Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide clarity on the FAA's management of the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system, share details on recent events, and explain our efforts to modernize the NOTAM system.

Today is also an opportunity to discuss the modernization needs of the national airspace system overall, some of the challenges we face, and some of the opportunities on the horizon. 

We are experiencing the safest period in aviation history, but we do not take that for granted. Recent events remind us that we cannot become complacent and that we must continually invest in our aviation system. 

NOTAM Service Interruption and Response

I know we are here to discuss the challenges we experienced with our NOTAM system last month, so I want to provide a brief background about what we know so far.

Late on January 10, NOTAM applications and services became unreliable.  Technical experts attempted to address the issue by, among other things, switching to a backup database. While technical experts worked through the night, the FAA activated a hotline to provide real-time status updates to airspace users. During this time, there were no reports of operational impacts.

In the early morning hours of January 11, the system appeared to have been restored, but formatting issues persisted. To resolve this, FAA’s air traffic leadership directed the rebuild of the databases.

As the morning air traffic rush approached, and work on the system continued, I ordered a ground stop at approximately 7:15 a.m. EST, pausing all departures in the United States in order to maintain safety and preserve predictability. I did so after consulting with the airlines and safety experts. Once resiliency testing on the system was conducted, I lifted the ground stop at 9:07 a.m. EST.

The FAA’s preliminary findings are that contract personnel unintentionally deleted files while working to correct synchronization between the live primary database and a backup database. We have found no evidence of a cyber-attack or other malicious intent.

After the incident, we implemented a synchronization delay to ensure that bad data from one database cannot affect a backup database. Additionally, we have implemented a new protocol that requires more than one individual to be present and engaged in oversight when work on the database occurs.

As our review of the root causes of this incident continues, please know that the FAA will keep the Committee apprised of our findings.

NAS Modernization 

As you are well aware, 2023 will be a big year for aviation. Our current authorization expires on September 30th, and there is sustained energy from both industry and government around the development of ideas and proposals to modernize the NAS and the FAA’s approach to managing it. As we delve into that reauthorization process, there are several important points we would like to highlight for the Committee.

Right now, the FAA is managing three airspace systems to serve the diverse users of the NAS. The first is the classic or legacy system that many users still count on.

The second is the system that relies on the next generation of technology for improved communication, navigation, and surveillance. The FAA has operationalized the foundational pieces of this system, and we continue to deploy additional services as operator equipage and federal resources allow.

The third is the future—a future that has already arrived. It is the system that must accommodate new entrants in all their forms, including drones, advanced air mobility aircraft, commercial spacecraft, and other new aircraft yet to be imagined.

For us to sustain, implement, and plan for all of these systems, we have a lot of work ahead. We look forward to partnering with the Committee to ensure that the FAA’s oversight and regulation of the NAS continue to deliver the level of aviation safety and efficiency expected by the American public.

Call to Action

Before we get to questions, I wanted to take a moment to acknowledge some of the recent incidents we have seen throughout the system. I am sure that you and the public have seen some of the news reports about close calls on runways and other operational events.

Because I want to make sure we are giving the right amount of attention to all of these recent occurrences, I am 
forming a safety review team to examine the U.S. aerospace system’s structure, culture, processes, systems, and integration of safety efforts.

The initial focus will be to hold a Safety Summit to examine what additional actions the aviation community needs to take to maintain our safety record. A group of commercial and general aviation leaders, labor partners, and others will examine which mitigations are working and why others appear to be not as effective as they once were.

I can say without reservation that the aviation professionals who comprise the American aerospace industry are proud of our safety record. But we all know that complacency has no place in air transportation -- whether it’s on the flight deck, in the control tower, the ramp or the dispatch center.

We are confident that we are taking the right steps here, and we look forward to working with the Committee and this Congress in developing a long-term FAA reauthorization bill that accelerates the next era of aviation—one that is safe, efficient, sustainable, and open to all.