Federal Aviation Administration
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Transport Airplane and Engine Issue Area
Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group

Task 1 – Electrical Generating and Distribution System
Task Assignment
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee; Transport Airplane and Engine Issues--New Tasks

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of new task assignments for the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC).

SUMMARY: Notice is given of new tasks assigned to and accepted by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). This notice informs the public of the activities of ARAC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Stewart R. Miller, Transport Standards Staff (ANM-110), Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056; phone (425) 227-1255; fax (425) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA has established an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to provide advice and recommendations to the FAA Administrator, through the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, on the full range of the FAA's rulemaking activities with respect to aviation-related issues. This includes obtaining advice and recommendations on the FAA's commitment to harmonize its Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and practices with its trading partners in Europe and Canada.

One area ARAC deals with is Transport Airplane and Engine Issues. These issues involve the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes and engines in 14 CFR parts 25, 33, and 35 and parallel provisions in 14 CFR parts 121 and 135.

The Tasks

This notice is to inform the public that the FAA has asked ARAC to provide advice and recommendation on the following harmonization tasks:
Task 1: Electrical Generating and Distribution System Requirements

Phase I -- The following differences between Part 25 and JAR 25 and their associated guidance material have been identified as having a potentially significant impact on airplane design and cost.

1. FAR/JAR 25.1351(b) -- FAR 25.1351(b) defines minimum requirements for generating system power sources, distribution busses and cables, and associated control, regulation and protection devices. JAR 25.1351(b), with its related ACJ 25.1351(b)(5), adds accessibility requirements for means to disconnect power sources from the electrical system.

2. FAR/JAR 25.1351(c) -- FAR 25.1351(c) defines minimum requirements for connecting external power to the airplane electrical power system. JAR 25.1351(c) introduces additional parameters for external power protection.

3. FAR/JAR 25.1351(d) -- FAR 25.1351(d) defines minimum requirements for a standby power system that can enable safe operation in VFR conditions for a period of not less than five minutes to enable engine relight. JAR 25.1351(d), with its related ACJs, requires provision for a high integrity standby power system with a duration for time limited systems compatible with JAR-OPS and ICAO Annex 8. These ACJs also provide Interpretive Material for non-time limited standby power sources and specifies services that must remain powered following loss of normal electrical power.

For each of the above tasks the working group is to review airworthiness, safety, cost, and other relevant factors related to the specified differences, and reach consensus on harmonized Part 25/JAR 25 regulations and guidance material.

The FAA expects ARAC to submit its recommendation(s) from Phase I by July 31, 2001.

Phase II -- The following additional differences between Part 25 and JAR 25 and their associated guidance material have been identified as having a lesser impact on airplane design and cost:

4. FAR/JAR 25.1353(a) & 25.1431(d) -- JAR 25.1353(a) provides an additional sentence for consideration of the effects of interference on systems with associated interpretative material. JAR 25.1431(d) has additional requirements on the survivability of essential electronic equipment during electrical power transients. Such paragraph does not exist in the FAR's. Neither FAA advisory nor JAA guidance material currently is available. This guidance material needs to be generated.

5. FAR/JAR 25.1353(c)(5) -- JAR 25.1353(c)(5) is different to FAR 25.1353(c)(5) in that it requires any Nickel-Cadmium battery (receiving a direct charge from the aircraft electrical system) to be subjected to this requirement. Past experience has shown that damage has been caused to structure (from defective batteries and their installations) from batteries irrespective of whether utilized for engine or APU starting or not.

6. FAR/JAR 25.1353(c)(6) -- See also item 5 above. In addition, interpretative material is provided in JAR's concerning maintenance check intervals for over temperature sensing devices.

7. FAR/JAR 25.1353(d) -- JAR 25.1353(d) contains additional paragraphs for electrical cables. Note: Paragraph 1 of ACJ to JAR 25.1301(b) in effect duplicates JAR 25.1353(d)(2) and could be deleted after harmonization of FAR/JAR 25.1353(d).

8. FAR/JAR 25.1355(c) -- JAR 25.1355(c) introduces interpretative material concerning segregation of electrical feeders to minimize the possibility of cascade or multiple failures. The ACJ to JAR 25.1355(c)
should be reviewed in conjunction with current ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309 with a view to combining the two ACJs and forming new interpretative material to FAR/JAR 25.1355(c).

9. FAR/JAR 25X1360--Precautions against injury. This JAR requirement and corresponding ACJ was created following reported injuries to service and maintenance personnel.

10. JAR 25X1362--Electrical supplies for emergency conditions. This JAR requirement and corresponding ACJ was created to ensure that electrical supplies are maintained to emergency services (such as fuel and hydraulic shut-off valves) so that these may be closed after the main power sources have been switched off by the Flight Crew.

11. FAR/JAR 25.1363--JAR 25.1363 requires tests to be performed under specific criteria with (ACJ) additional means of compliance.

12. Tasks coming from the System Design and Analysis Harmonization Working Group (SD&A HWG): Harmonize and update 25.1310 (previous 25.1309(e) and (f)) as proposed by the SD&A HWG. Consider also JAA specific AMJ 25.1309(b) on heated domestic appliances and electric overheat protection equipment design/ failures considerations.

For each of the above tasks the working group is to review the current standards of the FAR and JAR requirements concerning electrical generating and distribution system requirements and any associated advisory material, to review also any relevant service experience and consider the increased reliance of aircraft and systems dependent on electrical power and distribution systems. In the light of this review, recommend changes to harmonize the above FAR and JAR requirements and develop related advisory material as necessary.

The FAA expects ARAC to submit its recommendation(s) from Phase II by July 31, 2003.

Task 2: Electrical Bonding and Protection Against Lightning and Static Electricity

JAA regulations include JAR 25X899 and ACJ 25x899 or consideration of electrical bonding and protection against lightning and static electricity. FAA regulations do not include this requirement. This initiative will consider the material contained in the JAR and ACJ, revise this information (as appropriate), develop new FAA requirements, revise JAA requirements as applicable, including regulations and advisory material, to achieve a harmonized result. Part 23, 27, 29 and 33 requirements will be reviewed to assure consistency in requirements and modified a applicable. The use of the phrase "as applicable" provides the responsible working group with the prerogative to recommend changes to any or all identified FAR's, JAR's, or none. Suitable representative from industry and regulatory authorities is necessary to accomplish this assignment.

The FAA expects ARAC to submit its recommendation by March 31, 2001.

The FAA requests that ARAC draft appropriate regulatory documents with supporting economic and other required analyses, and any other related guidance material or collateral documents to support its recommendations. If the resulting recommendation is one or more notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published by the FAA, the FAA may ask ARAC to recommend disposition of any substantive comments the FAA receives.

ARAC Acceptance of Tasks
ARAC has accepted the tasks and has chosen to establish a new Electrical systems Harmonization Working Group. The working group will serve as staff to ARAC to assist ARAC in the analysis of the assigned task. Working group recommendations must be reviewed and approved by ARAC. If ARAC accepts the working group's recommendations, it forwards them to the FAA as ARAC recommendations.

Working Group Activity

The Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group is expected to comply with the procedures adopted by ARAC. As part of the procedures, the working group is expected to:

1. Recommend a work plan for completion of the tasks, including the rationale supporting such a plan, for consideration at the meeting of ARAC to consider transport airplane and engine issues held following publication of this notice.

2. Give a detailed conceptual presentation of the proposed recommendations, prior to proceeding with the work stated in item 3 below.

3. Draft appropriate regulatory documents with supporting economic and other required analyses, and/or any other related guidance material or collateral documents the working group determines to be appropriate; or, if new or revised requirements or compliance methods are not recommended, a draft report stating the rationale for not making such recommendations. If the resulting recommendation is one or more notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published by the FAA, the FAA may ask ARAC to recommend disposition of any substantive comments the FAA receives.

4. Provide a status report at each meeting of ARAC held to consider transport airplane and engine issues.

Participation in the Working Group

The Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group will be composed of technical experts having an interest in the assigned tasks. A working group member need not be a representative of a member of the full committee.

An individual who has expertise in the subject matter and wishes to become a member of the working group should write to the person listed under the caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT expressing that desire, describing his or her interest in the tasks, and stating the expertise he or she would bring to the working group. All requests to participate must be received no later than October 12, 1998. The requests will be reviewed by the assistant chair and the assistant executive director, and the individuals will be advised whether or not the request can be accommodated.

Individuals chosen for membership on the working group will be expected to represent their aviation community segment and participate actively in the working group (e.g., attend all meetings, provide written comments when requested to do so, etc.). They also will be expected to devote the resources necessary to ensure the ability of the working group to meet any assigned deadline(s). Members are expected to keep their management chain advised of working group activities and
decisions to ensure that the agreed technical solutions do not conflict with their sponsoring organization's position when the subject being negotiated is presented to ARAC for a vote.

