Section 1. General

  1. INTERREGIONAL REQUIREMENTS
  1. An air route traffic control center (ARTCC) is responsible to an En Route and Oceanic Operations Area Office. Terminal and Flight Service facilities located within an ARTCC operational area must comply with the En Route and Oceanic Operations Area Office directives governing interfacility operational requirements. Although these facilities are not under its administrative jurisdiction, the En Route and Oceanic Operations Area Office responsible for the administration of the ARTCC must provide these directives to the appropriate facilities in ARTCC operational areas. These facilities must coordinate directly on mutual procedural or operational requirements.
  2. When the resolution of procedural or operational problems is not possible or when the En Route and Oceanic Operations Area Office directives are incompatible with those published by the administratively responsible area office, the facility must notify its own Terminal Operations Area or Flight Service Safety and Operations Group for resolution.
  1. FACILITY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES DIRECTIVE

The air traffic manager must issue a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Directive. The directive must specify, as a minimum, the required procedures for maintaining a safe and efficient operation and the jurisdictional boundaries for each operational position/sector.

  1. Review SOPs at least annually and update as necessary. Examine current SOPs for practices and/or procedures that are no longer required. Review includes both content and relevance that achieve full operational efficiency and customer flexibility.
  2. Review and, if necessary, update SOPs when new or revised instrument flight procedures are published or pertinent national procedures are implemented or changed.

NOTE-

Information related to subscribing for alerts regarding upcoming changes to instrument flight procedures is available at the Instrument Flight Procedures Information Gateway: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/procedures/.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 2-1-6, Checking Accuracy of Published Data.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-1-1, Correspondence Standards.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-3, Developing LOA.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-7, Annual Review/Revisions.

  1. Ensure noise abatement procedure commitments are included in the SOP or other facility directives and identified as such.

NOTE-

Noise abatement procedure commitments are the result of the NEPA process or other formal/informal agreements.

  1. POSITION/SECTOR BINDERS

Air traffic managers must develop and maintain binders for each position/sector within the facility. In addition to the above, this must include a supervisor position binder. The supervisor position binder should address procedures that will enhance controller performance in areas such as scanning, coordination, use of proper phraseology, and proficiency/remedial training. The binders must contain as a minimum, but not be limited to, the information listed in the En Route, Terminal, Flight Service Option Specific Guidelines. The binder must contain information that is necessary for the safe and efficient operation of each position/sector, including examples and formats where appropriate. A copy of each binder must be in a location easily accessible by each position/sector. Data may be stored and displayed via electronic means, e.g., on Information Display Systems (IDS), where available. Air traffic managers in terminal facilities may determine the need for individual binders for associated/coordinator positions.

  1. REFERENCE FILES

Air traffic managers must maintain current sets of orders, facility directives, Letters of Agreement (LOA), aeronautical charts, pertinent International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) documents and related publications so that they may be readily available for operational use and study by facility personnel. Also, the air traffic manager must maintain reference materials at appropriate work areas. These materials must consist of pertinent directives, agreements, emergency and overdue aircraft procedures, and a location listing of airports within the area of responsibility including runway alignment, lighting, surface, and length as a minimum. Current telephone numbers of user companies/organizations identifying the source who has the capability of contacting no radio (NORDO) aircraft may also be listed. Air traffic managers must determine the applicability of other materials to be included.

NOTE-

The air traffic manager will ensure that the user list is kept current.

  1. RELEASE OF INFORMATION
  1. It is FAA policy to make factual information available to persons, properly and directly concerned, except information held confidential for good cause.
  2. Except as provided in this and other FAA orders, or when specifically authorized to do so by the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator, no agency employee must release information from any National Airspace System (NAS) database regarding the position, altitude, heading, flight plan, origination or destination of a single aircraft (“Flight Track Data”) upon the oral request of an individual outside of the FAA.
  1. No request for Flight Track Data must be granted unless it is first determined that the request is being made in the interest of aviation safety or efficiency, or for an official purpose by a United States Government agency or law enforcement organization with respect to an ongoing investigation.
  2. No Flight Track Data on aircraft conducting military, law enforcement, presidential, or other sensitive flights must be released except as operationally required to assist such flights.
  3. Each request must be handled in the following manner:
  1. The agency employee must positively identify the requestor by name, organization or affiliation, and point-of-contact (including a telephone call-back number).
  2. The agency employee must inquire about the purpose of the request so as to determine whether the request is being made in the interest of aviation safety or efficiency, or for an official purpose.
  3. Except for requests received from any United States Government agency or law enforcement organization, the agency employee must enter into the facility Daily Record of Facility Operation, FAA Form 7230-4, a record of the request, including:
  1. The information obtained under subparagraphs b3(a) and b3(b) above; and
  2. A summary of any information provided to the requestor, including the flight number or registration number of the aircraft in question.
  1. For requests received from any United States Government agency or law enforcement organization, the only information entered into the local facility log must be that called for by subparagraph b3(a) above, with a brief notation as to whether the request was granted or not.
  1. If the request is from an individual and it is determined that the request, if granted, would not further aviation safety or efficiency, the employee must deny the request and may inform the requester that information may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A FOIA request should be filed in writing with the FOIA Officer, ARC-40, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591, or by email to 7-AWA-ARC-FOIA@faa.gov.
  2. If it cannot be ascertained whether the purpose of the request, if from an individual, is in furtherance of aviation safety or efficiency, or if from a United States Government agency or law enforcement organization, is for an official purpose, the agency employee must contact facility management for guidance. If local management is unable to determine whether or not a request should be granted, the official should contact the Quality Assurance Investigator on-call in Washington headquarters. En Route and Oceanic Operations, Terminal Operations, and Flight Service Safety and Operations Group may elect to process after-hour requests through the appropriate Service Area office Quality Assurance on-call specialist.
  1. Federal Contract Flight Service Stations (FCFSS) must handle the release of information in accordance with contract requirements.
  1. CHECKING ACCURACY OF PUBLISHED DATA

Air traffic managers and air traffic representatives (ATREPs) must ensure, upon receipt of official publications, that a review of data pertaining to their facilities and areas of concern is accomplished to ensure accuracy and completeness. When pertinent national procedures, aeronautical data (to include weather reporting locations), or flight procedures are created or changed, review facility standard operating procedures (SOPs) directives, position/sector binders, reference files, and/or letters of agreement (LOAs) and initiate corrections and briefings as required.

NOTE-

  1. Information related to subscribing for alerts regarding upcoming changes to instrument flight procedures is available at the Instrument Flight Procedures Information Gateway: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/procedures/
  2. Additional digital AeroNav Products are available via the following websites:
    1. https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/procedures
    2. http://aerochart.faa.gov
  3. Information on aeronautical data changes, including weather reporting locations, is available for free at the Aeronautical Information Services (AJV-A), Aeronautical Data web portal. Check 28-Day Subscription and Transmittal Letters at https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/aero_data/
  4. Notice to Air Missions information may be viewed on the Aeronautical Information System Replacement (AISR) or at https://notams.aim.faa.gov/notamSearch.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 2-1-2, Facility Standard Operating Procedures Directive.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 2-1-3, Position/Sector Binders.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 2-2-11, Personnel Briefings Regarding Orders, Published Aeronautical Data and Flight Procedures.FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-3, Developing LOA.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 4-3-7, Annual Review/Revisions.
FAA Order 7930.2, Notices to Air Missions (NOTAM).
FAA Order JO 8260.19, Flight Procedures and Airspace.
FAA Order JO 8260.3, United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS).
FAA Order JO 8260.43, Flight Procedures Management Program.

  1. AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE DURING PLANNED AND UNPLANNED OUTAGES

The air traffic manager (ATM) must develop and maintain guidelines to provide continuity of required services during planned and, to the degree possible, during unplanned outages.

