

# Safety in the ATO

## Integrating Safety with Verification and Validation

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By: Mark DeNicolò

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**Federal Aviation  
Administration**



# When safety isn't a priority...



Federal Aviation  
Administration

# Safety of the National Airspace System (NAS)

- **Safety programs help us understand:**
  - What is happening in the NAS
  - Where the hazards exist
  - How to mitigate the hazards
- **Examples of safety programs:**
  - Risk Analysis Process (Airborne, Surface, System Integrity)
  - Voluntary reporting programs
  - Partnership for Safety
  - Runway Safety
  - Quality Assurance and Quality Control
  - Safety audits and assessments



# How the ATO Manages Safety

**The ATO's safety management system is made up of four basic components:**

Safety  
Policy

Safety  
Promotion

Safety  
Assurance

Safety Risk  
Management

V&V directly supports these  
areas.



# The ATO's Approach to Safety:

## Collect, Find, Fix





# Collect, Find, Fix in Action: The Top 5



## **IFR/VFR**

Close encounters between IFR and VFR aircraft



## **NOTAM Issuance/Cancellation**

Lack of, untimely, or outdated NOTAMs in the system



## **NOTAM Prioritization**

Inability of ATC or pilots to distinguish between applicable or pertinent NOTAMs



## **Runway Flyovers**

Unexpected aircraft/vehicle on the runway with another aircraft cleared to takeoff/land, resulting in flyover



## **Wrong Surface Landing**

Aircraft lands on wrong runway or taxiway, or at wrong airport




# Safety Risk Management (SRM)

- **Any change to the NAS that affects operations requires a safety analysis.**
- **Safety analyses serve to:**
  - Understand the planned change (Collect)
  - Identify the potential safety risk of the change (Find)
  - Mitigate and monitor the risk (Fix)
- **For acquisition programs, this is an iterative process that matures with the program.**



# How Safety Integrates with V&V





# Safety Hazards

- **The Hazard Analysis Worksheet (HAW) is the basis of every safety analysis.**
- **For each hazard, the HAW includes:**
  - Cause
  - System state
  - Controls (already implemented)
  - Effects
  - Risk (severity and likelihood)
  - Performance targets
  - Safety requirements




# Safety Requirements

- **Safety requirements are program requirements designed to mitigate the hazards in the HAW.**
- **All safety requirements must be verified and validated.**
  - This is typically done through the test program.
  - Verification and validation should consider the system state, causes, and controls from the HAW.
  - This is documented in the Safety Requirements Verification Table (SRVT).



# Example: IOA Supports Safety and V&V



- ✓ IS IT **SUITABLE?**
- ✓ IS IT **EFFECTIVE?**
- ✓ IS IT **SAFE?**

- **Independent Operational Assessment (IOA) is conducted before full deployment of a system.**
- **IOA is a safety assessment and a V&V activity.**
- **IOA provides a readiness determination in support of the In-Service Decision.**



# How IOA Integrates Safety

- IOA incorporates SRM into its processes.
- IOA planning and conduct incorporates SRM documentation and answers the following questions:
  - Are the identified hazards occurring?
  - Are there new hazards?
- IOA reports findings that have any potential safety risks.



# V&V Supports Safety

- Many new systems provide important safety benefits. [Watch the video ▶](#)
- V&V can support safety by ensuring that safety benefits are realized with minimal new risk.
  - **Verification** of the safety requirements to reduce new risk
  - **Validation** that the design achieves the intended safety benefits





# Event: San Francisco International Airport (SFO) *July 7, 2017, at 11:56 pm PDT*

- Runway 28L was closed, but Runway 28R remained open. Taxiway C runs parallel to Runway 28R.
- ACA759 (Air Canada) was on an approximate 0.6 mile final when the pilot asked the controller to verify that they were still cleared to land on Runway 28R because they saw lights.
  - The controller confirmed and re-cleared ACA759 to land on Runway 28R.
- ACA759 instead lined up with Taxiway C and overflew the following four aircraft:
  - UAL1 and PAL115 by 100 feet
  - UAL863 by 200 feet
  - UAL1118 by 300 feet

[Watch the video ▶](#)



# What You Can Do

**Know** how your program benefits/impacts safety.

*Understand how your program impacts the overall safety of the NAS.*

**Learn** about the hazards and safety requirements associated with your program.

*Verify safety requirements in the context of the hazard.*

**Report** potential safety issues.

*Determine if your V&V findings impact safety.*