Once the working group has begun deliberations, members will not be added or substituted without the approval of the assistant chair, the assistant executive director, and the working group chair.

The Secretary of Transportation has determined that the formation and use of ARAC are necessary and in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the FAA by law.

Meetings of ARAC will be open to the public. Meetings of the Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group will not be open to the public, except to the extent that individuals with an interest and expertise are selected to participate. No public announcement of working group meetings will be made.

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4, 1998.
Joseph A. Hawkins,
Executive Director, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.
[FR Doc. 98-24419 Filed 9-10-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
Recommendation Letter
March 10, 2000

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue
Washington, DC 20591

Attention: Thomas McSweeny, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification

Subject: ARAC Recommendations

Reference: ARAC Tasking, Federal Register, November 26, 1999

Dear Tom:

In accordance with the reference the ARAC Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group is pleased to forward the following “fast track” reports as recommendations to the FAA:

25.869(a)
25.899
25.1309(b) – Note: It was agreed that this item should remain a “fast track” Category 1 project
25.1310
25.1351(b)
25.1351(c)
25.1353(a)
25.1353(c)(5)
25.1353(c)(6)
25.1353(d)
25.1355(c)
25.1357
25.1431(d)
These reports have been prepared by the Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group.

Sincerely yours,

Craig R. Bolt
Assistant Chair, TAEIG

cc: Kris Larsen – FAA – NWR  
* Dorenda Baker – FAA – NWR  
   Effie Upshaw – FAA – Washington, DC – ARM  
* Brian Overhuls – Boeing

*Letter only
Recommendation Letter
April 4, 2000

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591

Attention: Mr. Thomas McSweeny, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification

Subject: ARAC Recommendations

Reference: 1) ARAC Tasking, Federal Register, November 19, 1999
2) TAEIG Letter to FAA, dated March 10, 2000

Dear Tom,

The Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group is pleased to submit the following "Fast Track" reports as recommendations to the FAA in accordance with the Reference 1 tasking. These reports have been prepared by the Electrical Systems HWG.

- 25X899 - Corrected report, previously submitted per Reference 2
- 25X1360
- 25.1351d
- 25.1363

Sincerely yours,

Craig R. Bolt
Assistant Chair, TAEIG

Attachments

Copy: Kris Carpenter - FAA-NWR
*Brian Overhuls - Boeing
*Effie Upshaw - FAA Washington, DC

*letter only

CRB08_040400
Recommendation
ARAC ESHWG REPORT AMJ 25.1309(b)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

JAR specific AMJ 25.1309(b) was introduced to cover two basic issues:

(a) Faulty galley heating equipment has been the cause of many incidents which have resulted in smoke or fire in the cabin and of incidents involving injuries to cabin crew, etc. Improvements in the safety of aircraft domestic equipment design and installations should reduce the probability of such incidents and improve safety standards.

(b) Recorded incidents have shown that the circuit protection devices used in motor power supplies, particularly those used in domestic systems, have not always provided adequate protection against failures which cause a motor overheat condition.

The advisory material provided in AMJ 25.1309(b) gives guidance on some acceptable methods of reducing the probability of failures which could cause airworthiness hazards.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR and JAR texts for 25.1309 are identical, but JAR 25.1309(b) makes reference to AMJ 25.1309(b).

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

FAR does not provide standards for domestic services and appliances.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

JAA has a specific AMJ. There is no equivalent published FAA Advisory Material on the subject, apart from AC 25-10, which is less specific.

AMJ 25.1309(b)

Equipment Systems and Installations
See JAR 25.1309(b)

1. Heated Domestic Appliances (Galley Equipment)
   1.1 The design and installation of heated domestic appliances should be such that no single failure (e.g. welded thermostat or contactor) can result in dangerous uncontrolled heating and consequent risk of fire or smoke or injury to occupants.
   An acceptable method of achieving this is by the provision of a means independent of the normal temperature control system, which will automatically interrupt the electrical power supply to the unit in the event of an overheat condition occurring. The means adopted should be such that it cannot be reset in flight.
   1.2 The design and installation of microwave ovens should be such that no hazard could be caused to the occupants or the equipment of the aeroplane under either normal operation or single failure conditions.
   1.3 Heated liquid containers, e.g. water boilers, coffee makers should, in addition to overheat protection, be provided with an effective means to relieve over pressure, either in the equipment itself or in its installations.
   NOTE: Due account should be taken of the possible effects of lime scale deposit both in the design and maintenance procedures of water heating equipment.

2. Electric Overheat Protection Equipment, Including those Installed in Domestic Systems
   2.1 Unless it can be shown that compliance with JAR 25.1309(b) is provided by the circuit protective
device required by JAR 25.1357(a), electric motors and transformers etc. (including those installed in domestic systems, such as galleys and toilet flush systems) should be provided with a suitable thermal protection device if necessary to prevent them overheating such as to create a smoke or fire hazard under normal operation and failure conditions.

The following should be taken into consideration:

a. Failures of any automatic control systems, e.g. automatic timer systems, which may cause the motor to run continuously;
b. Short circuit failures of motor windings or transformer windings to each other or to the motor or transformer frame;
c. Open circuit of one or more phases on multi-phase motors;
d. Motor seizures;
e. The proximity of flammable materials or fluids;
f. The proximity of other aeroplane installations;
g. Spillage of fluids, such as toilet waste;
h. Accumulation of combustible material; and
i. Cooling air discharge under normal operating or failure conditions.

5 - What is the proposed action?

According to the better plan for harmonisation, FAR/JAR 25.1309(b) is to be enveloped to the most stringent requirement. As there is no direct equivalent FAA AC text, the initial plan was to adopt AMJ 25.1309(b) as FAA advisory material.

The ESHWG position is that the AMJ 25.1309(b) is not the best place to add substantial material that is specific for domestic services and appliances only, since this could give the suggestion that 25.1309(b) is not applicable to other systems.

Furthermore it is proposed to have a lead in paragraph specific to domestic appliances which would contain the parts of the AMJ that are more appropriate to a rule text (see also 12), and also contain some parts of JAR 25X1499 that are relevant to the subject.

To accomplish this, the proposal is to:

- Introduce a new FAR/JAR 25.1365 within the "Miscellaneous Equipment" section of subpart F, that is specific to domestic appliances.
- Introduce a new AC/ACJ 25.1365 that is based on existing AMJ 25.1309(b) and ACJs to 25X1499, but with those elements that have been transferred to the rule removed.
- Delete existing AMJ 25.1309(b).
- See also 18 below

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

\[ \text{FAR/JAR 25.1365} \quad \text{Electrical appliances and motors} \\
\text{[see AC 25.1365 - JAR only]} \]

\textbf{Note: FAR will not make reference to AC or ACJ in rule text}

(a) Domestic appliances must be so designed and installed that in the event of failures of the electrical supply or control system, the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.1309 (b), (c) and (d) will be satisfied.
(b) The installation of galleys and cooking appliances must be such as to minimise the risk of fire.

(c) Domestic appliances, particularly those in galley areas, be so installed or protected as to prevent damage or contamination of other equipment or systems from fluids or vapours which may be present during normal operation or as a result of spillage, where such damage or contamination may hazard the aeroplane.

(d) Unless it can be shown that compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309(b) is provided by the circuit protective device required by FAR/JAR 25.1357(a), electric motors and transformers etc. (including those installed in domestic systems, such as galleys and toilet flush systems) must be provided with a suitable thermal protection device if necessary to prevent them overheating such as to create a smoke or fire hazard under normal operation and failure conditions.

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The now proposed standard contains material that was introduced in JAR 25 by NPA 25DF-191. At first as NPA and since the introduction in JAR-25 as basic JAR code the material was used in aircraft certification programs since 1987 and has improved the safety of domestic appliances significantly. (for instance by the introduction of an overheat protection independent from the normal temperature regulation of heating galley equipment). The proposal can be considered as an improvement of current practices and adoption of existing JAA text to cover the underlying safety issue.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The proposed standard increases the level of safety.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The proposed standard increases the level of safety.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

No other options have been considered.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

Aircraft Operators and Manufacturers together with galley equipment and electrical equipment suppliers could be affected by this change.

Since new certificated aircraft have to be supplied with new standard galley equipment, airplane operators may elect to introduce the same new equipment on their old fleet for reason of fleet commonality.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

Parts of AMJ 25.1309(b) that are more pertinent to a rule text have been moved to a new FAR/JAR 25.1365 paragraph specific to domestic appliances.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?
There is no equivalent published FAA Advisory Material on the subject, apart from AC 25-10, which is less specific. It is recommended that a revised AMJ 25.1309(b) be adopted for FAR/JAR 25 for compliance with the new FAR/JAR 25.1365.

