to present you a non-controversial document with all members of the working group in complete agreement regarding its details. That is not possible. The majority of the working group feels the AC can serve a beneficial purpose in improving aviation safety by reducing operational fatigue. There is not complete consensus on some of the application provisions and other details.

If we may be of further assistance to you in this matter, please don't hesitate to call upon us.

Sincerely,

William W. Edmunds, Jr.
Assistant Chairman
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

WWE:amr
attachments

cc: ARAC Air Carrier Operations
    Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Working Group
Recommendation
Mr. Bill Edmunds, Chairman  
ARAC Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee  
c/o ALPA Safety Department  
1625 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Bill:

Approximately four weeks ago APA sent you a confidential working draft of the APA’s Objections to the Proposed Controlled Rest Advisory Circular. We had previously submitted our preliminary objections in writing, and later verbalized the increasing breadth of our concerns at meetings of the Controlled Rest Working Group and the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee.

Enclosed is a signed copy of APA’s formal statement of objections to the proposed Advisory Circular. As you can see, it is far too comprehensive to be reduced to a single paragraph or even a page in a letter of transmittal. The statement of objections is 30 pages long and the appendices, containing related source documents contains an additional 100 pages.

Due to the extremely serious safety implications of the proposed procedure, APA has devoted considerable time and effort to create a complete statement of our objections. Pursuant to our request at the last meeting of the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee (noted in the minutes of that meeting), it remains our request that the entire document be made a part of the record and be transmitted to the FAA with the proposed Controlled Rest Advisory Circular. As we discussed, to ease the Subcommittee’s administrative burden APA will furnish signed copies directly to all ARAC members, to the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee, and to the FAA, with a copy of this letter attached. We will also provide additional copies to other interested parties upon request.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Your assistance in making APA’s objections a part of the official record is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Capt. Brian A. Mayhew  
ARAC Representative For the APA

BAM/clc  
cc: R. T. LaVoy/B. B. Bickhaus/M. P. Cronin/A. J. Broderick  
ARAC Members/Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee

Enclosure
THE ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION'S OBJECTIONS TO
THE PROPOSED "CONTROLLED REST" ADVISORY CIRCULAR
("COCKPIT NAPPING")
FOR U.S. CERTIFIED AIR CARRIERS

Presented To
The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC)

Prepared at the direction of Captain Richard T. LaVoy, President
By Captain Brian A. Mayhew and Captain Michael P. Cronin
November 19, 1992
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APPENDIX A

Draft Advisory Circular Revision 8/19/92
Draft Advisory Circular

APPENDIX B CREW FACTORS IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS:

Effects of Preplanned Cockpit Rest on Crew Performance and Alertness in Long-Haul Operations (NASA Technical Memorandum Draft #103884)

Factors Influencing Sleep Timing and Subjective Sleep Quality in Commercial Long-Haul Flight Crews (NASA Technical Memorandum #103852)

Sleep and Wakefulness in International Aircrews (NASA Technical Memorandum #88231)
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Based on a thorough review of the Draft Advisory Circular and discussions at A.R.A.C. Operations Subcommittee meetings, the Allied Pilots Association believes that the Draft Advisory Circular on Controlled Rest is not consistent with the public interest.

The APA objects to the Draft Advisory Circular because: It contradicts current Federal Aviation Regulations and Aircraft Certification Standards, U.S. airline Operating procedures, and Crew Resources Management principles; and U.S. laws concerning the duty of care expected of common carriers, their agents and employees; it exceeds the stated task authority given the ARAC Working Group; and because it goes far beyond the available scientific support. The APA finds references to cockpit napping on two-pilot aircraft in any operation, and in the domestic ATC environment in any aircraft, exceptionally objectionable.

These objections are stated in the interest of protecting the flying public and ensuring that the currently prevailing standards for safety of flight are not diminished on U.S. certificated air carriers.

II. TASK AUTHORITY EXCEEDED

The following is the Task Authority granted by the FAA to the ARAC Controlled Rest Working Group, as published on October 23, 1991 in the Federal Register:

"Specifically, the working group's task is the following: To determine the feasibility of preplanned rest in the cockpit during long-range flights and, if feasible, determine the criteria for the establishment of such rest periods."

The Draft Advisory Circular does not limit cockpit napping to "long-range" flights as specified by the Task Statement. The proposed Advisory Circular states that its applications may be extended to domestic U.S. operations, very few of which are "long-range" and to two-pilot operations as well. Indeed, during the most recent meeting of the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee, one representative stated it was his understanding that cockpit napping would apply to domestic U.S. operations of every type. He specifically mentioned bank check carriers as an example, which are characterized by short-haul flights using small aircraft. The proposed Advisory Circular encourages the development of cockpit napping procedures in a wide range of operations not included in the Task Authority.
The proposed Advisory Circular will not increase the current level of airline safety. It is contrary to the public interest because cockpit napping will expose the flying public to instances where inadvertent sleeping by the designated alert pilot results in the lack of even one alert pilot at the controls, and available to respond quickly to critical situations. The conclusion reached in the 1992 NASA study by Rosekind, Graeber, et al was that a pilot would be more alert for the approach phase of a flight if he/she had rested for 45 or less minutes during the pre-descent part of the flight. The NASA study also pointed out that the beneficial effects of a brief nap are short lived and cannot overcome the large sleep deficits typically accumulated on long international schedules containing days of Circadian Rhythm disruption.

NASA's research does not support the proposed Advisory Circular as drafted, partly because critical areas have not been addressed by the studies, partly because the proposed Advisory Circular covers flying operations that have never been studied, partly because only one crew member can be provided with a 45-minute nap when it will do the most good (during the pre-descent phase of flight), and because other, safer means of ensuring properly rested flight crews are currently available for use on long-haul international flights. In fact, such practices are currently in use at most U. S. flag airlines.

