Task Assignment
SUMMARY: Notice is given of a new task assigned to and accepted by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). This notice informs the public of the activities of ARAC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart R. Miller, Transport Standards Staff (ANM-110), Federal Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056; phone (425) 227-1255; fax (425) 227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA has established an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to provide advice and recommendations to the FAA Administrator, through the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, on the full range of the FAA's rulemaking activities with respect to aviation-related issues. This includes obtaining advice and recommendations on the FAA's commitment to harmonize its Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and practices with its trading partners in Europe and Canada.

One area ARAC deals with is Transport Airplane and Engine Issues. These issues involve the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes and engines in 14 CFR parts 25, 33, and 35 and parallel provisions in 14 CFR parts 121 and 135.

The Task

This notice is to inform the public that the FAA has asked ARAC to provide advice and recommendation on the following harmonization task:

Flight Control Systems
Review the current Secs. 25.671 and 25.672 standards and corresponding JAR 25.671 and 25.672 standards pertaining to flight control systems, taking into account the requirements in Secs. 25.1309 and 25.1329. Also review current policy including that established by special conditions issued for fly-by-wire control systems and active flight controls, and any related advisory material. Examine accumulated transport airplane service history to validate assumptions made on the probability of occurrence of system failure and consider any NTSB recommendation. In light of this review, recommend new harmonized standards, and develop related advisory material as necessary. Of particular concern is development of advisory material addressing the following regulatory areas:

A. In FAR 25.671(c), the definition of extremely improbable and probable failures is provided in the rule itself, and this definition differs from the numerical definition which is commonly used in showing compliance with FAR 25.1309, which sometimes leads to confusion. Unlike FAR, JAR 25.671(c)(1) excludes single failures when they are shown to be extremely improbable. JAR definition of probabilities is in line with 25.1309. A uniform means of compliance needs to be developed. It is expected that considerable elaboration would be made as to how the various mechanical, hydraulic and electrical failures should be handled. Consideration should be given to latent failures and the relationship of the flight control failures with the occurrence of engine failures.

B. In light of the rate of control jams experienced in the transport fleet to date, and using the experience as an indicator of types of control system malfunctions that may be safety concerns, provide any necessary regulatory and/or policy provisions to:

1. Define the meaning of the terms `normal flight envelope'', `without exceptional piloting skill or strength'', `minor effects'', and `control position normally encountered'' as used in Sec. 25.671(c).

2. Determine to what extent basic airmanship skills and reasonable pilot response and action may be used to alleviate the resulting airplane control problems. Determine the applicability of crosswind to the landing situation with a jammed flight control.

3. Identify acceptable methodology by which to judge the controllability/maneuverability of an airplane with a jammed control system (e.g. Handling Qualities Rating System (HQRM)).

4. Review NTSB Recommendation A-96-108 and appropriately respond to the proposed criteria.

5. Consider comments in AIA-GAMA letter dated January 23, 1997 and the input received at the December 3, 1996, public meeting conducted by the FAA.

6. Address structural loading conditions following the jammed failure condition required for continued safe flight and landing.

C. Provide advisory material that addresses the all engine failure condition defined in Sec. 25.671(d).

The FAA expects ARAC to submit its recommendation(s) by March 31, 2001.

The FAA requests that ARAC draft appropriate regulatory documents with supporting economic and other required analyses, and any other related guidance material or collateral documents to support its recommendations. If the resulting recommendation is one or more notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published by the FAA, the FAA may ask ARAC to recommend disposition of any substantive comments the FAA receives.
ARAC Acceptance of Tasks

ARAC has accepted the tasks and has chosen to establish a new Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group. The working group will serve as staff to ARAC to assist ARAC in the analysis of the assigned task. Working group recommendations must be reviewed and approved by ARAC. If ARAC accepts the working group's recommendations, it forwards them to the FAA as ARAC recommendations.

Working Group Activity

The Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group is expected to comply with the procedures adopted by ARAC. As part of the procedures, the working group is expected to:

1. Recommend a work plan for completion of the task, including the rationale supporting such a plan, for consideration at the meeting of ARAC to consider transport airplane and engine issues held following publication of this notice.

2. Give a detailed conceptual presentation of the proposed recommendations, prior to proceeding with the work stated in item 3 below.

3. Draft appropriate regulatory documents with supporting economic and other required analyses, and/or any other related guidance material or collateral documents the working group determines to be appropriate; or, if new or revised requirements or compliance methods are not recommended, a draft report stating the rationale for not making such recommendations. If the resulting recommendation is one or more notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published by the FAA, the FAA may ask ARAC to recommend disposition of any substantive comments the FAA receives.

4. Provide a status report at each meeting of ARAC held to consider transport airplane and engine issues.

Participation in the Working Group

The Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group will be composed of technical experts having an interest in the assigned task. A working group member need not be a representative of a member of the full committee.

An individual who has expertise in the subject matter and wishes to become a member of the working group should write to the person listed under the caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT expressing that desire, describing his or her interest in the tasks, and stating the expertise he or she would bring to the working group. All requests to participate must be received no later than September 25, 1998. The requests will be reviewed by the assistance chair and the assistant executive director, and the individuals will be advised whether or not the request can be accommodated.

Individuals chosen for membership on the working group will be expected to represent their aviation community segment and participate actively in the working group (e.g., attend all meetings, provide written comments when requested to do so, etc.). They also will be expected to devote the resources necessary to ensure the ability of the working group to meet any assigned deadline(s). Members are expected to keep their management chain advised of working group activities and decisions to ensure that the agreed technical solutions do not conflict
with their sponsoring organization's position when the subject being negotiated is presented to ARAC for a vote. Once the working group has begun deliberations, members will not be added or substituted without the approval of the assistant chair, the assistant executive director, and the working group chair.

The Secretary of Transportation has determined that the formation and use of ARAC are necessary and in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties imposed on the FAA by law.

Meetings of ARAC will be open to the public. Meetings of the Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group will not be open to the public, except to the extent that individuals with an interest and expertise are selected to participate. No public announcement of working group meetings will be made.

Issued in Washington, DC, on August 20, 1998.
Joseph A. Hawkins,
Executive Director, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.
[FR Doc. 98-22918 Filed 8-25-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
Recommendation Letter
May 21, 2001

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C. 20591

Attention: Mr. Thomas McSweeny, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification

Reference: ARAC Tasking, Federal Register, November 26, 1999

Dear Tom,

In accordance with the reference tasking statement, the ARAC Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group is pleased to forward the attached technical report regarding the harmonization of 25.672 to the FAA as an ARAC recommendation. This report has been prepared by the Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group.

Sincerely,

Craig R. Bolt
Assistant Chair, TAEIG

cc: Kris Carpenter – FAA-NWR
    Effie Upshaw – FAA-Washington, D.C.*
    Larry Schultz – Boeing*

* letter only
September 17, 2002

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C. 20591

Attention: Mr. Nicholas Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification

Subject: ARAC Recommendation, Flight Controls

Reference: ARAC Tasking, Federal Register, August 26, 1998

Dear Nick,

The Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group is pleased to submit the following as a recommendation to the FAA in accordance with the reference tasking. This information has been prepared by the Flight Controls Harmonization Working Group.

- FCHWG report – 25.671, Control Systems - General
- Proposed NPRM – 25.671, Control Systems - General
- Proposed AC 25.671 – Control Systems - General

Also attached is a document from Raytheon and Cessna providing clarification on a dissenting opinion.

Sincerely yours,

Craig R. Bolt

C. R. Bolt
Assistant Chair, TAEIG

Copy: Dionne Krebs – FAA-NWR
Mike Kaszycki – FAA-NWR
Effie Upshaw – FAA-Washington, D.C.
Larry Schultz - Boeing
Acknowledgement Letter
Mr. Craig R. Bolt  
Assistant Chair, Aviation Rulemaking  
Advisory Committee  
Pratt & Whitney  
400 Main Street  
East Hartford, CT 06108

Dear Mr. Bolt:

This letter acknowledges receipt of letters that you sent recently on behalf of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) on Transport Airplane and Engine (TAE) Areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Letter</th>
<th>Task No.</th>
<th>Description of Recommendation</th>
<th>Harmonization Working Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Review the current §§ 25.671 and 25.672 standards and corresponding JAR 25.671 and 25.672 standards pertaining to flight control systems, taking into account the requirements in §§ 25.1309 and 25.1329.</td>
<td>Flight Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Harmonize ... 25.851(b) (fire extinguishers) ...</td>
<td>Mechanical Systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I would like to thank the ARAC, particularly those members associated with the Flight Controls and Mechanical Systems Harmonization Working Groups for their cooperation in using the fast track process and completing the working group report in a timely manner. The report will be forwarded to the Transport Airplane Directorate for review. The Federal Aviation Administration’s progress will be reported at the TAE meetings.

Sincerely,

Anthony F. Fazio  
Director, Office of Rulemaking

ARM-209:EUphaw:fs:7/16/01:PCDOCS #15888  
cc ARM-1/20/200/209; APO-320, ANM-110  
File # ANM-98-428-A and ANM-00-085-A
Recommendation
Clarification of Dissenting Opinion

5. Proposed revision to landing exposure criteria. [Raytheon, Cessna]

Under current FAA/JAA regulation, 25.671(c)(3) allows an applicant to consider a jam as Extremely Improbable, as might be the case should the jam occur in the small time window immediately before landing. The proposed 25.671(c)(3) removes this allowance, but it specifically excludes from the jam evaluation "...the time immediately before landing where recovery may not be achievable when considering time delays in initiating recovery." This delay period, from failure to pilot response, is specified in the Draft AC25.671 Sect. 9.e(1)(iii) as 4 sec. + any system activation time for cases where transfer of control is necessary.

The Draft AC25.671 Sect. 9.e(1)(iii) delay times also apply to mechanical disconnect of pilot control devices covered under 25.671(c)(1). Typical state-of-the-art aircraft employ dual independent, single load path pilot control input devices in the cockpit. As is also the case in the event of a jam, should one pilot control device fail during the time immediately before landing, the airplane is exposed to uncontrolled ground contact during the specified pilot delay and recovery time. This is especially true during a sideslipped approach under crosswind conditions and/or in gusty conditions.

Determination of whether nacelle or wing tip strikes, or nosegear first touchdown at 10+ ft/sec descent rate is catastrophic would be an unnecessary burden placed on the applicant. This determination would also likely be a source of inconsistency between certification agencies and ACO's. This determination and the applicant's alternative of installing dual load path pilot controllers are unwarranted based on the lack of documented safety concerns with the current state-of-the-art design.

It is believed that the failure rate of a single mechanical disconnect in a primary flight control system is similar to that of a flight control jam. Consistency would require that both be excluded from showing CSFL in this small exposure time. Yet, the proposed 25.671(c)(1) does not allow a probability assessment to exclude this disconnect condition or a specific exclusion as in proposed 25.671(c)(3)(ii) for jams.

Applicants have historically not been required to evaluate this type of disconnect failure just before touchdown for FAA certification. Current JAA 25.671(c)(1) would allow an applicant to consider a mechanical disconnect in this small time exposure Extremely Improbable. Continuation of the past FAA certification practice is uncertain under the new proposed 25.671 due to the attention given to this phase of flight for jams in 25.671(c)(3)(ii).

Therefore, it is recommended that the exclusion for jam failures in "...the time immediately before landing where recovery may not be achievable when considering time delays in initiating recovery" allowed under proposed 25.671(c)(3)(ii) be extended to single mechanical disconnect failures considered under the proposed 25.671(c)(1) that occur in a similarly narrow time window. It is recognized that this would raise potential for inconsistency with 25.1309. However, expansion of the exceptions in the draft 25.1309 NPRM to exclude both jams covered by 25.671(c)(3) AND mechanical disconnects covered by 25.671(c)(1) should address this concern.
FAR/JAR 25.671 FCHWG - ARAC Report

(Includes Rule, Advisory Material, & Alternate Recommendations)

1. What is the underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR? [Explain the underlying safety rationale for the requirement. Why should the requirement exist? What prompted this rulemaking activity (e.g., new technology, service history, etc.)?]

This requirement ensures the basic integrity and availability of flight control systems, and further ensures that any failure experienced in service is manageable by the aircrew and will not prevent continued safe flight and landing. This rulemaking activity was prompted by efforts to harmonize the FARs and JARs, recommendations from the NTSB as a result of accident investigation, and the need to update the rule to address recent Special Conditions applied to fly-by-wire control systems.

2. What are the current FAR and JAR standards? [Reproduce the FAR and JAR rules text as indicated below.]

Current FAR Text:

FAR 25.671 General.

(a) Each control and control system must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate to its function.

(b) Each element of each flight control system must be designed, or distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in the malfunctioning of the system.

(c) The airplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems), within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot.

(1) Any single failure, excluding jamming (for example, disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic components, such as actuators, control spool housing, and valves).

(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single failure in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure).

(3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during takeoff, climb, cruise, normal turns, descent, and landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely improbable, or can be alleviated. A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable.
(d) The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail. Compliance with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.


Current JAR Text:

JAR 25.671 General

(a) Each control and control system must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate to its function (See ACJ 25.671 (a).)

(b) Each element of each flight control system must be designed or distinctively and permanently marked, to minimise the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in the malfunctioning of the system. (See ACJ 25.671 (b).)

(c) The aeroplane must be shown by analysis, test, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems) within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot.

(1) Any single failure not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming, (for example, disconnection or failure of mechanical elements, or structural failure of hydraulic components, such as actuators, control spool housing, and valves). (See ACJ 25.671(c)(1).)

(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, excluding jamming (for example, dual electrical or hydraulic system failures, or any single failure in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure).

(3) Any jam in a control position normally encountered during take-off, climb, cruise, normal turns, descent and landing unless the jam is shown to be extremely improbable, or can be alleviated. A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable.

(d) The aeroplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail. Compliance with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.