  1. The ATM must collaborate with Technical Operations (Tech Ops) during any projected planned maintenance tasks that may impact air traffic control (ATC). The ATM must ensure affected air traffic stakeholders or appropriate subject matter experts (SMEs) are notified of planning meetings.
  2. The ATM must review all project risk plans (PRP) received from Tech Ops. A PRP is a living document that promotes coordination and communication and reduces the risk to the National Airspace System (NAS) associated with project implementation. After review, the ATM must forward concur or non-concur via the notification email or directly through the corporate work plan portal link provided in the email. The ATM may forward questions or comments regarding the PRP directly through the notification email or by contacting the point of contact identified in the notification email.
  3. Facility Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) must include the use of the Operational Risk Management Plan (ORMP), which is the formal document for review and approval that includes the plan for ATC to protect continuity of service.

NOTE-

Operational Risk Management (ORM) training is available via eLMS.

  1. The ORMP must be used in conjunction with local procedures to support the completion of formal ORM maintenance activities and projects.
  2. Certain maintenance tasks that do not meet the criteria identified in subparagraph c1 may still have the potential for operational consequences locally. Air Traffic and Technical Operations should jointly identify these additional maintenance activities that will require an ORMP.
  1. The ATM must develop an ORM section in the facility SOP. The facility SOP must identify persons or positions authorized to review and/or approve ORMPs for the facility. Additionally, the SOP must identify communication procedures to ensure team members are notified in a timely manner of their team participation responsibilities.
  2. All air traffic personnel identified in an ORMP are team members. Additional team members may be added for informational and increased situational awareness purposes and should address any concerns through the point of contact (POC)/reviewer or approver. The required air traffic team members consist of POC/reviewer and approver. Air traffic team members must:
  1. Add additional team members as necessary.
  2. Participate in ORMP meetings.
  3. Review and comment on the ORMP.
  4. Assess operational risks, identify any conflicting activities, and propose mitigations.
  5. Maintain situational awareness until completion of the activity.
  6. Contact the air traffic POC if the situation changes or the ORMP requires reassessment.
  1. The air traffic POC/reviewer is responsible for coordination of the ORMP meeting with all affected air traffic stakeholders. The air traffic POC/reviewer:
  1. Reviews the composition of the ORMP team and ensures the appropriate air traffic team members and/or air traffic approver have been assigned. When more than one facility is affected, ORMPs may require multiple reviewers or approvers.
  2. Adds team members as appropriate.
  3. Participates in ORMP meetings.
  4. Ensures the completeness and feasibility of executing the ORMP, (shares responsibility with the air traffic approver).
  5. Identifies any conflicting activities.
  6. When the ORMP has been submitted for Air Traffic review, completes the air traffic mitigation plan element and submits the ORMP for approval. The System Support Center (SSC) manager will submit the plan to the Air Traffic and Tech Ops approvers.
  7. Ensures the affected air traffic personnel are briefed and prepared to implement mitigations prior to commencing work.
  1. The Air Traffic and Tech Ops approvers are responsible for the final review of the ORMP. Plans approved by Air Traffic and Tech Ops approvers are forwarded to Tech Ops personnel to perform the agreed-upon work. If a plan is not approved, the approver will select the Take 5 button in the ORMP tool and will notify the SSC manager or the initiator of their concern. The approvers:
  1. Ensure the completeness and feasibility of executing the ORMP (shared responsibility with the air traffic POC/reviewer).
  2. Approve the ORMP or select the Take 5 button with comments for additional consideration or follow-up.
  3. Change role assignments or team members as necessary.
  4. Identify any conflicting activities.
  5. Ensure the High Visibility Event flag is set when it meets the appropriate definition outlined below.

NOTE-

High Visibility Events are those that require upper management awareness because of their potentially significant impact on the NAS. These are events that if the worst-case scenario occurs, even with mitigations in place, could cause a hazardous situation in the NAS, change Operational Contingency Level (OCL), create a significant increase in workload for ATC, or cause aircraft to be held or diverted, especially at High Impact facilities.

  1. The majority of interactions with Tech Ops will not involve a PRP or an ORMP. Therefore, the facility must develop and incorporate procedures into the facility SOP for the coordination of maintenance activities which may affect the ability of the facility to provide air traffic services. These procedures must be consistent with the Principles of ORM outlined below and take into consideration the facility's unique operational circumstances. Air traffic personnel will use these procedures when coordinating and executing planned outages and maintenance tasks with Tech Ops.
  2. Principles of ORM.
  1. Situational Awareness. Understand the current state and dynamics of the operation and remain vigilant for future changes and developments. Considerations include:
  1. Peak and off-peak traffic periods.
  2. Weather conditions.
  3. Known concurrent activities that could impact, or be impacted by this activity. Example: VIP movement, airshows, other outages, etc.
  4. Additional outages in your facility or adjacent facility.
  5. Current staffing/operational oversight.
  6. Other communication/surveillance equipment available as an alternate means of providing air traffic services.
  1. Plan Actions. The method and resources needed to accomplish the activity. Considerations include:
  1. Review break rotations/staffing plan to ensure positions are staffed accordingly.
  2. Review applicable (e.g., FAA Order JO 1900.47) Air Traffic Control Operational Contingency Plans.
  3. Brief affected staff prior to outages of the credible risks and potential impacts including worst-case scenarios and alternate procedures.
  4. Identify the Tech Ops POC if immediate contact is needed.
  5. Test back-up equipment before releasing the primary equipment to be worked on (where applicable).
  1. Identify operational consequences. Identify the NAS systems and air traffic stakeholders that will, or could potentially be affected during the execution of the plan. Considerations include:
  1. Credible risks and potential impacts including worst-case scenarios that could affect air traffic's ability to provide service.
  2. Affected facilities, sectors/areas, positions, or other stakeholders participating in, or potentially impacted by the activity.
  3. Adverse effects to ATC personnel safety.
  1. Communicate. An ongoing exchange of information between Technical Operations and air traffic personnel is essential for the review of the potential operational consequences and development of mitigation strategies. The information must be received, understood, and, in some cases, approved. Considerations include:
  1. Identified credible risks and potential impacts including worst-case scenarios.
  2. Mitigation Strategies.
  1. Include using the back-up equipment/systems, alternate channels, etc.
  2. Confirm proper operation of support equipment, standby equipment and/or backup systems prior to conducting the scheduled activity.
  3. Confirm Technical Operations and Air Traffic are prepared to implement their mitigation strategies.
  1. Notify Tech Ops immediately of any circumstances that may affect the procedure/task, e.g., change in operational hours, unusual circumstances, or operational configurations.
  2. “Take-5,” if needed (to gain more information or reassess approval).
  3. Discuss and/or document effectiveness of plan for future reference or training.
  1. Coordinate. Considerations include:
  1. Coordinating the activity with the appropriate adjacent facilities.
  2. Additional coordination and notification requirements should there be a change to planned activity.
  3. Notify Regional Operations Center (ROC), Domestic Events Network (DEN), or facility management (when applicable).
  4. Verify the equipment status and configuration upon completion of the activity.
  5. Ensuring that Out for Maintenance (OFM) and Return to Service (RTS) are recorded on FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operations.
  1. For unplanned outages, the ATM must develop and maintain operational plans that provide continuity of services to the extent dictated by the outage. The plans must be in accordance with FAA Order JO 1900.47.
  1. OPERATIONS DURING A STAFFING CONSTRAINT

The following steps must be followed when traffic management initiatives (TMI), ATC-0, or any reduction in ATC services are being considered due to staffing constraints:

  1. The Air Traffic Manager (ATM) or their designee must contact the General Manager (GM) or Assistant General Manager (AGM) or their designee and provide the factors of the staffing shortage, expected duration, facility mitigations implemented, and any other related information. If the situation can be mitigated by other means and no TMIs, ATC-0 declaration, or reduction in services is required, the GM or AGM or their designee will determine if a Staffing Trigger Form should be initiated and coordinated with the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO).
  2. If it is determined that TMIs are required, ATC-0 is unavoidable, or a reduction in services is required, then the GM, AGM, or their designee must notify the DDO for their concurrence. The GM or AGM or their designee must obtain DDO approval before submitting the Staffing Trigger Form to the National Operations Manager (NOM) and Joint Air Traffic Operations Command (JATOC).
  3. If the DDO agrees that TMIs, ATC-0, or reductions in service are required, the facility will submit the Staffing Trigger Form to the NOM. The DDO will also initiate an upward notification to the AJT Vice President/Deputy Vice President (VP/DVP) or their designee immediately, detailing the impact to the NAS.