- We must reiterate that none of the various NASA studies pertain to two-pilot aircraft operations.
- A two-pilot crew with one pilot sleeping is a single-pilot operation by any reasonable definition.
- NASA did not observe in-flight operations on three-pilot or two-pilot crews within the higher density, U.S. domestic ATC environment. The domestic environment consists of VOR defined airways system, areas of dense, closely-spaced air traffic, and vastly different navigation/communications procedures, yet the proposed Advisory Circular would permit the development and use of cockpit napping procedures under these conditions.
- NASA did not observe or analyze responses by partially-asleep crews during actual emergency or abnormal situations, yet these situations are certain to arise during line operations.
- Neither NASA nor ARAC considered the far-reaching regulatory and legal consequences of a change in aircraft operating philosophy of this magnitude.
APA has reviewed the following NASA studies and determined that none of them provides scientific support for the Advisory Circular as drafted. Copies of the Operational Summaries from the following NASA Technical Memoranda (and draft NTM) are attached as Appendix B:


(#88231) Sleep and Wakefulness in International Aircrews by Graeber (1986)

*Note: Draft copies of NTM #103884 were circulated by NASA to the FAA, the participating air carriers, and the ARAC working group that drafted the proposed Advisory Circular. NTM #103884 will be in press at the NASA publications branch in January, 1993.

IV.
THE PROPOSED ADVISORY CIRCULAR GOES FAR BEYOND AVAILABLE DATA

The scientific research upon which the proposed Advisory Circular is supposedly based did not include observations or an analysis of "controlled rest" on two-pilot aircraft, or on any type of aircraft during operations in the domestic route/ATC environment, or during actual emergencies. The scope of the NASA Cockpit Napping Study (by Rosekind, Graeber, et al) was limited to long-range international operations, over water, in three-crew aircraft (without an augmented crew), during normal revenue operations. Since actual emergencies were not observed, the study cannot provide scientific conclusions about the impact of a partially asleep crew on proper handling of in-flight emergencies or abnormal situations. NASA allowed a 20-minute period for an awakened pilot to regain his faculties and situational awareness. That luxury will not exist following a critical, unplanned emergency, such as the cargo door failure and decompression experienced on a trans-Pacific United B-747. Neither does the NASA study provide data about cockpit napping during operations in the U.S. domestic ATC environment with its relatively dense VOR airways system for any type of aircraft. The following are quotes on point from NASA's Technical Memoranda:

(Draft #103884) "The primary goal was to determine the effectiveness of a preplanned cockpit rest period to improve performance and alertness in nonaugmented, 3-person long-haul flight operations."
(Draft #103884) "It must be acknowledged that every scientific study has specific limitations that restrict the generalizability of the results. This study involved only one trip pattern on a commercial airline carrier. The study was conducted on transpacific flights to utilize the opportunity of scheduling the preplanned rest periods during the low workload portion of cruise over water. Also, the highest levels of accumulated fatigue, that probably occurred during the final trip legs, were not studied except for log book and activity data.

(Draft #103884) "This study involved B747 aircraft flown by 3-person crews. The specific application of these results to the 2-person cockpit were not addressed in this study. It is important to remain cognizant of these limitations when attempts are made to generalize the study results to questions that extend beyond the scope of the specific scientific issues addressed here."

(Draft #103884) "The preplanned nap appeared to provide an effective, acute relief for the fatigue and sleepiness experienced in nonaugmented 3-person long-haul flight operations. The strength of the current results does support the implementation of preplanned cockpit sleep opportunities in nonaugmented long-haul flight operations involving 3-person crews."

(Draft #103884) "The Rest Group was allowed a preplanned 40-minute rest period during the low workload, cruise portion of flight over water. Pilots rested one at a time, on a prearranged rotation, with 2 crew members maintaining the flight at all times... The rest opportunity was divided into an initial preparation period (3 mins), followed by the 40 minute rest period, followed by a recovery period (20 mins)... The rest was terminated at a present time by a researcher and the resting pilot was fully briefed prior to re-entering the operational loop."

A. Critical Differences Between Two- and Three-Crew Operations Ignored

APA believes that some unintended results will flow from the inclusion of the two-pilot aircraft (even those with augmented crews) and from the inclusion of domestic operations, in an Advisory Circular based on a study of three-crew aircraft on long-haul, overwater flights. By including two-pilot aircraft and domestic operations on two and three crew aircraft late in the process, these consequences may not have received the in-depth consideration they deserve.

Current Federal regulations limit all domestic operations regardless of crew complement to eight hours of flight time between rest periods, 14 CFR 121.471(a)(4), and limits two-pilot crews in flag (international) air carriers to a maximum of eight hours flight time between rest periods (14CFR 121.481.a). Flight time beyond eight hours in a duty period on an aircraft designed for two-pilot operation is possible under 14 CFR 121.483 only by providing an additional pilot for in-flight relief. Responsible scheduling practices
under these current regulations should obviate the need for cockpit napping in those operations.

There are fundamental differences between the application of the cockpit napping concept on the three-crew aircraft vs. two-crew aircraft, even when the two-pilot crew is augmented by a relief pilot. On the three-crew flight deck with one crew member napping, the remaining two alert crew members are at their normal duty stations with full access to all necessary flight controls, navigation/communication gear, and vital systems controls such as fuel, electrical, hydraulics and pressurization.

On a two-pilot aircraft, even with a relief pilot in the flight deck jumpseat, when one pilot is napping in a pilot seat, only one alert crew member (the other operating pilot) has access to flight navigation, communications, and/or systems controls. Even when an alert relief pilot is available on the flight deck on two-pilot aircraft, he/she must be buckled into a cockpit jumpseat, which on many aircraft types is affixed to the aft cockpit bulkhead. Though alert, the relief pilot cannot reach essential flight/navigation/communication systems controls and cannot assist the alert operating pilot with either routine or emergency duties without getting out of the jumpseat.