AC/ACJ 25.1365
Domestic appliances
See FAR/JAR 25.1365

1. Heated Domestic Appliances (Galley Equipment)

1.1 The design and installation of heated domestic appliances should be such that no single failure (e.g. welded thermostat or contactor, loss of water supply) can result in dangerous overheating and consequent risk of fire or smoke or injury to occupants. An acceptable method of achieving this is by the provision of a means independent of the normal temperature control system, which will automatically interrupt the electrical power supply to the unit in the event of an overheat condition occurring. The means adopted should be such that it cannot be reset in flight.

1.2 The design and installation of microwave ovens should be such that no hazard could be caused to the occupants or the equipment of the aeroplane under either normal operation or single failure conditions.

1.3 Heated liquid containers, e.g. water boilers, coffee makers should, in addition to overheat protection, be provided with an effective means to relieve overpressure, either in the equipment itself or in its installations.

NOTES:

Due account should be taken of the possible effects of lime scale deposit both in the design and maintenance procedures of water heating equipment.

The design of galley and cooking appliance installations should be such as to facilitate cleaning to limit the accumulation of extraneous substances which may constitute a fire risk.

2. Electric Overheat Protection Equipment

In showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1365(d), the following should be taken into consideration:

a. Failures of any automatic control systems, e.g. automatic timer systems, which may cause the motor to run continuously;

b. Short circuit failures of motor windings or transformer windings to each other or to the motor or transformer frame;

c. Open circuit of one or more phases on multi-phase motors;

d. Motor seizures;

e. The proximity of flammable materials or fluids;

f. The proximity of other aeroplane installations;

g. Spillage of fluids, such as toilet waste;

h. Accumulation of combustible material; and

i. Cooling air discharge under normal operating or failure conditions.

3. Water systems

3.1 Where water is provided in the aeroplane for consumption or use by the occupant, the associated system should be designed so as to ensure that no hazard to the aeroplane can result from water coming
into contact with electrical or other systems.

3.2 Service connections (filling points) should be of a different type from those used for other services, such that water could not inadvertently be introduced into the systems for other services.

14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

There is no equivalent ICAO standard.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

This proposal does not affect other HWG’s.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

Since the new and higher safety standard was introduced ten years ago (by NPA 25DF-191) and was applied in all JAA certification programs since that time, the cost of implementation in the harmonised FAR/JAR-25 code seems to be negligible.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

The ESHWG considers that the Category 1 fast track harmonization process is not appropriate for this rule for the following reasons:

The proposal being made is to introduce a new rule derived from existing rule text and advisory material. The main reason is that reference to AMJ 25.1309 is only advisory and relates only to a general rule or requirement whilst the subject is specific to domestic appliances and electrical motors. Therefore, additional time is needed to consolidate this material into a new rule 25.1365, Electrical appliances and motors, with associated advisory material.

It is proposed that this task is now made a Category 3 item.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1310

NOTE
There is not yet a FAR/JAR 25.1310. JAA has issued NPA 25F-281 for this paragraph but FAA has not yet issued related NPRM. The NPRM is now in for the FAA's Legal review and comments. The hope is to publish it prior to the publication of the fast-track harmonization proposals. It is assumed that NPRM on 25.1309/25.1310 will be published before the package covered in this report.

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

Proposed FAR/JAR 25.1310 presently covered by FAR/JAR 25.1309(e) and (f) define what is an 'essential load' on the power supply and the conditions under which those loads must be supplied.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Based on SD&A HWG proposal
(NPA 25F-281 on JAA side, NPRM not yet published on the FAA side)

Section 25.1310 Power source capacity and distribution.

(a) Each installation whose functioning is required for type certification or by operating rules and that requires a power supply is an "essential load" on the power supply. The power sources and the system must be able to supply the following power loads in probable operating combinations and for probable durations.

(1) Loads connected to the system with the system functioning normally.
(2) Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, power converter, or energy storage device.
(3) Essential loads after failure of –
   (i) Any one engine on two-engined airplanes; and
   (ii) Any two engines on three-or-more engined airplanes.
(4) Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is required, after any failure or malfunction in any one power supply system, distribution system, or other utilization system.

(b) In determining compliance with paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) of this section, the power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a monitoring procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of operation authorized. Loads not required in controlled flight need not be considered for the two-engine-inoperative condition on airplanes with three or more engines.

Current JAR text:

Based on SD&A HWG proposal
(NPA 25F-281 on JAA side)

JAR 25.1310 Power source capacity and distribution

(a) Each installation whose functioning is required for type certification or by operating rules and that requires a power supply is an "essential load" on the power supply. The power sources and the system must be able to supply the following power loads in probable operating combinations.
and for probable durations (see ACJ 25.1310(a)):

1. Loads connected to the system with the system functioning normally.
2. Essential loads, after failure of any one prime mover, power converter, or energy storage device.
3. Essential loads after failure of -
   (i) Any one engine on two-engined aeroplanes; and
   (ii) Any two engines on three-or-more engined aeroplanes.

After the failure of any two engines on a three-engined aeroplane, those services essential to airworthiness must continue to function and perform adequately within the limits of operation implied by the emergency conditions. (See ACJ 25.1310(a)(3).)

4. Essential loads for which an alternate source of power is required, after any failure or malfunction in any one power supply system, distribution system, or other utilisation system.

(b) In determining compliance with sub-paragraphs (a)(2) and (3) of this paragraph, the power loads may be assumed to be reduced under a monitoring procedure consistent with safety in the kinds of operation authorised. Loads not required in controlled flight need not be considered for the two-engine-inoperative condition on aeroplanes with three or more engines.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

These requirements, formerly contained in FAR/JAR 25.1309(e) and (f), are not directly related to the other safety and analysis requirements of JAR 25.1309 and are stated separately for the purpose of clarity through NPA 25F-281. JAR 25.1310 and FAR 25.1310 are not be completely harmonised in that JAR 25.1310 contains requirements for maintenance of airworthiness essential services after failure of any two engines on a three-engined aeroplane and makes reference to two ACJs.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

JAR has two specific ACJs.

ACJ 25.1310(a)
(Same as ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309)
Power Source Capacity and Distribution (Acceptable Means of Compliance)
See JAR 25.1310(a)

When alternative or multiplication of systems and equipment is provided to meet the requirements of JAR 25.1310(a), the segregation between circuits should be such as to minimise the risk of a single occurrence causing multiple failures of circuits or power supplies of the system concerned. For example, electrical cable bundles or groups of hydraulic pipes should be so segregated as to prevent damage to the main and alternative systems and power supplies.

ACJ 25.1310(a)(3)
(Same as ACJ No. 7 to JAR 25.1309)
Equipment, Systems and Installations (Interpretative Material)
See JAR 25.1310(a)(3)

For aeroplanes for which the two-power-units-inoperative performance is scheduled, such services should remain operative as will enable the flight to be safely continued and terminated. In achieving this -

a. Some reduction in the performance of particular services is permissible (e.g. airframe ice-protection),

b. It may be assumed that electrical loads are reduced in accordance with a predetermined procedure which is consistent with safety in the types of operation for which the aeroplane is certificated, and
c. Consideration should be given to any restrictions that may be necessary should the air supply for cabin pressure be interrupted or seriously reduced consequent upon the failure of the power-units.

5 - What is the proposed action?

According to the better plan for harmonisation, FAR/JAR 25.1310 is to be enveloped to the most stringent requirement, which is FAR 25.1310. JAR text can be considered as an alleviation of the services to be maintained after the failure of any two-engines on a three-engined airplane. This should be also applicable on a four (or more) engined aircraft.

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

The standard of FAR 25.1310 as proposed through the SD&A HWG

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The proposal can be considered as a clarification of existing requirements and in line with current practices.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The proposed standard maintains the same level of safety.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

This proposal is in line with current industry practices.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

The adoption of JAR was considered however for the reasons as stated above FAR was retained.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

As the proposal is in line with current design practices, the effect is considered to be minimum for Aircraft Operators and Manufacturers affected by this change.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?

There is no current published FAA Advisory Material. It is recommended that the JAR ACJ to 25.1310(a) be adopted as FAA advisory material as it provides useful acceptable means of compliance.
14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

The proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical systems

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

This proposal does affect the SD&A HWG because it covers part of their proposal for review of 25.1309/1310.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

As the proposal is in line with current design practices the cost impact will be negligible.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

See 18.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

The ESHWG considers that the Category 1 fast track harmonization process is not appropriate for this rule for the following reasons:

1. Additional time is required to review in more detail the concept of “essential load” due to the fact that the term “essential load” as defined in the current text conflicts with the definition of “essential” used in other sections of the FAR/JAR. This conflict in definitions can lead to various interpretations in the compliance to the rule. The wording of the FAR/JAR should be revised to ensure the correct interpretation of the word “essential”.