NOTE-

  1. Situations involving a minor disruption of air traffic services or a short duration ATC-0 situation that does not have an impact on the NAS should be reported to the DDO. The DDO will determine if a Staffing Trigger Form is to be submitted to the NOM. (e.g., a facility is opening a few minutes late without flight delays, airborne holding, or flight diversions.)
  2. The Staffing Trigger form is a fillable form created to ensure that the collection of key data elements related to a staffing constraint is captured and available to be forwarded to the NOM for upward distribution. The Staffing Trigger form is accessible at:
    https://ksn2.faa.gov/ajt/Home/AJT23/BURST/Pages/default.aspx

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 11-1-2, Duties and Responsibilities.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Chapter 18, Section 7, Traffic Management Initiatives.

  1. HANDLING BOMB THREAT INCIDENTS

Air Traffic facilities must establish procedures to carry out their functions in accordance with FAA Order 1600.6, Physical Security Management Program. The following provisions must be incorporated into facility plans:

  1. All air traffic facilities must notify the respective regional operations center and other appropriate Service Area office element when a bomb threat occurs.
  2. All personnel in the facility will be advised when a bomb threat has been received and of pertinent information regarding the bomb threat.
  3. The decision to evacuate a facility will be made by the air traffic manager or his/her designee.
  4. If the decision is made to evacuate and air safety is not a factor, immediately release nonessential personnel, instruct aircraft to contact the appropriate facility designated in the facility contingency plan, advise adjacent facilities as appropriate (ARTCCs should advise the ATCSCC of pending evacuation), broadcast that the facility is being evacuated, and evacuate the building.
  5. If the decision is made to evacuate and air safety is a factor, immediately release nonessential personnel, resolve traffic conflicts (aircraft on radar vectors should be cleared to resume normal navigation), instruct aircraft to contact the appropriate facility designated in the facility contingency plan, advise adjacent facilities (ARTCCs should advise the ATCSCC), broadcast that the facility is being evacuated, and evacuate the building as rapidly as personnel can be released. The appropriate actions should be accomplished quickly to minimize personnel exposure. Further, the air traffic manager or his/her designee will determine which personnel will remain on duty until the traffic situation is resolved. Personnel designated to perform this function normally will be selected from the supervisory ranks or persons volunteering temporary services. To be effective this action should be planned in advance. There are various ways in which this can be accomplished. One simple method is that at the beginning of each watch, supervisors will plan their watch coverage should the need to evacuate arise.
  6. The evacuation plans will also include recall procedures.
  7. Consideration should be given to establishing an alternate site to provide limited flight service or airport air traffic and approach control services.

NOTE-

Processes for the establishment of alternate sites and divestiture of airspace/responsibilities are outlined in FAA Order JO 1900.47 and facility Operational Contingency Plans (OCPs).

  1. During bomb threat situations, facility air traffic managers or their designees should exercise discretion regarding admittance of visitors to their facilities.
  2. Facilities will take action to increase the security whenever such action is feasible. Measures to protect administrative and operational areas and equipment rooms should be taken. FAA Order 1600.6, Physical Security Management Program, provides additional guidance for the protection of agency facilities, installations, equipment, etc. Examples are:
  1. Increase security forces and measures.
  2. Ensure that facilities are kept tidy so that out-of-place articles can be easily detected. This concept should be emphasized to all personnel including contractors and their employees.
  3. Room or area monitors can be assigned to “look over” the area at frequent intervals for suspicious objects. In this regard, air traffic personnel assigned temporary administrative duties would be given building warden responsibilities.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 2-8-2, Medical Clearance Requirements.

  1. Outside areas should be kept as neat as possible. Landscaping should, if possible, be done in a manner that will not enhance clandestine activities.
  1. Although it is envisioned that the foregoing will be accomplished within existing resources, planning (including budgeting) should be initiated to establish a secure environment.
  2. Release information on bomb threat incidents in accordance with the procedures established in current directives. Where no applicable procedures have been established, all information must be treated as “For Official Use Only.”
  1. HANDLING MANPADS INCIDENTS
  1. Air traffic managers must coordinate with federal, local, and other law enforcement agencies, as needed, to develop notification and contingency plans during a threat or attack from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
  2. Air traffic managers must establish procedures to ensure the dissemination of MANPADS alert level 2 (credible threat)/alert level 3 (reported attack) and post-event activity via ATIS and/or controller-to-pilot transmissions. These reports must continue until notified otherwise by the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC).

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-9-3, Content.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 10-2-13, MANPADS Alert.
FAA Order JO 7610.4, Para 15-1-3, Responsibilities.

  1. Air traffic managers must ensure the Operations Manager/OS/controller-in-charge (CIC) notifies the DEN ATSC of any MANPADS threat or attack as soon as possible. In the event of an observed or reported MANPADS launch, the initial report to the DEN ATSC must include the following information:
  1. Call sign (if known);
  2. Type aircraft (if known);
  3. Coordinated Universal time;
  4. Position/location of event;
  5. Altitude (if known); and
  6. Any other pertinent information (e.g., contrail sighting, additional pilot or ATC observation reports, law enforcement contact, etc.).
  1. AIRPORT EMERGENCY PLANS
  1. Operational instructions covering airport emergency service at airports served by an ATCT and/or FSS must be issued by the air traffic manager (the ATCT manager at airports with both facilities) in the form of a LOA. Procedures and/or LOAs for alerting airport emergency equipment at other public-use airports served by the ATCT and/or FSS must also be developed, if deemed appropriate.

NOTE-

Facility managers or their designee should meet with Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel on an annual basis to review the local airport emergency service LOA and the effectiveness of local procedures.

REFERENCE-

FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5210-7, Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Communications.

  1. Responsibility for the prompt dispatch of equipment upon alert notice by the FAA ATCT or the FSSs is the joint responsibility of the airport management and the emergency equipment operator. The amount of equipment and number of personnel responding to the emergency will be determined by the equipment operator and should be kept to the minimum required. After receiving the alert and the route to be taken, the personnel operating the equipment are responsible for handling the emer-gency.
  2. Procedures for alerting airport emergency equipment, including additional equipment which may be located off the airport, must consist only of:
  1. Stating the nature and the location of the emergency by means of a signalling system; e.g., a siren and/or telephone. When required, the tower must indicate the route to be taken by the emergency equipment. FSSs must not specify such routes.
  2. Specifying, when required, the category of alert applicable to the emergency.
  3. Initiating the alert when, in the opinion of any of the following, a potential or actual emergency exists:
  1. The FAA specialists on duty.
  2. The pilot of the aircraft concerned.
  3. The operator of the aircraft or his/her representative.
  4. A representative of the airport management.
  1. Alert Phases: Operations personnel may categorize local alerts if the category or phase designations have been coordinated locally and agreed to. It may be desirable for emergency equipment to be alerted on a standby or ready basis by use of a two-phase or three-phase alert system, but keep these actions as inconspicuous as possible without impairing efficiency. A three-phase alert may be set up as follows:
  1. Alert I: Indicating an aircraft approaching the airport is in minor difficulty; e.g., feathered propeller, oil leak, etc. The emergency equipment and crews would standby at the equipment house for further instructions.
  2. Alert II: Indicating an aircraft approaching the airport is in major difficulty; e.g., engine on fire, faulty landing gear, no hydraulic pressure, etc. This could mean emergency equipment would proceed to a predetermined location (end of runway, etc.) to await development of the potential emergency.
  3. Alert III: Indicating an aircraft involved in an accident on or near the airport and emergency equipment should proceed immediately to the scene.
  1. After alerting the emergency equipment, notify only the local aircraft operator or his/her representative and the airport management.

