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WASHINGTON -- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has signed agreements with Tulsa Community College and the University of Oklahoma to become the first two schools for the Enhanced Air Traffic – Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI).
This new program will provide the same thorough curriculum and advanced technology offered at the FAA Air Traffic Controller Academy at Oklahoma...
Chair Blumenthal, Ranking Member Johnson, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss the FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s production and manufacturing system and the agency’s whistleblower programs.
I would like to begin by reiterating that the number one priority for the FAA is the safety of the flying public. As we carry out our regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will always inform our decision-making, and I am prepared to use the full range of my authority to ensure accountability whether from a manufacturer, an air carrier, or the FAA’s own operations.
FAA Whistleblower Program
I want to start off by stressing the importance of our Whistleblower and Safety Hotline programs. The safety and integrity of our air transportation system relies heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly. It is a priority for me to have a strong whistleblower program at the FAA. I want to thank the many individuals who have already reached out to our Office of Audit and Evaluation, and I strongly encourage anyone with safety concerns to report them to the FAA’s Hotline at hotline.faa.gov. We thoroughly evaluate every report we receive.
In addition to having our hotline program available to employees, Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its organizations. The FAA will continue to closely monitor Boeing’s implementation of the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the maturity of its Speak-up program as part of our oversight.
FAA Safety Oversight and Boeing Issues
Boeing’s manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers. Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust safety system comprising of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production and delivery of safe airplanes.
787 Shimming Issues
Following reports of shimming-related discrepancies, in 2019 the FAA required Boeing to conduct a system-wide assessment of its shimming practices. During this assessment, Boeing stopped production and reinspected airplanes within its production system. FAA regulations required Boeing to evaluate the issue and implement immediate corrective actions within the production system to ensure only conforming products were built after the point of discovery. The FAA oversaw Boeing’s implementation of the corrective actions, which included adding additional shim training requirements for mechanics and quality personnel, improving the workforce skillsets, and incorporating lessons learned and best practices for shimming into its production planning. The FAA also increased its surveillance of Boeing’s shimming and gap management activities and retained our authority to issue airworthiness certificates for new 787 airplanes.
Extensive evaluations of the non-conforming joins showed that their strength significantly exceeded the load limits requirements and that there were no immediate safety of flight concerns. In 2021 and 2022, the FAA also issued two airworthiness directives to require repetitive inspections to ensure any damage accumulated over time does not create a safety issue. The FAA will continue to monitor the long-term safety of the in-service fleet by requiring inspections to be performed over the life of the aircraft.
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid-exit door plug blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug configuration.
We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to return to service. Our findings during those inspections revealed that the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required further scrutiny. We increased oversight activities including:
Boeing Comprehensive Plan
This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and production issues.
During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely with Boeing as it developed its roadmap and plan for the path forward. I required this plan to address the findings from the FAA’s special audit as well as the recommendations from the expert review panel report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.
However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA’s increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the company’s safety culture to holistically address its systemic quality assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain those changes in the long term.
In April of this year, we issued regulations that require Boeing to have a Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing risk.
As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the following:
To monitor the health of Boeing’s production and quality system, we also directed Boeing to identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time visibility into the production system with specific control limits that will trigger corrective action if needed.
FAA’s Oversight Activities
As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the right layers of safety are in place. I am directly engaged to ensure Boeing executes the necessary changes to transform its safety culture and address its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes must be sustained in the long term. We will also remain engaged with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to expeditiously provide notice, in real-time, of any activities that may be criminal so that DOJ can take any action they deem appropriate.
We have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities include:
Our safety inspectors are also monitoring each of Boeing’s sub-teams tasked with implementing the key areas of the plan. Our safety inspectors are providing direct feedback on Boeing’s proposed changes and monitoring the KPIs to identify potential system risks. The FAA is closely reviewing the KPIs to monitor Boeing’s production system health and will independently assess any early indicators of risks within the system.
In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing, we also have hundreds of other personnel who are focused on our oversight of Boeing. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.
Addressing these safety issues also requires that the FAA continually examine the effectiveness of its own oversight processes and make the necessary improvements. We must continue to be increasingly proactive and establish more dynamic oversight protocols that allow us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest themselves as events. As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety management programs and other internal safety oversight initiatives.
