Develop Security Test Plans and Procedures (k)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Solution Implementation

Description

The security controls developed for a new information system must be tested and evaluated prior to deployment to ensure that the controls are working properly and are effective. Some types of security controls (primarily those controls of a non-technical nature) cannot be tested and evaluated until the information system is deployed - these are typically management, technical and operation level controls. For these security controls that can be assessed prior to deployment, a security test plan and test result report is developed. This plan guides the security testing and evaluation of the security controls for that system.

Security testing should confirm that the assumptions in the system security requirements have been implemented as assumed and that the total set of security controls are adequate to reduce the residual risks to an acceptable level.

If possible, an independent third-party should be involved in the testing of the security controls on the system. This test should give an unbiased view of the system and find vulnerabilities that may have been overlooked previously.

Tasks

• Develop Security Test Plan and Test Results Report document
• Develop Security Test procedures
• Review the latest Security Controls for that system
• Test the system
• Bring in an independent third party to perform additional testing
• Update the Security Test Plan and Test Result Report based on results of the tests

Resources

• NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle
• NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems
• FAA's ISS Handbook
• ATO - Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAP)

Update the ISSP (j)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Solution Implementation

Description

Why do we need the Information Systems Security Plan (ISSP):

FISMA requires the FAA to have ISSP for the information security programs to assure the adequate information security for networks, facilities, information systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate. The ISSP is required for every FAANAS or non-NAS system. The preparation of ISSP for an information system ensures that the required security controls (planned or in place) are fully documented. The key attachments may include the references to documents supporting the FAA's information security program within the System Certification and Authorizations Package (SCAP).

What does the ISSP do:

The ISSP identifies the information system components; operational environment; sensitivity and risks; and detailed, cost-effective measures to protect a system or group of systems. The ISSP objective is to fulfill one of the final components of the SCAP document required within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, Appendix III, and by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235). The existence of, and adherence to, an ISSP is one of the fundamental requirements for the SCAP.

What is the content of the ISSP:

The following FAA documents, Systems Engineering Manual (SEM) Section 4.8, ISS Handbook, and Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide to review the detailed information toward the preparation of ISSP. Also check for latest updates of what the contents should include. The structure is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems.

Consider including these following information to the ISSP:

• System Identification
• System Environment
• Sensitivity of Information Handled
• Management Controls (Risk Assessment, Review of Security Controls, Rules of Behavior, Life Cycle Security Planning, Accreditation/Authorization)
• Operational Controls (Personnel, Physical, Hardware and Software Maintenance Controls, Integrity Controls, Documentation, Security Awareness and Training, Incident Response Capability)
• Technical Controls

ISSP Maintenance requirements:

The ISSP must be maintained throughout the entire system life cycle. It is considered complete when the selected controls are tested and the designated authorized FAA official signs the final SCAP. The ISSP is routinely updated on annual or every three years as part of the SCAP process or earlier to reflect significant changes that may impact the system's security posture. A recertification of the SCAP documents may be required depending on the level of impact to the FAANAS or non-NAS systems.

Tasks

• Finalize the determination of whether it is for the NAS or non-NAS system
• Determine the update requirements based on the level of impact to the NAS or non-NAS system; annual, once every three years or recertification

Resources

• OMB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, Appendix III, Security of Federal Automated Information Resources
• 44 USC 35, Subchapter II, Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
• Public Law 106-398, Government Information Security Reform Act of 2000 (GISRA)
• NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle
• NIST Special Publication 800-27, Engineering Principles for IT Security
• NIST Special Publication 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems
• FAA's ISS Handbook
• FAA — Systems Engineering Manual (SEM)
• ATO — Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAPs)

Integrate Security Architecture and Design (i)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Solution Implementation

Description

The security architecture and design have a significant impact on the system's vulnerabilities and testing. A good design includes the testability as criteria. Having the proper security architecture provides a framework for cost-effective development of the security services by reducing the security impact of developing systems and services with unknown security properties. Security architecture and design should include techniques (encapsulation and isolation) and mechanisms (DMZs, and firewalls) to mitigate the vulnerabilities and risks and the cost of ST&E.

