



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: FEB 16 2016

To: Hesham Ashraf, Manager, Legal Program Management Staff, AGC-10
Thru: Reggie Govan, Director, Chief Counsel, AGC-1

From: David Hempe, Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification Service, AIR-2 *DH*

Prepared by: Jeffrey E. Duvon, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100

Subject: Formal Complaint Docket No. 2014-2, Final Response to Configuration
Management Complaint Regarding a Boeing Supplier in Italy

Background

On June 12, 2014, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received a written complaint from a Boeing employee regarding configuration management issues at Alenia, a Boeing supplier in Italy. The complainant alleged Boeing failed to conduct proper oversight, resulting in failures of the configuration management process.

In addition, the complainant alleged Boeing provided misleading information to the FAA relating to configuration control issues. These events allegedly occurred during the certification efforts of the Boeing 787-8 airplanes.

Discussion

Prior to FAA notification of this complaint, Boeing conducted a configuration management health assessment (CMHA) at Alenia, Italy in March of 2013. This assessment identified failures of Alenia's configuration management process, specifically the engineering bill of material (EBOM) to manufacturing bill of material (MBOM) reconciliation. Boeing issued a supplier evaluation report (SER) to Alenia requesting root cause and corrective action. The root cause corrective action related to this SER was allegedly validated as effective by Boeing and closed. The complainant believes the SER was closed prematurely and that corrective action effectiveness was not properly verified.

In addition, the FAA identified similar configuration management issues at Boeing suppliers, including Alenia, as early as November 2008. These identified issues resulted in the issuance of an FAA enforcement action in 2009, seeking root cause and corrective

action. The FAA found Boeing's corrective action acceptable, verified implementation of corrective action, and closed the enforcement case in June of 2010.

On July 10, 2014, two FAA inspectors met with the complainant, a Boeing senior manager and the Boeing supplier quality manager for regulatory affairs. The complainant presented information identifying configuration reconciliation failures at the Alenia facility in Grottaglie, Italy.

The complainant's allegations raised concerns that corrective actions noted in the 2009 FAA enforcement action were not effectively implemented. On July 11, 2014, the FAA issued a letter requesting further information from Boeing regarding their corrective action followup. The letter also requested reconciliation packages (for Alenia components) on two recently delivered 787-8 airplanes.

On July 22, 2014, two FAA inspectors again met with the complainant to review the two aircraft reconciliation packages. No discrepancies were identified when comparing the EBOM to the MBOM for both aircraft. The complainant stated he believed this indicated improvements in the reconciliation process. However, three unresolved concerns required further FAA investigation.

- The Boeing EBOM identified parts that should be installed on the aircraft. Alenia's MBOM did not show all these parts were installed.
- A concern that Boeing Management knew of the configuration management issues and provided misleading information to the FAA
- Alenia could not provide evidence they were following the process requiring a validation of the supplier's as-built to Boeing as-planned configuration

As a result of these concerns, the FAA issued a Letter of Investigation (LOI) to Boeing. The LOI final response was received January 30, 2015, with a commitment to implement final corrective action by August 28, 2015.

An FAA inspector conducted an onsite corrective action verification from September 14 through September 23, 2015 at Alenia facilities located in Grottaglie and Foggia, Italy. This verification was to confirm the corrective action commitments noted in Boeing's response to the FAA LOI had been effectively implemented. This FAA evaluation verified the corrective actions were effectively implemented. In addition, interviews with senior managers and documentation review could not substantiate Boeing provided misleading information to the FAA.

Summary

The complainant identified configuration management noncompliances at Alenia that were subsequently confirmed by Boeing and the FAA. Boeing's latest corrective action plan for the three concerns above was satisfactorily implemented, verified by the FAA, and determined to be effective. Therefore, we recommend closure of this complaint.

May 22, 2014

May 22, 2014

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

To:

Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of the Chief Counsel,
Attention: Enforcement Docket (AGC-10),
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, DC 20591

Ferrer, Frank
Manager of ANM-108B
1601 Lind Ave., SW
Renton, WA 98057

Subject: Complaint filed for the purpose of seeking enforcement action according to Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Part 13, section 13.5

Dear Chief Council and Mr. Ferrer,

This is a formal complaint for violations of the following sections of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 21 Certification procedures for products and parts

- A. §21.183 Issue of standard airworthiness certificates for normal, utility, acrobatic, commuter, and transport category aircraft; manned free balloons; and special classes of aircraft.
- B. §21.137 Quality system
- C. §21.2 Falsification of applications, reports, or records.