Leaving the jumpseat to stand behind the pilot seats is not a practical alternative in turbulence, with a loss of cabin pressure, in an emergency descent, or in other situations where the alert relief pilot's assistance could be critical to the safe completion of the flight. Further, the light/indicator switches on modern two-pilot aircraft are positioned to be visible/operated only from the pilot seats.

It is possible that following an explosive decompression at the extremely high cruising altitudes typically used by two-pilot aircraft such as the Boeing 757/767, a sleeping pilot may not recover his faculties in time to don an oxygen mask. The time of useful consciousness (T.U.C.) without oxygen at flight level 410 is measured in seconds, so it is entirely possible that a pilot sleeping in a pilot seat may lose consciousness and may be unable to assist the alert pilot. Neither would an alert crew member in a cockpit jumpseat be able to assist in any meaningful way because he/she could not reach the controls and switches for aircraft systems/flight/communications/navigation.

B. Current In-Flight Crew Rest Practices Would Be Degraded

At the May 12, 1992 meeting, members of the Operations Subcommittee agreed that is was not their intent that cockpit naps be taken in a cockpit jumpseat on either two or three-crew aircraft. They stated that such rest should be taken at the normal duty station (pilot or flight engineer seat). This recognizes a practical necessity because cockpit jumpseats on many aircraft do not recline and are notoriously uncomfortable.

At the May 12 and September 16, 1992 meetings, members of the Operations Subcommittee seemed to agree with APA's position that various aviation constituencies
including oversight groups, Congress, and the media would take a dim view of any cockpit napping procedure that permitted one crew member to be sleeping in a crew rest seat (in the cabin) or in a bunk, while a second crew member is napping in a pilot seat - because this would mean that there would be only one alert pilot on the flight deck. If the ARAC accepts that premise, then it is logical to assume that for cockpit napping to be used on two-pilot aircraft, even with an augmented crew, the relief pilot would be required to be in a cockpit jumpseat. As a practical matter, this would eliminate the use of a crew rest seat (in the cabin) or a bunk while "controlled rest" is being used.

C. NASA Did Not Study Two-Pilot Operations or Domestic Operations

As previously mentioned, the various NASA studies cover only long-range international operations on three-crew aircraft under normal conditions. These flights are characterized by a series of long overwater legs, utilizing inertial navigation, and entail severe circadian rhythm disruption caused by rapid crossing of multiple time zones over a period of days. The following is a quote from NASA's Technical Memorandum Draft #103884:

"Long-haul flight operations often involve rapid multiple time zone changes, sleep disturbances, circadian disruptions, and long, irregular work schedules. These factors can result in fatigue, cumulative sleep loss, decreased alertness, and decreased performance in long-haul flight crews. Thus, operations effectiveness and safety may be compromised due to pilot fatigue. One natural compensatory response to the sleepiness and fatigue experienced in long-haul operations is the occurrence of both unplanned, spontaneous napping and non-sanctioned rest periods. The occurrence of these activities is supported by anecdotal, observational, and subjective report data from a variety of sources."

Readily available solutions currently exist to counter fatigue caused by excessive duty in that environment, especially during peacetime commercial operations. The use of relief crew members, on-board rest facilities, and proper scheduling practices that factor in human limitations, have proven to be effective countermeasures for pilot fatigue in both civil and military applications. Because these measures are known to be effective and are currently in use by most U.S. airlines, the purported rationale for the proposed cockpit napping Advisory Circular breaks down.

When in-flight crew rest is needed, it can and should be provided in a responsible manner, using proven methods that place public safety first. Admittedly, these currently available safety measures are more costly than the use of cockpit napping, but that is not a valid reason to abandon procedures that are known to be effective, in favor of new procedures known to have critical safety deficiencies.

D. Prevention of Inadvertent Sleeping by "Alert" Pilot Not Addressed
During at least two NASA studies, pilots were observed to fall asleep in an uncontrolled fashion due to fatigue, even when it was pre-briefed that they must remain awake. On several occasions when one pilot was taking a sanctioned cockpit nap, the designated alert pilot also fell asleep. This phenomenon is far less likely to occur during the controlled conditions of the NASA study than during unobserved line operations using cockpit napping procedures. The pilots in the study were wired to recording devices and were aware that they were being observed by two scientists in the cockpit jump seats — yet the designated "alert" pilots still fell asleep inadvertently, leaving the aircraft and its passengers without a qualified pilot awake at the controls. It must be emphasized that this occurred on non-augmented crews, operating without a relief pilot and without the opportunity to use on-board rest facilities. This speaks volumes about the safety value of relief crew members and crew rest facilities currently provided by most U. S. carriers on long-haul flights. The following are quotes on point from NASA's Technical Memoranda:

(Draft #103884) "There were two NASA researchers on the flight deck during the in-flight data collection periods. While they were instructed to minimize their interactions and presence, there is no question that having two extra individuals on the flight deck may have potentially altered the regular flow of cockpit conversation and interaction."

(Draft #103884) "An interesting finding emerged from analysis of the physiological data collected during the No-Rest Group 40-minute control period. While instructed to continue usual flight activities, 4 No-Rest Group pilots fell asleep (a total of 5 episodes) for periods lasting from several minutes to over 10 minutes."

(Draft #103884) "The period from one hour prior to top of descent (TOD) through descent and landing was analyzed for the occurrence of brain and eye movement microevents indicative of reduced physiological alertness."

(Draft #103884) "There was at least one microevent [of reduced physiological alertness] identified in 78% of the No-Rest Group and 50% of the Rest Group."