2. The initial tasking was based on the hypothesis that the proposed 25.1310 coming from the SD&A HWG would be circulated as NPA/NPRM and published as final text. NPA 25F-281 has been published and commented upon, but the equivalent NPRM is still within the FAA. It is impossible to harmonise 25.1310 before it is published.

It is proposed that this task be made a Category 3 item.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1351(b)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

The FAR/JAR give requirements relating to electrical generating system power sources, distribution busses and cables, and associated control, regulation and protection devices.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

**Current FAR text:**

Section 26.1361 General

(b) Generating system. The generating system includes electrical power sources, main power busses, transmission cables, and associated control, regulation, and protective devices. It must be designed so that -

(5) There are means accessible, in flight, to appropriate crew members for the individual and collective disconnection of the electrical power sources from the system.

**Current JAR text:**

JAR 26.1361 General

(b) Generating system. The generating system includes electrical power sources, main power busses, transmission cables, and associated control, regulation, and protective devices. It must be designed so that -

(5) There are means accessible where necessary, in flight, to appropriate crew members for the individual and rapid disconnection of each electrical power source (see ACJ 25.1351(b)(5));

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

JAR 25.1351(b)(5), with its related ACJ 25.1351(b)(5), provide different accessibility requirements for means to disconnect power sources from the electrical system. FAR 25.1351(b)(5) requires means that are accessible in flight for individual and collective disconnection of all power sources. JAR 25.1351(b)(5) specifies "individual and rapid disconnection" instead of "individual and collective disconnection" and allows for flexibility by use of the words "where necessary".

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

The JAR has a specific ACJ to cover the means for disconnecting power sources from the electrical system.

5 – What is the proposed action?

The proposed action is to adopt JAR 25.1351(b)(5) and associated ACJ. This allows for a greater flexibility for appropriate action to be taken, and removes the implication that a single means for disconnection of all electrical power sources is required. This is also in line with current design practices.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1351(c)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

FAR and JAR 25.1351(c) define minimum requirements for connecting external power to the airplane electrical power system, with the objective to protect the airplane/systems from possible malfunctions from the external power.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Sec. 25.1351 General.

(c) External power. If provisions are made for connecting external power to the airplane, and that external power can be electrically connected to equipment other than that used for engine starting, means must be provided to ensure that no external power supply having a reverse polarity, or a reverse phase sequence, can supply power to the airplane's electrical system.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1351 General

(c) External power. If provisions are made for connecting external power to the aeroplane, and that external power can be electrically connected to equipment other than that used for engine starting, means must be provided to ensure that no external power supply having a reverse polarity, a reverse phase sequence (including crossed phase and neutral), open circuit line, incorrect frequency or over-voltage, can supply power to the aeroplane's electrical system.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

JAR 25.1351(c) refines the FAR requirements by requiring additional parameters to be monitored for the external power. This was introduced with NPA 25DF-191 due to an increasing number of incidents being reported of damage being caused to aircraft installed equipment, by malfunctioning external power supply equipment. Modern aircraft do already incorporate comprehensive external power protection systems.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

None.

5 - What is the proposed action?

The ESHWG is proposing to envelope JAR 25.1351(c) with a minor revision to replace "incorrect frequency or over-voltage" by "incorrect frequency or voltage". This ensures that all incorrect voltage conditions are addressed.
6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

Section 25.1351  General

(c) External power. If provisions are made for connecting external power to the aeroplane, and that external power can be electrically connected to equipment other than that used for engine starting, means must be provided to ensure that no external power supply having a reverse polarity, a reverse phase sequence (including crossed phase and neutral), open circuit line, incorrect frequency or voltage, can supply power to the aeroplane's electrical system.

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The proposed standard provides for improved protection for aeroplane systems by adopting the JAR and specifying that means must be provided to protect the aircraft from any incorrect voltage.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The proposed standard increases the level of safety because it requires additional protection for aircraft systems in regard to incorrect external power supply parameters.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

This proposal is in line with current industry practices with the exception of low voltage protection (the deletion of the word “over” before voltage in the text implies the requirement for protection against both over and under voltage conditions - see 5 above).

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

The adoption of FAR and JAR were both considered however for the reasons as stated the modified JAR text (as proposed) was selected.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

As the proposal is generally in line with current design practices, the effect is considered to be minimum for Aircraft Operators and Manufacturers affected by this change.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

There is no current advisory material that needs to be included in the rule text or the preamble.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1353(c)(5)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

The FAR/JAR gives requirements relating to the design and installation of nickel cadmium storage batteries.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

**Current FAR text:**

Section 25.1353 Electrical Equipment and Installations

(c) Storage batteries must be designed and installed as follows -

(5) Each nickel cadmium battery installation capable of being used to start an engine or auxiliary power unit must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems that may be caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of individual cells.

**Current JAR text:**

JAR 25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations

(c) Storage batteries must be designed and installed as follows –

(5) Each nickel cadmium battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems that may be caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of individual cells.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

JAR 25.1353(c)(5) requires provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems by all nickel cadmium batteries regardless of their capabilities; whereas FAR 25.1353(c)(5) requires provisions only for the batteries capable of being used to start an engine or auxiliary power unit.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

All nickel cadmium batteries are required to show compliance to the JAR 25.1353(c)(5) requirements. Whereas FAR 25.1353(c)(5) requires only batteries with engine and APU start capability to show compliance.

5 - What is the proposed action?

The proposed action is to adopt JAR 25.1353(c)(5). This allows for coverage of the greater range of battery sizes and capabilities.

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?
(c) Storage batteries must be design and installed as follows –

(5) Each nickel cadmium battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems that may be cause by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of individual cells.

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

Safety is ensured for the design and installation of nickel cadmium batteries regardless of their sizes and capabilities.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

By covering all nickel cadmium battery sizes, the safety will be increased.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

This proposal is in line with current industry practice for aircraft main batteries used for engine or APU starting, however in relation to all other nickel cadmium batteries, the level of safety may be increased.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

The adoption of FAR was considered however for the reasons as stated above JAR was selected. The ESHWG considered deletion of the reference to "Nickel Cadmium" batteries so that the rule would apply to all battery types. This change was not adopted because it does not fit within the fast track harmonization guidelines and would require additional evaluation of the impact on other battery types.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

As stated above for main batteries the proposal is in line with current design practices and therefore the effect is considered to be minimal. There may be an impact on other nickel cadmium battery installations by aircraft operators, manufacturers and modifiers.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate?

There are no additional FAA or JAA advisory materials required.

14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?
This proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical Systems.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

This proposal does not affect other HWG’s.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

As the proposal is in line with current design practices for aircraft main batteries the cost impact will be negligible. There may be an impact on other nickel cadmium battery installations by aircraft operators, manufacturers and modifiers.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

The ESHWG considers that the fast track harmonization process is appropriate for this rule.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1353(c)(6)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

FAR/JAR give requirements relating to nickel cadmium battery installations with regard to protection against battery overheating.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Section 25.1353(c)(6)

(6) Nickel cadmium battery installations capable of being used to start an engine or auxiliary power unit must have -

(i) A system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically so as to prevent battery overheating;

(ii) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition; or

(iii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1353(c)(6)

(6) Nickel cadmium battery installations that are not provided with low-energy charging means must have-

(i) A system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically so as to prevent battery overheating;

(ii) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition; or

(iii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure. [ (See ACJ 25.1353 (c)(6)(ii) and (iii).) ]

Note: The existing text of JAR 25.1353(c)(6) is such that some confusion exists in the interpretation of the relationship of paragraphs (i) and (ii). JAA Temporary Guidance Material TGM/25/03 was issued to correct the interpretation between these paragraphs. The correct interpretation between JAR 25.1353(c)(6)(i) and JAR 25.1353(c)(6)(ii) is that an 'OR' is to be placed between the two paragraphs.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1353(d)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

The rule gives design requirements relating to the installation of aircraft electrical wiring. All wire and equipment installations must provide for continuous fault protection against fire and smoke hazards, there must be permanent cable, connector and terminal identification and the risk of mechanical, fluid, heat or vapor damage must be minimized.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

There is no current FAR rules text.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1353(d)

(d) Electrical cables and cable installations must be designed and installed as follows:

1. The electrical cables used must be compatible with the circuit protection devices required by JAR 25.1357, such that a fire or smoke hazard cannot be created under temporary or continuous fault conditions.
2. Means of permanent identification must be provided for electrical cables, connectors and terminals.
3. Electrical cables must be installed such that the risk of mechanical damage and/or damage caused by fluids, vapors or sources of heat, is minimized.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

JAR 25.1353(d) provides very explicit aircraft installation design requirements for electrical cables. FAR 25.1353(a), (b) and (c) does not address these design features.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

The JAR states specific requirements for cable installations that must be met. Installation designs approved by the FAR's typically meet the JAR requirement. Installation designers through experience have adopted the practice of permanent identification, protection and installation routing to minimize the risk of damage to electrical cables.