Security architectures that integrate countermeasures or controls should be considered. These countermeasures or controls include point solutions for individual networks (firewalls and intrusion detection systems [IDS]), security information management (SIM) systems, and SIM integration with a secure network management (SNM) system.

Tasks

• Configure the operating system and applications with proper allocated security controls or policies
• Provide physical and personnel security to support the access controls to the systems
• Develop Management, Operational and/or Technical controls to mitigate the listed security risks

Resources

• FAA Order 1370.82A, Information Systems Security Program
• FAAs Systems Engineering Manual (SEM)
• ATO — Information Systems security Architecture (ISSA). Latest version

Update CONOPS and Security Requirements (g)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Solution Implementation

Description

After the risk and vulnerability assessment has been updated, it is time to update the CONOPS and more specifically define the security requirements. There is no such single security CONOPS document. The CONOPS document is written to communicate the overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to the stakeholders (user, buyer, developer, and other organizational elements). Therefore, as new risks and vulnerabilities are defined for the system, the CONOPS needs to be updated so all of the stakeholders are aware of the new issues. The CONOPS aids in the requirements capturing and communicates the need to the developing program office. Since the high level requirements (including security) are also part of the CONOPS, the security requirements needs to be updated to reflect the issues addressed in the updated Risk and Vulnerability Assessment.

The CONOPS describes the user's operational needs without delving into technical details. It provides a mechanism for expressing ideas and concerns on possible solution strategies and builds consensus among user groups, acquisition organizations, and developers.

The CONOPS document is a means of bringing together people, policy, and technology.

Tasks

• Review the updated Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report in the SCAP
• Ensure that the CONOPS and Security Requirements reflect the results of the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
• Update the CONOPS and Security Requirements and forward the updates to the requirements team

Resources

• NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Lifecycle
• FAA System Engineering Manual
• NAS SR-1000, security section

Integrate Initial Security Needs and Threat Stipulation into the MNS (a)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Mission Analysis >>> Service Analysis

Description

The needs determination is the evaluation of the capacity of an organization's assets to satisfy existing and emerging demands. The traditional components of needs determination are establishing a basic system idea, preliminary requirements definition, feasibility assessment, technology assessment, and a formal approval to investigate further. The same holds true for security needs.

The list below provides an example of the perceived threats to the NAS:

• Intrusion or unauthorized access to system resources
• Insertion of malicious code, software/hardware, or database modification
• Exploitation of known software weaknesses
• Corruption by system, system errors, or failures
• User abuse or fraud
• Inadvertent acts of carelessness
• Natural disasters
• Saturation of communications or resources
• Theft, sabotage, vandalism, or physical intrusion
• Physical cable cuts
• Jamming (telecomm)
• Installation errors
• Eavesdropping or shoulder surfing
• Data entry errors or omissions
• Misrepresentation of identity/impersonation
• Environmental conditions
• Improper disposal of sensitive media

Note: During this early phase of the system's development, the security needs determination will give better understanding of the Information Systems Security assurance requirements. The security implications of alternatives should also be considered during the Concept & Requirements Definition (CRD) lifecycle phase. In this stage you must locate your Certification Lead (CL) and Information System Security Officer (ISSO) within your program office. They may assist and guide you through your determination level of efforts on the security activities that result in the overall development of the SCAP document. If there is an SCAP for the existing system then do either an annual update or the re-SCAP. Review the document, ATO - Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAPs) and consult with your program office for this activity.