(Draft #103884) "The 24-hr rest/activity patterns, in combination with the subjective logs, demonstrated that 86% of the 21 subjects accumulated a sleep debt that ranged from 4 to 22 hrs and averaged approximately 9 hrs by the ninth day of the duty cycle."

(Draft #103884) "Further analysis demonstrated that the cockpit nap did not significantly alter the cumulative sleep debt observed in the Rest Group."

(Draft #103884) "The speed of falling asleep in the Rest Group (5.6 mins) is comparable to that seen in moderately sleep deprived individuals. A diagnostic guide for excessive sleepiness in sleep disorder patients is a sleep latency of 5
mins or less. Also, there were five episodes of sleep that occurred during the control period in four No-Rest Group pilots that had been instructed to continue the usual flight operations.

(#103852) "Naps were also reported, both during layovers and on the flight deck."

(#103852) "Such first naps were not very common and were associated with the acute sleep debt imposed by overnight eastward flights crossing five or more time zones (67%) or the prolonged wakefulness associated with westward flights crossing five or more time zones (25%)."

(#103852) "On the flight deck, crew members were observed to be napping at least 11% of the available time. The average duration of these naps was 46 min (range 10-130 min)."

This known serious deficiency in the proposed cockpit napping procedures (uncontrolled, inadvertent sleeping by the designated "alert" pilot) calls into question the whole concept of encouraging cockpit crew members to sleep on duty. It is known that inadvertent sleep happened in addition to whatever sleep was permitted as "controlled rest" on non-augmented crews, flying long-haul international flights. It is known that the level of fatigue experienced by non-augmented airline crews scheduled in accordance with the minimum standards set by current U.S. flight/duty-time regulations caused uncontrollable/inadvertent sleeping by designated "alert" pilots even in a controlled study environment, with two observers on the flight deck. How then is inadvertent sleeping by the "alert" operating crew member supposed to be controlled as a practical matter in normal (unobserved) line operations? The Draft Advisory Circular is very vague on this critical point.

V. RESPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC TRUST

The proposed Advisory Circular will undoubtedly be used in the future as justification for proposals to increase flight/duty time limits and eliminate current crew rest facilities. With that in mind, it is useful to contrast the flight/duty limits of airline pilots crossing tens of time zones in a matter of days with that of airline dispatchers who live and work in the same time zone. Dispatchers are limited by FAA regulations to ten hours on duty (14 CFR 121.465 (b)(1)). For inexplicable reasons, pilots are allowed to remain on duty for much longer periods, even on two-pilot aircraft.

It must be pointed out that for flight crews, time on duty always exceeds flight time, sometimes substantially. Current regulations do not directly address time on duty for flight crews. Creative interpretation of 14 CRF 121.471 would seem to allow as much as sixteen hours on duty without a rest period so long as scheduled flight time does not
mins or less. Also, there were five episodes of sleep that occurred during the control period in four No-Rest Group pilots that had been instructed to continue the usual flight operations. 

(#103852) "Naps were also reported, both during layovers and on the flight deck."

(#103852) "Such first naps were not very common and were associated with the acute sleep debt imposed by overnight eastward flights crossing five or more time zones (67%) or the prolonged wakefulness associated with westward flights crossing five or more time zones (25%)."

(#103852) "On the flight deck, crew members were observed to be napping at least 11% of the available time. The average duration of these naps was 46 min (range 10-130 min)."

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exceed eight hours. No duty time limitations whatsoever are apparent from a reading of the regulations for flag air carriers, although 24 hours seems implied by the specification of required rest based on flight time within the previous 24 hours (14 CFR 121.480-493). Even at unionized U. S. airlines, a crew may be required to remain on duty for up to fourteen hours without a rest period or augmentation by a relief pilot.

It is clear that pilots are most directly responsible for the safe conduct of a flight, and have a greater opportunity to cause a loss of life and property by a fatigue-induced mistake or lapse in judgment. Current flight/duty time regulations that allow pilots to be on duty longer and to be more fatigued than dispatchers do not appear to be consistent with the FAA’s mandate to ensure the maximum practical level of public safety.

VI.
OPERATIONAL SAFETY CONCERNS

If the proposed Advisory Circular is adopted, what will ensure that designated "alert" crew members will remain awake? The draft Advisory Circular offers no advice on this critical point, even though NASA observed that even under controlled conditions, inadvertent sleeping by designated "alert" pilots occurred. What then does the "controlled" aspect of "controlled rest" consist of? It is more of a sales slogan than scientific term. The vague wording of the Advisory Circular could conceivably permit a company-issued alarm clock to be used. This Advisory Circular could provide the basis to substitute alarm clocks for the proper crew complements and proper scheduling practices that are currently used by most U. S. airlines to ensure that rested and alert flight crews are at the controls.

The Proposed Advisory Circular Leaves Major Questions Unanswered:

• Who is legally "in command" while the Captain is sleeping on duty?
• Who is responsible for violations, mishaps, incidents and/or accidents while the "pilot-in-command" is sleeping on duty?
• Will increased qualifications and licenses be required for First Officers if the Captain is allowed to sleep on duty?
• Must designated "alert" pilots hold a current flight engineers license and be current as an F/E on that aircraft if the flight engineer is allowed to sleep on duty?

VII.
REGULATORY AND LEGAL CONCERNS

A. Aircraft Certification Standards Contradicted
exceed eight hours. No duty time limitations whatsoever are apparent from a reading of the regulations for flag air carriers, although 24 hours seems implied by the specification of required rest based on flight time within the previous 24 hours (14 CFR 121.480-493). Even at unionized U.S. airlines, a crew may be required to remain on duty for up to fourteen hours without a rest period or augmentation by a relief pilot.