The complaint is submitted by (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6) telephone (b) (6) (b) (6) a Technical Fellow employed at The Boeing Company.

The complaint is for violations of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 1901 Oaksdale Ave SW, Renton, Washington and seeks an appropriate order or other enforcement action to ensure root cause corrective action of Boeing Supplier oversight failures on Configuration Management as well as ensures, that the configuration of in-service 787 airplanes complies to the approved type design, including 787 supplier based major end items.

The FAA found (File Number 2009SER410003, dated November 26, 2008, FAA certificate management office – Boeing to (b) (6) FAA Liaison Manager, Boeing) that Boeing had “several systemic supplier control nonconformances requiring Boeing’s attention prior to the FAA adding the 787 Model to Boeing’s Production Certificate”. The finding focused on nonconformances related to Configuration Management processes at suppliers. The FAA identified the following issues:

May 22, 2014

1. "The FAA observed several suppliers that had not performed E-BOM to M-BOM reconciliation and "freezes" according to contractual requirements. ..."
2. "Boeing oversight plan for Partners, including addressing systemic issues ..."
3. "Subtier oversight and contract requirements flow down problem ..."
4. "Commonality Matrix noncompliances by suppliers."
5. - 8. Others

The complaint alleges, that Boeing provided misleading information to the FAA about the corrective actions on these finding, as well as that significant aspects of the findings with potential impact on airworthiness of in-service airplanes are still at issue at the Boeing supply base. Internal investigations the complainant initiated have been hampered by the wide spread involvement of senior and executive management in wrongly determining, that the violations were acceptable in airplane production.

For example, at a specific large supplier responsible executives on the 787 program misled the FAA during the production certification process with respect to closure of FAA findings 1, 3 and 4. Boeing executive were aware, that corrective action at the supplier for these issues had failed. The corresponding issues continue to exist at such supplier until at least March 2013, for which hard technical evidence is available. There is no evidence available, that the issues are corrected as of May 2014. The impact of these issues to the airworthiness analysis for each in-service airplane has been communicated to executive management. Through Boeing management (including Boeing Commercial VP for Quality) direction or in-action, corrective actions in the supply chain are not effectively accomplished and newly found issues not documented.

The logic and evidence for proving the violations of the Code of Federal Regulations was provided in written notifications to Boeing in several internal Ethics complaints (2010 - 2013) and in a formal submission to the Boeing Supplier Quality Regulatory Office, (b) (6)(b) (6) on March 26, 2014. Additional detailed evidence is available on the Boeing-owned computer of (b) (6)(b) (6) as well as in a message sent on April 16, 2014 to (b) (6). Due to the evidence being Boeing Proprietary and Supplier Proprietary, the submitter cannot provide this evidence without a subpoena to The Boeing Company.

Why is the resolution of these issues critical to airworthiness of the airplane in order to establish conformity to the type design?

787 Suppliers deliver products, whole airplane sections and complete wings which require supplier oversight with respect to Configuration Management to at least the same level as Boeing performs for internal production. After shipment of these products to Boeing, Boeing has limited ability to detect nonconformance and perform inspections of such complete products due to covered structure. Boeing has significant internal processes for checking and ensuring Configuration Management for production compliance to type design in 787 final assembly processes in Everett and Charleston. Boeing has built detailed procedures and extensive computing programs and data analytics capabilities to check the internally produced and assembled product.