NOTE-

Airport management is responsible for notifying other agencies or personnel.

REFERENCE-

Advisory Circular AC 150/5210-7, Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Communications.

  1. EXPLOSIVES DETECTION K-9 TEAMS

At many of our major airports a program has been established by the FAA and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to make available an explosives detection K-9 team. ATC facilities must take the following actions should they receive an aircraft request for the location of the nearest explosives detection K-9 team:

  1. The facility will relay the pilot's request to the FAA Washington Operations Center, AEO-100, telephone: commercial (202) 267-3333; ETN 521-0111; or DSN 851-3750 providing the aircraft's identification and position.
  2. AEO-100 will provide the facility with the nearest location. The facility will have AEO-100 standby while the information is relayed to the pilot.
  3. After it has been determined that the aircraft wishes to divert to the airport location provided, the air traffic facility will ascertain estimated arrival time and advise AEO-100. AEO-100 will then notify the appropriate airport authority at the diversion airport. In the event the K-9 team is not available at this airport, AEO-100 will relay this information to the air traffic facility providing them with the secondary location. ATC will then relay this to the pilot concerned for appropriate action.
  1. INTERSECTION TAKEOFFS

Air traffic managers at ATCTs and at FSS facilities that provide LAA will prepare an airport diagram showing intersection takeoff information as follows:

  1. Indicate the actual remaining runway length from each intersection; round all actual measurements “down” to the nearest 50-feet. Obtain measurements from an authentic source and record them on the diagram.

NOTE-

Some airports publish “declared distances” for a particular runway. These are published in the Chart Supplement U.S. or the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), and there is no requirement that facility personnel be made aware of them. These distances are a means of satisfying airport design criteria and are intended to be used by pilots and/or operators for preflight performance planning only. There are no special markings, signage, or lighting associated with declared distances, and they do not limit the actual runway available for use by an aircraft. Therefore, they cannot be used for any air traffic control purpose. If pilots inquire about the existence of declared distances, refer them to the Chart Supplement U.S. or the AIP.

  1. If the airport authority requests that certain intersection takeoffs be denied, so indicate on the diagram.

EXAMPLE-

/NO TKOFF/

  1. Indicate any access points to a runway from which an intersection takeoff may be made.
  1. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS

To alleviate any potential misunderstandings of aircraft identifications caused by duplicate, phonetically similar-sounding, or hard to distinguish registration numbers or call signs operating in the same area, facility managers must ensure that operations supervisors report those occurrences to a facility officer and that the following actions be taken.

  1. Scheduled air carrier aircraft: When two or more air carriers with duplicate flight numbers or phonetically similar-sounding call signs operate within 30 minutes of each other at the same airport or within the same sector and cause an identification problem on a recurring basis, request that the flight identification numbers be changed by:

NOTE-

Recurrent situations would be aircraft proceeding primarily the same direction through the same sectors three or more times a week, at least two weeks out of four consecutive weeks.

  1. For carriers listed at the following web address, http://tfms.faa.gov/airlinephones.html, contact the appropriate airline office.
  2. For carriers not listed on the website, contact the operator or the chief pilot of the carrier concerned. Changes to the list can be provided to the ATCSCC Facility Automation Office via the Traffic Management Officer (TMO) or the Deputy Director of System Operations (DDSO).
  1. Military aircraft: Contact base operations of the departure airport and request that action be taken to have the flight identifications changed when duplicate, phonetically similar, or hard to distinguish call signs are causing a flight identification problem. If additional assistance is required, immediately advise the military representative assigned to the Service Area office.
  2. Civil aircraft other than air carrier: Advise Mission Support Services, Aeronautical Information Services, at Callsigns@faa.gov when two or more designated call signs are found to be phonetically similar or difficult to pronounce and are causing a flight identification problem.
  3. The designated facility officer must maintain a record of actions taken and provide feedback to operations supervisors. That record should include:
  1. Date/time of occurrence.
  2. Location (e.g., RUS VORTAC, sector 90, Shannon Airport).
  3. Call signs involved in the occurrence.
  4. Date occurrence is reported by facility.
  5. Office/person that facility contacted.
  1. APPROACH CONTROL AIRSPACE

With the advancement of technologies, the air traffic services provided by en route facilities and terminal facilities are becoming more integrated. Terminal airspace should be adjusted to match the services provided. Although en route services are an ARTCC function, terminal facilities may be expected to provide some en route service. There are some areas in which an ARTCC may not have adequate radar coverage or resources, and in these areas it may be necessary to expand the terminal airspace to provide service. Conversely, at locations with nonradar approach control facilities, en route facilities may have radar coverage, and better service would be provided if some approach control airspace is recalled to the ARTCC. At certain locations, the en route facility may be able to absorb all the airspace of a nonradar approach control. Prior to implementing airspace changes, en route and terminal facility managers must work together to ensure the delegated approach control airspace best meets the needs of the airspace area.

  1. AUTHORIZATION FOR SEPARATION SERVICES BY TOWERS
  1. Nonapproach control towers, not equipped with a tower radar display, may be authorized to provide appropriate separation between consecutive departures based upon time or diverging courses, and between arrivals and departures, provided:
  1. A LOA exists with the IFR facility having control jurisdiction which authorizes the separation responsibilities and prescribes the procedures to be used;
  2. The agreement has been approved by the Area Director of Terminal Operations; and
  3. There is no delegation of airspace to the tower.
  1. Towers equipped with certified tower radar displays (CTRD) may be authorized to provide separation services in accordance with paragraph 10-5-3, Functional Use of Certified Tower Radar Displays.
  2. An authorization for towers to provide separation services other than those prescribed in subparagraphs a and b must be supported by a staff study prepared by the authorizing facility or the Terminal Operations Service Area office which addresses at least:
  1. The proposed procedures.
  2. Operational benefits.
  3. Operational impact.
  4. Why the IFR facility is unable to provide an equal or superior level of service without the delegation.
  5. Improved services to users.
  6. Additional radar training.
  7. The measures taken to ensure that the local controller's ability to satisfy the FAA's air traffic responsibilities regarding aircraft operating on the runways or within the surface area is not impaired.
  8. On-site spares, maintenance support/restoration requirements.
  9. Savings and/or additional costs.
  10. The number of additional people required.
  1. The staff study must, following the Terminal Operations Service Area review and concurrence, be forwarded to Terminal Services through System Operations Planning, and System Safety and Procedures for approval. System Operations Planning will coordinate with all affected Technical Operations Services Area Service Directors prior to finalizing their comments and recommendations.
  1. BIRD HAZARDS

The air traffic manager of the ATCT must establish procedures to:

  1. Ensure that any reported bird strikes or trend toward an increase in bird activity on or around the airport served by the ATCT are reported to airport management.
  2. Ensure that coordination will be accomplished with airport management for the possible issuance of NOTAMs when flocks of birds roost on the runways.

NOTE-

It is the responsibility of airport management to issue any such NOTAMs.