As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is taking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide more real time insight into any emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various components of our safety ecosystem.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Subcommittee Chairman Graves, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to provide an update on the FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s production and manufacturing system. I want to thank the committee for your hard work in passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA started implementation immediately, and we are committed to keeping you and your staff updated on our progress on a quarterly basis.
I would like to begin by reiterating that the number one priority for the FAA is the safety of the flying public. As we carry out our regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will always inform our decision-making, and I am prepared to use the full range of my authority to ensure accountability whether from a manufacturer, an air carrier, or the FAA’s own operations.
Alaska Airlines Flight 1282
On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug configuration.
We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to return to service. Our findings during those inspections revealed that the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required further scrutiny. We increased oversight activities including:
Boeing Comprehensive Plan
This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and production issues.
During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely with Boeing as it developed its roadmap and plan for the path forward. I required this plan to address the findings from the FAA’s special audit as well as the recommendations from the expert review panel report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.
However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA’s increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the company’s safety culture to holistically address its systemic quality assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain those changes in the long term.
In April of this year, we issued regulations that require Boeing to have a Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing risk.
As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the following:
To monitor the health of Boeing’s production and quality system, including the impacts of those changes, we also directed Boeing to identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time visibility into the production system with specific control limits that will trigger corrective action if needed.
FAA’s Oversight Activities
Boeing’s manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers. Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust safety system comprised of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production and delivery of safe airplanes.
As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the right layers of safety are in place. As FAA Administrator, I am directly engaged with Boeing’s senior leadership to ensure they execute the necessary changes to transform Boeing’s safety culture and address its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes must be sustained in the long term.
The safety and integrity of our air transportation system rely heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly. Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its organizations.
We have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities include:
Our safety inspectors are also monitoring each of Boeing’s sub-teams tasked with implementing the key areas of the plan. Our safety inspectors are providing direct feedback on Boeing’s proposed changes and monitoring the KPIs to identify potential system risks. The FAA is closely reviewing the KPIs to monitor Boeing’s production system health and will independently assess any early indicators of risks within the system.
In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on production oversight, we also have hundreds of other FAA personnel who are focused on other aspects of our oversight of Boeing. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.
Addressing these safety issues also requires that the FAA continually examine the effectiveness of its own oversight processes and make the necessary improvements. We must continue to be increasingly proactive and establish more dynamic oversight protocols that allow us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest themselves as events.
As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety management initiatives and establishing a strategy to revamp our agency-wide safety management program. As part of this long-term strategy, we are in the process of elevating the role of our Executive Committee which oversees our regulatory oversight and safety management programs. To drive the necessary improvements to our oversight model across the agency, both the Deputy Administrator and I will serve on the Executive Committee. By doing so, this commitment underscores the importance of promoting an effective safety culture at every level of the agency.
As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is undertaking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide more real-time insight into any emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various components of our safety ecosystem.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.
WASHINGTON — The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes $633,009 in civil penalties against Space Exploration Technologies Corp (SpaceX) for allegedly failing to follow its license requirements during two launches in 2023, in accordance with statutorily-set civil penalty guidelines.
“Safety drives everything we do at the FAA, including a legal responsibility for the safety oversight of companies with commercial space transportation licenses,” said FAA Chief...
Chair Lucas, Chair Babin, Ranking Member Lofgren, Ranking Member Sorensen, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the important role the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have in enabling safe commercial space transportation. As the regulator of commercial space transportation, we are committed to ensuring the safety and economic competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. Maintaining our safety record is a key to the uninterrupted growth of this industry that has become an important economic engine for our nation. A safe industry is a successful industry.
U.S. commercial space capabilities and innovation are vitally important to our Nation. Space exploration has an impact on our everyday lives in countless ways and many benefits are yet to be realized. The commercial space transportation industry continues to develop new technologies that hold tremendous potential for further advancements that will assure our Nation’s access to space, take us back to the moon and to other interplanetary destinations, connect global communities, better serve the planet, and improve the daily lives of our citizens. Commercial space activity worldwide increases every day, resulting in a half-trillion dollar global space economy that will nearly double in the next decade. The United States contributes roughly half of all commercial space activity, and the U.S. commercial space industry will continue to be an extremely important contributor to the growth of this space economy.
I’m here before you today to discuss how our office drives the mission to enable safe space transportation and our ongoing efforts to streamline and improve our regulatory framework and processes.