Tasks

• Locate your Program Office CL and ISSO
• Review and become familiar with the Resources listed below
• Review the document ATO - Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAPs) for overall information
• Determine the security needs of the program
• Trade studies to find most appropriate possible solutions

Resources

• Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive - 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
• OMB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Systems, Appendix III
• 44 USC 35, Subchapter II, Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
• Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), PL 107-347, Title III
• FAA Order 1370.82A, Information Systems Security Program
• NIST Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security - The NIST Handbook
• NIST Special Publication 800-14, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-23, Guidelines to Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and Acquisition - Use of Tested/Evaluated Products
• NIST Special Publication 800-27, Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security (A Baseline For Achieving Security)
• NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-35, Guide to Information Technology Security Services
• NIST Special Publication 800-36, Guide to Selecting Information Technology Security Products
• NIST Special Publication 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-51, Use of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Vulnerability Naming Scheme
• NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-55, Security Metrics for Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories
• NIST Special Publication 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
• NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle
• FIPS Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
• FIPS Publication 199 - Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems
• FAA Systems Engineering Manual (SEM)
• FAA Acquisition System Toolset (FAST)
• NAS SR-1000, security section
• ATO - Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAPs)
• ATO - Information Systems security Architecture (ISSA). Latest version
• FAAISS Handbook

Begin Service Analysis (SA) for AMS decision point: #1

(Start: Service Analysis activities for the Mission Needs Decision (MND))

Note: The symbol "*" indicates that the FAA firewall access is required to view this link.

Review

• FAAFASTAMS Lifecycle Phases and Decisions guidance website:
  • Service Analysis (SA)
  • Mission Need Decision (MND)
  • ISS policy guidance listed in the ATOISS Program Library website.
    • FAA Orders 1370.82A, "Information Systems Security Program"*
  • ISS Engineering
    • AMS Lifecycle Management Process with ISSE related activities

Initiate

• Service Level Mission Need (SLMN) Threat Stipulation and basic security policy.
  • Integrating Initial Security Needs and Threat Stipulation into the SLMN (a)

Deliverable(s)

1. Statement of security policy and threat environment stipulation incorporated into the SLMN.

End SA for AMS decision point: #1

Develop CONOPS and Preliminary Security Requirements (b)

AMS Lifecycle Phase: Mission Analysis >>> Concept & Requirement Definition (CRD)

Description

The system's Concept of Operations (CONOPs) can be used for presenting the results of the needs determination and requirements analysis. As the system's CONOPs become more recognized, improved communication among stakeholders can occur because a more standardized approach is in use. Particularly, communication of security specifications to potential offerors can be greatly enhanced.

Further, a system CONOPs acts as a record of the security analysis performed during the mission analysis phase. It provides a place to record the threats that are being considered, the security objectives that are being pursued, and the actual security specifications as they are created. The CONOPs should be viewed as an "evolving" document that records the security analysis performed during the course of the requirements generation process.

The CONOPS should contain the following:

• A clear statement of the goals and objectives
• The strategies, tactics, policies, and constraints that describe how security will effect the program
• The organizations, activities, and interactions that describe who will participate and what these stakeholders do in that process
• A clear statement of the responsibilities and authority of the roles played in the process
• The specific operational processes, in overview fashion, that provide a process model in terms of when and in what order these operation processes take place, including such things as dependencies and concurrencies
• Processes for initiating the program, developing the products and components, maintenance of the products, and components, and possibly for retirement of the program and its products and components

The CONOPS should relate a narrative of the process to be followed. It must define the roles of the various stakeholders involved in the process. The CONOPS is not intended to be an implementation or transition plan since it does not provide managers with the detailed steps involved in planning for the transition: establishing accountability, managing risk, scheduling, and budgeting. However, it does offer a clear methodology to realize the goals and objectives of the approach to software development/acquisition of core assets and systems.

The security requirements for enterprise systems should address the following issues:

• the system should not create vulnerabilities or unintended interdependencies in other enterprise systems
• the system should not decrease the availability of other enterprise systems
• the system should not decrease the overall security posture of the entire enterprise
• systems connected to external domains must analyze and attempt to counter hostile actions originating from these domains
• security specifications should be appropriate for the given state of the system
• security specifications should be stated clearly to convey the desired functions and assurances to the enterprise system product team and the developers
• implement specifications that sufficiently reduce the risks to the enterprise system and to the enterprise mission that the system supports

There are six steps in the development of security requirements. The process is outlined below:

Note: The security implications of alternatives are considered in this stage. It is based on the requirements need of the NAS system assessed while it was derived from the security section of the NAS SR-1000.

