The Biden-Harris Administration’s FY 2025 FAA budget proposal calls for a dedicated capital investment of $8 billion over the next five years to replace aging facilities and modernize 377 critical radar systems that average 36 years of age. 

Structural deficiencies and maintenance-related issues are becoming more frequent and apparent. Aging radars add risk to the system. Older radar systems require more frequent repairs, leading to increased costs and periods when the system is not operational. This increases the risk of delayed or cancelled flights.

Modernizing radar systems will enhance the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System by:

• Helping the flying public avoid costly and inconvenient delays.
• Reducing costs through the consolidation of radar systems.
• Continuing support for Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security missions.
• Continuing support for General Aviation pilots.
• Providing increased cybersecurity capabilities. 

Background 

The FAA oversees a vast network of air traffic control facilities and a sophisticated network of 618 radar systems which are  essential detection and monitoring tools for air traffic controllers.  The FAA owns and operates short-range radar surveillance systems across the national airspace system, comprised of “cooperative radars” which identify and track aircraft with the help of on-board aircraft transponders, and “non-cooperative radars” which identify and track an aircraft’s position independently, without the use of on-board transponders.  

Radars play a critical role in NAS operations. Indeed, the NAS would not operate without radars. There are two main reasons why radars are still an essential part of the National Airspace System: 

First, certain National Airspace System users are not equipped with the kind of avionics needed for the satellite based Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) aviation surveillance technology. These users, which include significant portions of general aviation, as well as law enforcement and the Department of Defense, are dependent on FAA radars.

Second, the safety and security of our airspace depends on resiliency.  Radars work together with satellite technology for the safety and security of our airspace.

Why were radar systems at the top of the FAA needs list?

• Modern radar systems to be funded through the Facility Replacement and Radar Modernization (FRRM) program will address the operational sustainment risk posed by the old obsolete systems. All cooperative radars (up to 343) and 34 (of 230) non-cooperative will be modernized – this is 60% of the FAA’s radar portfolio.
• The new systems will address shortfalls not met by the current systems sustainment strategy.   Modern systems provide a more cost-effective architecture by consolidating the five cooperative and three non-cooperative radar baselines into one version of each.  This would reduce separate redundant maintenance, management, training, and supply support activities and personnel costs for the next 20+ years of operation.  
• Radar systems top the FAA needs list due to the criticality of the surveillance data for operation of the NAS, the lack of recent radar investment and resulting operational sustainment risk. 
• Radar systems remain a critical and necessary part of the NAS as ADS-B did not eliminate the need for radar.  The FAA’s ADS-B Out 2020 mandate does not require all aircraft operating in the NAS to be equipped with ADS-B Out cooperative avionics outside of the highest-density airspace.  It also doesn’t apply to the Defense Department (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other government missions.
• The lack of radar system replacement over the last 20 years has led to more   unscheduled radar outages, greater time to restore services and higher sustainment costs, diverting limited operational support personnel and funding from other FAA systems. The outages are becoming more common and increasing in duration, causing air traffic delays, impacting the ability of general aviation pilots to fly, and impeding law enforcement and defense missions. 
• By replacing a large part of our infrastructure, we can reduce how many types of radars in the system, down from ten to perhaps as few as four, thus cutting future maintenance and repair costs, and allowing the FAA to invest in more advanced radar technology.

Examples of impacts to passenger operations during a radar outage in conjunction with a satellite/GPS outage:

• An unscheduled cooperative radar outage impacted air traffic at Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) (ZMA) and Jacksonville ARTCC (ZJX) resulting in significant aircraft delays.  Identical unscheduled outages at three other radar facilities impacted air traffic at Washington Center (ZDC), New York Center (ZNY), and Cleveland Center. 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) anomalies impacted air traffic in the Dallas and Denver areas. This impact was limited only because the cooperative and non-cooperative radars remained in operation. If these radars were not operational due to an unscheduled outage, these GPS events would likely have resulted in a days-long delays at DFW and Denver, affecting thousands of flights).

These two real world examples above demonstrate the potential for concrete impact to operations if we have simultaneous GPS and radar outages.

Example of impacts to security and law enforcement operations in the case of a radar outage:

• DoD, DHS and law enforcement aircraft typically operate with an aircraft’s cooperative avionics turned off to avoid detection and tracking by nefarious actors. The non-cooperative radars are the only means to detect those aircraft and provide the air traffic control (ATC) services for those critical missions. Radar outages negatively impact the ATC services available for those missions, impacting operational safety.  With radars -- not satellites and GPS -- being used to  track these operations and provide air traffic services, any unexpected radar outage will result in ATC  being unable to see these aircraft and support their mission.
• Radar outages negatively impact DoD national defense and DHS boarder security and law enforcement missions. When these systems are not operational, nefarious operators can identify the lack of radar transmissions and take advantage of this vulnerability.