3. What are the differences in the standards? [Explain the differences in the standards or policy, and what these differences result in relative to (as applicable) design features/capability, safety margins, cost, stringency, etc.]
The JAR allows for the demonstration of single failures to be shown extremely improbable and also includes ACJ advisory material for paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)(1). Due to their similarity, there has been little effect on cost or safety to comply with one standard or the other.

4. What, if any, are the differences in required means of compliance? [Provide a brief explanation of any differences in the current compliance criteria or methodology (e.g., issue papers), including any differences in either criteria, methodology, or application that result in a difference in stringency between the standards.]

In practical terms, there has been little difference in the means of compliance between JAR and FAR. The FAA in specific instances has also allowed certain single failures to be shown to be extremely improbable.

Another area of difference is that in compliance demonstration, the FAA has allowed use of the Handling Qualities Rating Method of AC 25-7, which is not recognized by the JAA.

Also an issue has been the term "extremely improbable" as used in FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2). Both the FAR and JAR paragraphs identify examples of "any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable." One of these examples is any single failure in combination with any probable failure. The FAA has considered this example to be a requirement, while the JAA has considered it to be just an example which is not specifically required.

In regard to 25.671, the greatest issue is a need for basic rule clarification and advisory material to produce more consistent demonstration of compliance for jam failure conditions from one airplane program to the next. This is reflected in recent FAA Issue Papers (which were not harmonized) and policy letters regarding Jam Failure Conditions, such as Issue Paper F-2 (applied to 737NG).

5. What is the proposed action? [Describe the new proposed requirement, or the proposed change to the existing requirement, as applicable. Is the proposed action to introduce a new standard, or to take some other action? Explain what action is being proposed (not the regulatory text, but the underlying rationale) and why that direction was chosen for each proposed action.]

Harmonized revisions are proposed to the rule accompanied by advisory material to achieve greater consistency in demonstration of compliance for flight control jam failures. This includes definition of "normally encountered position" and "continued safe flight and landing". A summary of changes is listed below.

25.671(a) Includes material from recent fly by wire certifications requiring operation in any attitude.
FAR/JAR 25.671 FCHWG - ARAC Report
(Includes Rule, Advisory Material, & Alternate Recommendations)

25.671(b) Revised to discourage marking alone as a desired means of ensuring correct assembly.

25.671(c) Negligible change.

25.671(c)(1) Clarifies which jamming to be excluded from "any single failure". Removes "extremely improbable" as a means of compliance.

25.671(c)(2) Added 1/1000 specific risk to numerical analysis. Clarifies which jamming to be excluded.

25.671(c)(3) Provides (c)(3) jam definition. Removes "extremely improbable" as a means of compliance. Adds 1/1000 specific risk analysis on additional failure conditions. Adds recognition of the difficulty in covering the time period just before landing.

25.671(c)(4) Highlights requirement to address runaway. Requires addressing single failure regardless of probability.

25.671(d) Clarifies all engine-out flight to be considered at any point in the flight. Requires flare capability.

New-25.671(e) Adds requirement for recognition of control means at the limits of authority from recent fly by wire certifications.

New-25.671(f) Adds requirement for mode annunciation from recent fly by wire certifications.

AC/AMJ Material:
- Includes Current ACJs
- Provides Advisory Material for All Paragraphs of 25.671
- Defines "Normally Encountered Positions"
- Defines Criteria for "Continued Safe Flight & Landing"
- Provides Examples of Compliance for 1/1000 Specific Risk Criteria

6. What should the harmonized standard be? [Insert the proposed text of the harmonized standard here]

See the rule changes and advisory material in Enclosures 1 and 2.

7. How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue identified in #1? [Explain how the proposed standard ensures that the underlying safety issue is taken care of.]

This standard requires the use of "Fail Safe" compliance methods and analysis techniques common to 25.1309 to ensure safety following single failures and combination of failures not extremely improbable. This includes consideration of the effect of dormant failures and specific demonstration of acceptable operation following flight control failure conditions. A 1/1000 probability requirement is used to ensure a minimum residual level of safety following a single failure or jam and
replace the "single plus probable" material included in the parentheses of the current 25.671(c)(2). Definitions of "normally encountered position" and "continued safe flight and landing" are included in the advisory material. Use of advisory material is appropriate for these definitions since some variation can be expected due to the characteristics of individual flight control systems.

8. Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety? [Explain how each element of the proposed change to the standards affects the level of safety relative to the current FAR. It is possible that some portions of the proposal may reduce the level of safety even though the proposal as a whole may increase the level of safety.]

The proposed standard will increase the level of safety through expansion of the flight envelope in which jams are demonstrated and through specific criteria which defines "continued safe flight and landing". Safety is also increased by requiring a specific residual level of safety following a single failure. Comments on the effect of each change on safety are included below.

25.671(a) Includes material from recent fly by wire certifications requiring operation in any attitude. This change will increase the level of safety by providing coverage absent in the current FAR/JAR.

25.671(b) Revised to discourage marking alone as a desired means of ensuring correct assembly. This change will increase safety by promoting greater use of design features that ensure correct assembly.

25.671(c) Negligible change.

25.671(c)(1) Clarifies which jamming to be excluded from "any single failure". Removes "extremely improbable" as a means of compliance. This change will increase safety since all single failures must now be considered.

25.671(c)(2) Added 1/1000 specific risk to numerical analysis. Clarifies which jamming to be excluded. The FCHWG proposal removes the single plus probable failure combination from 25.671(c)(2) which is somewhat ambiguous and has been inconsistently applied, and replaces it with the 1/1000 specific risk criteria. The proposed criteria is both more conservative and less conservative than the current standard. In addition to a single failure, the current standard requires the inclusion of any probable failure, using a $10^{-5}$ failure rate as the determining factor. The new standard would require, in addition to any single failure, the inclusion of any failures which have combined probability of greater than 1/1000. The new standard thus prescribes a more moderate residual failure probability, but it applies to all possible failure conditions, including dormant failures. The new standard also has the advantage of being more clear than the existing requirement.
25.671(c)(3) Provides (c)(3) jam definition. Removes "extremely improbable" as a means of compliance. Adds 1/1000 specific risk analysis on additional failure conditions. These changes will result in an increase in safety by requiring consideration of all jams, ensuring a minimum level of safety after the jam condition, and by clarifying the type of jam to be covered under (c)(3). Adds recognition of limitations in compliance achievable in the landing phase. This reduces the coverage in the rule, but it is an exclusion that has been allowed as a matter of practicality under the existing rule.

25.671(c)(4) Highlights requirement to address runaway. Requires addressing single failure regardless of probability. This change will result in an increase in safety by highlighting the need to address all single failures that could cause a runaway.

25.671(d) Clarifies all engine-out flight to be considered at any point in the flight. Requires flare capability. This change will improve the level of safety by clarifying that the capability must provided throughout the flight regime and be sufficient for a flare to a landing.

New-25.671(e) Adds requirement for recognition of control means at the limit of authority from recent fly by wire certifications. This change will increase the level of safety by providing coverage absent in the current FAR/JAR.

New-25.671(f) Adds requirement for mode annunciation from recent fly by wire certifications. This change will increase the level of safety by providing coverage absent in the current FAR/JAR.
FAR/JAR 25.671 FCHWG - ARAC Report
(Includes Rule, Advisory Material, & Alternate Recommendations)

9. Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintains the same level of safety? [Since industry practice may be different than what is required by the FAR (e.g., general industry practice may be more restrictive), explain how each element of the proposed change to the standards affects the level of safety relative to current industry practice. Explain whether current industry practice is in compliance with the proposed standard.]

The proposed standard will increase the level of safety for the same reasons as described in #8.

10. What other options have been considered and why were they not selected? [Explain what other options were considered, and why they were not selected (e.g., cost/benefit, unacceptable decrease in the level of safety, lack of consensus, etc.) Include the pros and cons associated with each alternative.]

There was consideration to simply reference 25.1309 and its corresponding advisory material and use AC25-7A to address handling quality criteria with flight control failures. However, it was determined that material does not contain sufficient guidance to address jam failure conditions and accompanying demonstration. In addition, the intent of the material in the parentheses of 25.671(c)(2) is captured by the 1/1000 "specific risk" criteria that is not addressed in 25.1309. The Handling Quality Rating Method was not used because it is not harmonized with the JARs.

11. Who would be affected by the proposed change? [Identify the parties that would be materially affected by the rule change – airplane manufacturers, airplane operators, etc.]

It is intended that this new rule material be applied in new certification programs. Manufacturers of transport category airplanes would be affected by the change. Operators using newly certified airplanes may be affected through additional non-normal procedures and operator training may be required to address jam failure conditions. Additional operator maintenance requirements may be driven by the 1 in 1000 residual safety requirement.

Note that this material introduces some extensive additions to the rule interpretation and new criteria. The full impact of such a change on the manufacturers cannot be predicted without application to an actual flight control certification program.

12. To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g. ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) need to be included in the rule text or preamble? [Does any existing advisory material include substantive requirements that should be contained in the regulation? This may occur because the regulation itself is vague, or if the advisory material is interpreted as providing the only acceptable means of compliance.]

See enclosed rule and advisory material. A part of one JAR ACJ has been added to 25.671(a) because it was determined to be rule material.
13. Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted? [Indicate whether the existing advisory material (if any) is adequate. If the current advisory material is not adequate, indicate whether the existing material should be revised, or new material provided. Also, either insert the text of the proposed advisory material here, or summarize the information it will contain, and indicate what form it will be in (e.g., Advisory Circular, policy, Order, etc.)]

There is no existing FAA advisory material for 25.671. See the enclosure 2 for proposed advisory material. Advisory Circular 25-7 does contain a method for assessing flight control failures that affect handling qualities that is acceptable to the FAA but not accepted by the JAA. Advisory Circular 25.672 relates to flight controls and is being addressed by the Loads & Dynamics Harmonization Working Group. See also the separate recommendation for 25.672.

14. How does the proposed standard affect the current ICAO standard? [Indicate whether the proposed standard complies with or does not comply with the applicable ICAO standards (if any)]

The proposed standard does not conflict with the current ICAO standard shown below. Compliance with 25.1309 using "Common Cause Analysis" provides coverage for the criteria in the ICAO standard.

ICAO change to Annex 8, effective March 12, 2000:

"4.1.6(b) Aeroplane systems shall be designed, arranged and physically separated to maximize the potential for continued safe flight and landing after any event resulting in damage to the aeroplane structure or systems."

15. How does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s? [Indicate whether the proposed standard should be reviewed by other harmonization working groups and why.]

This proposed standard contains criteria and requires compliance for flight controls beyond that contained in 25.1309 and the Handling Qualities Rating Method in Appendix 7 of AC25-7A. In addition, since a primarily qualitative approach is used in the proposed 25.671 advisory material, there may be some inconsistencies with the numerical approach used in those two standards. It also must be compatible with the Structures standards developed for 25.302.

The FAA agrees that the 1/1000 criteria added to the rule text in 25.671(c)(2) is an acceptable replacement of the current "single plus probable" requirement, as described in #8 of this report. However, there is currently a review of alternative "specific risk" criteria under FAR/JAR 25.1309. The FAA believes that it is imperative that 25.1309 and 25.671 be fully compatible with regard to any specific risk criteria. Furthermore,
the LDHWG has been requested to evaluate these specific risk criteria in regards to the possible implications to flutter prevention.

Another FAA concern relative to compatibility between guidance material is the interchangeable use of the term "dormant" in 25.671 and "latent" in 25.1309. The FAA believes it is important to use a common term to avoid confusion.

16. What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard? [Please provide information that will assist in estimating the change in cost (either positive or negative) of the proposed rule. For example, if new tests or designs are required, what is known with respect to the testing or engineering costs? If new equipment is required, what can be reported relative to purchase, installation, and maintenance costs? In contrast, if the proposed rule relieves industry of testing or other costs, please provide any known estimate of costs.]

The new standard will increase the amount of evaluation for certification of flight controls, both in analysis and testing. Depending on the airplane architecture, system changes may be required in new certification programs for greater use of jam override devices or split control surfaces. Some duplicate analysis or testing may be avoided through FAR/JAR harmonization.

17. If advisory or interpretive material is to be submitted, document the advisory or interpretive guidelines. If disagreement exists, document the disagreement.

See the Enclosure 3.

18. Does the HWG wish to answer any supplementary questions specific to this project? [If the HWG can think of customized questions or concerns relevant to this project, please present the questions and the HWG answers and comments here.]

The working will be able to answer questions arising during the process of NPRM development. The HWG has no supplementary questions to provide.

19. Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at Phase 4 prior to publication in the Federal Register?

Yes.

20. In light of information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the "Fast Track" process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the "Fast Track" process? [A negative answer to this question will prompt the FAA to pull the project out of the Fast Track process and forward the issues to the FAA’s Rulemaking Management Council for consideration as a “significant” project.]

The HWG considers this project too complex for the "Fast Track" process.
CONTROL SYSTEMS

25.671 General

(a) Each control and control system must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate to its function. The flight control system shall be designed to continue to operate and must not hinder aircraft recovery from any attitude.

(b) Each element of each flight control system must be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect assembly that could result in failure of the system to perform its intended function. Distinctive and permanent marking may be used only where design means are impractical.

(c) The airplane must be shown by analysis, test, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight and landing after any of the following failures, including jamming, in the flight control system and surfaces (including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems) within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. Probable failures must have only minor effects and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot.

(1) Any single failure, excluding failures of the type defined in (c)(3).

(2) Any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Furthermore, in the presence of any single failure in the flight control system, any additional failure states that could prevent continued safe flight and landing shall have a combined probability of less than 1 in 1000. This paragraph excludes failures of the type defined in (c)(3).

(3) Any failure or event that results in a jam of a flight control surface or pilot control that is fixed in position due to a physical interference. The jam must be evaluated as follows:

(i) The jam must be considered at any normally encountered position.

(ii) The causal failure or failures must be assumed to occur anywhere within the normal flight envelope except during the time immediately before landing where recovery may not be achievable when considering time delays in initiating recovery.