However, Boeing does not deploy equivalent techniques in configuration management oversight of 787 suppliers; even though a delivered airplane section for one supplier's Bill of Material system contains more than 40,000 entries just for one line number with a high degree of complexity including manufacturing assemblies and subcontractor-supplier provided products. Boeing provides limited skills to the oversight operations, in particular in the Supplier Quality organizations. Since before the issuance of the 787 addition to the production certificate, Boeing has not fully addressed compliance problems known to Boeing

* using the message-counter system at Boeing

May 22, 2014

executive management nor has Boeing established the necessary skills and willingness to perform required oversight for Configuration Management at 787 suppliers. There is nobody assigned who can perform at the supplier systemic configuration checks for the overall delivered product at the same level as Boeing requires for their internal production at least during planned supplier oversight audits. Boeing deploys no corresponding computing and analytics capability as it does for internal production. The procedure for Configuration Management Health Assessments does not require actual data analysis of configuration information. Boeing does not require the 787 supplier to have certified computing systems for controlled and accurate management of configuration data even so Boeing has the requirement for internal production and for other airplanes. Yearly 1-2 week oversight visits by the FAA at the supplier sites cannot fill the gap for Boeing's lack of oversight, in particular, the FAA does not have the technology to perform systemic checking of configurations within the supplier's computing systems. The FAA therefore has difficulty discovering the Configuration Management issues at the Boeing supply base and has to rely on Boeing provided information for their oversight.

The submitters credentials are described below.

Internal requests by (b) (6)(b) (6) at Boeing to investigate these allegations have not yielded a change in behavior by Boeing management, they are on-going. Open ethics investigations into issues affecting airworthiness without a resolution after one year (or 2.5 years after the initial ethics submittals) demonstrate an inability of The Boeing Company to correct configuration management issues in a timely manner. The complainant was directed to not contact any management outside his home organization and ethics about these issues.

I request that the FAA investigate the attached allegations and initiate appropriate corrective actions at The Boeing Company, in particular with respect to in-service airplanes.

Sincerely,

(b) (6)

5-22-14

Attachment: detailed descriptions of the allegations

Background

The Boeing Company has to prove that its quality system "ensures that each product and article conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation." (CFR 21.137)

In support of the Production Certification, Boeing accomplishes the procedural requirements of ensuring conformance through a procedures system described in Boeing's Quality Manual and its associated documentation as approved by the FAA. For the 787 program, with respect to Configuration Management, the 787 Configuration Management (CM) plan describes the Configuration Management practices, requirements and processes. The CM plan defines the requirements to 787 suppliers with respect to Configuration Management as flown down formally in the 787 Process and System Commonality Matrix.

In support of the Airworthiness Certificate, Boeing accomplishes the proof of producing the airplane to the Type Design through an accountability process which compares completed as-built records at Boeing and Supplier manufacturing specifications to the approved Type Design. This process assumes, that the supplier provided end item is correctly configured with respect to the Boeing provided manufacturing configuration. No further checks are performed at Boeing. This assumption is not valid from some suppliers, nor systemically checked on a regular basis through Boeing oversight with qualified and trained personnel.

Violations of Title 14, Part 21 Certification procedures for products and parts, 21.2 Falsification of applications, reports, or records

1. 787 Executive and Senior Management knowingly misled the FAA during the production certification process with respect to closure of FAA findings 2009SER410003 on Configuration Management.

As part of the corrective action process for the FAA finding, Boeing performed Configuration Management Health Assessments (CMHA) across the major structures suppliers for the 787. This led to a number of formal findings (SER) in the Boeing Supplier Quality system, which were tracked by Boeing and reported to the FAA on a regular basis. The reports to the FAA include status charts, which provided for a status blue "CA (Corrective Action) Verified / Compliance validated."

For several large suppliers Boeing management ordered the closure of findings related to

- reconciliation (FAA issue #1),
- process documentation, Commonality Matrix and Configuration Management planning (FAA issue #4),
- supplier oversight (FAA issue #3)

when Boeing had not correctly validated that the finding was effectively resolved. Formal records in the Boeing Supplier Quality system tracking the closure of such items cannot demonstrate objective evidence of resolution for many of the closed findings. The closure statements sometimes provide only evidence that some corrective action took place but lack evidence that the issue is in fact resolved.