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VII.
REGULATORY AND LEGAL CONCERNS

A. Aircraft Certification Standards Contradicted
All U.S. transport category aircraft are currently certified with a minimum crew complement. Presumably, current regulations contemplate that all crew members required for certification will be alert while at their duty stations. Does the FAA intend to redefine or waive current aircraft certification standards and operating manual requirements for crew complement if the cockpit napping Advisory Circular is adopted? Will the manufacturers be required to recertify all current aircraft for a lesser number of alert flight crew members? Will prior certification tests that were accomplished with the required flight crew complement participating be declared invalid with a lesser number of alert crew members operating the aircraft? NASA recommended (and the proposed Advisory Circular reiterates the recommendation) that a newly-awakened crew member be given a recovery period free of all duties for fifteen or twenty minutes. Surely such a person cannot be counted on in a critical and unexpected emergency. Recall what NASA Technical Memorandum Draft #103884 has to say about the need for a recovery period for awakened crew members:

"The rest opportunity was divided into an initial preparation period (3 mins), followed by the 40 minute rest period, followed by a recovery period (20 mins)... The rest was terminated at a present time by a researcher and the resting pilot was fully briefed prior to re-entering the operational loop."

B. Approved Operating Procedures/Operating Manuals Invalidated

Two-pilot and three-pilot operations are currently governed by FAA-approved procedures designed to require the active and coordinated participation of the entire (required) flight crew complement. Those procedures are designed to provide a system of checks and balances and to provide the best available input during critical decisions/actions. That fundamental principle is incorporated in all U.S. airline operational procedures and is the foundation of FAA-mandated Crew Resource Management (CRM). The Draft Advisory Circular violates these proven principles without comment.

Will airlines that adopt cockpit napping be required to amend their FAA-approved operating manuals and training programs to provide various versions of emergency/abnormal procedures, e.g. "Emergency Descent With All Crew Members Awake," "Emergency Descent With Captain Asleep," "Emergency Descent With F/O Asleep," "Emergency Descent With F/E Asleep"? All airline emergency/abnormal procedures currently in effect depend on close crew coordination. The proposed Advisory Circular would eliminate the very foundation of CRM – proper crew coordination.

C. Single Pilot Operations Created

Current regulations prohibit single-pilot operation of large transports. The proposed Advisory Circular violates that basic principle by providing official guidelines by which airline aircraft can be flown with only one pilot awake on duty. If that is the intended result, the FARs should be rewritten, an NPRM issued, and an opportunity for
public comment provided. This is a huge change in operating and regulatory philosophy. The draft Advisory Circular further reduces the number of alert crew members that airline passengers and shippers currently pay for and currently expect to be alert when on duty.

D. Physiological Needs Rede fined

Current federal regulations allow a crew member to be absent from his/her station briefly for physiological needs. Are cockpit sleepers considered "absent" under that regulation? Is sleeping on duty a physiological need? If sleeping on duty is recognized by the Advisory Circular as a physiological need for flight crews, what does that say about the adequacy current flight and duty time regulations and the level of safety provided by the current scheduling practices used by some operators?

From the flying public's point of view, the responsible approach would surely be to create flight/duty time regulations, and to require scheduling practices that recognize the physiological limitations of human beings whose mental alacrity and sound judgment is critical to the safe operations of the aircraft.

E. Duty of Care For "Common Carriers" And Captain's Responsibility Ignored

While the FAA may decide that it will not violate pilots for sleeping on duty within the guidelines of the proposed Advisory Circular, will the FAA also agree to ignore any other violations that occur while a pilot is sleeping on duty? Will a pilot sleeping on duty be violated for infractions by the alert pilot? Will federal, state, and local courts find pilots and their airlines guilty of negligence and liable for damages if a pilot is sleeping on duty and loss of life or property results? The ARAC Working Group did not research these liability problems and NASA's research does not address the issue.

The Captain's responsibility for things that go wrong while he/she is asleep is a major legal and regulatory issue. Recall the public's predictable reaction to the Exxon Valdez disaster. The Captain was chastised for not taking into account the limited capacity of his fellow deck officers before he went to sleep during a long duty day, even though company policy permitted him to sleep while underway. One must understand that sleeping was permitted by policy but not required, so the captain and his company were deemed to be grossly negligent and were legally responsible for the aftermath. When incidents occur while a crew member is sleeping, as they surely will, the Captain will inevitably find his judgement as to "who sleeps when" closely scrutinized with predictably adverse results.

F. No Coordination With International Authorities

There has been no coordination with ICAO, or with regulatory agencies in
sovereign nations whose airspace U. S. airlines transit and with whose regulations they must comply. What will their "enforcement attitude" be towards incidents that occur while crew members are sleeping on duty?

U. S. Flight crews involved in incidents/accidents on foreign soil are subject to action under the laws of those jurisdictions. How will a French or Greek or Egyptian or Argentinean court rule on questions of negligence, liability, and criminal responsibility? In many foreign countries, pilots are subject to immediate incarceration following an aircraft accident involving serious injury or death. Neither the Air Carrier Operations Subcommittee, nor its Working Group has obtained advice from the FAA General Counsel on these regulatory legal questions, nor from ICAO, nor from legal authorities in other ICAO nations.

VIII.
COCKPIT NAPPING EPITOMIZES CHOOSING ECONOMICS OVER SAFETY

Cockpit napping in general, and the inclusion of two-pilot and domestic operations in particular, will result in a significant increase in risk to the flying public by permitting U. S. airline aircraft to be operated with only one alert crew member the controls, assuming he/she has not also fallen asleep inadvertently. This will seriously degrade safety during a critical emergency such as an explosive decompression, and it will negate the checks and balances currently available during routine operations.

Proponents of cockpit napping argue that it will improve (or legitimize) the crew rest practices currently used by a few operators who are not willing to provide a properly-augmented crew and proper on-board rest facilities on long-haul operations. But if the vast majority of operators who currently do provide relief pilots and a crew rest facility were to adopt cockpit napping procedures instead, a significant degradation of current scheduling/crewing practices and in-flight crew rest would result — and therefore public safety would be adversely affected.