(iii) In the presence of a jam considered under this sub-paragraph, any additional failure states that could prevent continued safe flight and landing shall have a combined probability of less than 1 in 1000.

(4) Any runaway of a flight control to an adverse position if such runaway could be due to a single failure, or due to a combination of failures that is not extremely improbable.

(d) The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable and an approach and flare to a landing possible if all engines fail at any point in the flight. Compliance with this requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.

(e) The system design must ensure that the flight crew is made suitably aware whenever the primary control means nears the limit of control authority.
(f) If the design of the flight control system has multiple modes of operation, a means must be provided to indicate to the crew any mode that significantly changes or degrades the normal handling or operational characteristics of the airplane.
Advisory Circular

Subject: Control Systems - General
Date: 19 March 2001
Initiated By: FCHWG
AC/AMJ No: 25.671
Change: Post TAEIG

Table of Contents:

1. PURPOSE. ............................................................................................................................ 2
2. CANCELLATION. ................................................................................................................... 2
3. RELATED DOCUMENTS. ...................................................................................................... 3
4. APPLICABILITY OF 14 CFR 25.671 AND ADVISORY MATERIAL. ............................. 4
5. DEFINITIONS. ...................................................................................................................... 4
6. BACKGROUND. .................................................................................................................. 78
7. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION -- 25.671(a) .......................... 9
8. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM ASSEMBLY -- 25.671(b) ......................... 940
9. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES -- 25.671(c) ......................... 10
10. EVALUATION OF ALL-ENGINES FAILED CONDITION -- 25.671(d) ............... 24
11. EVALUATION OF CONTROL AUTHORITY AWARENESS -- 25.671(e) ............. 26
12. EVALUATION OF FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM SUBMODES -- 25.671(f) .......... 26
13. ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION ....................... 27

APPENDIX 1. FAILURE RATE AND PROBABILITY CONSIDERATIONS.................... 29
APPENDIX 2. EXAMPLES OF 25.671(c)(2)’s 1 in 1000 REQUIREMENT ...................... 31
ENCLOSURE 2

1. PURPOSE.

a. This AC/AMJ provides an acceptable means, but not the only means, of showing compliance with the control system requirements of 14 CFR 25.671 (referred to as FAR/JAR 25.671 in this AC/AMJ) of the Federal Aviation Requirements (FAR)/Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR). These means are intended to provide guidance to supplement the engineering and operational judgment that must form the basis of any compliance demonstration.

b. The means described in this AC/AMJ are neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and do not constitute a regulation. These means are issued, in the interest of standardization, for guidance purposes and to outline a method that has been found acceptable in showing compliance with the standards set forth in the rule. Because this AC/AMJ is not mandatory, terms “shall” and “must” used in this AC/AMJ only apply to those applicants who choose to demonstrate compliance using this particular method.

c. Other, alternate means of compliance that an applicant may propose should be given due consideration, provided they meet the intent of the regulation. In the absence of a rational analysis substantiated by data supporting alternative criteria, the criteria listed in this AC/AMJ may be used to show compliance with FAR/JAR 25.671.

2. CANCELLATION.

The following material is cancelled by this AC/AMJ:

a. ACJ 25.671(a), Control Systems – General (Interpretive Material)

b. ACJ 25.671(b), Control Systems – General (Interpretive Material)

c. ACJ 25.671(c)(1), Control Systems – General (Interpretive Material)
ENCLOSURE 2

3. RELATED DOCUMENTS.

The following regulatory and advisory materials are related information:

a. Regulations.

(1) FAR/JAR 25.21(e), General - Proof of Compliance.

(2) FAR/JAR 25.143, Controllability and Maneuverability - General.

(3) FAR/JAR 25.302, Interaction of Systems and Structures.


(5) FAR/JAR 25.331, Symmetric Maneuvering Conditions.

(6) FAR/JAR 25.571, Damage-Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure.

(7) FAR/JAR 25.629, Aeroelastic Stability Requirements.

(8) FAR/JAR 25.671, Control Systems – General.

(9) FAR/JAR 25.672 (FCHWG Draft), Stability Augmentation and Automatic and Power-Operated Systems.

(10) FAR/JAR 25.683, Operation Tests.

(11) FAR/JAR 25.701, Flap and Slat Interconnection.


(13) FAR/JAR 25.1322, Warning, Caution, and Advisory Lights.

(14) FAR/JAR 25.1329, Automatic Pilot Systems.

(15) FAR/JAR 25.1435, Hydraulic Systems.


(17) FAR/JAR 25.1583, Operating Limitations.
ENCLOSURE 2

b. Advisory Circulars, Advisory Material Joint.


(2) AC/AMJ 25.1309 (SDAHWG Diamond Draft), System Design and Analysis.

c. Industry Documents.

(1) RTCA/DO-178B/EUROCAE ED12B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.

(2) SAE ARP 4754, Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems.

(3) SAE ARP 4761, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment.

4. APPLICABILITY OF 14 CFR 25.671 AND ADVISORY MATERIAL.

14 CFR 25.671 (referred to as FAR/JAR 25.671 in this AC/AMJ) applies to all flight control system installations (including primary, secondary, trim, lift, drag, feel, and stability augmentation systems) regardless of implementation technique (manual, powered, fly-by-wire, or other means).

5. DEFINITIONS.

The following definitions apply to the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.671 and the guidance material provided in this AC/AMJ. Unless otherwise stated, they should not be assumed to apply to the same or similar terms used in other regulations or ACs/AMJs. Terms for which standard dictionary definitions apply are not defined herein.

a. **At Risk Time.** The period of time during which an item must fail in order to cause the failure effect in question. This is usually associated with the final fault in a fault sequence leading to a specific failure condition. See also SAE ARP 4761.

b. **Catastrophic Condition.** As used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 (reference 3.b.2).

c. **Continued Safe Flight and Landing.** The capability for continued controlled flight and landing at an airport without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength.
ENCLOSURE 2

d. **Dormant Failure.** A dormant failure is defined as one that has already occurred, but has not become evident to the flight crew or maintenance personnel. (The advisory material to 25.1309 uses the term "latent" in this application.)

e. **Dormancy Period.** The duration between actions necessary to check for the existence of a failure – the action may be a pre-flight flight crew check, periodic maintenance check, or periodic maintenance inspection (including component overhaul). See also "Exposure Time."

f. **Error.** An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance personnel, or a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation. See also AC/AMJ 25.1309 and SAE ARP 4761.

g. **Event.** An occurrence that has its origins distinct from the airplane, such as atmospheric conditions (e.g., gusts, temperature variations, icing, and lightning strikes) and runway conditions, but is not intended to cover sabotage. See also AC/AMJ 25.1309 and SAE ARP 4761.

h. **Exposure Time.** The period of time between when an item was last known to be operating properly and when it will be known to be operating properly again. See also SAE ARP 4761.

i. **Extremely Improbable.** As used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 (reference 3.b.2).

j. **Extremely Remote.** As used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 (reference 3.b.2).

k. **Failure.** An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or element such that it can no longer function as intended (this includes both loss of function and operation outside specified limits). Note: Errors may cause Failures, but are not considered to be Failures. See also "failure" and "malfunction" in AC/AMJ 25.1309 and SAE ARP 4761.

The following are some of the types of failures to be considered in showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.671(c). Since the type of failure and the failure’s effect will depend on system architecture this list is not all-inclusive, but serves as a general guideline.

(1) **Jam.** A failure or event such that a control surface, pilot control, or component is fixed in one position.

   (i) If the control surface or pilot control is fixed in position due to a physical interference, it is addressed under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3). Causes may include corroded bearings, interference with a foreign or loose object, control system icing, seizure of an actuator, or a disconnect that results in a jam by

05/17/02 DRAFT 5
ENCLOSURE 2

creating an interference. Jams of this type must be assumed to occur and should be evaluated at positions up to and including the normally encountered positions defined in Section 9.b.

(ii) All other failures that result in a fixed control surface, pilot control, or component are addressed under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(1), 25.671(c)(2), and 25.671(c)(4), as appropriate. Depending on system architecture and the location of the failure, some jam failures may not always result in a fixed surface or pilot control; for example, a jammed valve could result in a surface runaway.

(2) Loss of Control of Surface. A failure such that a surface does not respond to commands. Failure sources include control cable disconnection, actuator disconnection, or loss of hydraulic power. In these conditions, the position of the surface(s) or controls can be determined by analyzing the system architecture and airplane aerodynamic characteristics; common positions include surface centered (0°) or zero hinge-moment position (surface float).

(3) Oscillatory Failure. A failure that results in undue surface oscillation. Failure sources include control loop destabilization, oscillatory sensor failure, oscillatory computer or actuator electronics failure. The duration of the oscillation, its frequency, and amplitude depend on the control loop, monitors, limiters, and other system features.

(4) Restricted Control. A failure that results in the achievable surface deflection being limited. Failure sources include foreign object interference or travel limiter malfunctioning. This failure is considered under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(1) and 25.671(c)(2), as the system/surface can still be operated.

(5) Runaway or Hardover. A failure that results in uncommanded control surface movement. Failure sources include servo valve jamming, computer or actuator electronics malfunctioning. The speed of the runaway, the duration of the runaway (permanent or transient) and the resulting surface position (full or partial deflection) depend on the available monitoring, limiters and other system features. This type of failure is specifically addressed in FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(4).

(6) Stiff or Binding Controls. A failure that results in a significant increase in control forces. Failure sources include failures of artificial feel systems, corroded bearings, jammed pulleys, and failures causing high friction. This failure is considered under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(1) and 25.671(c)(2), as the system/surface can still be operated. In some architectures, the higher friction may result in reduced centering of the controls.
I. Failure States. As used in 25.671(c), this term refers to the sum of all failures and failure combinations contributing to a hazard, apart from the single failure being considered, and including the effect of exposure time.

m. Flight Control System. Flight control system refers to the following: primary flight controls from the pilots’ controllers to the primary control surfaces, trim systems from the pilots’ trim input devices to the trim surfaces (incl. stabilizer trim), speedbrake/spoiler (drag devices) systems from the pilots’ control lever to the spoiler panels or other drag/lift-dumping devices, high lift systems from the pilots’ controls to the high lift surfaces, feel systems, and stability augmentation systems. Supporting systems (i.e., hydraulic systems, electrical power systems, avionics, etc.) should also be included if failures in these systems have an impact on the function of the flight control system.

n. Probable. As used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 (reference 3.b.2).

o. Probability vs. Failure Rate. Failure rate is typically expressed in terms of average probability of occurrence per flight hour. In cases where the failure condition is associated with a certain flight condition that occurs only once per flight, the failure rate is typically expressed as average probability of occurrence per flight (or per takeoff, or per landing). Failure rates are usually the "root" numbers used in a fault tree analysis prior to factoring in dormancy periods, exposure time, or at risk time. Probability is non-dimensional and expresses the likelihood of encountering or being in a failed state. Probability is obtained by multiplying a failure rate by the appropriate exposure time.


q. Single Failure Considerations. As used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 (reference 3.b.2).

6. BACKGROUND.

Two sets of requirements exist for flight control systems: FAR/JAR 25.671 and FAR/JAR 25.1309. Both are aimed at ensuring an adequate level of safety. FAR/JAR 25.1309 has the advantage of being associated with structured assessment methods and guidelines. While useful as a general guide for analysis and a complement to the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.671, FAR/JAR 25.1309 does not specifically address (1) minimum residual airplane capabilities following single failures, nor (2) the concept of control jams in normally encountered positions. FAR/JAR 25.671 specifically addresses these two areas.

This advisory material was developed to harmonize FAA and JAA requirements and provide guidance in showing compliance to FAR/JAR 25.671. This material addresses the existing JAA ACJ guidance as well as the following regulatory areas:
ENCLOSURE 2

a. FAR/JAR 25.671(c) prescribes the failure conditions that must be considered in a control system design. While the failure conditions in FAR/JAR 25.671(c) are similar to those to be considered under FAR/JAR 25.1309, there are differences between the rules that lead to confusion and inconsistent application of FAR/JAR 25.671(c). In addition, JAR 25.671(c)(1) allows the exclusion of single failures that can be shown to be extremely improbable; FAR 25.671(c)(1) requires all single failures, regardless of failure probability, to be considered. FAR 25.671(c)(1) and JAR 25.671(c)(1) need to be harmonized. A uniform means of compliance to FAR/JAR 25.671(c) needs to be developed. It is expected that considerable elaboration would be made as to how the various mechanical, hydraulic, and electrical failures should be handled. Consideration should be given to dormant failures and the relationship of the flight control failures with the occurrence of engine failures.

b. Using the rate of control jams experienced in the transport fleet to date, and in service experience as an indicator of types control system malfunctions that may be safety concerns, the following aspects of 25.671 were also addressed:

(1) Defined the meaning of the terms "normal flight envelope", "without exceptional piloting skill or strength", "minor effects", and "position normally encountered" as used in § 25.671(c).

(2) Determined to what extent basic skills and reasonable pilot response and action may be used to alleviate the resulting airplane control problems. Determined the applicability of crosswind to the landing situation with a jammed flight control.

(3) Identified acceptable methodology by which judge the controllability/maneuverability of an airplane with a jammed control system (e.g. Handling Qualities Rating System -- HQRM).


(5) Considered comments in AIA-GAMA letter dated January 23, 1997 and the input received at the December 3, 1996, public meeting conducted by the FAA.

(6) Addressed structural loading conditions following the jammed failure condition required for continued safe flight and landing.

c. Provided advisory material that addresses all engine failure condition defined in FAR/JAR 25.671(d).

d. The confusion of two different interpretations and inconsistent application of prior FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) was clarified with new wording and advisory material.

One interpretation of prior FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) focused on "combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable" and considered this requirement essentially
ENCLOSURE 2

equivalent with the analysis required by AC/AMJ 25.1309. The examples in the parenthetical expression of prior FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) were viewed as examples only and not the main intent of the rule. Therefore, all combinations of failures that were not extremely improbable \((1 \times 10^{-9}/FH)\) were considered.