5 – What is the proposed action?

Adoption of JAR 25.1353(d) in its entirety is recommended. This requires an appropriate design action to be taken, removes the possibility that a designer may not consider a critical installation design condition and is in line with current best design practices.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1355 (c)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

The FAR/JAR gives requirements relating to the arrangement, protection and control of the electrical feeders from the busbars to the distribution points. The divisions of loads among the feeders shall be such that no single fault occurring in any feeder or associated control circuit will hazard the aeroplane.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Section 26.1366(c)

(c) If two independent sources of electrical power for particular equipment or systems are required by this chapter, in the event of the failure of one power source for such equipment or system, another power source (including its separate feeder) must be automatically provided or be manually selectable to maintain equipment or system operation.

Current JAR text:

JAR 26.1356(c)

(c) If two independent sources of electrical power for particular equipment or systems are required by this JAR-25, in the event of the failure of one power source for such equipment or system, another power source (including its separate feeder) must be automatically provided or be manually selectable to maintain equipment or system operation. (See ACJ 25.1355 (c) and ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309.)

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

The FAR refers to “chapter” while the JAR refers to “JAR 25” in the rule text. The FAR reference to “chapter” implies broader coverage. The JAR also refers to advisory material.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

There are no differences in the means of compliance, however the JAR has specific ACJ’s as follows: The ACJ to JAR 25.1355(c) introduced Interpretative Material concerning the segregation of electrical feeders to minimize the possibility of cascade or multiple failures. In addition, ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309 refers to the same objective but in relation to the installation of the equipment and systems rather than the electrical feeders only. Segregation of electrical cable bundles or groups of hydraulic pipes being examples that are explicitly quoted.

5 – What is the proposed action?

In line with the fast track harmonization process, the FAR with text changes identified in Item 6 is to be adopted.
6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

FAR/JAR 25.1355(c)

If two independent sources of electrical power for particular equipment or systems are required for certification or by operating rules, in the event of the failure of one power source for such equipment or system, another power source (including its separate feeder) must be automatically provided or be manually selectable to maintain equipment or system operation.

(See ACJ 25.1355 (c) and ACJ No. 6 to JAR 25.1309.) This reference applies to JAR only.

Note: ACJ No 6 to 25.1309 is likely to become ACJ 25.1310(a) if the proposed adoption of FAR/JAR 25.1310 takes place.

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

Regulation remains unchanged.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The level of safety is maintained whilst providing clarification in the form of acceptable means of compliance.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The level of safety is maintained whilst providing clarification in the form of acceptable means of compliance.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

Adoption of JAR was considered, however for reasons as stated above, the FAR text was selected together with JAR Interpretative material.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

As proposal is in line with current design practices, there should be minimal effect on operators or manufacturers.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?

As no equivalent Advisory Material exists, it is recommended that the current ACJ to JAR 25.1355(c) and ACJ No 6 to JAR 25.1309 be retained and adopted as FAA advisory material.
14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

This proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical Systems.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG's?

No.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

As the proposal is in line with existing regulations and current design practice, the cost impact will be negligible.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

The ESHWG considers that the fast track harmonisation process is appropriate for this rule.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1431(d)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

JAR specifies requirements relating to the design and installation of electronic equipment such that these may not cause essential loads to malfunction. There is no equivalent FAR.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

There is no current FAR rules text.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1431 Electronic Equipment

(d) Electronic equipment must be designed and installed such that it does not cause essential loads to become inoperative, as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

There is no equivalent FAR. JAR requires additional verification that any electronic equipment will not cause essential loads to become inoperative as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

Since there are no equivalent FAR standards, additional verification is required by JAR that electronic equipment will not cause essential loads to become inoperative as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.

5 - What is the proposed action?

The proposed action is to adopt JAR 25.1431(d).

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

FAR/JAR 25.1431 Electronic Equipment

(d) Electronic equipment must be designed and installed such that it does not cause essential loads to become inoperative, as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The proposed standard addresses the need for installed electronic equipment to be designed and installed such that essential loads (as defined in JAR25.1309(e)) will not become inoperative as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.
8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

Since this proposal is in line with current industry practices, and it is already included by implication in Sections 25.1309(e), 25.1351(b) and 25.1353(a) it will maintain the same level of safety.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

Since this proposal is in line with current industry practices, and it is already included by implication in Sections 25.1309(e), 25.1351(b) and 25.1353(a), it will maintain the same level of safety.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

Not to adopt the JAR requirements was considered however for the reasons as stated above the group decided to adopt the more specific requirement in accordance with fast track harmonization process.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

As the proposal is in line with current design practices, the effect is considered to be minimum for aircraft operators and manufacturers affected by this change.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?

There is no current published FAA Advisory Material and no additional materials are required.

14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

This proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical Systems.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

This proposal does not affect other HWG’s.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

As the proposal is in line with current design practices the cost impact will be negligible.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?
Yes.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

The ESHWG considers that the fast track harmonization process is appropriate for this rule.
ARAC WG Report FAR/JAR 25.1351(d)

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

This section provides requirements for operations without normal electrical power.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Section 25.1351(d) Operation without normal electrical power.

It must be shown by analysis, test, or both, that the airplane can be operated safely in VFR conditions, for a period of not less than five minutes, with the normal electrical power (electrical power sources excluding the battery) inoperative, with critical type fuel (from the standpoint of flameout and restart capability), and with the airplane initially at the maximum certificated altitude. Parts of the electrical system may remain on if-

(1) A single malfunction, including a wire bundle or junction box fire, cannot result in loss of both the part turned off and the part turned on; and

(2) The parts turned on are electrically and mechanically isolated from the parts turned off.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1351(d) Operation without normal electrical power.

(See ACJ 25.1351 (d).) The following apply:

(1) Unless it can be shown that the loss of the normal electrical power generating system(s) is Extremely Improbable, alternate high integrity electrical power system(s), independent of the normal electrical power generating system(s), must be provided to power those services necessary to complete a flight and make a safe landing.

(2) The services to be powered must include -

   (i) Those required for immediate safety and which must continue to operate following the loss of the normal electrical power generating system(s), without the need for flight crew action;

   (ii) Those required for continued controlled flight; and

   (iii) Those required for descent, approach and landing.

(3) Failures, including junction box, control panel or wire bundle fires, which would result in the loss of the normal and alternate systems must be shown to be Extremely Improbable.

3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

FAR and JAR 25.1351(d) address alternate/standby power systems. FAR 25.1351(d) defines minimum requirements for an alternate/standby power system that can enable safe operation in VFR conditions for period of not less than five minutes to enable attempted engine re-lights. JAR 25.1351(d), with its related ACJ, requires provision for a high integrity alternate/standby power system with a duration for time limited system compatible with JAR-OPS and ICAO Annex 8. This ACJ also provides Interpretative Material for non-time limited alternate/standby power sources and specifies services that must remain powered following loss of normal electrical power.
4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

The rules between the FAR and JAR are significantly different therefore the means of compliance are also significantly different.

5 - What is the proposed action?

Since the JAR is considered to be more stringent and more closely related to the current industry and regulatory practices the ESHWG recommends the adoption of the current JAR 25.1351(d) and the associated ACJ 25.1351(d).

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

Current JAR 25.1351(d) and associated ACJ 25.1351(d)

7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The proposed standard will ensure adequate electrical power is supplied to those services which are necessary to complete the flight and make a safe landing in the event of a failure of all normal generated electrical power. With the growing dependence on electrically powered systems for safe aircraft operation, this section of the FAR has become out of date.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

The proposed adoption of the JAR would increase the level of safety of the aircraft when operating without normal electrical power, by increasing the time duration capability and integrity of the emergency electrical power system.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

In regard to non-JAA certified aircraft, the proposal would increase the level of safety relative to current FAR requirements. Recent FAA policy for new certifications has been to use issue papers which require increased capability and integrity of aircraft emergency power systems similar to current JAR requirements.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

The group originally intended to take the current ACJ25.1351(d) and incorporate parts of the proposed AC 25.1351-1 into a combined AC/ACJ. However, the group agreed to adopt the more stringent requirement between FAR and JAR in accordance with the “fast track” harmonization process.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

Aircraft manufacturers, modification centers, equipment/system manufacturers and operators of transport category aircraft (Part 25).
12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?