IX.
CONCLUSION: SLEEPING ON DUTY IS NOT THE ANSWER

If the objective is enhanced safety of flight, an overhaul of flight/duty time regulations is required. Current regulations, to a large extent, leave safe crewing and scheduling practices to be settled as a matter of contract, where a contractual relationship exists between pilots and their airlines. The baseline federal regulations were written long ago, when trans-ocean flights in propeller aircraft required days of flying with multiple stops and layovers, rather than the 8 to 16 hours required today.

The effects of "jet lag", more properly called Circadian Rhythm Disruption, are well
known to today’s high speed travelers. Those negative physiological effects are even more severe for flight crews that continue to cross time zones for several days in a row all month. Using the proposed band-aid fix for a symptom of inadequate flight/duty time regulations, and for the questionable crewing/scheduling practices by some operators simply will not work. The proposed Advisory Circular invites significant new problems where none presently exist for most operators. We have seen again and again in a deregulated airline industry, the lowest common denominator (e.g. least cost) will become the competitive imperative – even if it degrades current in-flight rest and crewing/scheduling practices, and even if it diminishes the current level of public safety.

If current crewing and scheduling practices and regulations are so inadequate that legally required crew members must be allowed to sleep on duty so they can be alert during the critical approach and landing phases of flight, then the regulations must be rewritten in the interest of public safety. NASA’s studies and the proposed Advisory Circular admit as much, but the ill-conceived fix proposed in this draft Advisory Circular is a short-sighted approach to a serious public safety problem. The following are quotes on point from NASA’s Technical Memoranda:

(#103852) “There has been a tendency on the part of regulatory authorities to view the entire time off duty as being time available for sleep, despite anecdotal evidence that the ease of falling asleep and the ability to remain asleep were not constant throughout a layover. This study clearly documents that in scheduled commercial long-haul operations, there are physiologically and environmentally determined preferred sleep times within a layover, i.e., the time available for sleep is less than the time off duty.”

(Draft #103884) “Both groups had more lapses [in alertness] at TOD [Top of Descent] on night flight leg 4 than TOD on night leg 2. However, the number of lapses in the No-Rest Group pilots increased twice as much as in the Rest Group pilots. Vigilance functions also revealed that on night flights the NRG [No Rest Group] was approaching a level of performance that was significantly decreased.”

(Draft #103884) “The period from one hour prior to top of descent (TOD) through descent and landing was analyzed for the occurrence of brain and eye movement microevents indicative of reduced physiological alertness.”

(Draft #103884) “There was at least one microevent [of reduced physiological alertness] identified in 78% of the No-Rest Group and 50% of the Rest Group.”

(Draft #103884) “The 24-hr rest/activity patterns, in combination with the subjective logs, demonstrated that 86% of the 21 subjects accumulated a sleep debt that ranged from 4 to 22 hrs and averaged approximately 9 hrs by the ninth day of the duty cycle.”
"However, when the accumulated sleep debt was high, the circadian rhythm in sleep propensity could be overridden, and crew members could fall asleep at unusual times in their temperature cycles."

"Further analysis demonstrated that the cockpit nap did not significantly alter the cumulative sleep debt observed in the Rest Group."

"The nap did not affect layover sleep or the overall cumulative sleep debt displayed by the majority of crew members."

Sleeping on duty is not the answer for fatigued pilots who, under current FAA flight/duty time regulations, and within the current FAA-approved scheduling practices of some operators, may be unable to perform their required duties safely. NASA's researchers observed this fact while riding with non-augmented crews on long-haul flights. Congress reached a similar conclusion as a result of hearings following a series of high visibility crashes. In recognition of the fact that current crewing and scheduling practices as permitted by current regulations are insufficient, an ARAC Flight Time/Duty Time Working Group has been formed by DOT/FAA and has been given the very important task of examining and recommending changes to current regulations.

A. Infringes on Task of ARAC Flight/Duty Time Working Group

In early 1993, another ARAC Working Group will begin its examination of current flight and duty time regulations. Adoption of the proposed Controlled Rest Advisory Circular is ill-advised and premature. ARAC's upcoming review of flight/duty time regulations will provide an opportunity to find a real fix for the pilot fatigue problem, without asking the traveling public to accept a nonsense argument that pilots should be sleeping at the controls. In the meantime, the FAA and the industry must act responsibly by avoiding actions that encourage "minimum legal" crewing and scheduling practices that make sleeping on duty a "physiological requirement" for airline flight crews.

B. Provides False Basis For Assault On Current Flight/Duty Time Limits And Crew Rest Facilities

If adopted, the proposed Advisory Circular would provide a false basis, but one sure to be used, for an assault on the current flight/duty time rules in effect for all operations by U. S. carriers. The obvious next step for operators seeking ways to cut costs will be a request to waive or increase flight/duty time limits, arguing that if the pilots are allowed to sleep on duty, they should be allowed to fly and be on duty for more hours. A further argument will be made that since pilots can sleep on duty in the cockpit, crew rest seats and bunks will no longer be needed.

This sort of rationale is already implied in the current regulations for international
operations on aircraft with a crew of three, which allows twelve hours of duty aloft in a twenty-four hour period. How can three crew members, one of whom may not be pilot-qualified, safely fly twelve hours in twenty four, when a crew of two pilots is only allowed to fly eight hours in twenty four? It seems to be implied that the third person on three-crew aircraft can relieve the two pilots in some unspecified way, even if the third crew member is not pilot qualified. The proposed Advisory Circular takes this "wink" found in the current FAA regulations and gives it an official "nod".