  1. Participate in local bird hazard programs when established by airport management.
  1. PROHIBITED/RESTRICTED AREAS AND STATIONARY ALTRVS

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, prescribes separation requirements from special use, ATC-assigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs. In recognition of the fact that prohibited/restricted areas and stationary ALTRVs may be established for security reasons or to contain hazardous activities not directly involving aircraft operations, provision is made for exempting these areas from vertical and radar separation minima if the areas have been identified by facility management. The intent in prescribing separation requirements from special use, ATC-assigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs is to establish a buffer between nonparticipating aircraft and aircraft operations inside special use, ATC-assigned airspace, and stationary ALTRVs. As such, the buffer serves as an extra safety margin in consideration of possible operational, procedural, or equipment variances. Application of the separation prescribed in FAA Order JO 7110.65 is not considered necessary whenever the prohibited/restricted airspace and stationary ALTRV does not contain aircraft operations because these areas typically provide an internal buffer based upon the exact type of activity taking place. In making a determination to exempt specific areas, air traffic facility managers must be guided by the following:

  1. Determine the exact nature of prohibited/ restricted area and stationary ALTRV utilization through direct liaison with the using agency.
  2. Coordinate with the Service Area office during the analysis of area utilization.
  3. The following types of activity are examples of restricted area utilization which often will not require application of separation minima:
  1. Explosives detonation.
  2. Ground firing of various types.
  3. Aircraft operations associated with the above in a safety, observer, or command and control capacity only; i.e., the aircraft is not directly engaging in activity for which the airspace was designated and is operating visual flight rules (VFR).
  1. If area utilization varies between aircraft operations and other types of activity as described above, do not exempt the area from separation requirements unless a significant operational advantage can be obtained.
  2. Restricted airspace with the same number but different letter suffixes are considered to be separate restricted areas. However, treat these types as one restricted area for the purpose of identifying areas for exemption from separation requirements in order to simplify application of separation minima unless a significant operational advantage can be obtained.
  1. SPECIAL AIR TRAFFIC RULES (SATR) AND SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA (SFRA)

The Code of Federal Regulations prescribes special air traffic rules for aircraft operating within the boundaries of certain designated airspace. These areas are listed in 14 CFR Part 93 and can be found throughout the NAS. Procedures, nature of operations, configuration, size, and density of traffic vary among the identified areas.

  1. Special Flight Rules Areas are areas of airspace wherein the flight of aircraft is subject to special air traffic rules set forth in 14 CFR Part 93, unless otherwise authorized by air traffic control. Not all areas listed in 14 CFR Part 93 are Special Flight Rules Areas, but special air traffic rules apply to all areas designated as SFRA.

REFERENCE-

14 CFR Part 93, Special Air Traffic Rules
P/CG Term - SPECIAL AIR TRAFFIC RULES (SATR)
P/CG Term - SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA (SFRA)

  1. Each person operating an aircraft to, from, or within airspace designated as a SATR area or SFRA must adhere to the special air traffic rules set forth in 14 CFR Part 93, as applicable, unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC.
  1. ATC SECURITY SERVICES FOR THE WASHINGTON, DC, SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA (DC SFRA)

ATC security services are designed to support the national security mission of the FAA and other agencies. A designated security services position has area responsibility for the purpose of security service. Such positions do not have airspace jurisdiction and are not ATC operational positions for purposes beyond the scope of this section, for example, transfer of control, communications, point-out, etc.

  1. The OS/CIC must report all instances of loss of radio communication, intermittent transponder or transponder/Mode C failure, the inability to security track aircraft, and other unusual IFR/VFR flight information to the Domestic Events Network (DEN) through the appropriate lines of communication. Some examples are, but are not limited to; suspicious activities, deviation from assigned course/altitude, or other equipment malfunction that may cause an aircraft to operate in an unexpected manner. Relay all known information regarding the aircraft.
  2. ATC Security Services Position: ATC Security Services Position is responsible for providing ATC security services as defined. This position does not provide air traffic control IFR separation or VFR flight following services, but is responsible for providing security services in an area comprising airspace assigned to one or more ATC operating sectors and as such, normal airspace jurisdictional constraints do not apply.
  3. Facility manager must:
  1. Designate in a facility directive which existing position(s) and frequencies will be utilized to provide Security Services when required and the transition procedures from the ATC operational status to the Security Services Position.
  2. Ensure that contingency plan parent and support procedures are updated regarding operational capability level (OCL) changes that affect Special Security Areas.

NOTE-

The requirement to establish an ATC Security Services Position in addition to ATC operating position does not by itself constitute a need for additional staffing nor is its purposes intended to justify or deny facility staffing needs.

  1. When the Security Services position and the ATC Operating position are both staffed, detailed position responsibilities must be defined in the facility directive.

NOTE-

Airspace sectorization and the workload associated with the normal use of that airspace may degrade the ability of an ATC operation position to provide security services. When this occurs, pilots must be held outside of the security services area in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 9-2-1, Aircraft Carrying Dangerous Materials, subparagaph b2.

  1. When an ATC Security Services Position is not separately staffed, the appropriate ATC operating position responsible for that airspace will assume the security service responsibilities.
  2. Requests for ATC services to VFR aircraft operating within the designated area to enter positive controlled airspace must be issued by the appropriate radar position in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, and other applicable directives.
  1. Adjacent Airport Operations.
  1. Aircraft that will enter the designated airspace after departing controlled airports within or adjacent to security areas must be provided security services by the appropriate ATC facility having jurisdiction over the affected airspace. Procedures for handling this situation must be covered in a Letter of Agreement (LOA) or facility directive as appropriate.
  2. Aircraft departing uncontrolled airports within security areas must be handled using procedures contained in a NOTAM or rule designating the area where ATC security services are required.
  1. AIRPORT TRAFFIC PATTERNS
  1. The Service Area Directors of Air Traffic Operations are the focal point to review traffic patterns. Traffic patterns at airports without an operating control tower should be established in accordance with Advisory Circular, AC 90-66, Non-Towered Airport Flight Operations.
  2. FAA Order JO 7400.2, Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, will be the source for handling technical matters pertaining to the establishment or the revision of traffic patterns.
  1. OBSTACLE IDENTIFICATION SURFACES, OBSTACLE FREE ZONES, RUNWAY SAFETY AREAS, APPROACH/ DEPARTURE HOLD AREAS, AND CLEARWAYS
  1. Facility air traffic managers must monitor planned airport construction projects, work with the regional airports office and the airport manager in determining the need to modify any taxi routes normally used, and request notification from the airport manager when adequate signage and marking are completed on the new/different taxi routes, while ensuring that local procedures provide protected airspace from adjacent, nonintersecting runways and taxiways where simultaneous use could create hazards for arriving and departing aircraft. These procedures must be reviewed whenever new runways or taxiways are programmed or whenever new/different aircraft are scheduled to provide service to the airport.
  2. Ensure that aircraft on the ground do not penetrate marked Obstacle Identification Surfaces, Obstacle Free Zones, Runway Safety Areas, Approach/Departure Hold Areas, Clearways, or other airspace designed to provide protection for departures and arrivals.
  3. At locations where potential for conflict exists, take action to rectify the situation by developing proposed solutions and establishing local procedures to define conditions when the Approach/Departure Hold Areas and other surfaces must be protected. These procedures must be included in a facility directive and the signage at the intended hold position must be consistent with the phraseology identified in FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 3-7-2, Taxi and Ground Movement Operations.
  4. ATMs must consult with the airport authority, Flight Standards, Airports, and the Regional Runway Safety Program Manager (RSPM) when developing proposed solutions and establishing local procedures. The RSPM will assist the ATM, as needed, in initiating contact with Flight Standards and Airports.

REFERENCE-

P/CG Term - APPROACH/DEPARTURE HOLD.