Tasks

• Meet with stakeholders to ascertain the technical and programmatic security requirements
• Develop, evaluate and select from the list of alternatives
• Develop a preliminary list of security requirements based on the MNS and the selected alternative during the CRD

Resources

• NIST Special Publication 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Lifecycle
• NAS SR-1000, security section

Update Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (f)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Solution Implementation

Description

The updated vulnerability and risk assessment is a continuation of the preliminary vulnerability and risk assessment activities. At this stage, more details are known about the system, therefore a more accurate vulnerability and risk assessment is performed. The idea at this stage is to review the preliminary vulnerability and risk assessment to determine if new threats and vulnerabilities exist and that previously identified vulnerability-threat pairs are still valid.

At this stage, risk mitigation strategies in the ISSP are also put into place. After the risks have been identified, countermeasures or security controls must be applied to mitigate these risks. These countermeasures or security controls are Management, Operational or Technical controls. For example, the countermeasures or security controls may be either adding and or setting the attributes to the firewalls, filtering routers, virus protection, and or other available countermeasures. Other countermeasures or security controls as listed within the FAA are to be considered for the mitigation. For these risks it is essential to have solid policies and procedures to counter these threats. A determination must be made based on the requirements of a given system as to what countermeasures or security controls must be allocated. These countermeasures will be the basis of the Risk Mitigation/Remediation listed in the plan that is to be included in the SCAP.

Tasks

• Refine the security requirements checklist
• Review the POAMS and the information from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Enterprise Security Portal (ESP)
• Gather more detailed information on the system's processing environment
• Review industry sources to identify application and hardware specific vulnerabilities
• Review the previously identified threats to and vulnerabilities in the information system to ensure they are still valid
• Identify any new threats and vulnerabilities that have developed
• Identify the potential impact or magnitude of harm that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability would have on the assets
• Identify and analyze the security controls for the information system

Resources

• NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems
• NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems
• NIST National Vulnerability Database
• Department of Transportation (DOT) Enterprise Security Portal (ESP)
• ATO Information Systems Security Program Implementation Guide (SCAPs)
• ATO Information Systems security Architecture (ISSA). Latest version
• FAA's ISS Handbook

Begin Initial Investment Analysis (IIA) for AMS decision point: #3

(Start:OMB Exhibit 300 Attachment 2 for the Initial Investment Decision (IID))

Review

• FAAFASTAMS Lifecycle Phases and Decisions guidance website
  • Investment Analysis (IA)
  • Investment Decision (ID)
• FAAFASTISS Flow Chart of the IIA section
• Security engineering activities
  • FAA Information Systems Security (ISS) Engineering Process

Update

• CONOPS of system.
• ISS section of the Preliminary Requirements. (pPR document).
  • Apply 800-53.
    • Tailor 800-53 security requirements to your acquisitions.

Generate

• Basis of Estimates (BOE) on security cost estimates for alternatives.
• SCAP with your Service Unit/Service Area Certification Team Lead.
• The preliminary Information System Security Plan, (ISSP).
  • "Develop the Preliminary ISSP (Including Basic Security Policy)" (c)
    • NISTSP 800-18, "Guide for Developing Security plans for Federal Information Systems" (February 2006)
• Preliminary System Characterization/Categorization.
  • Develop Systems Characterization/Categorization (d)
  • FIPS-199
  • 800-53 controls.
• Preliminary vulnerability and risk assessment.
  • Developing Preliminary Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (e)
    • NISTSP 800-30, "Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems"

Deliverable(s)

1. BOE on security cost estimates for alternatives.
2. OMB Exhibit 300, Attachment 2: Business Case Analysis Report (BCAR)
3. Updated OMB Exhibit 300, Attachment 1: (pPR)
   • Requirements for the ISS section of the (pPR) to include the 800-53 controls.
4. Preliminary vulnerability and risk assessment.
5. Preliminary SCAPs document
   • Preliminary ISSP with security policy statement.
   • Preliminary System Characterization/Categorization.