There is no current published FAA advisory material for FAR 25.1351(d). The ESHWG recommends the adoption of ACJ 25.1351(d). There is a draft AC 25.1351-1, however this draft does not adequately address this requirement. The ESHWG recommends that this draft AC along with the current ACJ 25.1351(d) be used in the future to create a more up to date harmonized AC/ACJ.

14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

The proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical systems.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

No.

16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

This item is a significant regulatory difference. Although the cost is likely to be higher for products that are certified only to FAR requirements, there will be savings for manufacturers intending to certify to the proposed harmonised standard in lieu of dual (JAA/FAA) certification programmes. The majority of part 25 aircraft manufacturers today comply with the JAR requirement for their new products. For the few manufacturers currently certifying only to FAR, the costs to certify to JAR may include new design in the areas of power distribution (examples include junction-boxes, circuit breaker panels, wire routing, wire protection, distribution control/monitoring and increased battery capacity), development testing for the new design, and certification testing for the new design. Manufacture, installation, weight and maintenance costs of a FAR/JAR compliant design may be slightly higher due to increased complexity.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

18 - In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process? Explain.

Yes, it is appropriate for the "Fast Track" process. However as stated above, the Group recommends review of the Advisory Material at a later date.
ARAC ESHWG REPORT 25.1363

1 - What is underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR?

The underlying safety issue addressed by FAR/JAR 25.1363 is to provide assurance that tests of the electrical system are performed using mock-ups and equipment that are as close to the airplane characteristics as possible. This means that generator drives must simulate the actual airplane prime mover (mechanical equivalence), generating equipment must be the same as the aircraft and the distribution system must be simulated to the extent required to give valid test results. For any condition that cannot be simulated adequately in a laboratory or ground test, flight testing must be done.

2 - What are the current FAR and JAR standards?

Current FAR text:

Section 25.1363 Electrical System Tests.

(a) When laboratory tests of the electrical system are conducted—

(1) The tests must be performed on a mock-up using the same generating equipment used in the airplane;
(2) The equipment must simulate the electrical characteristics of the distribution wiring and connected loads to the extent necessary for valid test results; and
(3) Laboratory generator drives must simulate the actual prime movers on the airplane with respect to their reaction to generator loading, including loading due to faults.

(b) For each flight condition that cannot be simulated adequately in the laboratory or by ground tests on the airplane, flight tests must be made.

Current JAR text:

JAR 25.1363 Electrical System Tests [See ACJ 25X1363]

(a) Tests must be made to determine that the performance of the electrical supply systems meets the requirements of this JAR – 25 under all the appropriate normal and failure conditions. When laboratory tests of the electrical system are conducted—

(1) The tests must be performed on a mock-up using the same generating equipment used in the aeroplane;
(2) The equipment must simulate the electrical characteristics of the distribution wiring and connected loads to the extent necessary for valid test results; and
(3) Laboratory generator drives must simulate the actual prime movers on the aeroplane with respect to their reaction to generator loading, including loading due to faults.

(b) For each flight condition that cannot be simulated adequately in the laboratory or by ground tests on the aeroplane, flight tests must be made.
3 - What are the differences in the standards and what do these differences result in?

FAA and JAA standards and policies are generally equivalent. However, the JAR adds requirements for testing to demonstrate performance of the electrical supply system under all appropriate normal and failure conditions. The related ACJ 25.1363 specifies Acceptable Means of Compliance, which requires testing to account for load switching and flight crew operation of the system. This ACJ also gives more specific guidance for electrical parameters that should be simulated in laboratory tests to demonstrate system performance. Testing must demonstrate system performance throughout the temperature range and other environmental extremes for all ground and flight conditions. There must be written test procedures to document the conditions of each ground or flight test.

4 - What, if any, are the differences in the means of compliance?

The differences in the means of compliance are related to the additional testing and reports that must be prepared and submitted. Even though the JAR contains additional specific test conditions and requirements, they are normally addressed in the design phase of the project regardless of whether it is for FAA or JAA certification.

5 - What is the proposed action?

The proposed action is for the FAA to adopt the JAR text for 25.1363 and to adopt ACJ 25.1363 as FAA advisory material.

6 - What should the harmonized standard be?

FAR/JAR 25.1363 Electrical System Tests [See ACJ 25.1383]

(a) Tests must be made to determine that the performance of the electrical supply systems meets the requirements of this JAR – 25 under all the appropriate normal and failure conditions. When laboratory tests of the electrical system are conducted –

(1) The tests must be performed on a mock-up using the same generating equipment used in the aeroplane;
(2) The equipment must simulate the electrical characteristics of the distribution wiring and connected loads to the extent necessary for valid test results; and
(3) Laboratory generator drives must simulate the actual prime movers on the aeroplane with respect to their reaction to generator loading, including loading due to faults.

(b) For each flight condition that cannot be simulated adequately in the laboratory or by ground tests on the aeroplane, flight tests must be made.

Note: Reference to ACJ is for JAR only.
7 - How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue (identified under #1)?

The proposed standard incorporates the JAR into the FAR. This will require tests rather than letting them be optional, as is the case in the FAR. By requiring appropriate testing the operation of the electrical system is verified rather than depending upon analysis.

8 - Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

Relative to the current FAR, the proposed standard may provide an increase in safety. Current industry standards are very similar to the proposed requirements.

9 - Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? Explain.

Relative to current industry practice, the proposed standard will maintain the same level of safety.

10 - What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?

No other options were considered.

11 - Who would be affected by the proposed change?

Only a manufacturer or modifier who did not intend to certify to JAA requirements would possibly be affected because they may not have a test plan that would meet the JAR with its related ACJ.

12 - To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g., ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) needs to be included in the rule text or preamble?

None.

13 - Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted?

Existing FAA advisory material does not address the additional testing requirements found in the JAR and its ACJ. ACJ 25.1363 should be adopted as FAA advisory material.

14 - How does the proposed standard compare to the current ICAO standard?

This proposal is in line with ICAO Annex 8 Chapter 8 Electrical Systems.

15 - Does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s?

No.
16 - What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard?

The additional requirements in the JAR and its related ACJ do not result in significant increases in aircraft certification project costs. Aircraft manufacturers generally have for their products similar internal company standards as are contained in this JAR and ACJ. There may be additional expense involved in documenting the test parameters and test results to show compliance with this proposed standard but this would be offset by having a single harmonized rule.

17 - Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at “Phase 4” prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

18 – In light of the information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the “Fast Track” process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the Fast Track Process. Explain.

Yes, this rulemaking project is within the scope of the “Fast Track” process.
FAA Action: Electrical Cables; NPRM -- FAA-2001-9633
and
Design and Installation of Electronic Equipment on Transport Category Airplanes; NPRM -- FAA-2001-9638
Tuesday,
March 16, 2004

Part IV

Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25
Electrical Equipment and Installations, Storage Battery Installation; Electronic Equipment; and Fire Protection of Electrical System Components on Transport Category Airplanes; Final Rule
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25


RIN 2120–AI21

Electrical Equipment and Installations; Storage Battery Installation; Electronic Equipment; and Fire Protection of Electrical System Components on Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA amends the regulations governing airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes concerning: electrical equipment; nickel cadmium battery installation and storage; electrical cables; design and installation of electronic equipment; and fire protection of electrical system components. Adoption of these amendments eliminates significant regulatory differences between the airworthiness standards of the U.S. and the Joint Aviation Requirements of Europe, without affecting current industry design practices.

DATES: This amendment becomes effective April 15, 2004.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

How Can I Obtain a Copy of This Final Rule?

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:

(1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);

(2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/index.cfm; or


You can also request a copy from the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591 [(202) 267–9680]. Be sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this rulemaking.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within our jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question regarding this document you may contact your local FAA official or the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm, or by e-mailing us at 9–AWA–SBREFA@faa.gov.

Background

This final rule responds to recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) submitted under the FAA’s Fast Track Harmonization Program. It amends six sections of the regulations governing airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes concerning: electrical installation, nickel cadmium battery installation and storage; electrical cables; design and installation of electronic equipment; and fire protection of electrical system components. The FAA proposed these changes in four notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). The notices and the affected sections are listed in the table below.

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<th>Section title</th>
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In these notices you will find a history of the problems and discussions of the safety considerations supporting our course of action. You also will find a discussion of the current requirements and why they do not adequately address the problem. We also refer to the recommendations of the ARAC we relied on in developing the proposed rule. The NPRMs also discuss each alternative there we considered and the reasons for rejecting the ones we did not adopt.