  1. FACILITY IDENTIFICATION
  1. Service Area Directors are the focal point to review/approve requests for waivers for facility identification changes in FAA Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-4-19, Facility Identification, subparagraphs a, b, and c. The Flight Service Safety and Operations Group (AJR-B100) is the focal point to review/approve requests for waivers for facility identification changes in FAA Order JO 7110.10, Flight Services, paragraph 11-1-14, Facility Identification, subparagraph f. If the waiver request is approved, the Service Area Director or the Director of Flight Service, as appropriate, must ensure that all aeronautical publications are changed to reflect the new identification and that a Letter to Airmen is published notifying the users of the change.
  2. Service Area Directors must forward a copy of the approval to System Operations Services.
  1. DISPOSITION OF OBSOLETE CHARTS
  1. Obsolete charts may only be disposed of by destroying, including recycling, or by giving to flight schools and other training institutions where the charts are to be used only for training in the classroom. Under no circumstances should obsolete charts be given to pilots or the general public, regardless if they are marked obsolete or not.
  2. There are hundreds of changes that appear on each new edition of a chart. When pilots are given obsolete charts they are not aware of critical changes that have occurred. Further, the use of such a chart could result in a Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) violation or an accident which would have serious legal implications for the agency.
  1. OUTDOOR LASER DEMONSTRATIONS
  1. The Area Directors of Terminal Operations Services are the focal point for reviewing/approving requests for outdoor laser demonstrations.
  2. FAA Order JO 7400.2, Procedures for Handling Airspace Matters, is the source for processing outdoor laser demonstration requests.
  1. COMBINE/RECOMBINE AN ATCT/TRACON

Prior to consideration for any ATCT/TRACON to combine or recombine, a detailed staff study will be required from the facility explaining the benefit to the agency and the customer. After the Terminal Operations Service Area office review, the staff study must be forwarded to the Director of Terminal Planning. A decision to combine or recombine an ATCT/TRACON will require coordination with the ATO Chief Operating Officer.

  1. SUBMISSION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ASSIGNED AIRSPACE (ATCAA) DATA

Air Traffic Service Area offices submit data on all ATCAAs used on a continuing/constant basis, and any subsequent changes to the ATCAA database to System Operations Airspace and Aeronautical Information Management for the purpose of updating the Special Use Airspace Management System (SAMS) and Aeronautical Information System. Include the following as applicable:

  1. Transmittal memorandum containing a brief overview of the ATCAA, and/or changes to, FAA headquarters, and System Operations Airspace and Aeronautical Information Services. Summarize the ATCAAs or any amendments made to ATCAAs including additional changes, etc.
  2. A separate attachment that contains a description of the area to include latitude/longitude points, boundaries, altitudes, times, controlling agency, using agency, and any other relative information.

NOTE-

If only part of the description of an existing area is being amended, the attachment should show just the changed information rather than the full legal description.

  1. A sectional aeronautical chart depicting the final boundaries of the proposed area, including any subdivisions.
  2. Any other information that should be considered by FAA headquarters.

NOTE-

ATCAA descriptive data will normally be submitted 9 weeks prior to the requested/required airspace effective date.

  1. SUBMISSION OF SUA AND PAJA FREQUENCY INFORMATION

The Aeronautical Information Services maintain a national database of Special Use Airspace (SUA) and Parachute Jump Area (PAJA) controlling sector contact information. The database is used to publish frequencies for pilots to obtain status information for SUAs and PAJAs. Facility managers should ensure that the following information is forwarded to Aeronautical Information Services:

  1. Contact frequencies for existing SUAs and PAJAs within your area of jurisdiction.
  2. Any changes to contact frequencies for existing SUAs and PAJAs within your area of jurisdiction.
  3. Contact frequencies for any new SUAs or PAJAs within your area of jurisdiction.
  1. REPORTING UNAUTHORIZED LASER ILLUMINATION OF AIRCRAFT

Consistent with the provisions of Air Traffic Service, Duty and Operational Priorities; all Air Traffic Control facilities, FAA Contract Towers, and Flight Service Stations must report unauthorized laser illumination incidents as follows:

  1. Contact local law enforcement or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as soon as possible providing location, description, and other pertinent information regarding the incident;
  2. Report the incident to the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC);
  3. Record the incident via the Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis and Reporting (CEDAR) program or, if CEDAR is not available, via the appropriate means, in accordance with FAA Order JO 7210.632, Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting;
  4. Provide the following information when reporting the incident via the DEN and CEDAR:
  1. UTC date and time of event.
  2. Call Sign, or aircraft registration number.
  3. Type of aircraft.
  4. Nearest major city.
  5. Altitude.
  6. Location of event (e.g., latitude/longitude and/or Fixed Radial Distance (FRD)).
  7. Brief description of the event.
  8. Any other pertinent information.
  9. Law enforcement contact information.

NOTE-

Facilities without direct access to the DEN should forward the information through the Washington Operations Center Complex (WOCC) to the DEN.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-9-3, Content.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 10-2-14, Unauthorized Laser Illumination of Aircraft.

  1. REPORTING SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT/PILOT ACTIVITIES
  1. Facility air traffic managers must ensure that the operational supervisor/controller-in-charge promptly reports any suspicious aircraft/pilot activities to the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC).

NOTE-

Additional information for ATC on identifying suspicious situations is located in FAA Order JO 7610.4, Special Operations, Chapter 7, Section 3, Suspicious Aircraft/Pilot Activity.

  1. The DEN ATSC must be notified as soon as possible of any suspicious activity, including the following:
  1. Radio communications are lost or not established. Consider any IFR aircraft that is NORDO for more than 5 minutes as suspicious. This includes all aircraft (for example, general aviation, law enforcement, military, medevac) regardless of transponder code. ATC actions taken to establish communications with the NORDO aircraft must be reported to the DEN ATSC.
  2. An aircraft fails to turn on or changes from its assigned transponder beacon code (other than approved emergency/radio failure beacon code).
  3. An aircraft deviates from its assigned route of flight/altitude and refuses to return to it when instructed.
  4. Phantom or inappropriate transmissions such as unusual questions about military activities or sensitive/secure areas.
  5. Inconsistent or abnormal repetitive aircraft activity such as; flights over/near sites of interest or prohibited/restricted airspace, inappropriate speed or rate of climb/descent, or missed crossing restrictions or reporting points.
  6. Pilot reports flight difficulties with no eventual explanation or response to ATC.
  7. Any air carrier, cargo, or scheduled air taxi that requests to divert from its original destination or route for any reason other than weather or routine route changes should be considered by ATC as suspicious activity.
  8. Any general aviation arriving from an international departure point that requests to divert from the original U.S. destination airport.
  9. Other general aviation and non-scheduled air taxi or charter services that request to divert from the original destination or route for any unusual reason (e.g., reasons other than weather, company request, passenger request, mechanical, etc.) should be considered by ATC as suspicious activity.
  10. Any other situation that may indicate a suspicious aircraft, including any reported or observed unauthorized unmanned aircraft activity or remote controlled model aircraft that deviate from normal practice areas/flight activities would be considered suspicious or a safety hazard.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-2, Duty Priority.
Advisory Circular 91-57, Model Aircraft Operating Standards.

  1. Any situation or pilot activity (for example, background noise, change in pilot's voice characteristics, etc.) that may indicate a hijacked aircraft. Due to air to ground communications capabilities (e.g., data links, cellular phones), ATC facilities may learn of a hijack situation from alternate sources (for example, airline air operations center) rather than the aircrew itself.
  1. REPORTING DIVERTED AIRCRAFT ARRIVING FROM INTERNATIONAL LOCATIONS

Any aircraft departing from an international location that diverts to a U.S. Airport, or is diverted and lands at a U.S. airport different from the original U.S. destination airport, must be reported to the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC). In addition, any diverted aircraft that ATC identifies as suspicious (in accordance with paragraph 2-1-30) must be promptly reported to the DEN ATSC.

NOTE-

Weather, airport/runway conditions, or other unforeseen reasons may necessitate an aircraft to divert or be diverted on short notice. Reporting via the DEN assists U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with real-time notification of the airport change.