During this time, members of the CMHA team notified Boeing management, that there was objective evidence of failure for some of the key SERs. Boeing internal e-mail can demonstrate, that Boeing Executive and Senior management, including the 787 Quality Management Representative, were fully aware of the failed findings with respect to FAA issues #1 reconciliation, #4 documentation and #3 subtler oversight. Boeing executive management direction to achieve closure caused Boeing Supplier Quality including FAA designees to close findings for each of the FAA issues while fully understanding that there was objective evidence of failure. The evidence demonstrating failure prior to the issuance of the production certificate has been preserved as well as new findings in March 2012 confirmed that the issues had not been resolved. A Boeing internal ethics investigation on these SER closures, including full involvement of the BCA VP for Quality, directors in Supplier Quality and 787 ALIT did not change this

behavior, nor result in addressing underlying root causes and investigating impact to delivered and in-service airplanes.

The closure of the findings was in July 2011 and prior reported to the FAA as status blue "CA (Corrective Action) Verified / Compliance validated." Management creating the charts and approving their communication to the FAA knew of the objective evidence to the contrary. This includes the 787 Quality Management Representative. This constitutes knowingly misleading the FAA on a condition placed by the FAA to achieve the 787 addition to the Boeing Production Certificate.

2. Airworthiness applications for delivered 787 airplanes were made with the knowledge by the senior manager for Configuration Management, that the required supplier performance with respect to Configuration Management was flawed and therefore the logic for proving airworthiness for 787 was

^{wrong}
(b) (6) is the Senior Manager on 787 for Configuration Management, and in a leadership role involved in the Airworthiness Certification process for each delivered 787 airplane. (b) (6) led the Configuration Management Health Assessment team in March 2013, which was trying to verify effectiveness of corrective actions for findings on various Configuration Management issues in March 2012. These findings included most of the issues of the FAA finding 2009SER410003. (b) (6) was fully aware of data provided to him prior to the verification that corrective actions had failed. Despite this evidence, the responsible FAA designee on his team closed the corresponding findings. (b) (6) as well as senior management in Supplier Quality were fully aware, that the supplier's correct performance on the Configuration Management requirements, identified in FAA finding 2009SER410003, were directly related to Boeing's logic on proving airworthiness of delivered 787 airplanes and insufficient to proof airworthiness. As such this constitutes a violation of the regulations on Airworthiness, in particularly important in light of Boeing's ODA status. (b) (6) specifically acknowledged in writing after the closure of the corresponding Boeing findings that the supplier's processes were not in compliance with the requirements.

Violations of Title 14, Part 21 Certification procedures for products and parts, 21.137 Quality System

The BCA Quality VP, as well as executive and senior management in Supplier Quality, 787 and Boeing Company senior executive management have been informed (as can be demonstrated through e-mail and meeting records from 2011-2012) about the failure to close the Configuration Management (CM) issues properly.

There is no secondary analysis or safety process in place at Boeing which would catch product nonconformances caused by CM issues, except by chance. Boeing executives and senior management have been informed during the ethics investigations in 2012, about these issues. Boeing ethics has still as of May 2014 on-going investigations on these issues without apparent resolutions.

- For delivered airplanes, Boeing cannot prove through documented reports, that the reconciliation records at several large suppliers for early airplanes until currently delivered airplanes, are fulfilling the Boeing requirements for reconciliation with respect to accounting for all parts between the supplier as-built records and the Boeing Manufacturing Configuration Requirements. For example, Boeing executives have been presented with objective evidence that the CM issues at a particular supplier were ongoing into 2013. The responsible 787 executive directed (b) (6)(b) (6) to only work with the Boeing ethics organization, and not communicate further with high level management.
- A specific large supplier has no validated process to ensure accountability between their paper as-built records and the as-planned configuration used to reconcile the Bill of Materials at the

- supplier. Known nonconformities in reconciliation were not corrected or captured for product delivered to Boeing. Other reconciliation records were missing.
- The first deliveries of the 787-9 sections at a large supplier led to 100+ nonconformances for configuration issues only, documented as capture and controls in Boeing's velocity system. Yet, Boeing closed the corresponding SERs while having knowledge of the first of those nonconformances.
 - Boeing has no requirements for the 787, that supplier systems used for Configuration Management must be fulfilling similar certification requirements as Boeing's computing systems. As such, suppliers have implemented key Configuration Management systems without such certifications. Boeing has performed no validation that the resulting configurations at some of the supplier's production systems are conforming. Boeing performed only theoretical reviews of systems design and procedures, no technical checks of the resulting systems.
 - A small number of suppliers which are required to perform to contractual requirements for processes and systems as documented in the 787 Commonality Matrix (FAA issue #4) are properly contracted with acceptance of the requirements for the November 2013 release of the Commonality Matrix.