A different interpretation of prior FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) focused on the parenthetical expression and considered the failure combinations listed as the kinds of failures not considered to be extremely improbable, regardless numerical probability. Further, the phrase "any single failure in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical failure" had been expanded to a more generic form of "any single failure in combination with any probable failure." Therefore, "single+probable" failures were not considered extremely improbable (regardless of probability) and therefore were to be considered for compliance.

7. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION – 25.671(a).

a. Control systems for essential services should be so designed that when a movement to one position has been selected, a different position can be selected without waiting for the completion of the initially selected movement, and the system should arrive at the finally selected position without further attention. The movements that follow and the time taken by the system to allow the required sequence of selection should not be such as to adversely affect the airworthiness of the airplane.

b. Compliance should be shown by evaluation of the closed loop flight control system. This evaluation is intended to ensure that there are no features or unique characteristics (including numerical singularities) which would restrict the pilot's ability to recover from any attitude. It is not the intent of this rule or guidance material to limit the use of envelope protection features or other systems that augment the control characteristics of the aircraft.

8. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM ASSEMBLY – 25.671(b).

This rule is intended to ensure the parts applicable to the type design are correctly assembled and is not intended to address parts control (ref. 25.1301(b), 45.14, & 45.15).

a. For control systems, the design intent should be such that it is impossible to assemble elements of the system so as to prevent its intended function. Examples of the consequences of incorrect assembly include the following:

(1) an out-of-phase action, or

(2) reversal in the sense of the control, or
ENCLOSURE 2

(3) interconnection of the controls between two systems where this is not intended, or
(4) loss of function.

b. Adequate precaution should be taken in the design process and adequate procedures
should be specified in the maintenance manual to prevent the incorrect installation,
connection, or adjustment of parts of the flight control system.

9. EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES – 25.671(c).

The guidance provided in this advisory material for 25.671(c) is not intended to address
requirement errors, design errors, software errors, or implementation errors. These are typically
managed through development processes or system architecture, and are adequately addressed by
SAE ARP 4754, DO-178B, and AC/AMJ 25.1309.

FAR/JAR 25.671(c) requires that the airplane be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable
of continued safe flight and landing following failures in the flight control system and surfaces
(including trim, lift, drag, and feel systems) within the normal flight envelope, without requiring
exceptional piloting skill or strength.

Subparagraph (c)(1) requires the evaluation of any single failure, excluding the types of jams
addressed in subparagraph (c)(3). Subparagraph (c)(1) requires that any single failure be
considered, suggesting that an alternative means of controlling the airplane or an alternative load
path be provided in the case of a single failure. All single failures must be considered, even if
they can be shown to be extremely improbable. The single failure considerations of AC/AMJ
25.1309 apply.

Subparagraph (c)(2) requires the evaluation of any combination of failures, excluding the types of
jams addressed in subparagraph (c)(3), not shown to be extremely improbable. For this
application, extremely improbable is defined based on the criteria established in AC/AMJ
25.1309. In addition, subparagraph (c)(2) states that after any single failure in the flight control
system, additional failure states that could prevent continued safe flight and landing shall have a
combined probability of less than 1 in 1000. A probability of less than 1 in 1000 is not a failure
rate but a time based probabilistic parameter intended to provide a required minimum residual
airplane capability following a single flight control system failure.

Subparagraph (c)(3) requires the evaluation of any failure or event that results in a jam of a flight
control surface or pilot control. This subparagraph is intended to address failure modes that
would result in the surface or pilot's control being fixed at the position commanded at the time of
the failure due to some physical interference. The position at the time of the jam should be at any
normally encountered control position encountered during takeoff, climb, cruise, normal turns,
descent, and landing. In some architectures, component jams within the system may result in
failure modes other than a fixed surface or pilot control; those types of jams are considered under subparagraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(4).

In the past, determining a consistent and reasonable definition of normally encountered control positions has been difficult. A review of in-service fleet experience, to date, showed that the overall failure rate for a control surface jam is approximately $10^{-6}$ to $10^{-7}$ per flight hour. Considering this in-service data, a reasonable definition of normally encountered positions represents the range of control surface deflections (from neutral to the largest deflection) expected to occur in 1000 random operational flights, without considering other failures, for each of the flight segments identified in the rule.

One method of establishing acceptable control surface deflections is the performance-based criteria outlined in this AC which were established to eliminate any differences between aircraft types. The performance-based criteria prescribe environmental and operational maneuver conditions, and the resulting deflections may be considered normally encountered positions for compliance with FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3).

Alleviation means may be used to show compliance with subparagraph (c)(3). For this purpose, alleviation means include system reconfigurations, jam prevention design features, or any other features that eliminate or reduce the consequences of a jam or permit continued safe flight and landing.

Subparagraph (c)(3) also states that in the presence of a jam that results in a fixed position of a flight control surface or pilot control, additional failure conditions that could prevent continued safe flight and landing shall have a combined probability of less than 1 in 1000 of existing. As with subparagraph (c)(2), a probability of less than 1 in 1000 is not a failure rate but a time based probabilistic parameter intend to provide a required minimum residual airplane capability following this type of jam.

Subparagraph (c)(4) requires that any runaway of a flight control to an adverse position be accounted for if such a runaway is due to a single failure or due to a combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Means to alleviate the runaway may be used to show compliance by reconfiguring the control system, deactivating the system (or a failed portion thereof), overriding the runaway by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense, eliminating the consequences of a runaway in order to ensure continued safe flight and landing following a runaway, or using a means of preventing a runaway. Without a suitable means to alleviate or prevent the runaway, an adverse position would represent any position for which they are approved to operate.

All approved aircraft gross weights and cg locations should be considered. However, only critical combinations of gross weight and cg need to be demonstrated.
ENCLOSURE 2

a. Compliance with FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2). In showing compliance with the multiple failure requirements of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), two different types of analysis/assessment are necessary.

(1) The first analysis/assessment requires that the airplane be capable of continued safe flight and landing following any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. To satisfy this initial requirement, a safety analysis according to the techniques of AC/AMJ 25.1309 should be used.

(2) To comply with the second part of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), the applicant is required to show that in the presence of any single failure in the flight control system (regardless of probability), any additional failure state (subsequent or pre-existing) that could prevent continued safe flight and landing when combined with the single failure must have a probability of less than 1 in 1000 of existing. This additional requirement ensures that a minimum level of safety exists should the single failure occur. As such, it establishes a minimum required reliability for systems that provide a backup function to a primary system even though the primary system may have a very low failure probability (e.g., a $10^{-7}$ backup system to a $10^{-8}$ primary system would not be allowed).

Jams of the type addressed in (c)(3) are excluded from consideration under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2).

Given the current state of technology, some failure combinations such as dual electrical system or dual hydraulic system losses are not generally accepted as being extremely improbable.

The following is a general outline of the steps to perform the additional analysis for FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), following the safety analysis per AC/AMJ 25.1309:

(i) Systematically work through the flight control system and impose a single failure on each single component or element of the flight control system. The single failure is assumed to have happened, regardless of its calculated failure rate or probability.

(ii) With each single failure, identify any additional failure state(s) that would preclude continued safe flight and landing.

(iii) Accounting for dormancy period (check/inspection interval), exposure time, or at risk time, calculate the risk probability of encountering the additional failure state(s) that would preclude continued safe flight and landing. The risk probability of encountering any of these additional failure states(s) on the same flight as the single failure shall be less than 1 in 1000.

(iv) Repeat the above steps for each single failure in the flight control system.
ENCLOSURE 2

Or viewed in another way, in showing compliance with the additional analysis of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), for every numerical analysis that demonstrates a flight control failure condition that prevents continued safe flight and landing is extremely improbable, it shall be possible to substitute a probability of 1.0 at any individual gate or condition that represents a single failure, and the fault tree result due to the remainder of the analysis shall not be greater than 1 in 1000.

Appendix 2 gives simplified examples explaining how the 1 in 1000 analysis might be applied.
ENCLOSURE 2

b. Determination of Control System Jam Positions – FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3). The flight phases required by FAR/JAR 25.671 can be encompassed by three flight phases: takeoff, in-flight (climb, cruise, normal turns, descent, and approach), and landing. Takeoff is considered to be the time period between brake release and 35 ft. In-flight is considered to be from 35 ft following a takeoff to 50 ft prior to landing including climb, cruise, normal turns, descent, and approach.

25.671(c)(3) requires that the airplane be capable of landing with a flight control jam and that the airplane be evaluated for jams in the landing configuration. However, for the evaluation of jams which occur just prior to landing, proximity to the ground need not be considered for the transient condition. Given that some amount of time and altitude is necessary in order to recover from any significant flight control jam, there is no practical means by which such a recovery could be demonstrated all the way to touchdown. The potential delay in accomplishing a recovery could be on the order of 5 seconds as described in section 9.e. For a jam at a control deflection corresponding to .8 g, a recovery may not be possible below approximately 200' even with a state of the art control system. While it is recognized that this means that a specific hazard is not addressed (a control jam that occurs, or is recognized, just before landing), this hazard is mitigated for the following reasons. First, the landing phase represents a limited exposure window in which a jam could occur. Second, successful operation of the controls throughout the flight minimizes the likelihood of a jam suddenly appearing during the landing phase. Also, some sources of jamming such as icing are not prevalent in the landing phase. Third, a certain level of recovery capability will be ensured through compliance with this AC such that if a jam does occur during landing, the crew will have a reasonable chance of landing safely.

Only the airplane rigid body modes need to be considered when evaluating the aircraft response to maneuvers and continued safe flight to landing.

It is assumed that if the jam is detected prior to $V_1$, the takeoff will be rejected.

Although 1 in 1000 operational takeoffs is expected to include crosswinds up to 25 knots, the short exposure time associated with a control surface jam occurring between $V_1$ and $V_{LOF}$ allows usage of a less conservative crosswind magnitude when determining normally encountered lateral and directional control positions. Given that lateral and directional controls are continuously used to maintain runway centerline in a crosswind takeoff, and control inputs greater than that necessary at $V_1$ will occur at speeds below $V_1$, any jam in these control axes during a crosswind takeoff will normally be detected prior to $V_1$. Considering the control jam failure rate of approximately $10^{-6}$ to $10^{-7}$ per flight hour combined with the short exposure time between $V_1$ and $V_{LOF}$, a reasonable crosswind level for determination of jammed lateral or directional control positions during takeoff is 15 knots.
ENCLOSURE 2

The jam positions to be considered in showing compliance include any position up to the maximum position determined by the following maneuvers. The maneuvers and conditions described in this section are only to provide the control surface deflection to evaluate continued safe flight and landing capability, and are not to represent flight test maneuvers for such an evaluation; see section 9.e."

(1) Jammed Lateral Control Positions.

(i) Takeoff: The lateral control position for wings-level at V1 in a steady crosswind of the lesser of 2515 knots (at a height of 10 meters above the takeoff surface) or the maximum demonstrated crosswind. Variations in wind speed from a 10 meter height can be obtained using the following relationship:

\[
V_{alt} = V_{10\text{meters}} \times \left( \frac{H_{\text{desired}}}{10.0} \right)^{1/7}
\]

Where:

- \( V_{10\text{meters}} = \) Wind Speed at 10 meters AGL (knots)
- \( V_{alt} = \) Wind Speed at desired altitude (knots)
- \( H_{\text{desired}} = \) Desired altitude for which Wind Speed is Sought

(Meters AGL), but not lower than 1.5m (5 ft)

(ii) In-flight: The lateral control position to sustain a 12 deg/sec steady roll rate from 1.23\( V_{SR1}(1.3V_{S}) \) to VMO/MMO or \( V_{fe} \), as appropriate, but not greater than 50% of the control input.

Note: If the flight control system augments the pilot’s input, then the maximum surface deflection to achieve the above maneuvers should be considered.
(2) Jammed Longitudinal Control Positions.

(i) Takeoff: Three longitudinal control positions should be considered:

(1) Any control position from that which the controls naturally assume without pilot input at the start of the takeoff roll to that which occurs at V1 using the manufacturer's recommended procedures.

Note: It may not be necessary to consider this case if it can be demonstrated that the pilot is aware of the jam before reaching V1 (for example, through a manufacturer's recommended AFM procedure).

(2) The longitudinal control position at V1 based on the manufacturers recommended procedures including consideration for any runway condition for which the aircraft is approved to operate.

(3) Using the manufacturers recommended procedures, the peak longitudinal control position to achieve a steady aircraft pitch rate of the lesser of 5 deg/sec or the pitch rate necessary to achieve the speed used for all-engines-operating initial climb procedures (V2+XX) at 35 ft.

(ii) In-flight: The maximum longitudinal control position is the greater of:

(1) The longitudinal control position required to achieve steady state normal accelerations from 0.8g to 1.3g at speeds from 1.23Vs to VMO/MMO or VR, as appropriate.

(2) The peak longitudinal control position commanded by the stability augmentation or other automatic system in response to atmospheric discrete vertical gust defined by 15 fps from sea level to 20,000 ft.
ENCLOSURE 2

(3) **Jammed Directional Control Positions.**

(i) **Takeoff:** The directional control position for takeoff at $V_1$ in a steady crosswind of to the lesser of 2515 knots (at a height of 10 meters above the takeoff surface) or the maximum demonstrated crosswind. Variations in wind speed from a height of 10 meters can be obtained using the following relationship:

$$V_{\text{alt}} = V_{10\text{meters}} \times (H_{\text{desired}}/10.0)^{1/7}$$

Where:
- $V_{10\text{meters}} = $ Wind Speed at 10 meters AGL (knots)
- $V_{\text{alt}} = $ Wind Speed at desired altitude (knots)
- $H_{\text{desired}} = $ Desired altitude for which Wind Speed is Sought (Meters AGL), but not lower than 1.5m (5 ft)

(ii) **In-flight:** The directional control position is the greater of:

1. The peak directional control position commanded by the stability augmentation or other automatic system in response to atmospheric discrete lateral gust defined by 15 fps from sea level to 20,000 ft.