  1. REPORTING INOPERATIVE OR MALFUNCTIONING ADS-B TRANSMITTERS

FAA Flight Standards Service (AFS), Safety Standards Division is responsible for working with aircraft operators to correct ADS-B malfunctions. Reports of inoperative or malfunctioning ADS-B transmitters must be forwarded to adsbfocusteam@faa.gov and must include the following information:

  1. The aircraft identification used for the flight;
  2. Location of the occurrence;
  3. Date and time of the occurrence (UTC); and
  4. Any additional information or observations that may be pertinent or helpful to AFS in their investigation.

NOTE-

The intent of this paragraph is to capture ADS-B anomalies observed by ATC, such as errors in the data (other than Call Sign Mis-Match events, which are detected and reported to AFS automatically) or instances when civil ADS-B transmissions would normally be expected but are not received (e.g., ADS-B transmissions were observed on a previous flight leg).

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 5-4-2, Requests for Deviation from ADS-B Out Requirements.
FAA Order JO 7210.3, Para 5-4-9, ADS-B Out OFF Operations.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-2-22, Inoperative or Malfunctioning ADS-B Transmitter.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-2-23, ADS-B Alerts.
FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 5-2-24, ADS-B Out OFF Operations.

  1. REPORTING SUSPICIOUS UAS ACTIVITIES

Consistent with the provisions of Air Traffic Service, Duty, and Operational Priorities, all Air Traffic Control facilities, FAA Contract Towers, and Flight Service Stations must report suspicious UAS. Suspicious UAS operations may include operating without authorization; loitering in the vicinity of sensitive locations (e.g., national security and law enforcement facilities and critical infrastructure); or disrupting normal air traffic operations resulting in runway changes, ground stops, pilot evasive action, etc. Reports of a UAS operation alone do not constitute suspicious activity. Development of a comprehensive list of suspicious activities is not possible due to the vast number of situations that could be considered suspicious. ATC must exercise sound judgment when identifying situations that could constitute or indicate a suspicious activity.

  1. Notify local authorities (e.g., airport/local law enforcement; airport operations; and/or the responsible Federal Security Director Coordination Center) in accordance with local facility directives, including Letters of Agreement with the airport owner/operator.
  2. Report the incident to the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC).
  3. Record the incident via the Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis and Reporting (CEDAR) program or, if CEDAR is not available, via the appropriate means, in accordance with FAA Order JO 7210.632, Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting.
  4. Notify the air traffic manager.
  5. Provide the following information when reporting the incident via the DEN and CEDAR:
  1. UTC date and time of incident.
  2. Reporting source(s).
  3. Position: fixed radial distance, bearing and distance, landmark, altitude, and heading.
  4. Flight behavior (i.e., loitering, heading toward the airport).
  5. UAS type (e.g., quadcopter, fixed wing), if known.
  6. Report operational impacts in accordance with paragraph 21-4-1, Domestic Events Network (DEN), of this order.
  1. Attempt to obtain additional information relevant to the suspicious UAS including:
  1. Size and color.
  2. Number of reported/sighted UAS.
  3. Location of the person(s) operating the UAS.
  4. Remote pilot information including name, address, and phone number, if obtained by local law authorities or other verifiable means.
  1. Facilities must maintain a checklist that provides guidance on reporting suspicious UAS activities. At a minimum, this checklist must be available to Operations Supervisor (OS), Controller-in-Charge (CIC), and Operations Manager (OM) personnel. Facilities must consider the following for inclusion on the checklist:
  1. Items a through f of this paragraph.
  2. Contact information necessary for completing the notification requirements of this paragraph.
  3. Local factors that may be necessary in determining if an operation is suspicious (e.g., location of critical infrastructure).
  4. A requirement to notify the Regional Operations Center (ROC) for security-related events that may generate significant media or congressional interest as required by FAA Order JO 1030.3.
  5. Any other information as deemed necessary by the air traffic manager.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-2, Duty Priority.
FAA Order JO 7610.4, Para 7-3-1, Application.
FAA Order JO 1030.3, Initial Event Response, Chapter 2, Upward Notification.
FAA Order JO 7210.632, Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting.
Advisory Circular 91-57B, Exception for Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft.
P/CG Term - SUSPICIOUS UAS.

  1. USE OF UAS DETECTION SYSTEMS

Airport owners/operators or local enforcement may contact ATC facilities to coordinate their acquisition, testing, and operational use of UAS detection systems. These systems and how they are used may have implications for FAA regulations for airports; potentially affect ATC and other Air Navigation Services systems (e.g., RF interference with radars); and/or trigger airport responses (e.g., closing runways), which must be coordinated with ATC.

  1. Requests by airport authorities for ATC facility cooperation/authorization in the acquisition, testing, or use of UAS detection systems will be referred to the appropriate FAA Airports District Office (ADO). The ADO will initiate internal FAA coordination, including reviews by the responsible ATO offices and facilities.
  2. ATC facilities must not enter into any verbal or written agreement with a commercial vendor or an airport authority regarding UAS detection capabilities without prior coordination and approval from HQ-AJT-0.

NOTE-

  1. UAS detection systems do not include the interdiction components that characterize UAS mitigation technologies, also referred to as Counter Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) technologies. Only select Federal Departments and Agencies have the legal authority to use C-UAS systems in the NAS. The FAA does not support the use of this technology by other entities without this legal authorization.
  2. The FAA does not advocate the use of UAS detection in the airport environment until appropriate policy and procedures are developed.
  1. USE OF COUNTER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (C-UAS)

Select Departments and Agencies, which have been legally authorized to use this technology, are operationally using Counter Unmanned Aircraft System systems (C-UAS) in the NAS to protect certain facilities and assets. C-UAS systems are capable of disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of a suspicious UAS, and may integrate or be linked to UAS detection capabilities. These Departments and Agencies are required to coordinate with the FAA to assess and mitigate risks to the NAS posed by these C-UAS systems. These systems and their deployment may affect ATC and other Air Navigation Services systems (e.g., RF interference with radars); which could impact other air traffic in the vicinity including legitimate, compliant UAS flights. Additionally, the C-UAS may involve the response and deployment of ground/airborne operational security assets, which must be coordinated with ATC.

  1. The Joint Air Traffic Operations Command (JATOC) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC) team, which manages the Domestic Events Network (DEN), must notify affected ATC facilities when C-UAS systems are activated.

NOTE-

Only select Federal Departments/Agencies have been legally authorized to utilize C-UAS to cover certain facilities and assets, and with coordination with the FAA to address risks to the NAS. Risk mitigation for the NAS typically includes notification to potentially affected ATC facilities.

  1. The DEN must alert all ATC facilities affected by C-UAS deployment and JATOC National Operations Control Center (NOCC) of any possible operational impacts.
  1. The alerts will focus on real-time reporting regarding possible operational impacts of C-UAS activities providing the affected facilities with heightened awareness to potential flight and equipment anomalies; and will allow the facilities to take actions needed to sustain safe operations.
  2. The alerts must be made via landline communications and must not be broadcast over radios, shout lines, or direct dial lines to air traffic controllers on position.
  3. The affected ATC facilities must not discuss C-UAS operations with any outside entity.
  1. REPORTING DEATH, ILLNESS, OR OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH RISK ON BOARD AIRCRAFT
  1. When an air traffic control facility is advised of a death, illness, and/or other public health risk, the following information must be forwarded to the DEN:
  1. Call sign.
  2. Number of suspected cases of illness on board.
  3. Nature of the illness or other public health risk, if known.
  4. Number of persons on board.
  5. Number of deaths, if applicable.
  6. Pilot's intent (for example, continue to destination or divert).
  7. Any request for assistance (for example, needing emergency medical services to meet the aircraft at arrival).