Closure of SERs with objective evidence to the contrary has been happening since 2007 until at least 2013 at various suppliers. These SERs were related directly to the FAA findings above. Boeing also did not formalize a number of nonconformities found during formal audit activities. This includes not filing SERs just prior to the issuance of the 787 addition to the Production Certificate at a subtler supplier for fundamental failures in First Article Inspections, availability and non-usage of engineering and inspection to uncontrolled media. As a result, corrective action did not occur and in some instances led to nonconformances discovered later on the airplane in Boeing final assembly. Senior management has been formally informed about such instances. Of course, this does not preclude, that further nonconformances are still hidden in product delivered. Not filing SERs for findings on Configuration Management was ongoing as of March 2013.

The corrective actions Boeing had committed to in support of the FAA finding have to a large extent been phased out and oversight at the supply base has been reduced. Supplier Quality has not developed the appropriate skill base and technology (e.g. data analytics). The responsibilities for oversight between Supplier Quality and Engineering are unclear, as documented in e-mails from supplier quality at the executive level.

In summary of this issue, The Boeing Company with respect to Configuration Management issues knowingly does not ensure to "eliminate the causes of an actual or potential nonconformity to the approved design or noncompliance with the approved quality system." This includes actions and non-actions by executive quality management at BCA.

Through assigning a significant number of personnel to be on-site at a supplier, Boeing tries to eliminate actual nonconformities to the approved design by pure man power assigned. But, Boeing does not ensure that the suppliers are compliant to their approved quality system with respect to Configuration Management in key aspects. Boeing does not ensure that the supplier's quality system fulfills Boeing's requirements in particular for Configuration Management planning, configuration control, configuration status accounting and configuration verification and audit. Boeing does also not ensure that potential nonconformities are discovered and analyzed for prior delivered product, when Configuration Management issues are discovered. This can be demonstrated in detail for the Configuration Management nonconformances at a specific large supplier, both for findings before and after the issuance of the 787 addition to the Boeing Production Certificate. Boeing executive management has been informed about these issues, yet has failed to either implement corrective action, or track those issues. Boeing senior

management performing audits has closed issues while acknowledging in writing, that on-going significant issues exist.

For all the allegations above detailed evidence is available, both technical data and e-mail communications.

Violations of Title 14, Part 21 Certification procedures for products and parts, 21.183 Issue of standard airworthiness certificates for normal, aircraft

Boeing, as part of the application for airworthiness has to prove that the aircraft conforms to the Type Design. Boeing utilizes for this proof internal as-built records and the Manufacturing Specification Boeing provides to Suppliers. This process is only valid, if Boeing suppliers prove through reconciliation (FAA Issue #1), that the supplier's delivered product conforms to the Manufacturing Specification. Suppliers certify the correctness of this reconciliation in their Declaration of Conformities for the products. Boeing has no backup analysis replacing the correctness of the supplier actions.

Boeing is responsible to ensure through oversight, that this reconciliation is accurate with respect to correctness and completeness, both in actual execution and in record keeping, as specified in Boeing's requirements documentation. (CFR 21.137 (c) Supplier control. Procedures that— Ensure that each supplier-furnished product or article conforms to its approved design)

It can be demonstrated through the SER findings, corrective action plans and objective evidence related to verification activities at suppliers (stored in formal records, as well as others communicated to management through e-mail and meetings) that Boeing failed on this oversight prior and after the issuance of the 787 addition to the Boeing production certificate. Boeing supplier quality accepted shipments of major end items, while Supplier Quality FAA designees and senior management knew the supplier's declaration of conformities were based on incorrect configuration analysis and knowingly incorrect. Besides failing to achieve root cause corrective action, the activities failed to ensure immediate corrective action at some suppliers with respect to capturing delivered product and ensuring that such product conforms to Type Design with documented correct and complete reconciliation and as-built records.