2. Maximum rudder angle required for lateral/directional trim from $1.23V_{SR1}(1.3V_{S})$ to the maximum all engines operating airspeed in level flight with climb power, but not to exceed $V_{MO}/M_{MO}$ or $V_{fe}$ as appropriate. While more commonly a characteristic of propeller aircraft, this addresses any lateral/directional asymmetry that can occur in flight with symmetric power.

(4) **Control Tabs, Trim Tabs, and Trimming Stabilizers.** Any tabs installed on control surfaces are assumed jammed in the position associated with the normal deflection of the control surface on which they are installed.

Trim tabs and trimming stabilizers are assumed jammed in the positions associated with the manufacturer's recommended procedures for takeoff and that are normally used throughout the flight to trim the aircraft from $1.23V_{SR1}(1.3V_{S})$ to $V_{MO}/M_{MO}$ or $V_{fe}$ as appropriate.

(5) **Speed Brakes.** Speed brakes are assumed jammed in any position for which they are approved to operate during flight at any speed from $1.23V_{SR1}(1.3V_{S})$ to $V_{MO}/M_{MO}$ or $V_{fe}$ as appropriate. Asymmetric extension and retraction of the speed brakes should be considered. Roll spoiler jamming (asymmetric spoiler panel) is addressed in Section 9.b.1.
(6) **High Lift Devices.** Leading edge and trailing edge high lift devices are assumed to jam in any position for takeoff, climb, cruise, approach, and landing. Skew of high lift devices or asymmetric extension and retraction should be considered; FAR/JAR 25.701 contains a requirement for flap mechanical interconnection unless the aircraft has safe flight characteristics with the asymmetric flap positions not shown to be extremely improbable.

(7) **Load Alleviation Systems.**

(i) **Gust Load Alleviation Systems.** At any airspeed between \(1.23V_{SR}(1.3V_S)\) to \(V_{MO}/M_{MO}\) or \(V_{fe}\), as appropriate, the control surfaces are assumed to jam in the maximum position commanded by the gust load alleviation system in response to a discrete atmospheric gust with the following reference velocities:

1. 15 fps (EAS) from sea level to 20,000 ft (vertical gust),
2. 15 fps (EAS) from sea level to 20,000 ft (lateral gust).

(ii) **Maneuver Load Alleviation Systems.** At any airspeed between \(1.23V_{SR}(1.3V_{S_{min}})/V_{ref}\) to \(V_{MO}/M_{MO}/V_{fe}\), the control surfaces are assumed to jam in the maximum position commanded by the maneuver load alleviation system during a pull-up maneuver to 1.3g or a pushover maneuver to 0.8g.

c. **Jam Combination Failures – FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3).** In addition to demonstration of jams at "normally encountered position," compliance with FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3) should include an analysis that shows a minimum level of safety exists should the jam occur. This additional analysis should show that in the presence of a jam considered under 25.671(c)(3), any additional failure state that could prevent continued safe flight and landing when combined with the jam must have a probability of less than 1 in 1000 of existing. (This analysis uses the same methods for demonstration of compliance with 25.671(c)(2), where the jam is the single failure.) As a minimum, this should include analysis of such elements as a jam breakout or override, disconnect means, alternate surface control, alternate electrical or hydraulic sources, or alternate cable paths. This analysis should help determine intervals for scheduled maintenance activity or operational checks that ensure the availability of alleviation or compensation means.

d. **Runaway to an Adverse Position – FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(4).** Consideration of a control runaway will be specific to each application and a general interpretation of an adverse position cannot be given. Where applicable, the applicant is required to assess the resulting surface position after a runaway, if the failure condition is not extremely improbable or can occur due to a single failure. This applies to all controls discussed in Section 9.b.
ENCLOSURE 2

e. **Assessment of Continued Safe Flight and Landing – FAR/JAR 25.671(c)**. Following a flight control system failure of the types discussed in Sections 9.a, 9.b, 9.c, and 9.d, the maneuverability and structural strength criteria defined in the following sections should be considered to determine the airplane's capability for continued safe flight and landing.

1. **Flight Characteristics**.
   
   i. **General**. Following control system failure, appropriate procedures may be used including system reconfiguration, flight limitations, and crew resource management. The procedures for safe flight and landing should not require exceptional piloting skill or strength.

   Additional means of control, such as trim system, may be used if it can be shown that the systems are available and effective. Credit should not be given for use of differential engine thrust to maneuver the aircraft. However, differential thrust may be used following the recovery to maintain lateral/directional trim following the flight control system failure.

   For the longitudinal control surface jam during takeoff prior to rotation, it is necessary to show that the aircraft can be safely rotated for liftoff without consideration of field length available.

   ii. **Transient Response**. There should be no unsafe conditions during the transient condition following a flight control system failure. The evaluation of failures, or maneuvers leading to jamming, is intended to be initiated at 1g wings-level flight. For this purpose, continued safe flight and landing is generally defined as not exceeding any one of the following:

   1. A load on any part of the primary structure sufficient to cause a catastrophic structural failure
   2. Catastrophic loss of flight path control
   3. Exceedance of \( V_{df}/M_{df} \)
   4. Catastrophic Flutter or vibration
   5. Bank angle in excess of 90 degrees

   In connection with the transient response, compliance should be shown to the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.302. While \( V_F \) is normally an appropriate airspeed limit to be considered regarding continued safe flight and landing, temporary exceedence of \( V_F \) may be acceptable as long as the requirements of FAR/JAR 25.302 are met.
Paragraph 9.b. provides a means of determining control surface deflections for the evaluation of flight control jams. In some cases, aircraft roll or pitch rate or normal acceleration is used as a basis to determine these deflections. The roll or pitch rate and/or normal acceleration used to determine the control surface deflection need not be included in the evaluation of the transient condition. For example, the in-flight lateral control position determined in paragraph 9.b.(1)(ii) is based on a steady roll rate of 12 degrees per second. When evaluating this condition, whether by analysis, simulation or in-flight demonstration, the resulting control surface deflection is simply input while the airplane is in wings-level flight, at the appropriate speed, altitude, etc. During this evaluation, the airplane’s actual roll or pitch rate may or may not be the same as the roll or pitch rate used to determine the jammed control surface position.
ENCLOSURE 2

(iii) **Delay Times.** Due consideration should be given to the delays involved in pilot recognition, reaction, and operation of any disconnect systems, if applicable.

\[
\text{Delay} = \text{Recognition} + \text{Reaction} + \text{Operation of Disconnect}
\]

Recognition is defined as the time from the failure condition to the point at which a pilot in service operation may be expected to recognize the need to take action. Recognition of the malfunction may be through the behavior of the airplane or a reliable failure warning system, and the recognition point should be identified but should not normally be less than 1 second. For flight control system failures, except the type of jams addressed in (c)(3), control column or wheel movements alone should not be used for recognition.

The following reaction times should be used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flight Condition</th>
<th>Reaction Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Ground</td>
<td>1 sec (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Air, (&lt;1000 ft AGL)</td>
<td>1 sec (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Flight (&gt;1000 ft AGL)</td>
<td>1 sec (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Flight (&gt;1000 ft AGL)</td>
<td>3 sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( **) 3 sec if control must be transferred between pilots.

The time required to operate any disconnect system should be measured either through ground tests or during flight testing. This value should be used during all analysis efforts. However, flight testing or manned simulation that requires the pilot to operate the disconnect includes this extra time; therefore, no additional delay time would be needed for these demonstrations.

(iv) **Maneuver Capability for Continued Safe Flight and Landing.** If, using the manufacturer’s recommended procedures, the following maneuvers can be performed following the failure, it will generally be considered that continued safe flight and landing has been shown.

1. "A steady 30° banked turn to the left or right,
2. A roll from a steady 30° banked turn through an angle of 60° so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 11 seconds (in this maneuver the rudder may be used to the extent necessary to minimize sideslip, and the maneuver may be unchecked),
ENCLOSURE 2

(3) A pushover maneuver to 0.8g, and a pull-up maneuver to 1.3g,

(4) A wings level landing flare in a 90° crosswind of up to 10 knots (measured at 10 meters above the ground).

Note: For the case of a lateral or directional control system jam during takeoff that is described in Section 9(b)(1) or 9(b)(3), it should be shown that the aircraft can safely land on a suitable runway with any crosswind from 0 kt to the crosswind level and direction at which the jam was established.

Note: For the case of control surface jams during takeoff that are detected by the flight crew, it may be assumed that the aircraft is returned to a suitable runway, including consideration of crosswind. As a result, it can be assumed that the aircraft is returned to a runway with a favorable crosswind no more than 15 knots less than the crosswind at the time of the jam.

(v) Control Forces. The short and long term control forces should not be greater than 1.5 times the short and long term control forces allowed by FAR/JAR 25.143(c).

Short term forces have typically been interpreted to mean the time required to accomplish a configuration or trim change. However, taking into account the capability of the crew to share the workload, the short term forces of 25.143(c) may be appropriate for a longer duration, such as the evaluation of a jam on takeoff and return to landing.

During the recovery following the failure, transient control forces may exceed these criteria to a limited extent. Acceptability of any exceedances will be evaluated on a case by case basis.
ENCLOSURE 2

(2) Structural Strength for Flight Control System Failures.

(i) Failure Conditions per FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(4). It should be shown that the aircraft maintains structural integrity for continued safe flight and landing. This should be accomplished by showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.302 (Interaction with Systems and Structures). In FAR/JAR 25.302, a failure is declared extremely improbable based solely on a quantitative probability. However, some failures may exhibit failure rates that are less than \(10^{-9}\) per flight hour and not be classified as extremely improbable (some single failures may fall into this category). The level of structural strength assessment should be according to the probability of the failure as defined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Failure Probability (Quantitative Assessment)</th>
<th>Failure Probability (Qualitative Assessment)</th>
<th>Structural Substantiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(&gt;10^{-9}) per flight hour</td>
<td>Not Extremely Improbable</td>
<td>As per FAR/JAR 25.302, Appendix K25.1(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&lt;10^{-9}) per flight hour</td>
<td>Not Extremely Improbable</td>
<td>As per Section 9.e.2.iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(&lt;10^{-9}) per flight hour</td>
<td>Extremely Improbable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Jam Conditions per FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(3). It should be shown that the aircraft maintains structural integrity for continued safe flight and landing. Recognizing that jams are infrequent occurrences and that margins have been taken in the definition of normally encountered positions of this Advisory Circular, criteria other than those specified in FAR/JAR 25.302 Appendix K25.1(c) may be used for structural substantiation to show continued safe flight and landing.

This structural substantiation should be per Section 9.e.2.iii

(iii) Structural Substantiation. The loads considered as ultimate should be derived from the following conditions at speeds up to the maximum speed allowed for the jammed position or for the failure condition:

1. Balanced maneuver of the airplane between 0.25g and 1.75g with high lift devices fully retracted and in enroute configurations, and between 0.6g and 1.4g with high lift devices extended,

2. Vertical and lateral discrete gusts corresponding to 40% of the limit gust velocity specified at \(V_c\) in FAR/JAR 25.341(a) with high lift devices fully retracted, and a 17 fps vertical and 17 fps head-on gust with high lift devices extended.
10. EVALUATION OF ALL-ENGINES FAILED CONDITION – 25.671(d).

a. Explanation. FAR/JAR 25.671(d) states that, “The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable and an approach and flare to a landing possible if all engines fail at any point in the flight. Compliance with the requirement may be shown by analysis where that method has been shown to be reliable.”

The intent of FAR/JAR 25.671(d) is to assure that in the event of failure of all engines and given the availability of an adequate runway, the airplane will be controllable and an approach and flare to a landing possible. In this context, “flare to a landing” refers to the time until touchdown. Although the rule refers to “flare to a landing” with the implication of being on a runway, it is recognized that with all engines inoperative it may not be possible to reach an adequate runway or landing surface; in this case the aircraft must still be able to make a flare to landing attitude.

FAR/JAR 25.671(d) effectively requires airplanes with fully powered or electronic flight control systems to have a source for emergency power, such as an air driven generator, wind-milling engines, batteries, or other power source capable of providing adequate power to the flight control system.

Analysis, simulation, or any combination thereof may be used to show compliance where the methods are shown to be reliable.

b. Procedures.

(1) The airplane should be evaluated to determine that it is possible, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength, to maintain control following the failure of all engines, including the time it takes for activating any backup systems. The airplane should also remain controllable during restart of the most critical engine, whilst following the AFM recommended engine restart procedures.

(2) The most critical flight phases, especially for airplanes with emergency power systems dependent on airspeed, are likely to be takeoff and landing. Credit may be taken for hydraulic pressure/electrical power produced while the engines are spinning down and any residual hydraulic pressure remaining in the system. Sufficient power must be available to complete a wings level approach and flare to a landing.

Analyses or tests may be used to demonstrate the capability of the control systems to maintain adequate hydraulic pressure/electrical power during the time between the failure of the engines and the activation of any backup systems. If any of the
backup systems rely on aerodynamic means to generate power, then a flight test demonstration should be performed to demonstrate that the backup system could supply adequate electrical and hydraulic power to the flight control systems. The flight test should be conducted at the minimum practical airspeed required to perform an approach and flare to a safe landing attitude.