NOTE-

  1. If the ATC facility is not actively monitoring the DEN or does not have a dedicated line to the DEN, they must call into the DEN directly via 844-432-2962 (toll free).
  2. Except in extraordinary circumstances, such as a situation requiring ATC intervention, follow-on coordination regarding the incident will not involve ATC frequencies.
  3. The initial report to a U.S. ATC facility may be passed from a prior ATC facility along the route of flight.
  1. Once notification of an in-flight death, illness, and/or other public health risk is provided by an ATC facility, the DEN Air Traffic Security Coordinator must ensure the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) receives the following information:
  1. Call sign.
  2. Number of suspected cases of illness on board.
  3. Nature of the illness or other public health risk, if known.
  4. Number of persons on board.
  5. Number of deaths, if applicable.
  6. Departure airport.
  7. Arrival airport.
  8. Estimated time of arrival.
  9. Pilot's intent (for example, continue to destination or divert).
  10. Any request for assistance (for example, a need for emergency medical services to meet aircraft at arrival).

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 10-2-19, Reporting Death, Illness, or Other Public Health Risk on Board Aircraft.

  1. OPPOSITE DIRECTION OPERATIONS

Opposite Direction Operations consists of IFR/VFR Operations conducted to the same or parallel runway where an aircraft is operating in a reciprocal direction of another aircraft arriving, departing, or conducting an approach.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 1-2-2, Course Definitions.

  1. Each facility must:
  1. Determine the operational feasibility of conducting opposite direction operations.
  2. At a minimum, develop the opposite direction operations procedures necessary to accommodate aircraft that have an operational need or receiving operational priority.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 2-1-4, Operational Priority.

  1. For aircraft receiving IFR services that are conducting opposite direction operations to the same runway, facility directives must:
  1. Define minimum cutoff points identified by distance or fixes between:
  1. An arrival and a departure.
  2. An arrival and an arrival.
  1. Specify that use of Visual Separation is not authorized, except at those unique locations that are operationally impacted by terrain and when issued a Letter of Authorization by the Service Area Director of Operations.
  2. Require traffic advisories to both aircraft.

EXAMPLE-

OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC (distance) MILE FINAL, (type aircraft). OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC DEPARTING RUNWAY (number), (type aircraft). OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC, (position), (type aircraft).

  1. Require the use of a memory aid.
  2. Prohibit opposite direction same runway operations with opposing traffic inside the applicable cutoff point unless an emergency situation exists.
  3. Specify the position/facility responsible for ensuring compliance with cutoff points between aircraft conducting opposite direction operations.
  4. Contain the following minimum coordination requirements:
  1. Define the facility/position that is responsible for initiating coordination.
  2. All coordination must be on a recorded line and state “Opposite Direction.” Initial coordination must include call sign, type, and arrival or departure runway.
  1. The cutoff points established under subparagraph b1 must ensure that required lateral separation exists:
  1. When a departing aircraft becomes airborne and has been issued a turn to avoid conflict; or
  2. When the first aircraft has crossed the runway threshold for opposite direction arrivals.
  3. If the conditions in subparagraphs c1 and c2 are not met, facility directives must require action be taken to ensure that control instructions are issued to protect the integrity of the cutoff points.
  1. At a minimum, the following must be considered when developing cutoff points:
  1. Aircraft performance.
  2. Type of approach.
  3. Operational position configuration.
  4. Runway configuration.
  5. Weather conditions.
  6. Existing facility waivers.
  1. For aircraft receiving IFR services that are conducting opposite direction operations to parallel runways regardless of the distance between centerlines, facility directives must:
  1. Ensure that a turn away from opposing traffic is issued when opposing traffic is inside the cutoff points defined in b1 for the other runway.
  2. Specify that use of Visual Separation is authorized once a turn away from opposing traffic is issued.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 7-2-1, Visual Separation.

  1. Require traffic advisories to both aircraft.

EXAMPLE-

OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC (distance) MILE FINAL, (type aircraft). OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC DEPARTING RUNWAY (number), (type aircraft). OPPOSITE DIRECTION TRAFFIC, (position), (type aircraft).

  1. Require the use of a memory aid.
  2. Contain the following minimum coordination requirements:
  1. Define the facility/position that is responsible for initiating coordination.
  2. All coordination must be on a recorded line and state “Opposite Direction.” Initial coordination must include call sign, type, and arrival or departure runway.
  3. At those locations that routinely conduct Opposite Direction Operations due to noise abatement at night and when issued a Letter of Authorization by the Service Area Director of Operations, the provisions of paragraph e5 above are not required.
  1. For VFR aircraft that are conducting opposite direction operations to same or parallel runways, facility directives must contain procedures requiring the use of the following, including but not limited to:
  1. Ensuring departing VFR aircraft are issued a turn to avoid conflict with opposing IFR/VFR traffic.
  2. Traffic advisories to both aircraft.
  3. State the phrase “opposite direction” if coordination is required.
  4. Memory Aids.
  1. All facility directives and letters of agreement addressing opposite direction operations must be approved by the Service Area Director of Operations.

REFERENCE-

FAA Order JO 7110.65, Para 3-8-4, Simultaneous Opposite Direction Operation.

  1. SPECIAL INTEREST SITES
  1. Supervisory/CIC personnel receiving any reports or information regarding unusual aircraft activities in the vicinity of special interest sites such as nuclear power plants, power plants, dams, refineries, etc., must immediately notify local law enforcement authorities of these reports/information and notify the overlying air traffic facility of any of these reports and the action taken. Supervisory/CIC personnel may receive reports/information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or other sources.
  2. Air traffic facilities must promptly advise the Domestic Events Network (DEN) of any actions taken in accordance with this paragraph.
  3. Individual facilities must determine which special interest sites, if any, should be displayed on maps, charts, and video displays.
  1. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND FAA JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES

The requirements for Air Traffic Managers (ATM) to follow during security events, according to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the FAA Joint Operating Procedures Agreement, are as follows:

  1. If the TSA Federal Security Director (FSD) informs the ATM of an imminent and potentially life threatening security situation, the ATM, consistent with safety, must comply with the FSD's requested operational response. As soon as possible after action is taken, the ATM must contact the Domestic Events Network (DEN) Air Traffic Security Coordinator (ATSC) and report any action taken.
  2. The above guidance does not preclude the ATM from taking immediate action in the event the ATM learns of an imminent and potentially life threatening security situation. In such situations, as soon as possible, the ATM must notify the DEN ATSC and the FSD of the situation, along with any action taken.

NOTE-

For information concerning reporting of suspicious activities around airports and FAA facilities, see JO 7210.3, paragraph 2-7-6, Suspicious Activities Around Airports or FAA Facilities.

  1. For any security situation identified by TSA, in addition to those that are “imminent and life threatening,” the ATM must contact the DEN ATSC and the FSD to report the situation.
  2. At airports that have both an FAA and TSA presence, the ATM and FSD must meet at least every 6 months, or within sixty days of a new ATM or FSD entering into their position, to exchange/update contact information and to discuss security-related information and plans of mutual interest.
  3. The responsibilities outlined in this paragraph may be delegated as necessary.
  1. DISPLAYING SPACE LAUNCH AND REENTRY AREAS ON THE SITUATION DISPLAY

Facility ATMs must develop a means to ensure that volumes of airspace depicted on an operational situation display for space launch and reentry operations are verified to be accurate.

  1. DISPLAYING DEBRIS RESPONSE AREAS ON THE SITUATION DISPLAY

Facility ATMs must develop a means to ensure that, when possible, debris response areas (DRA) are displayable on operational situation displays at the start of a launch or reentry window.

NOTE-

The intent of this requirement is to allow controllers to quickly display a DRA if it is activated. If technical limitations prevent the DRA from being drawn on the operational situation display in advance of a space operation, such as if the DRA would cover an entire sector or facility, then an alternative means of providing the needed geographic area of the DRA to the controller must be used. This could be accomplished using the TSD, a paper map, or some other means.