As an example, for a specific large supplier, Supplier Evaluation Records and documentation created and supplied by the March 2013 verification audit team, prove that the supplier's reconciliation processes in documentation and actual execution are deficient in ensuring that the supplier's product conforms to the Boeing Manufacturing Specification. The corrective action plans had no activities to ensure that delivered product was captured and reconciliation documentation was accurate to prove conformance to Boeing Manufacturing Specification. Analysis of reconciliation records for airplane line numbers 75, 118 and 127 showed significant failures for whole airplane sections. Reconciliation failed to detect production planning and execution issues which resulted in 100+ detected and documented configuration non-conformances for a given airplane section for the first 787-9 airplanes and 787-8 airplanes in 2012-2013. Boeing documented that the supplier had not performed reconciliation correctly and blamed it on failings in a new computing system, yet did not corrections on the underlying reconciliation causes.

Email records can demonstrate, that executive and senior management have been informed about this failure to meet the requirements of airworthiness of the Code of Federal Regulations for conformity of product to Type Design and failed to track and implement corrective action.

Background of Author

The author, Dr. (b) (6)(b) (6) is a (b) (6) Boeing employee. In 2001 he was promoted to Technical Fellow of The Boeing Company in the field of Business Process Engineering. In this field, he still holds one of the highest Engineering positions within Boeing Commercial Airplanes.

From 2000 – 2004, he was the Chief Process Architect for the 787 program (and its predecessors). In this capacity he led the development of the high level business processes for the program. He was responsible for the development of the Commonality Matrix providing for the process requirements to Boeing suppliers. In this capacity he was responsible for the technical content of supplier contracts with respect to Business Process and Computing Systems, including Configuration Management requirements for those. From 2004 – 2009, as the Partner Implementation Leader, he was responsible for the implementation of these Process and System requirements for the 787 wing, including wing box and edges, landing gear, and later also the fuselage sections of the 787. In this capacity he learned in detail of the structures suppliers internal Quality Management Systems and their implementation of Configuration Management requirements.

From 2008 – 2011, he was assigned to ensure the compliance of such suppliers to Configuration Management requirements and the correction of internal Boeing process improvements on Boeing internal systems. In this capacity he led many Boeing audit teams on Configuration Management and was instrumental in the opening of many Supplier Evaluation Records (SER) at such suppliers. In August 2011 he was reassigned to different responsibilities. In December 2011 he has filed formal complaints in the Boeing ethics with respect to the allegations in this note. They have only yielded acknowledgements of issues, yet no real corrective action.

In early 2013 has was reassigned to be the technical lead of the Configuration Management Health Assessment at a specific large supplier, but removed from the assignment after finding significant configuration issues.

The submitter received awards for excellence in 787 Configuration Management and “far exceeds expectations” for multiple years in a row for 787 configuration management, until he refused to close supplier findings when issues still existed. After the latest removal from assignments in 2013, his evaluation was dropped to moderately effective causing no merit raise to be awarded in 2014. The author believes he has been retaliated for his actions regarding Configuration Management. He was repeatedly removed from assignments related to Configuration Management at suppliers when finding issues including up to 2013. A formal complaint with OSHA will be filed in conjunction with this filing.

Electronic Complaint Notification

To qualify for the Whistleblower Protection Program (WBPP), you must be or have been an employee of a U.S. air carrier, or a contractor or subcontractor of a U.S. air carrier.

A PERSONAL REMEDY FOR DISCRIMINATION IS ONLY AVAILABLE THROUGH THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA). **You must file a WBPP complaint with OSHA within 90 DAYS of the discrimination event.** This notification advises the FAA but is not a substitute for filing the required complaint with OSHA.

Has this complaint been filed with OSHA?: **Yes**

EWB16512 Submitted on: **10/23/2015**

Personal Info

Personal Information

Complainant's Name: **Mr. (b) (6)(b) (6)**

Number: **EWB16512**

Street:

(b) (6)(b) (6)

City: **(b) (6)**

State: **(b) (6)**

Zip Code: **(b) (6)**

Country: **United States**

Province (Non-U.S.):

Postal Code:

Phone: **(b) (6)**

Cell Phone:

(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

Employee's Job:
**Aircraft/Powerplant
Manufacturing**

Employer Info

Employer Information

Company Type: **Air Carrier Contractor**

Company Name:

The Boeing Company

Certificate Number:

d/b/a:

Street:

City:

State:

Zip Code:

Phone:

Extension:

Alleged Safety Violation(s)

Alleged Safety Violation(s)

Safety Violation Category:

Safety Violation Subject:

☐ **FAA Regulation/Order/Standard Violated** ☐ **Don't Know**

Which Regulation? (If Known):

Non-FAA Federal Law Violation Related To Air Carrier Safety:

Short Description of Violation:

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Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 USC 552.