End IIA for AMS decision point: #3

Develop Preliminary Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (e)

AMS Lifecycle Phase:Investment Analysis >>> Initial Investment Analysis

Description

Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the physical layout, organization, procedures, personnel, management, administration, hardware, or software that may be exploited to cause harm to system. The goal of the preliminary vulnerability assessment is to develop a list of system vulnerabilities (flaws or weaknesses) that could be exploited by a potential threat. For new systems, the search for vulnerabilities should focus on security policies, planned procedures, system requirements definitions, and security product analysis. For operational systems, analyze technical and procedural security features and controls used to protect the system. Vulnerability analysis encompasses the following five security control areas:

• Technical - hardware, software, system architecture, and modes of communication
• Operational - procedures that people perform with respect to an information system
• Administrative - weak countermeasures in the administrative procedures that affect information systems
• Physical - weak countermeasures in the physical layout of, and access to, facilities and enclosures where automated information systems are housed
• Personnel - weak countermeasures in policy, process, and procedures used for security screening of staff having access to the system

After analyzing the technical, operational, administrative, physical, and personnel controls on the system, the vulnerabilities are paired with specific threats to create a set of vulnerability-threat pairs. The next step is to analyze vulnerability-threat pairs and to identify and determine which existing system countermeasures reduce or mitigate specific vulnerabilities. This is the beginning of the risk assessment process.

Risk can be thought of as the combination of the severity of vulnerability and the likelihood that the vulnerability will be exploited.

R = L * I

Where R is the Risk, L is the Likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited and I is the Impact (or severity) of exploiting the vulnerability. The result of this combination is a risk rating. Risks can then be mitigated based on the overall risk rating. The table below is used when determining whether a risk is low, medium, or high. All high-level risks should be mitigated before medium or low level risks. Once all high risks have been mitigated, additional risks can be mitigated, based on schedule, funds, and ability of mitigation to mediate the risk(s).

The preliminary risk assessment should result in a brief initial description of the basic security needs of the system. In practice, the need for information security protection is expressed in terms of the need for integrity, availability, and confidentiality and other security needs that may be applicable (accountability, non-repudiation). Integrity can be examined from several perspectives. From a user's or application owner's perspective, integrity is the quality of data that is based on attributes such as accuracy and completeness. From a system's or operation's perspective, integrity is the quality of data that it is only changed in an authorized manner or that the system/software/process does what it is supposed to do and nothing more. Like integrity, availability also has a multipart definition. Availability is the state when data or a system is in the place needed by the user, at the time the user needs it, and in the form needed by the user. Confidentiality is the privacy, secrecy, or nondisclosure of information except to authorized individuals.

A preliminary risk assessment should define the threat environment in which the product or system will operate. This assessment is followed by an initial identification of required security controls that must be met to protect the product/system in the intended operational environment. The risk-based approach to information security is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems.

The risk assessment should be done before the approval of design specifications. The preliminary risk assessment may not be a large and complex document; however, it should take into account existing controls and their effectiveness. The risk assessment should identify any deficiencies in t eh analysis of integrity, confidentiality, and availability requirements or the security assurance requirements analysis by demonstrating the logical conclusion of the analyses.

The preliminary vulnerability and risk assessments should be combined into one final document that addresses the systems vulnerabilities and risks. At the completion of this step, the Product Team will have a general understanding of the security issues facing the system. As more details are known about the system, an updated vulnerability and risk assessment can be completed to uncover new areas of risk to the system.

Tasks

• Gather information on the system's processing environment
• Review the POAMS and the information from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Enterprise Security Portal (ESP)
• Review industry sources to identify application and hardware specific vulnerabilities
• Identify the threats to and vulnerabilities in the information system
• Identify the potential impact or magnitude of harm that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability would have on assets
• Identify and analyze the security controls for the information system

Resources

• NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems
• NIST National Vulnerability Database
• Department of Transportation (DOT) Enterprise Security Portal (ESP)
• FAA's ISS Handbook