Overview of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation and its Responsibilities
The Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), in accordance with Title 51 of the United States Code, regulates and oversees U.S. commercial space transportation operations, which include launch and reentry operations worldwide, the operation of launch and reentry sites, and human space flight missions. This authority has been delegated by the Secretary to the FAA, and I have led the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) as the Associate Administrator since September 2022. Our office carries out these authorities to protect public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to these important responsibilities, our office is also responsible for encouraging, facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector and facilitating the strengthening and expansion of U.S. space transportation infrastructure. To put it simply, the U.S. relies on our office to ensure public safety while enabling safe commercial space transportation, and we recognize and embrace the central role the DOT and the FAA play in ensuring the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space.
Licensing and Permitting of Commercial Space Transportation Operations
Commercial space transportation operations are increasing in complexity, diversity, and frequency, creating a significant growth in demand for AST’s licensing and permitting services and our resulting safety oversight.
Since 1989, the FAA has licensed or permitted more than 800 commercial space transportation operations, more than any other country in the world by far. To put the growth of the U.S. commercial space transportation sector into perspective, this fiscal year, AST has overseen the safety of 130 launch and reentry operations, which is more than triple the number of licensed operations that occurred in fiscal year 2020—and the year isn’t over yet. Additionally, we made 150% more application determinations in fiscal year 2024 as compared to fiscal year 2020. The catalyst for this increase is that we have seen steady growth of licensed vehicle operators and now have 26 licensed commercial launch and reentry operators.
The FAA has leveraged its licensing and regulatory capabilities and other various programs and initiatives in a manner that has resulted in an impressive safety record for this rapidly growing industry. No FAA-licensed launch or reentry operation has ever resulted in a fatality or injury to a member of the public, nor has there been any significant public property damage. I’ve encouraged our team to learn from every operation and to identify potential risks so that potential hazards and vulnerabilities become smaller and fewer. Looking forward, we expect the total number of licensed commercial space operations to double by fiscal year 2026. The FAA is committed to meeting this increased demand.
The safety record is the result of our licensing and permitting process, consisting of three phases: pre-application consultation, application evaluation, and operations and compliance monitoring. Prior to submitting an application, license and permit applicants are required to consult with the FAA to discuss the application process and other information relevant to the FAA’s licensing or permitting determination. Pre-application consultation marks the formal beginning of a relationship between AST and an applicant, and this phase of the licensing and permitting process ends when the applicant formally submits an application that is accepted by AST for evaluation. AST is required by statute to make a licensing determination within 180 days from license application acceptance and a permit determination within 120 days from permit application acceptance. During the application evaluation phase, AST reviews an application for compliance with applicable regulations and determines whether to issue an authorization (i.e., license or permit) to the applicant. The following reviews are conducted as part of an evaluation: a policy review, a payload review, a safety review, a financial responsibility determination, and an environmental review. Further, once AST issues a license or permit, it must ensure that the licensee or permittee complies with the governing statute, regulations, representations made in the application, and the terms and conditions of the license or permit. After a license or permit has been issued, operators frequently make changes to the vehicle configuration, launch procedures, or operations that may require the operator to apply for a license or permit modification. AST must evaluate all such changes in making determinations to approve or deny any modification to a license or permit. An applicant may also request a waiver(s) to regulatory provisions, and AST must evaluate and respond to each waiver petition to determine if it can be granted in the public’s interest and will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States. In the event there is a launch- or reentry-related mishap, AST or the National Transportation Safety Board oversees the mishap investigation.
We understand the importance of making timely licensing and permitting determinations and continue to make it our priority— over the last 11 years, we have issued 49 license determinations, averaging 151 days to issue a new license. We have taken action to improve our internal efficiency, which includes bolstering our staffing to handle licensing, permitting, and inspections; improved communication with industry that is clear, concise, specific, and actionable; wider availability through office hours and workshops; and investments in the development of new tools that will improve license application and processing efficiency.
We have also highlighted to industry a number of steps they can take to speed up license and permit determinations. We continue to encourage operators to ensure their licensing applications speak directly to our requirements at the outset, with clear narratives that spell out their safety case—exactly how their methodologies support the means of compliance. Additionally, it is important that operators minimize amendments and go-backs after their application review has started. When operators require significant changes to their applications, it often leads to significant and additional delays, as our experts have to verify and validate the changed data and its effects on other areas of the application. When a quality application is provided by an applicant at the start, a more expeditious approval is possible. The burden of proof of compliance rests with the operator, and with the increased demands placed on our office, we need operators to submit well-reasoned applications that clearly spell out means of compliance to make the most efficient and effective use of our resources.