Alleged Adverse Personnel Action

Alleged Adverse Personnel Action

Alleged Adverse Personnel Action: **Change in Terms or Conditions of Work** Short Explanation:

Discrimination Date: *mm/dd/yyyy*

90 Days Expires on:
(File with OSHA before this date)

Geographic Location of Discrimination:

State (U.S. Only): Province (Non-U.S.):

WA

Complaint

Complaint

Sent From : **OSHA**

Alleged safety violation: To whom did you report it and what alleged discriminatory personnel action resulted from your report. Be as specific about names, dates, and events as space permits.



EWB16512 OSHA Complaint 1.pdf



EWB16512 OSHA Complaint 2.pdf

Admin

Administration

☒ **Not Assigned** ☐ **Assigned** Reason Not Assigned:
Previously Investigated

Special Instructions:
1/21/16: Sent email to Brian Morris asking for report.
2/22/16: Sent findings letters.

☐ **Transfer To Safety Hotline**

☐ **CB** ☐ **AIP** ☐ **OIG** Underlying Facts:
☐ **ACB** ☐ **ASN** ☐ **RO**

Organization Assignment:

Date FAA Received Complaint:	Date of AQS100 Assignment:	Date Returned from AQS-1:	Form Letter:	Date Acknowledge ment Letter Sent:	Date Assignment Letter Sent:	Date Finding Letter Sent:	Date No-Finding Letter Sent:	Date OSHA Notification Letter Sent:
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10/23/2015

Date Received: Date Sent: Service: Special Handling:

Additional Information:
Additional Information:

OSHA RO: **10** OSHA RO Manually Assigned:
FAA RO: FAA RO Manually Assigned :

FAA Safety Due Date (45 Days From Date Assigned): Extended Due Date:

Awaiting Documentation?

☐ **Yes** ☐ **No**

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FAA Response Date:

FAA Status:

FAA Closed Date: 02/22/2016

☐ Open ☒ Closed

FAA Safety Action:

Destroy Date: 02/22/2019

OSHA Tracking

OSHA Tracking

OSHA Case #: 0-1960-14-077

ALJ Case #: 2016-AIR-00004

STEP	Date of First OSHA Action	Last Date to File Appeal	Remarks
OSHA First Action:	10/13/2015	11/12/2015	
<input type="radio"/> Preliminary Order			
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Complaint Dismissed			<input type="radio"/> No Merit
<input type="radio"/> Complaint Settled			<input checked="" type="radio"/> Untimely
<input type="radio"/> Complaint Not Filed			<input type="radio"/> Withdraw

OSHA Case Number: 0-1960-14-077

STEP	Remarks
First Action Appealed To ALJ?	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	

STEP	Date of First Action Appealed to ALJ	Last Date to File Appeal	Remarks
ALJ Decision:	01/26/2016	02/05/2016	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Dismissed			
<input type="radio"/> Order	<input type="radio"/> Stay		
<input type="radio"/> Settled	<input checked="" type="radio"/> Withdrawal		
<input type="radio"/> Upheld Primary Order			

ALJ Case #: 2016-AIR-00004

STEP	Remarks
ALJ Decision Appealed?	Order of Dismissal
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	

STEP	Remarks
Date of Final Order:	01/26/2016
AQS-100 EIR:	
Discrimination Date + 2 Years:	
FAA Civil Penalty Action (post OSHA	

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Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 USC 552.

Final Order):

Status:

Closed

Date Closed:

01/26/2016

Satisfaction Survey

[Satisfaction Survey](#)

Satisfaction Survey Submitted on: Rating Level: (1=Not at all satisfied 10=Extremely satisfied)

Is this FOIA ? ☐ Yes
☒ No

[Review Tracking](#)

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