The background material in the NPRM also contains the basis and rationale for these requirements and, except where we have specifically expanded on the background elsewhere in this preamble, supports this final rule as if it were contained here. That is, any future discussions regarding the intent of the requirements may refer to the background in the NPRM as though it was in the final rule itself. It is therefore not necessary to repeat the background in this document.

History

In the United States, Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 25 contains the airworthiness standards for type certification of transport category airplanes. The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe developed these standards, which are based on part 25, to provide a common set of airworthiness standards within the European aviation community. Thirty-seven European countries accept airplanes type certified to the JAR–25 standards, including airplanes manufactured in the U.S. that are type certified to JAR–25 standards for export to Europe.

Although part 25 and JAR–25 are similar, they are not identical in every respect. When airplanes are type certified to both sets of standards, the differences between part 25 and JAR–25
can result in substantial added costs to manufacturers and operators. These added costs, however, often do not bring about an increase in safety.

Recognizing that a common set of standards would not only benefit the aviation industry economically but also preserve the necessary high-level of safety, the FAA and the JAA began an effort in 1988 to “harmonize” their respective aviation standards.

After beginning the first steps towards harmonization, the FAA and JAA soon realized that traditional methods of rulemaking and accommodating different administrative procedures was neither sufficient nor adequate to make noticeable progress towards fulfilling the harmonization goal. The FAA identified the ARAC as an ideal vehicle for helping to resolve harmonization issues, and in 1992, the FAA tasked ARAC to undertake the entire harmonization effort.

Despite the work at ARAC has undertaken to address harmonization, there remain regulatory differences between part 25 and JAR–25. The current harmonization process is costly and time-consuming for industry, the FAA, and the JAA. Industry has expressed a strong desire to finish the harmonization program as quickly as possible to alleviate the drain on their resources and finally to establish one acceptable set of standards.

Recently, representatives of the FAA and JAA proposed an accelerated process to reach harmonization, the “Fast Track Harmonization Program.” The FAA initiated the Fast Track Harmonization Program on November 26, 1999 (64 FR 66522). This rulemaking has been identified as a “fast track” project.

Further details on ARAC, and its role in the harmonization rulemaking activity, and the Fast Track Harmonization Program can be found in the tasking statement (64 FR 66522, November 26, 1999) and the first NPRM published under this program, Fire Protection Requirements for Powerplant Installations on Transport Category Airplanes (65 FR 36978, June 12, 2000).

Related Activity

The new European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) was established and formally came into being on September 28, 2003. The JAA worked with the European Commission (EC) to develop a plan to ensure a smooth transition from JAA to the EASA. As part of the transition, the EASA will absorb all functions and activities of the JAA, including those to harmonize JAA regulations with those of the U.S. This rule is a result of the FAA and JAA harmonization rulemaking activities. It adopts the more stringent requirements of the JAR standards. These JAR standards have already been incorporated into the EASA “Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes” CS–25, in similar if not identical language. The EASA CS–25 became effective on October 17, 2003.

Discussion of the Comments

Electrical Installation, Nickel Cadmium Battery Installation, and Nickel Cadmium Battery Storage, RIN 2120–AH27

On May 17, 2001, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Notice No. 01–04, 66 FR 27582) entitled, “Electrical Installation, Nickel Cadmium Battery Installation, and Nickel Cadmium Battery Storage.” In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend three sections of 14 CFR part 25 regarding airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes concerning electrical equipment and installations to harmonize the standards with those of the associated JAR–25. In the NPRM, the proposed title of § 25.1353 is incorrect. This final rule corrects the title of § 25.1353 to read “Electrical equipment and installations.” For electrical equipment installations, the FAA proposed to add text from the associated JAR to harmonize the requirements, and to clarify the intent of this regulation. For nickel cadmium batteries, the FAA proposed to expand the applicability of the regulation to all nickel cadmium battery sizes, regardless of their capabilities. In addition, the FAA proposed to adopt the associated JAR Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) material for both electrical equipment and nickel cadmium battery installations.

General Comment

The FAA received four comments in response to the proposed rule. Two of the four commenters support the proposed changes. The other two commenters disagreed with the cost estimates in the proposal, as discussed below.

Comment: The third and fourth commenters submitted their comments through the Air Transport Association of America (ATA). The ATA provided comments that “indicate the cost estimates in the proposal are flawed because they do not address the cost of compliance when installing new equipment in existing airplanes.”

FAA Reply: The FAA does not concur. The cost and technical impacts on existing equipment due to harmonization of these rules are expected to be minimal because of the following:

1. These harmonized rules will, in general, not be applicable to existing airplanes or modifications to existing airplanes that were certified to earlier amendment levels as defined on the Type Certificate Data sheet. An exception may be new derivative airplane models or modifications to existing models that are deemed significant enough to require application of later amendment levels per 14 CFR 21.101.

2. It is anticipated that any modifications or retrofit changes that battery a showing of compliance to the harmonized rules for nickel cadmium batteries §§ 25.1353(c)(5) and (c)(6) will, in general, not require compliance to later amendments.

3. The requirements for temperature sensing, monitoring, and warning, in general apply to batteries that have high enough energy sources to be a hazard, and are typically main airplane batteries or APU start type batteries. Main airplane batteries (which have engine ignition as a stand-by load) or APU start batteries already are required to have this sensing and monitoring functionality.

4. This regulation will not be applicable to flashlights or emergency lighting equipment (dry cell type batteries as they generally have low energy-charging type systems (trickle charge); unless there were to be new designs or new technologies that warrant this type of battery monitoring and sensing due to potentially hazardous effects.

5. Harmonization of § 25.1353(a) with JAR 25.1353(a) provides consistency with existing rules, § 25.1431, and with the harmonized § 25.1309. The intent of both rules is the same in that the airplane is required to be designed with electrical interference effects that have no unsafe effects on the airplane, systems, or occupants. This rule provides further definition in terms of the level of safety or probability of failure that is required. The main difference between § 25.1353(a) and JAR 25.1353(a) is the use of the term “extremely remote,” which is defined as follows:

Extremely Remote Failure Condition: a failure condition that is not anticipated to occur to each airplane during its total life, but which may occur a few times when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of the type. [Note: The term “extremely remote” has been used previously within 14 CFR part 25 to describe a condition so remote that it is not anticipated to occur in service on any transport category airplane (i.e., “extremely improbable”). However, for the purposes of this regulation, the term “extremely remote” will have the meaning specified above.]
This is further supported by the Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) 25.1353(a), “Acceptable Means of Compliance and Interpretation,” Section Two of the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR–25).

The FAA has adopted the JAR ACJ material as an acceptable means of showing compliance with the revision to § 25.1353(a) and has developed an Advisory Circular (AC). The FAA will publish a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register after the AC is issued.

Changes: No changes were made as a result of this comment.

FAA Disposition of Comments: The FAA adopts the changes as proposed in the NPRM, Notice No. 01–04.

Electrical Cables, RIN 2120-AH29

On May 15, 2001, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Notice No. 01–03, 66 FR 26942) entitled, “Electrical Cables.” In the NPRM, the FAA proposed harmonizing the standards by revising the regulation to adopt the text of the associated JAR–25. The proposed revision would specify a design action to be taken, and remove the possibility that a designer may not consider a critical installation design condition.

General Comment

The FAA received one comment to both Notice No. 01–03 and Notice No. 01–07. The commenter fully supports the proposal.

Comment: The commenter fully supports the adoption of these amendments to reduce the differences between part 25 and JAR–25. Further, the commenter states that the fruits of the ARAC’s considerable efforts should enable the FAA to complete this rulemaking quickly.

Changes: No changes were made as a result of this comment.

FAA Disposition of Comment: The FAA adopts the changes as proposed in the NPRM, Notice No. 01–03.

Design and Installation of Electronic Equipment on Transport Category Airplanes, RIN 2120-AH28

On May 15, 2001, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Notice No. 01–07, 66 FR 26956) entitled, “Design and Installation of Electronic Equipment on Transport Category Airplanes.” In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise § 25.1431 to add a new paragraph (d) that would be parallel to JAR–25.1431(d). The proposal would provide one location in the regulations that explicitly addresses requirements related to electrical power supply transients, clarify the objective of the other related regulations in part 25, and harmonize 14 CFR part 25 with the associated JAR–25.

General Comment

The FAA received one comment to both Notice No. 01–03 and Notice No. 01–07. The commenter fully supports the proposal.

Comment: See Comment under “Electrical Cables” above.

Changes: No changes to the rule as proposed are necessary.