(3) The maneuver capability following the failure of all engines should be sufficient to complete an approach and flare to a landing. Note that the aircraft weight could be extremely low (e.g., the engine failures could be due to fuel exhaustion). The maximum speeds for approach and landing may be limited by other Part 25 requirements (e.g., ditching, tire speeds, flap or landing gear speeds, etc.) or by an evaluation of the average pilot’s ability to conduct a safe landing. At an operational weight determined for this case and for any other critical weights and c.g.’s identified by the applicant, at speeds down to the approach speeds appropriate to the aircraft configuration, the aircraft should be capable of:

(i) A steady 30° banked turn to the left or right,

(ii) A roll from a steady 30° banked turn through an angle of 60° so as to reverse the direction of the turn in not more than 11 seconds (in this maneuver the rudder may be used to the extent necessary to minimize sideslip, and the maneuver may be unchecked),

(iii) A pushover maneuver to 0.8g, and a pull-up maneuver to 1.3g,

(iv) A wings level landing flare in a 90° crosswind of up to 10 knots (measured at 10 meters above the ground).

Note: If the loss of all engines has no effect on the control authority of the aircraft (e.g., manual controls) then the results of the basic handling qualities flight tests with all engines operating may be used to demonstrate the satisfactory handling qualities of the airplane with all engines failed.

(4) It should be possible to perform a flare to a safe landing attitude, in the most critical configuration, from a stabilized approach using the recommended approach speeds and the appropriate AFM procedures, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength. For transient maneuvers, forces are allowed up to 1.5 times those specified in FAR/JAR 25.143(c) for temporary application with two hands available for control.
ENCLOSURE 2

11. EVALUATION OF CONTROL AUTHORITY AWARENESS – 25.671(e).

a. FAR/JAR 25.671(e) requires suitable annunciation to be provided to the flight crew when a flight condition exists in which near-full control authority (not pilot-commanded) is being used. Suitability of such a display must take into account that some pilot-demanded maneuvers (e.g., rapid roll) are necessarily associated with intended full performance, which may saturate the surface. Therefore, simple alerting systems, which would function in both intended and unexpected control-limiting situations, must be properly balanced between needed crew-awareness and nuisance alerting. Nuisance alerting should be minimized. The term suitable indicates an appropriate balance between nuisance and necessary operation.

b. Depending on the application, suitable annunciations may include cockpit control position, annunciator light, or surface position indicators. Furthermore, this requirement applies at limits of control authority, not necessarily at limits of any individual surface travel.

12. EVALUATION OF FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM SUBMODES – 25.671(f).

Some systems, EFCS in particular, may have submodes of operation not restricted to being either on or off. The means provided to the crew to indicate the current submode of operation may be different from the classic “failure warning.”
13. ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION.

It is recognized that it may be neither practical nor appropriate to demonstrate compliance by flight test for all of the failure conditions noted herein. Compliance may be shown by analysis, simulation, a piloted engineering simulator, flight test, or combination of these methods as agreed with the certification authority. Simulation methods should include an accurate representation of the aircraft characteristics and of the pilot response, including time delays as specified in Section 9.e.1.iii.

Efforts to show compliance with this regulation may result in flight manual abnormal procedures. Verification of these procedures may be accomplished in-flight or, with the agreement of the certification authority, using a piloted simulator.

a. Acceptable Use of Simulations. It is generally difficult to define the types of simulations that might be acceptable in lieu of flight testing without identifying specific conditions or issues. However, the following general principles can be used as guidance for making this kind of decision:

(1) In general, flight test demonstrations are the preferred method to show compliance.

(2) Simulation may be an acceptable alternative to flight demonstrations, especially when:
   (i) A flight demonstration would be too risky even after attempts to mitigate these risks (e.g., "simulated" takeoffs/landings at high altitude),
   (ii) The required environmental conditions are too difficult to attain (e.g., windshear, high crosswinds),
   (iii) The simulation is used to augment a reasonably broad flight test program,
   (iv) The simulation is used to demonstrate repeatability.

b. Simulation Requirements. Where it is agreed that a simulation will be used to establish compliance, to be acceptable for use in showing compliance with the performance and handling qualities requirements the simulation should:

(1) Be suitably validated by flight test data for the conditions of interest.
ENCLOSURE 2

(i) This does not mean that there must be flight test data at the exact conditions of interest; the reason simulation is being used may be that it is too difficult or risky to obtain flight test data at the conditions of interest.

(ii) The level of substantiation of the simulator to flight correlation should be commensurate with the level of compliance (i.e., unless it is determined that the simulation is conservative, the closer the case is to being non-compliant, the higher the required quality of the simulation).

(2) Be conducted in a manner appropriate to the case and conditions of interest.

(i) If closed-loop responses are important, the simulation should be piloted by a human pilot.

(ii) For piloted simulations, the controls/displays/cues should be substantially equivalent to what would be available in the real airplane (unless it is determined that not doing so would provide added conservatism).
APPENDIX I. FAILURE RATE AND PROBABILITY CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Failure Rates.

An important aspect in performing the analyses to show compliance with both multiple failure requirements of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) is the determination of failure rates. The failure rates are used in the fault tree analysis per FAR/JAR 25.1309 to determine the overall probability of failure combinations to ensure the probability is commensurate with the failure effects. Failure rates are also used to calculate the probability (i.e., risk) of additional failures, or of being in a failed state, that may preclude continued safe flight and landing following the single failure.

Failure rates should be conservative and adequately substantiated to yield an acceptable level of confidence. In order of preference, the following sources should be considered for calculating conservative/substantiated failure rates: manufacturer/vendor in-service data of like or similar components used in a similar application and similar environment, vendor prediction, industry standard (i.e., NPRD data), and engineering judgement based on prior experience with similar components. The methods of obtaining failure rates should be explained and traceability to sources should be maintained. Built-in conservatism in the analysis should also be explained. The certification agencies have the opportunity to question or discuss any failure rates in the course of reviewing safety analysis materials. Following certification, the manufacturer should monitor for in-service deviations from safety analysis assumed failure rates.

In some cases, manufacturers use published company design standards as one means to promote consistency and improvement of component failure rates. These standards typically specify environments, design features, and other considerations that the manufacturer's past design and service experience has shown provides acceptable service reliability. Generally, future components that adhere to these standards are expected to achieve reliabilities similar to predecessor components.

To aid in providing confidence in the analysis, sensitivity analyses should be conducted on the failure rates used in the fault tree analysis for 25.1309 to show the top failure condition probability still allows compliance to be shown.

b. Failure Rate vs. Probability.

In the analysis required by the second sentence of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), it is important to note that the "probability of less than 1 in 1000" for the additional failure state(s) that would preclude continued safe flight and landing is not to be confused with a failure rate of $10^{-3}$ per flight hour. Failure rates are expressed in "per flight hour" or "per flight" terms. The "probability" in the requirement is unitless and represents the "risk" of
ENCLOSURE 2

encountering those additional failure(s) during the same flight. For example, after the failure of the primary system, a backup system that is monitored with a failure rate of $1 \times 10^{-5}$ per flight hour (active failure) would have a probability of encountering that additional failure during the same flight of $1 \times 10^{-5}$ for a 1 hour flight, $3 \times 10^{-5}$ for a 3 hour flight, and $1 \times 10^{-4}$ for a 10 hour flight.

Dormancy periods also factor into the calculation of the 1 in 1000 probability. In the example of the $1 \times 10^{-5}$/FH backup system, if this were a dormant failure, then a check for the presence of the dormant failure must be performed every 100 hours to comply with the 1 in 1000 probability.

The above examples assume that the airplane is "at risk" of the additional failure for the duration of the flight. For cases where the airplane is at risk of the additional failure only during a limited portion of the flight, at risk time is used to determine the risk probability.

Flight time, dormancy period, exposure time, and at risk time all combine to contribute to the risk probability of the additional failures.
APPENDIX 2. EXAMPLES OF 25.671(c)(2)’s 1 in 1000 REQUIREMENT.

The following simplified examples explain how the additional 1 in 1000 requirement in FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) might be applied. Since many other factors influence the acceptability and certifiability of a design, inclusion of a design as an example does not imply the design will always be acceptable; the examples below are only included to illustrate the additional investigation required under FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2).

a. Example #1 – Dual Load-Path.

Although there are other requirements that govern such a design, consider a simplified case of a dual load-path design where two pushrods connect actuators to an unbalanced surface. Assume that a free-floating surface could preclude continued safe flight and landing in any flight phase and therefore must be guarded against.

For this example each pushrod is designed to carry the full load in the absence of the other, the pushrods are independent of one another, and they are readily inspectable. However, since the failure of one pushrod (one load-path) would not be readily apparent to the crew, that failure would be dormant.

(1) FAR/JAR 25.1309 Considerations -- Suppose the manufacturer has sufficient service history data to justify a failure of a pushrod is $1x10^7$/FH. Under a strict FAR/JAR 25.1309 approach and taking into account the dormancy of the failure, the failure of both pushrods in combination has a probability of occurrence per flight hour of...
\[
\frac{(1 \times 10^{-7}/\text{FH Pushrod Failure}) \times (t_{\text{insp hr dormancy period}})}{(1 \times 10^{-7}/\text{FH Pushrod Failure}) \times (t_{\text{flight hr avg flight}})} < 1 \times 10^{-9}/\text{FH}
\]

Since the "\(t_{\text{flight avg flight\}}\) term cancels out of the equation, solving for the maximum acceptable dormancy period that still satisfies the \(1 \times 10^{-9}/\text{FH criteria yields a dormancy period (i.e., inspection interval) of 100,000 FH.}\)

(2) FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) Considerations -- Now look at the additional multiple failure requirement in the second sentence of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2). The single failure is assumed to have occurred, regardless of probability; in this example the failure of one pushrod is the single failure. The additional failure that could preclude continued safe flight and landing is identified as the failure of the other pushrod. Now look to see if the probability of encountering the additional failure is less than 1 in 1000.

Since the additional failure is dormant, to calculate the probability that the additional failure has already occurred (or will occur) the full dormancy period is applied first using the inspection interval established for compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309.

\[
(1 \times 10^{-7}/\text{FH Pushrod Failure}) \times (100,000 \text{ hr check}) = 4 \times 10^{-2} \text{ (or 1 in 25)}
\]

Since the inspection interval for compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309 does not satisfy the 1 in 1000 criteria in the second part of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), the inspection interval is recalculated to comply with the 1 in 1000 criteria.

\[
(1 \times 10^{-7}/\text{FH Pushrod Failure}) \times (t_{\text{insp hr dormancy period}}) < 1 \times 10^{-3} \text{ (or 1 in 1000)}
\]

Solving for the inspection interval to satisfy 1 in 1000 yields an inspection interval (dormancy period) of no more than 10,000 hrs. In this case, the 1 in 1000 criteria in FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) would be more restrictive than 25.1309.
b. Example #2 – Flap System and Asymmetry Detection.

Although there are other requirements that govern such a design, consider the simplified flap drive system shown. Assume that excessive asymmetry could preclude continued safe flight and landing in any flight phase; therefore, excessive asymmetry must be sufficiently guarded against throughout the flight (i.e., at risk time could not be used in this case).

In this example a central power drive unit drives, through drive shafts, irreversible actuators at the flap surface. In the absence of the asymmetry monitor, a severance of the drive shaft just outside the PDU results in one flap being driven and the other flap remaining in its last commanded position – excessive asymmetry could develop. Since this excessive asymmetry is not extremely improbable, an electronic flap asymmetry monitor checks the position of each flap and shuts down the power drive unit should excessive asymmetry start to develop. The asymmetry monitor is passive; it only shuts down the PDU when it detects an excessive asymmetry.

(1) FAR/JAR 25.1309 Considerations — Suppose the manufacturer has sufficient service history data to justify the probability of either drive shaft severance is approximately $1 \times 10^{-7} \text{FH}$. Under a strict FAR/JAR 25.1309 approach, to ensure that excessive flap asymmetry is extremely improbable the likelihood of either drive shaft severance combined with the likelihood of an asymmetry monitor failure would need to be less than $1 \times 10^{-9} \text{FH}$.

Suppose the manufacturer has sufficient service experience with similar electronic monitor systems to justify a failure rate (fail to inoperative status) of $1 \times 10^{-5} \text{FH}$. In the example, the failure of the monitor is dormant since the monitor takes no action until it detects the asymmetry; therefore, a periodic check is established to satisfy the required minimum reliability for 25.1309.


\[
\begin{align*}
P &= \frac{(0.5 \times 10^{-5}/FH) \cdot (t_{\text{inap}})}{(1 \times 10^{-7}/FH)} \\
\text{Avg P/FH} &= \frac{(0.5 \times 10^{-5}/FH) \cdot (t_{\text{inap}})}{(1 \times 10^{-7}/FH)}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
P &= (1 \times 10^{-9}/FH) \cdot (t_{\text{inap}}) \\
P &= 2 \cdot (0.5 \times 10^{-7}/FH) \cdot (t_{\text{inap}})
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda &= 1 \times 10^{-9}/FH \\
\lambda &= 1 \times 10^{-7}/FH
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{Active}) & \quad (\text{Active}) \\
\lambda &= 0.5 \times 10^{-9}/FH \\
\lambda &= 0.5 \times 10^{-7}/FH
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Failure Left Drive} & \quad \text{Failure Right Drive}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{Latent}) \\
\lambda &= 1 \times 10^{-9}/FH
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ (1 \times 10^{-5}/FH \text{ Monitor Failure}) \cdot (t_{\text{inap}} \text{ hr dormancy period}) \} \\
[ (0.5 \times 10^{-7}/FH \text{ Either Drive Shaft Severance}) \cdot (t_{\text{flight}} \text{ hr avg flight}) ]
\end{align*}
\]

\[
/ (t_{\text{flight}} \text{ hr avg flight}) < 1 \times 10^{-9}/FH
\]

Since the "t_{\text{flight}} avg flight" term cancels out of the equation, solving for the maximum acceptable dormancy period that still satisfies the $1 \times 10^{-9}/FH$ criteria yields a dormancy period (i.e., inspection interval) of 2,000 FH.