C. Overriding Concern is The Degradation of Public Safety

The Allied Pilots Association believes that the "cockpit napping" procedures in the proposed Advisory Circular will seriously degrade the level of safety currently enjoyed by the flying public. This degradation would be particularly acute on two-pilot aircraft, and on flights within the domestic ATC system. APA believes that such procedures are an ill-advised approach to patching over a safety problem caused by antiquated flight and duty time regulations that have been proven by NASA to be a woefully inadequate baseline for crewing and scheduling modern jet transport operations. The current regulations permit unsafe crewing and scheduling practices by permitting operators to avoid the use of relief crew members and on-board rest facilities in situations where they are needed to ensure that alert flight crews at the controls.

The driving force behind cockpit napping is not safety, it is economics – operating cost dollars that might be saved in the future by eliminating relief pilots and crew rest facilities, and by increasing permissible flight and duty times. This approach totally ignores the incalculable cost of loss of life due to an avoidable accident caused by hurriedly adopting a short-sighted solution to flight crew fatigue. These future byproducts of cockpit napping are sure to degrade the level of safety currently provided to the flying public by scrupulous U. S. airline operators.
Submitted in Behalf of The Allied Pilots Association
At the Direction of Captain Richard T. LaVoy, President
On November 19, 1992:

BY:

Capt. Brian A. Mayhew

Capt. Michael P. Cronin
APPENDIX A

1) Modified Purpose Paragraph (Submitted by Dr. Graeber)
2) Proposed "Controlled Rest" Advisory Circular
PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance for the development and implementation of a Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Program to improve crew alertness, especially during critical phases of flight, and thereby enhance flight safety. This is one strategy, but not the only one, available to manage crew alertness in flight operations. Controlled Rest is not intended to substitute for any other strategies nor to justify changes to the rest requirements or practices for working crew members. Application is intended for aircraft certificated for three flight crew members. Use of Controlled Rest on such aircraft is based on the two nonresting crew members remaining awake and assuring each other's alertness. Use of controlled rest on aircraft certificated for two flight crew members is dependent on the application of techniques that ensure the alertness of the operating pilot.

Note: Italics indicated changes in original text. No other changes in this or other sections of the Draft are proposed.
Subject: CONTROLLED REST ON THE FLIGHT DECK

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance for the development and implementation of a Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck Program to improve crew alertness, especially during critical phases of flight, and thereby enhance flight safety. This is one strategy, but not the only one, available to manage crew alertness in flight operations. Current application is for aircraft certificated for three flight crewmembers and for aircraft certificated for two flight crewmembers when an augmenting crewmember is on duty on the flight deck. Additional use of controlled rest on aircraft certificated for two flight crewmembers is dependent on the application of techniques that ensure the alertness of the operating pilot.

2. RELATED FAR SECTIONS.
   a. FAR 91.3 Captain's Authority
   b. FAR 91.13 Careless and Reckless
   c. FAR 121.331.333 Supplemental Oxygen Requirements
   d. Part 121, Subpart N (Training), 121.400-405, 121.409-421, 121.424, 121.427
   e. FAR 121.543 Crew at Duty Station

3. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

4. BACKGROUND.
   a. It is widely recognized that airline operations benefit from a well rested and alert flight deck crew. Flight time limitations and rest requirements are intended to provide adequate rest; however, some flight operations can involve multiple time zone changes, long irregular work schedules, unplanned events, sleep disturbances and/or circadian disruption, coupled with long periods of relatively low activity during flight, which may result in sleep loss and/or reduced alertness.
   b. One natural compensatory response to the sleep loss experienced in some flight operations is the occurrence of both unplanned, spontaneous napping and non-sanctioned rest periods. The occurrence of these activities is supported by
anecdotal, observational, and subjective report data from a variety of sources (e.g., ASRS). In response to this information and concerns for maintaining flight safety, NASA developed a research program with FAA support to evaluate whether a planned flight deck rest period could provide a “safety valve” for the fatigue and sleepiness sometimes experienced in flight operations. The rest period allowed a planned opportunity to sleep during low workload periods, with the primary goal being to improve subsequent levels of alertness and performance, especially during critical phases of operation such as descent and landing. Laboratory studies have shown preplanned naps to be an effective way to maintain performance.

c. The NASA study found that pilots given a controlled rest opportunity on the flight deck demonstrated improved vigilance and enhanced physiological alertness during the subsequent descent and landing phases of flight compared to a no-rest control group. The rest was effective as an acute in-flight countermeasure but did not affect layover sleep or the overall sleep debt accumulated by the majority of crewmembers. The controlled rest procedures were implemented with minimal disruption to usual flight operations, and there were no reported or identified concerns regarding safety. The study results do not support regulatory changes in flight time and rest requirements based on the use of controlled rest on the flight deck.

d. The primary purpose of this AC is to develop and implement a program for controlled rest on the flight deck based on the “NASA Nap” findings. While Federal Aviation Regulations do not specifically prohibit or sanction sleep on the flight deck, it is known that some operators have utilized flight deck rest periods to combat fatigue.