FAA Disposition of Comment: The FAA adopts the changes as proposed in the NPRM, Notice No. 01–07.

Fire Protection of Electrical System Components on Transport Category Airplanes, RIN 2120–AG92

On May 15, 2001, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Notice No. 01–06, 66 FR 26964) entitled, “Fire Protection of Electrical System Components on Transport Category Airplanes.” In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to revise § 25.869(a), concerning the protection of electrical system components, to adopt the more stringent language in the parallel JAR–25.

General Comment

The FAA received three comments in response to the proposed rule. Two of the commenters agree with the proposal and recommend its adoption. The third commenter suggested a change to the applicability of the rule, as discussed below.

Comment: The commenter states, “Regulatory changes should apply to airplanes or electrical components manufactured after the date the CFR is changed. The CFR change should not be retroactive to airplanes manufactured before this new regulation is enacted.”

FAA Reply: The harmonized § 25.869(a) and JAR 25.869(a) will be incorporated into later revisions of 14 CFR part 25 and are not retroactive. Therefore, these harmonized rules will, in general, not be applicable to existing airplanes or electrical components that were certified to earlier amendment levels as defined on the Type Certificate Data sheet for the airplane models in question. An exception may be new derivative airplane models or modifications to existing models that are deemed significant enough to require application of later amendment levels per 14 CFR 21.101.

There is currently no FAA advisory material related to the standard. However, the FAA has developed AC 25.869–1X, “Electrical System Fire and Smoke Protection.” It contains guidance on this subject and includes, with some modification, the material currently in the IAA’s ACJ 25.869. The FAA will publish a Notice of Availability in the Federal Register after the AC is issued.

Changes: No changes were made as a result of this comment.

FAA Disposition of Comment: The FAA adopts the changes as proposed in the NPRM, Notice No. 01–06.

What Regulatory Analyses and Assessments Has the FAA Conducted?

Economic Evaluation, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. section 2531–2533) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act also requires agencies to consider international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).

In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this final rule:

1. Has benefits that do justify its costs, is not a “significant regulatory action” as defined in the Executive Order, and is not “significant” as defined in DOT’s Regulatory Policies and Procedures;
2. will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;
3. reduces barriers to international trade; and,
4. imposes no unfunded mandates on State, local, or tribal governments, or the private sector.

The (DOT) Order 2100.5, “Regulatory Policies and Procedures,” prescribes policies and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If it is determined that the economic impact of a rule is minor that the rule does not warrant a full evaluation, a statement to that effect and the basis
for it is included in the regulation. We provide the basis for this minimal impact determination below. We received no comments that conflicted with the economic assessment of minimal impact published in the notices of proposed rulemaking for this action. Given the reasons presented below, we have determined that the expected impact of this rule is so minimal that the final rule does not warrant a full evaluation.

Currently, airplane manufacturers must satisfy both the 14 CFR and the European JAR certification standards to market transport category airplanes in both the United States and Europe. Meeting two sets of certification requirements raises the cost of developing new transport category airplanes often with no increase in safety. In the interest of fostering international trade, lowering the cost of airplane development, and making the certification process more efficient, the FAA, JAA, and airplane manufacturers have been working to create, to the maximum possible extent, a single set of certification requirements accepted in both the United States and Europe. As discussed previously, these efforts are referred to as harmonization. This final rule results from the FAA’s acceptance of ARAC harmonization working group recommendations. Members of the ARAC working groups agreed that the requirements of this rule will not impose additional costs to U.S. manufacturers of part 25 airplanes. Specifically, this final rule requires:

1. amending §§25.1353(a), (c)(5), and (c)(6), and 25.869(a) to adopt the “more stringent” requirements currently in those same sections of JAR–25;
2. adding §25.1353(d) to adopt JAR 25.1353(d) in its entirety; and,
3. adding a new §25.1431(d) to incorporate the “more stringent” requirement of paragraph 25.1431(d) of the JAR.

We consider that this rule will neither reduce nor increase the requirements beyond those that are already met by U.S. manufacturers to satisfy European airworthiness standards. As this rule neither increases nor decreases certification requirements beyond those already in existence, we have determined there will be no cost associated with this rule to part 25 manufacturers. We have not tried to quantify the benefits of this amendment beyond identifying the expected harmonization benefit. This amendment eliminates an identified significant regulatory difference (SRD) between part 25 and the JAR wording. Eliminating the SRD will provide for a more consistent interpretation of the rules and, thus, is an element of the potentially large cost savings of harmonization.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) directs the FAA to fit regulatory requirements to the sale of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation. We are required to determine whether a proposed or final action will have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities” as defined in the Act.

If we find the action will have a significant impact, we must do a “regulatory flexibility analysis.” If, however, we find the action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, we are not required to do the analysis. In this case, the Act requires that we include a statement that provides the factual basis for our determination.

We have determined that this amendment will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for two reasons:

First, the net effect of the final rule is regulatory cost relief. The amendment requires that new transport category airplane manufacturers meet just the “more stringent” European certification requirement, rather than both the United States and European standards. Airplane manufacturers already meet or expect to meet this standard as well as the existing part 25 requirements.

Second, all United States manufacturers of transport category airplanes exceed the Small Business Administration small-entity criteria of 1,500 employees for airplane manufacturers. Those U.S. manufacturers include: The Boeing Company, Cessna Aircraft Company, Gulfstream Aerospace, Learjet (owned by Bombardier Aerospace), Lockheed Martin Corporation, McDonnell Douglas (a wholly owned subsidiary of The Boeing Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and Sabreliner Corporation.

The FAA received no comments that differed with the assessment given in this section. Since this final rule is cost relieving and there are no small entity manufacturers of part 25 airplanes, the FAA Administrator certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.

This rule is consistent with the Trade Agreement Act as the European standards are the basis for these U.S. regulations.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), is intended, among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a “significant regulatory action.”

This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements of Title II of the Act, therefore, do not apply.

What Other Assessments Has the FAA Conducted?

Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, there are no current or new requirements for information collection associated with this final rule.

International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices that correspond to these regulations.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA analyzed this final rule and the principles and criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government; we determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications.
Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in Title 14 of the CFR in a manner affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to establish such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers appropriate. Because this final rule applies to the certification of future designs of transport category airplanes and their subsequent operation, it could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Because no comments were received regarding this regulation affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, we will apply the rule in the same way that it is being applied nationally.

Plain Language

Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each agency to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand. We invite your comments on how to make these regulations easier to understand, including answers to questions such as the following:

• Are the requirements in the regulations clearly stated?
• Do the regulations contain unnecessary technical language or jargon that interferes with their clarity?
• Would the regulations be easier to understand if they were divided into more (but shorter) sections?
• Is the description in the final rule preamble helpful in understanding the regulations?

Please send your comments to the address specified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Environmental Analysis

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this final rule qualifies for a categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

The FAA has assessed the energy impact of this final rule in accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and Public Law 94–163, as amended (43 U.S.C. 6362), and FAA Order 1053.1. We have determined that the final rule is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 25 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.

2. Amend §25.869 by revising paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:

§25.869 Fire protection: systems.

(a) * * *

(4) Insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable installed in any area of the airplane must be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance with the applicable portions of part I, appendix F of this part.

3. Amend §25.1353 by revising paragraphs (a), (c)(5), and (c)(6), and by adding a new paragraph (d) to read as follows:

§25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations.

(a) Electrical equipment, controls, and wiring must be installed so that operations of any one unit or system of units will not adversely affect the simultaneous operation of any other electrical unit or system essential to the safe operation. Any electrical interference likely to be present in the airplane must not result in hazardous effects upon the airplane or its systems except under extremely remote conditions.

(c) * * *

(5) Each nickel cadmium battery installation must have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems that may be caused by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short circuit of the battery or of individual cells.

(6) Nickel cadmium battery installations must have—

(i) A system to control the charging rate of the battery automatically so as to prevent battery overheating; or

(ii) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition; or

(iii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the event of battery failure.

(d) Electrical cables and cable installations must be designed and installed as follows:

(1) The electrical cables used must be compatible with the circuit protection devices required by §25.1357 of this part, such that a fire or smoke hazard cannot be created under temporary or continuous fault conditions.

(2) Means of permanent identification must be provided for electrical cables, connectors and terminals.

(3) Electrical cables must be installed such that the risk of mechanical damage and/or damage caused by fluids, vapors, or sources of heat, is minimized.

4. Amend §25.1431 by adding a new paragraph (d) to read as follows:

§25.1431 Electronic equipment.

(d) Electronic equipment must be designed and installed such that it does not cause essential loads to become inoperative as a result of electrical power supply transients or transients from other causes.


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