The FAA’s impressive safety record and ability to meet the needs of this rapidly growing industry are in large part because of the incredible staff that we have in AST. FAA-licensed commercial operations have grown in the last decade by over 900%. Thanks to recent support from Congress, utilizing various hiring and recruiting authorities, we have been able to increase our total staff size to 150 staff members, which allows us to address some of the growing demands that have been placed on our office. The President’s fiscal year 2025 Budget Request continues this support by providing funding for the agency to hire additional staff to conduct authorization evaluations, safety analyses, and safety inspections.
FAA’s Commercial Space Regulatory Framework
AST has embraced a mindset and methods to become better, smarter, more agile, and more efficient—always in ways that won’t compromise safety. In December 2020, the FAA published a final rule to overhaul our launch and reentry regulations and consolidate, update, and streamline all launch and reentry regulations into a single performance-based part, which is found in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 450 (Part 450). This rule replaced prescriptive public safety requirements with performance-based requirements to provide more flexibility, allow more methods of compliance, and clear the path for innovation. We designed Part 450 to allow a commercial space operator to obtain a license for a portfolio of launch and reentry operations, which allows for different vehicle configurations, mission profiles, and even multiple sites under one license. The rule was developed to reduce the number of times an operator would need to come to the FAA for an approval and reduce the need to process waivers, improve regulatory clarity, and relieve administrative and cost burdens on industry and the FAA. Another benefit of Part 450 is that it enables an operator to streamline and include negotiated timelines for certain reporting requirements, which allows operators to design the reporting component of their program to fit their specific needs within a safe capacity.
Additionally, Part 450 enables coordination between the FAA and our Federal range partners, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense, on ground safety at Federal launch sites to eliminate gaps and duplication in oversight. By March 10, 2026, all launch and reentry licenses issued by the FAA under legacy regulations will no longer be valid, and launch and reentry vehicle operators must be in compliance with Part 450. We are encouraging industry to apply under Part 450 as soon as possible.
Currently, operators with proven launch vehicles and well-established concepts of operations, who could transition the soonest and benefit the most from Part 450, aren’t yet using it for their programs. New operators have begun using Part 450, but not to its fullest extent. As we approach these next 18 months, through various initiatives, AST is working to ensure industry has a full understanding of how to achieve compliance with Part 450 and how to take advantage of its intended benefits. To facilitate industry transition to Part 450, we have provided an assortment of aids, including license application checklists, advisory circulars, as well as virtual tutorials, office hours, and workshops. Part 450 will move us in the right direction toward efficiency and workload reductions for both the government and industry without compromising safety. As we look to the future, we will also continue to consider opportunities to improve the rule to better meet its objectives and identify other aids and resources to facilitate industry transition to Part 450. Additionally, we are also working to utilize advanced tools to adapt to the changing landscape. We are developing a Licensing Electronic Application Portal (LEAP), which will be used to accept, modify, exchange, and approve licensing materials under Part 450. LEAP is expected to enhance our ability to identify, track, and quickly resolve questions and issues both internally and externally with applicants. LEAP will streamline the licensing process for new applicants, provide more transparency into the process, and guide applicants in a step-by-step process.
Conclusion
I once again would like to reiterate the importance of the work we do at the FAA to enable safe space transportation. We have undertaken significant efforts to update our regulations and processes to create more capacity, and we continue to encourage legacy operators to move to the more efficient licensing process established under Part 450, well before they are required to do so. The Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, are here to ensure the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space by leading safely. We know the consequences can be enormous if we get it wrong—consequences for our lives, our planet, industry, and more. That’s why we remain committed to safety as our North Star. We will continue leveraging our licensing and regulatory capabilities, as well as other programs and initiatives, to enable the success of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry and ensure the U.S. remains the preeminent commercial space country of choice. Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the important role DOT and the FAA play in enabling safe commercial space transportation. This concludes my testimony, and I will be glad to answer any questions from the Committee.
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced $1.9 billion for 519 grants in 48 states, Guam, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, in its fifth announcement under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). An additional $269 million was also announced in FY 2023 Supplemental Discretionary Grants to fund 62 projects at 56 U.S. airports. This competitive grant...