(2) FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) Considerations — Now look at the additional multiple failure requirement in the second sentence of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2). The single failure is assumed to have occurred, regardless of probability. If the assumed single failure is the failure of the asymmetry monitor, the additional failure(s) that could preclude continued safe flight and landing is the failure of the drive shaft. Now look to see if the probability of encountering the additional failure(s) is less than 1 in 1000.

\[
(1 \times 10^{-7}/FH \text{ Either Drive Shaft Sev.}) \cdot (t_{\text{flight}} \text{ hr avg flight}) < 1 \times 10^{-3} \text{ (or 1 in 1000)}
\]

Since the probability of encountering the drive shaft failure is on the order of 1 in 10,000,000 (depending on the duration of the average flight) compared to a 1 in 1000 requirement, compliance with the multiple failure requirements of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) is shown for this single failure condition.

If the assumed single failure is the failure of the drive shaft, the additional failure(s) that could preclude continued safe flight and landing is the failure of the asymmetry monitor. Now look to see if the probability of encountering the additional failure(s) is less than 1 in 1000. Since the additional failure is dormant, the full dormancy period is applied first using the inspection interval established for compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309.

\[
(1 \times 10^{-5}/FH \text{ Monitor failure}) \cdot (2000 \text{ hr check}) = 2 \times 10^{-2} \text{ (or 1 in 50)}
\]
Since the 2000 hr inspection interval for compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309 does not satisfy the 1 in 1000 criteria in the second part of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2), a design change would be necessary. Options available include: (1) change the monitor to self-check so it is no longer a dormant failure, (2) change to a redundant drive path or redundant monitor path, (3) improve the reliability of the monitor, or (4) reduce the check interval on the monitor. For this example, let’s recalculate the inspection interval to comply with the 1 in 1000 criteria.

\[(1 \times 10^{-5} / \text{FH Monitor Failure}) \times (t_{\text{inap hr dormancy period}}) < 1 \times 10^{-3} \text{ (or 1 in 1000)}\]

Solving for the inspection interval to satisfy 1 in 1000 yields an inspection interval (dormancy period) of no more than 100 hrs. In this case, the 1 in 1000 criteria in FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2) would be more restrictive than 25.1309.
Team Member Alternate Recommendations / Dissenting Opinions

1. Proposal to use 245 knots crosswind in Lateral Directional Takeoff Conditions [FAA, DGAC, ALPA]

The team has discussed at great length the levels used to determine jam positions and generally settled on flight conditions somewhat larger than typically used in past certifications. However, this is not the case when considering the 15 knot crosswind levels used in the proposal. The strictly numerical approach would simply "AND" the probability of a crosswind and the probability of a jam in a short exposure time. There is evidence to say that jam failures do not necessarily occur in a purely probabilistic fashion. They may occur as a result of external events or be connected to maneuvering or specific positioning of the controls. For this reason, the determination of "normally encountered position" should be conservative and give careful consideration to pilot recommendations regarding conditions regularly seen in-service. Use of 25 knots crosswind in the determination of lateral/directional jams better reflects in-service experience.

The use of 25 knots is also consistent with the existing AC 25.1309 guidance for use of probabilities described in paragraph 8.e, "A probability of 1 should usually be used for encountering a discrete condition for which the airplane is designed," and "When combining the probability of such a random condition with that of a system failure, care should be taken to ensure that the condition and the system failure are independent of one another...."

The 1 in 1000 flights criteria in this proposed advisory circular describes the intent of the conditions to be covered. The value of a 25 knot crosswind as representing a 1 in 1000 occurrence is consistent with both AC 25-7 and AC 20-57A.

To be added in Section 9(b) of Draft B following:

(1) Jammed Lateral Control Positions.

(i) Takeoff: The lateral control position for wings-level at $V_1$ in a steady crosswind of the lesser of 245 knots (at a height of 10 meters above the takeoff surface) or the maximum demonstrated crosswind. Variations in wind speed from a 10 meter height can be obtained using the following relationship:

$$V_{alt} = V_{10meters} \times \left( \frac{H_{desired}}{10.0} \right)^{1/7}$$

Where:

- $V_{10meters}$ = Wind speed at 10 meters AGL (knots)
- $V_{alt}$ = Wind speed at desired altitude (knots)
- $H_{desired}$ = Desired altitude for which wind speed is sought (Meters AGL), but not lower than 1.5m (5 ft)

(ii) In-flight: The lateral control position to sustain a 12 deg/sec steady roll rate from $1.23V_{SR}(1.3V_S)$ to $V_{MO}/M_{MO}$ or $V_{fe}$, as appropriate, but not greater than 50% of the control input.

05/17/02

DRAFT 36
Enclosure 3

Note: If the flight control system augments the pilot’s input, then the maximum surface deflection to achieve the above maneuvers should be considered.
(2) Jammed Longitudinal Control Positions.

(i) Takeoff: Three longitudinal control positions should be considered:

(1) Any control position from that which the controls naturally assume without pilot input at the start of the takeoff roll to that which occurs at \( V_1 \) using the manufacturer’s recommended procedures.

Note: It may not be necessary to consider this case if it can be demonstrated that the pilot is aware of the jam before reaching \( V_1 \) (for example, through a manufacturer’s recommended AFM procedure).

(2) The longitudinal control position at \( V_1 \) based on the manufacturer’s recommended procedures including consideration for any runway condition for which the aircraft is approved to operate.

(3) Using the manufacturer’s recommended procedures, the peak longitudinal control position to achieve a steady aircraft pitch rate of the lesser of 5 deg/sec or the pitch rate necessary to achieve the speed used for all-engines-operating initial climb procedures (\( V_{2+XX} \)) at 35 ft.

(ii) In-flight: The maximum longitudinal control position is the greater of:

(1) The longitudinal control position required to achieve steady state normal accelerations from 0.8g to 1.3g at speeds from \( 1.23 V_{S1}(1.3 V_s) \) to \( V_{MO}/M_{MO} \) or \( V_{fe} \) as appropriate.

(2) The peak longitudinal control position commanded by the autopilot and/or stability augmentation system in response to atmospheric discrete vertical gust defined by 15 fps from sea level to 20,000 ft.
(3) **Jammed Directional Control Positions.**

(i) **Takeoff:** The directional control position for takeoff at $V_1$ in a steady crosswind of the lesser of 2.5 knots (at a height of 10 meters above the takeoff surface) or the maximum demonstrated crosswind. Variations in wind speed from a height of 10 meters can be obtained using the following relationship:

$$V_{alt} = V_{10\text{meters}} \times (H_{desired}/10.0)^{1/7}$$

Where:
- $V_{10\text{meters}}$ = Wind speed at 10 meters AGL (knots)
- $V_{alt}$ = Wind speed at desired altitude (knots)
- $H_{desired}$ = Desired altitude for which wind speed is sought (Meters AGL), but not lower than 1.5m (5 ft)

(ii) **In-flight:** The directional control position is the greater of:

1. The peak directional control position commanded by the autopilot and/or stability augmentation system in response to atmospheric discrete lateral gust defined by 15 fps from sea level to 20,000 ft.
2. Maximum rudder angle required for lateral/directional trim from $1.23V_{SR1}(1.3V_S)$ to the maximum all engines operating airspeed in level flight with climb power, but not to exceed $V_{MO}/M_{MO}$ or $V_{fe}$ as appropriate. While more commonly a characteristic of propeller aircraft, this addresses any lateral/directional asymmetry that can occur in flight with symmetric power.

Replace the Note in Section 9(e)(1)(iv) of Draft B with:

**Note:** For the case of control surface jams during takeoff that are detected by the flight crew, it may be assumed that the aircraft is returned to a suitable runway, including consideration of crosswind. As a result, it can be assumed that the aircraft is returned to a runway with a favorable crosswind no more than 15 knots less than the crosswind at the time of the jam.

Response to Proposal: The proposal above to determine jammed roll and yaw control positions used during demonstration of continued safe flight and landing would establish a crosswind level for a jam occurring during takeoff as the lesser of 25 knots or maximum demonstrated crosswind. The FAA Generic Issue Paper for flight control mechanical jam conditions and jam Issue Papers being used for current FAA certification programs establish roll and yaw control jam positions to be considered as that required for takeoff in a steady crosswind up to 15 knots. Transport Canada has indicated that recent Canadian certification programs have used a 14 knot crosswind to determine control positions for jams occurring during takeoff. The determination is based on crosswinds up to 15 knots for the following reasons:
The group has not identified a safety issue with the current means of compliance, which establishes a crosswind of 15 knots for determination of normally encountered roll and yaw control jam positions. An increase in crosswind to the lesser of 25 knots or maximum demonstrated capability is unwarranted.

The probability of a mechanical control jam occurring between \( V_1 \) and lift-off is Extremely Improbable by numerical evaluation. \( (1 \times 10^{-7} \text{flt-hr jam failure rate with less than a 5 sec. or } 0.0014 \text{ hr. exposure time results in a } 1.4 \times 10^{-10} \text{ probability of jam during this critical period per flight.}) \) The released FAA Flight Test Guide AC25-7A. Appendix 7 defines the probability of encountering a crosswind up to 25 knots as 1 in 1000 flights. Therefore, the probability of encountering a crosswind of 25 knots on the same flight as a mechanical control jam which occurs during the critical 3 second time period during takeoff is approximately \( 1 \times 10^{-12} \) to \( 1 \times 10^{-13} \).

If the 25 knot crosswind criterion were adopted, more complicated control systems may be required to ensure that continued safe flight and landing characteristics are provided. For example, an aileron-only lateral control system may no longer be certifiable, multiple rudder panels may be necessary, and redundant means for lateral trim may be necessary. These complications to proven control surface configurations would have a negative impact on the viability of new aircraft and may have a negative overall impact on airplane safety.

2. Proposal to allow use of a handling qualities rating method acceptable to the certification authority in lieu of the criteria in this advisory material. [Boeing]

It is recommended that other handling qualities rating methods such as presented in Appendix 7 to AC 25-7 be allowed as alternate means of compliance for demonstrating continued safe flight and landing if it is agreeable to the certification authority. The proposed advisory material uses arbitrary static control capability and does not account for measures of control including dynamic stability or capability for controlling flight path to accomplish a specific task (e.g., glide path control). The process in AC 25-7 is consistent with the principles of analysis in 25.1309, addresses both transient conditions and continued flight, and provides an orderly approach to evaluating handling qualities after failures. It has also been used successfully on previous certification programs. In prior certification efforts, airplanes have been determined to have enough maneuvering capability for continued safe flight and landing at maneuvering levels below that defined in the 25.671 proposed advisory material. It is proposed that a statement be included at the beginning of Section 9.e of the advisory material that allows the use of other handling quality rating methods that are agreeable to the certification authority.

Response to Proposal: Use of the other handling qualities rating methods has been discussed during team development of criteria for continued safe flight and landing. Since there is not a harmonized method accepted by all the certification agencies, criteria were developed which were generally agreeable to the team as a whole.
3. **Proposal to clarify the definition of single failure to allow consideration of the probability of subsequent fault propagation.** [Bombardier, Boeing]

The following change is recommended to the single failure definition:

5. **DEFINITIONS**

q. **Single Failure**: A single failure includes any set of failures or effects that are certain to occur as a direct consequence of the initial failure.

9. **EVALUATION OF CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES – 25.671(c)**

Subparagraph (c)(1) requires the evaluation of any single failure, excluding the types of jams addressed in subparagraph (c)(3). Subparagraph (c)(1) requires that any single failure be considered, suggesting that an alternative means of controlling the airplane or an alternative control path be provided in the case of failure of a single component, part or element of a system. All single failures must be considered, even if they can be shown to be extremely improbable. Any failure condition or effects that are certain to occur as a direct consequence of a single failure must be considered. Cascading failures or collateral damages that are not certain to occur in connection with an initial single failure, need not be considered under subparagraph (c)(1), instead such combination of events must be shown to comply with subparagraph (c)(2). Failure containment should be provided by the system design to limit propagation of the effect of any single failure to preclude catastrophic failure conditions. In addition, there must be no common cause failure that could affect both the single component, part or element, and its failure containment provisions. Failure containment techniques available to establish independence may include partitioning, separation, and isolation.

While single failures must normally be assumed to occur, there are cases where it is obvious that, from a realistic and practical viewpoint, any knowledgeable, experienced person, would unequivocally conclude that a failure mode simply would not occur, unless it is associated with a wholly unrelated failure condition that would itself be catastrophic. Once identified and accepted, such cases need not be considered failures in the context of FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(1). For example, with simply loaded static elements, any single failure mode resulting from fatigue fracture can be assumed to be prevented if this element is shown to meet the damage tolerance requirements of FAR/JAR 25.571.

**Rationale**

Since the proposed new wording deletes the reference to AC/AMJ 25.1309, the above is a repeat of AC/AMJ 25.1309 except for the underlined paragraphs.

This recommendation is based on the following:

AC/AMJ 25.1309 does not provide a definition of single failure. It does describe single failure considerations in section 11 Assessment of failure condition probabilities and analysis, but a real definition is lacking. Since 25.671 has a specific requirement
addressing single failures, it should also provide a definition of single failure in the AC/AMJ 25.671.

The words used in AC/AMJ 25.1309 to describe single failure considerations; “A single failure includes any set of failures which cannot be shown to be independent from each other” are too all encompassing. Using this description, one could be asked to include all cascading effects or collateral damages regardless of how remote the combined probability of these effects or damages and the single failure is.

There is precedence for limiting the effects that need to be considered to those that are certain to occur as a direct consequence from a single failure. For example, the Boeing 777 Special Condition A-9 “Reliance on Retained Stiffness with Dual Hydraulic Actuators Instead of Mass Balance” provided the following definition: “Multiple failures will be considered as a single failure if they are certain to occur as a direct consequence of a single event”. The implication here is that if the effects were not certain to occur as a direct consequence of a single event, they were considered as multiple failures. This interpretation was followed throughout the certification of the 777 Flight Control System.

If the probability of the cascading failures or collateral damages is high the combined probability would not satisfy the proposed FAR/JAR 25.671(c)(2). In particular, the second part of (c)(2), less than 1 in 1000 probability, would be very difficult to meet for likely effects. Obviously, if the numerical probability analysis shows that the combined probability is not extremely improbable, the applicant must show that the combination is not catastrophic.