5. DEFINITIONS:

a. Alertness Management - the management of resources available to improve and maintain the overall alertness of the crew, especially during critical phases of flight and non-normal operations. Resources can include those used in flight (e.g., bunks, naps, caffeine) as well as those used on the ground before and/or after the flight (e.g., scheduling, layover hotels).

b. Augmented Crew - a crew that includes an additional crewmember(s) for flights which are scheduled to exceed specified international flight time limits.

c. Circadian Rhythm - a measurable rhythmic variation in a physiological or behavioral parameter having a period of about 24 hours (e.g., sleep/wakefulness, body temperature). Circadian rhythms are controlled by an internal body clock and usually become synchronized by time cues in the local environment.

d. Inflight Countermeasures - those actions a crewmember may take in-flight to reduce the negative effects on performance due to sleep loss, circadian disruption, or time-of-day.

e. Sleep Debt - the cumulative effect of sleep lost over successive days and nights due to disrupted or shortened sleep. It reduces daytime alertness and increases the propensity for deep (i.e., slow wave) sleep.

f. Sleep Inertia - the residual, generally brief, negative effects of sleep (e.g., sleepiness, decreased mental functioning, grogginess) sometimes experienced upon awakening. The amount of time needed to resume a usual level of functioning can vary depending on the depth of sleep immediately prior to awakening, abruptness of the awakening, and total sleep debt.
6. BASIC CONCEPTS OF CONTROLLED REST ON THE FLIGHT DECK

a. Safety First. The planning and utilization of controlled rest periods on the flight deck serves the primary purpose of enhancing flight safety. To that purpose, other factors which have unique safety implications for a particular flight should be taken into account when considering the implementation of controlled rest. The resting crewmember will be awakened if a situation develops which may affect flight safety.

b. Captain’s Authority. The captain continues to be the final authority in the operation of the aircraft. This authority, when applied to the controlled rest program, should be exercised in a manner consistent with accepted principles of Crew Resource Management (CRM).

c. Benefit and Opportunity. A program for controlled rest on the flight deck is based upon two fundamental principles—rest will provide a potential benefit and a sufficient opportunity to rest exists; that is, when there is a benefit to be gained and an opportunity, controlled rest can be utilized.

d. Benefits of Planning Rest. A critical component of the program is that the rest is planned. Planning enables the pre-briefed, controlled integration of rest into the total flight deck operation. Crewmembers can anticipate their own rest period, thus enabling them to manage their alertness.

e. Overall Alertness Management. While controlled rest on the flight deck provides proven safety and crew performance benefits, it is only one strategy to manage overall alertness in flight operations. Other factors (e.g., scheduling, layover sleep, commuting, physical health, and lifestyle) known to affect overall alertness must also be considered.

7. PROGRAM ELEMENTS

a. Rest Opportunity Criteria

1. Flight segment. Controlled rest should be utilized only during the cruise phase of flight between top of climb and 30 minutes prior to planned top of descent, workload permitting. Controlled rest is appropriate during both domestic and international operations.

2. Workload. Controlled rest should be planned for low workload portions of cruise flight. Each airline should develop guidelines particular to its operations which define low workload. Factors to consider may include unplanned altitude changes, fuel transfer requirements, weather conditions, ATC communications, etc.

3. Duty station occupancy. Flight deck rest should be taken by only one crewmember at a time. During a planned rest period all crewmembers, including the resting crewmember, must remain at their stations. Therefore, all physiological needs that require the absence of any crewmember from the flight deck should be completed prior to beginning the pre-rest period. Controlled rest on the flight deck applies to both non-augmented and augmented crews.
b. Rest Implementation.

1. Planning. Planning for flight deck rest should be accomplished during the pre-flight briefing. This should include at least the following: choice of rest sequence; unannounced wake-up criteria; transfer of control procedures; and coordination with cabin staff. If the need arises, the same planning process can be accomplished in flight.

2. Pre-rest period. A short period of time (about five minutes) should be provided for rest preparation. This should include at least the following: any operational briefing; completion of tasks in progress; getting comfortable in the flight deck seat.

3. Rest period. Research indicates that a rest period up to 45 minutes should provide the desired benefit. Sleep longer than 45 minutes results in an increased likelihood of sleep inertia with its associated prolonged grogginess, therefore rest periods should be limited to a maximum of 45 minutes. There is no established minimum rest period, even five minutes may be beneficial.

4. Post-rest period. A planned recovery period, normally of at least 15 minutes, devoid of any flight duties or briefings should be implemented prior to reassuming flight deck responsibilities.

c. Other Rest Considerations.

1. Participation. Controlled rest is voluntary, and individual participation is optional.

2. Other Activities. Other activities (e.g., reading, listening to music) are not substitutes for sleep and will not provide the intended benefits of this controlled rest program.

3. Multiple rest periods. This program permits more than one rest period for individual crewmembers if a sufficient opportunity exists.

4. Rest equipment. To ensure optimal benefit, the operator should consider permitting the use of personal equipment which may facilitate rest. This could include eye shades, neck supports, earplugs, etc.

5. Oxygen use not required. In as much as the resting crewmember has not left his or her station at the controls, the controlled rest program does not require the use of oxygen by the non-resting or resting pilot.

d. Transfer of Control.

1. Operational briefing. An operational briefing should be conducted prior to and following each rest period. The operator will determine the subjects of these briefings.

2. Wakeup procedures. A non-resting crewmember will be responsible for awakening the resting crewmember at a predetermined time. Calling out the resting crewmember's name in a normal tone of voice is usually sufficient. An attempt should be made not to startle. Planned and unplanned wake-up techniques are the same.
Safeguards.

1. Enroute equipment considerations. The operator should determine equipment malfunctions that might preclude controlled rest on a particular flight.

2. Flight deck vigilance. Measures should be taken to assure that the resting crewmember's flight deck duties and monitoring responsibilities are assumed by the non-resting crewmembers.

a. OPERATION IMPLEMENTATION.

a. Policies and Procedures. It is recommended that operators develop company policies and procedures consistent with this advisory circular.

b. Operational Use. The implementation of this program requires, at a minimum, that all participating crew members be familiar with the company policies and procedures.

c. Additional Education. It is preferable that this Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck program be complemented by a training module on sleep, circadian rhythms, alertness, and fatigue countermeasures in flight operations. This training material may be incorporated into existing training programs and may take the form of presentations, written materials, or videotapes.
Operational Summaries From:


(#88231) Sleep and Wakefulness in International Aircrews by Graeber (1986)

APPENDIX B IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS DOCUMENT