Response to Proposal: The team did not choose to include a definition for single failure. The advisory material currently points to the 25.1309 use of "single failure". The team recognizes the shortcomings of how the term is used in 25.1309 but generally feels it is conservative and still allows use of engineering judgement in determining "independence".

4. Proposed revision to "continued safe flight and landing" criteria. [Transport Canada]

It is noted that para 9(e)(1)(ii) Transient Response applies to all flight control failures not shown to be extremely improbable including jams. The appropriate level of response for these failures should be no greater than the hazardous category and it is not reasonable to attempt to define a boundary right at the limit of being catastrophic. The hazardous level is consistent with the criteria originally proposed in the Transport Canada guidance material, which was tabled at the first Working Group meeting.

Transport Canada concedes that the hazardous criteria of the draft ACJ 25.1329 which was used as a basis in the working group discussions is not entirely appropriate to the flight control failure case, and proposes the following wording for para 9(e)(1)(ii):

"......For this purpose, continued safe flight and landing is defined as not encountering any one of the following:
(1) Exceedence of Limit loads

(2) Stall

(3) Speeds greater than Vdf/Mdf

(4) Buffet or vibration severe enough to interfere with control of the airplane or to cause structural damage

(5) Bank angles in excess of 67 degrees flaps up and 60 degrees flaps down

(6) Pitch angles greater than +30 degrees or lower than -20 degrees."

Response to Proposal: In developing the 25.671 criteria for safe flight and landing, the team recognized that there was an area of compliance to 25.1309 that was not specifically being addressed. That is, if a jam with a probability of 1E-06 occurred, to be consistent with 25.1309, the effects should not be Hazardous. This is an area not specifically covered by the 25.671 advisory material. The general view of the team was if a system is designed to achieve continued safe flight and landing (not Catastrophic) at the large deflections we have defined, it is likely that more probable jams at lesser deflections would have correspondingly less effect and also be acceptable.

5. Proposed revision to landing exposure criteria. [Raytheon, Cessna]

The proposed change to 25.671(c)(3) for flight control jams excludes from consideration the time immediately prior to landing. The background and intent of this exclusion should be clearly stated in the preamble to the NPRM. However, the reasons for this exclusion raise similar issues of compliance with the proposed 25.671(c)(1) for single mechanical flight control disconnects. Expansion of the landing exclusion to include single mechanical flight control system disconnects covered by 25.671(c)(1), should be considered by the FCHWG and coordinated with other committees involved in the harmonization of other affected regulations and advisory material. A possible revision to the rule could be:

"25.671(d) Mechanical flight control system disconnects considered under (c)(1) and jams considered under (c)(3) need not be assumed to occur immediately prior to landing during a reasonable time necessary for the crew to recognize the failure, react and recover."

Response to Proposal: The team recognized the similarity of some disconnect failure modes to the jam scenarios at low altitude for which an exclusion was defined. However, it was generally felt that allowing an exclusion for all disconnect failure modes in a short exposure time before landing was far too broad a criteria and that there were more feasible options to deal with disconnects than with jam failures. Addressing areas other than jams in such a unique fashion also generates a conflict.
Enclosure 3

with 25.1309, which the team had accepted as a basic analysis approach for all failure conditions except jamming.
1. **What is the underlying safety issue addressed by the FAR/JAR? [Explain the underlying safety rationale for the requirement. Why should the requirement exist? What prompted this rulemaking activity (e.g., new technology, service history, etc.)?]**

This requirement ensures the basic integrity and availability of augmentation & power operated systems, and further ensures that any failure experienced in service is manageable by the aircrew and will not prevent continued safe flight and landing. This requirement also contains the idea of transition to a limited flight envelope following a system failure. This rulemaking activity was prompted by efforts to harmonize the FARs and JARs.

2. **What are the current FAR and JAR standards? [Reproduce the FAR and JAR rules text as indicated below.]**

Current FAR Text:

Sec. 25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.

If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with Sec. 25.671 and the following:

(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in Sec. 25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system--

1. The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;
2. The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and
3. The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.

[Amtd. 25-23, 35 FR 5675 Apr. 8, 1970]
Current JAR & ACJ Text:

JAR 25.672 Stability Augmentation And Automatic And Power-Operated Systems

Date: October 1, 2000

If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this JAR-25, such systems must comply with JAR 25.671 and the following:

(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.

(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in JAR 25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system--

   (1) The aeroplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered. (See ACJ25.672(c)(1).)

   (2) The controllability and manoeuvrability requirements of this JAR-25 are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and aeroplane configurations) which is described in the Aeroplane Flight Manual; and

   (3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.

ACJ 25.672(c)(1) Stability Augmentation And Automatic And Power-operated Systems (Interpretative Material)

Date: October 1, 2000

See JAR 25.672(c)(1)

The severity of the flying quality requirement should be related to the probability of the occurrence in a progressive manner such that probable occurrences have not more than minor effects and improbable occurrences have not more than major effects.
3. **What are the differences in the standards?** [Explain the differences in the standards or policy, and what these differences result in relative to (as applicable) design features/capability, safety margins, cost, stringency, etc.]

The requirements are the same. The FAR has a corresponding AC and the JAR has an ACJ corresponding to paragraph (c)(1).

4. **What, if any, are the differences in required means of compliance?** [Provide a brief explanation of any differences in the current compliance criteria or methodology (e.g., issue papers), including any differences in either criteria, methodology, or application that result in a difference in stringency between the standards.]

There has been little difference in the means of compliance between JAR and FAR since the rules are the same.

5. **What is the proposed action?** [Describe the new proposed requirement, or the proposed change to the existing requirement, as applicable. Is the proposed action to introduce a new standard, or to take some other action? Explain what action is being proposed (not the regulatory text, but the underlying rationale) and why that direction was chosen for each proposed action.]

It is proposed that the AC be eliminated or superseded by 25.302 and its accompanying Appendix. It is also proposed that the ACJ be eliminated as being covered completely by 25.1309 and its advisory material. Systems showing compliance to 25.672 also must show compliance to 25.1309 (in its harmonized version).

6. **What should the harmonized standard be?** [Insert the proposed text of the harmonized standard here]

The current rules are identical. Eliminating the advisory material will make the rules harmonized.

7. **How does this proposed standard address the underlying safety issue identified in #1?** [Explain how the proposed standard ensures that the underlying safety issue is taken care of.]

No Change.

8. **Relative to the current FAR, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintain the same level of safety?** [Explain how each element of the proposed change to the standards affects the level of safety relative to the current FAR. It is possible that some portions of the proposal may reduce the level of safety even though the proposal as a whole may increase the level of safety.]

No change. It maintains the same level of safety.

9. **Relative to current industry practice, does the proposed standard increase, decrease, or maintains the same level of safety?** [Since industry practice may be
different than what is required by the FAR (e.g., general industry practice may be more restrictive), explain how each element of the proposed change to the standards affects the level of safety relative to current industry practice. Explain whether current industry practice is in compliance with the proposed standard.

No change. It maintains the same level of safety.

10. What other options have been considered and why were they not selected?
[Explain what other options were considered, and why they were not selected (e.g., cost/benefit, unacceptable decrease in the level of safety, lack of consensus, etc.) Include the pros and cons associated with each alternative.]

There was consideration to reduce duplication in areas of 25.672 which cover the same aspects as 25.1309 or 25.671 or 25.1322 by deleting particular paragraphs. It was determined that this did not result in a cohesive regulation so the rule was left intact.

11. Who would be affected by the proposed change? [Identify the parties that would be materially affected by the rule change – airplane manufacturers, airplane operators, etc.]

There would be no change to the regulation so no one would be affected.

12. To ensure harmonization, what current advisory material (e.g. ACJ, AMJ, AC, policy letters) need to be included in the rule text or preamble? [Does any existing advisory material include substantive requirements that should be contained in the regulation? This may occur because the regulation itself is vague, or if the advisory material is interpreted as providing the only acceptable means of compliance.]

To adopt this proposal, the new harmonized 25.1309 must apply to augmentation and power operated systems (it does) and the new harmonized 25.302 and accompanying Appendix must be adopted.

13. Is existing FAA advisory material adequate? If not, what advisory material should be adopted? [Indicate whether the existing advisory material (if any) is adequate. If the current advisory material is not adequate, indicate whether the existing material should be revised, or new material provided. Also, either insert the text of the proposed advisory material here, or summarize the information it will contain, and indicate what form it will be in (e.g., Advisory Circular, policy, Order, etc.).]

With the extensive advisory material for 25.671 (proposed) and for 25.1309, both of which apply to 25.672, no advisory material is necessary for 25.672. The difference between "control system" and "automatic, or power operated" system is getting harder to recognize with the greater use of "fly by wire" systems. It may be reasonable to consider future rulemaking activity that eliminates 25.672 completely and incorporates any unique aspects into 25.1309 or 25.671.
Mr. Ron Priddy
President, Operations
National Air Carrier Association
1100 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1700
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Priddy:

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently completed a regulatory program review. That review focused on prioritizing rulemaking initiatives to more efficiently and effectively use limited industry and regulatory rulemaking resources. The review resulted in an internal Regulation and Certification Rulemaking Priority List that will guide our rulemaking activities, including the tasking of initiatives to the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). Part of the review determined if some rulemaking initiatives could be addressed by other than regulatory means, and considered products of ARAC that have been or are about to be forwarded to us as recommendations.

The Regulatory Agenda will continue to be the vehicle the FAA uses to communicate its rulemaking program to the public and the U.S. government. However, the FAA also wanted to identify for ARAC those ARAC rulemaking initiatives it is considering to handle by alternative actions (see the attached list). At this time, we have not yet determined what those alternative actions may be. We also have not eliminated the possibility that some of these actions in the future could be addressed through rulemaking when resources are available.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Gerri Robinson at (202) 267-9678 or gerri.robinson@faa.gov.

Sincerely,

Anthony F. Fazio
Executive Director, Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Enclosure

cc:
William W. Edmunds, Air Carrier Operation Issues
Sarah MacLeod, Air Carrier/General Aviation Maintenance Issues
James L. Crook, Air Traffic Issues
William H. Schultz, Aircraft Certification Procedures Issues
Ian Redhead, Airport Certification Issues
Billy Glover, Occupant Safety Issues
John Tigue, General Aviation Certification and Operations Issues
David Hilton, Noise Certification Issues
John Swihart, Rotorcraft Issues
Roland B. Liddell, Training and Qualification Issues
Craig Bolt, Transport Airplane and Engine Issues
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARAC Projects that will be handled by Alternative Actions rather than Rulemaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Beta) Reverse Thrust and propeller Pitch Setting below the Flight Regime (25.1155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Protection (33.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotor Integrity--Overspeed (33.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Analysis (33.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotor Integrity – Over-torque (33.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Minute/30 Second One Engine Inoperative (OEI) (33.XX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bird Strike (25.775, 25.571, 25.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casting Factors (25.621)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification of New Propulsion Technologies on Part 23 Airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical and Electronic Engine Control Systems (33.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Track Harmonization Project: Engine and APU Loads Conditions (25.361, 25.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Protection of Engine Cowling (25.1193(e)(3))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight Loads Validation (25.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Vent System Fire Protection (Part 25 and Retrofit Rule for Part 121, 125, and 135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Gust Conditions (25.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards Flight Rules, Static Lateral-Directional Stability, and Speed Increase and Recovery Characteristics (25.107(e)(1)(iv), 25.177©, 25.233(a)(3)(4)(50)). Note: 25.107(a)(b)(d) were enveloping tasks also included in this project—They will be included in the enveloping NPRM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization of Part 1 Definitions Fireproof and Fire Resistant (25.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet and High Performance Part 23 Airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load and Dynamics (Continuous Turbulence Loads) (25.302, 25.305, 25.341 (b), etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restart Capability (25.903(e))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization of Improved Small Airplane Normal Category Stall Characteristics Requirements (23.777, 23.781, 23.1141, 23.1309, 23.1337, 25.1305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTC (25.904/App 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Compartment Fire Extinguishing or Suppression Systems (25.851(b), 25.855, 25.857)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of Structure (25.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Altitude Flight (25.365(d))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue and Damage Tolerance (25.571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Prosperities (25.694)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14. How does the proposed standard affect the current ICAO standard? [Indicate whether the proposed standard complies with or does not comply with the applicable ICAO standards (if any)]

No Change.

15. How does the proposed standard affect other HWG’s? [Indicate whether the proposed standard should be reviewed by other harmonization working groups and why.]

The Loads and Dynamics group should agree that the new 25.302 material is sufficient to allow deletion of AC 25.672.

16. What is the cost impact of complying with the proposed standard? [Please provide information that will assist in estimating the change in cost (either positive or negative) of the proposed rule. For example, if new tests or designs are required, what is known with respect to the testing or engineering costs? If new equipment is required, what can be reported relative to purchase, installation, and maintenance costs? In contrast, if the proposed rule relieves industry of testing or other costs, please provide any known estimate of costs.]

There is no cost impact since the rule is not changing.

17. If advisory or interpretive material is to be submitted, document the advisory or interpretive guidelines. If disagreement exists, document the disagreement.

None.

18. Does the HWG wish to answer any supplementary questions specific to this project? [If the HWG can think of customized questions or concerns relevant to this project, please present the questions and the HWG answers and comments here.]

The working will be able to answer questions arising during the process of NPRM development. The HWG has no supplementary questions to provide.

19. Does the HWG want to review the draft NPRM at Phase 4 prior to publication in the Federal Register?

No

20. In light of information provided in this report, does the HWG consider that the "Fast Track" process is appropriate for this rulemaking project, or is the project too complex or controversial for the "Fast Track" process? [A negative answer to this question will prompt the FAA to pull the project out of the Fast Track process and forward the issues to the FAA’s Rulemaking Management Council for consideration as a “significant” project.]

The "Fast Track" process may be appropriate since the rules are unchanged.